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Exploring participation and non-
participation in the 2010/11 student
protests against fees and cuts
Thesis abstract
This research project uses the 2010/11 student protests in the UK as a case study to
understand why certain individuals mobilise for forms of political participation and activism
and why others do not. The student protests are ideal as a case study of participation and
non-participation for a number of reasons. The UK Government’s proposal to treble the cap
tuition fees for students in England represented an issue of widespread grievance for the
student population, a grievance which was compounded for many by the Liberal Democrats’
decision to u-turn on its 2010 election campaign pledge. The student response featured large-
scale regional and national demonstrations, as well as the formation of a network of
simultaneous campus occupations across the UK, arguably presenting a greater scale and
diversity of protest than had been seen for a generation. Despite these multiple participatory
opportunities, however, student participation did not come close to matching the scale of
opposition to trebled fees and university funding cuts as articulated in surveys. This raises
fundamental questions about the social and political differences between participants and
non-participants.
Using original survey data of students from 22 UK universities, and 56 in-depth interviews
with students from 6 universities, this research examines social and political patterns and
relations between high, medium and low-cost/risk participants, and non-participants. Taking
into account the idea of the university campus as a network of actors, the research posits that
networks may preclude as well as facilitate participation. The research studies in detail the
formation and maintenance of student activism networks – including their collective
identifications and dis-identifications. Conversely, the study also looks at the social networks
of non-participants, and how these may help to socially produce and sustain non-
participation at an agency level. Finally, the research considers whether the protests against
fees and cuts should be seen as a unified movement, and whether student attitudes taken
together reveal a broadly-identifiable ‘participatory ideal’.
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1. Introduction: Millbank tendency
On 9 November 2011, approximately 6,000 students from around the UK marched through
London to protest the marketisation of higher education. University funding had been a key
student campaigning issue for more than a decade, but this was no ordinary demonstration.
The Metropolitan Police deployed 4,000 officers for the event, having announced in the days
beforehand that they would be prepared to use rubber bullets, baton rounds and water-
cannons on students, a threat which had the blessing of Prime Minister David Cameron
(Daily Mail, 8 November 2011). As a participant on the march conducting fieldwork1, I
observed on the morning of the march police distributing flyers at tube stations warning
marchers to avoid ‘outbreak[s] of violence and disorder’ as being caught in the wrong place
at the wrong time might lead to arrest and a criminal record that ‘could seriously affect your
future employment or educational opportunities’. As the march progressed through central
London, every side-street was closed, barricaded and patrolled by police officers, as snatch
squads dressed in ‘Black Bloc’ attire intermingled with marchers. In a march lasting more
than four hours, demonstrators were effectively encircled by a police line for its entire
duration.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, I recall in my field-notes that these conditions contributed to a tense
and paranoid atmosphere. As the march crossed Holborn Viaduct into the city’s financial
district – a pointed gesture in its own right – office workers from the overhead buildings
peered from their windows at the marchers below – some cheered, one or two flicked v-
signs, but most just stared or took photos on their smartphones, prompting one student
marcher to ask: ‘why are they watching us, why don’t they join us?’ Students kept up spirits
by singing and chanting, even if their repertoire started to shift away from the familiar
campaign slogan ‘No Ifs! No Buts! No Education Cuts!’ to commentaries on the march itself
– a group of female undergraduates chanted at police officers ‘you’re sexy! You're cute!
Take off your riot suit!’, whereas others sang (to the tune of ‘She’ll be Coming Round the
Mountain’) ‘you can shove your rubber bullets up your arse’.
1 This fieldwork was part of my ‘background ethnography’ in preparation for interviews with student
activists (see chapter three, ‘reflexivity’).
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Meanwhile, on the event’s Facebook page and Twitter hashtag (#nov9) students and activists
were monitoring the demonstration and its media coverage: some blamed the police for
being too aggressive, others criticised the marchers for being too timid, stressing the need for
direct action to attract more press attention. On the ground, however, opportunities seemed
limited: with each passing barricade, tension built between marchers and police, boiling over
on some occasions into direct confrontations as marchers were arrested (videos of which
were soon posted on YouTube). An attempt to set up a tent occupation of Trafalgar Square
was quickly quashed. By the time the march reached London Wall, a police dispersal order
saw marchers being tightly encircled by a police line (a tactic known as ‘kettling’) with small
numbers being allowed to filter out at set intervals. By 5pm, the march was over. Among
demonstrators the general feeling was that the protest had been effectively snuffed out –
aside from the left-leaning Guardian, there was very little coverage in the national press. In
the now-opened side-streets, student representatives took roll-calls of names before boarding
their minibuses back home.
Despite the limitations imposed by police, some students had found ways of making the
march worthwhile. Among students interviewed for this research, Yvonne, a first-year
undergraduate at the University of Warwick, admitted that she had also been partly attracted
by a union-subsidised day out in London. Ronnie, a Warwick postgraduate and experienced
activist, recalled enjoying the march because it was ultimately ‘a day out with people who I
get on with quite well’. For many student activists, however, 9th November was recalled with
much negativity, the march described variously by other interviewees as ‘unpleasant’ (Peter,
Edinburgh), ‘really bad’ (Marianne, Cambridge), ‘disempowering’ (Brett, UCL) and ‘the
worst demo ever’ (Rhiannon, Edinburgh). Angie, a second-year undergraduate at Cambridge
recalled that she and her friends attended out of a ‘sense of duty’, convinced that they would
all get kettled. Clearly, the police tactics were designed to stifle what might be considered
more confrontational or spontaneous actions. For John, an Edinburgh student, there was no
question as to why this was the case: ‘it was because of Millbank. No-one was pretending it
wasn’t. They didn’t want it to happen again’.
‘Millbank’ was on a lot of people’s minds. Almost exactly a year previously, the National
Student Union’s (NUS) march against Government plans to enact mass-cuts to higher
education and treble the cap on tuition fees for students in England had attracted 52,000
students, with over one hundred universities represented. The demonstration climaxed with a
small group of students breaking off from the main march to attack the Conservative Party’s
campaign headquarters at 30 Millbank. With some of the crowd diverging from the main
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march route, the building’s front windows were smashed and approximately 200 protesters
entered inside and hung banners from its roof. This was followed by clashes between
protesters and police, culminating in injuries to 14 people – including police and activists –
and the arrest of around 50 protesters (Guardian, 10 November 2010). Millbank – as the
event came to be known – was significant for giving the student cause a large amount of
public interest and kick-started a series of student protests across the UK unseen in scale and
scope since the 1960s. Students were on the front pages, with the press devoting column
inches to a new radical youth generation responsible for leading the fight against the
coalition Government’s nascent austerity agenda.
Government proposals to treble the fees cap passed – albeit with a much-reduced
parliamentary majority – in December 2010. Despite this defeat, many student activists felt
energised by the upsurge in mobilisation and public attention garnered by the protests and
sought to take the fight into 2011. They were also concerned with the content of the
Government’s recently-published White Paper which proposed further steps towards
marketising higher education. By November 2011, with the adjacent Occupy Movement in
full swing and a UK public sector strike looming, the student demonstration should have
been the perfect opportunity for students to resume their fight.
As it turned out, plenty of students stayed at home – indeed, many seemed unaware that the
demonstration was even taking place. Several of those who did attend felt that the police had
sought to scare students off by issuing threats and emotional blackmail amounting to the
effective criminalisation of protest. Others claimed that the demonstration had lacked a clear
political objective: compared to the previous year when the fees bill had yet to be voted on
by Parliament, the 2011 demonstration’s focus on opposing the White Paper appeared more
esoteric. Ideological fault-lines between activists also seemed more manifest than the
previous year, with students unsure over whether they should be campaigning for ‘free’ or
‘affordable’ education. In the end, the strongest uniting factor was, as Ronnie put it, to
‘remind people that we hadn’t forgotten about last year’. The demonstration’s organisers –
independent activist network NCAFC – understandably defended the event, but blamed low
participation on the lack of leadership from the NUS. Without its backing, finances, and air
of legitimacy, activists struggled to convince union committees to arrange travel expenses to
London, and mindful of the risks presented by Millbank the previous year, many unions
chose to ignore the event.
Of course, non-participation has always been a feature of social movements and the student
protests of 2010/11 were no different. Nor should ‘participants’ be taken as a homogenous
14
category: after all, the vast majority of students on the NUS demonstration did not occupy
Millbank, and the vast majority of students did not attend the NUS demonstration, well-
attended though it was. Moreover, most students did not take part in any form of activism in
the protests against fees and cuts. The point here is not to belittle the movement’s efforts in
mobilising people: rather, it is to draw attention to the movement’s research potential. First,
those who took part in the protests participated in different ways, from signing petitions and
‘liking’ Facebook pages to shutting down public meetings and occupying university
buildings. Second, one cannot assume those who did not participate were not engaged in the
fees and cuts issue: Opinion Panel (2010) surveyed students shortly after the fees
announcement and found that 81 per cent opposed the increase. In sum, the student protests
make for an ideal opportunity to study the relationship between participation and non-
participation: why did participants participate in the way that they did, and why did so many
supportive non-participants not participate at all?
2. Studying participation/non-participation
Participation and non-participation has long been a subject of theory and research in political
science, sociology and social movement studies. On the one hand, studies of participation
have often reflected normative and ethical interests, where research has been conducted with
the basic goal of finding ways to improve state-citizen dialogue and broaden democracy to
hard-to-reach areas of society. On the other hand, researchers have also sought to broaden
how we define participation, with studies of protest campaigns and activist movements
demonstrating how individuals sometimes express their dissatisfaction towards the
participatory system as much as its decision-makers.
Large-scale quantitative studies of participation conducted by Parry et al, (1992); Jordan and
Maloney (1997); Pattie et al, (2004), as well as the Hansard Society’s annual Audit of
Political Engagement (2004-13) have all shown that participation can be measured
longitudinally. Results tend to claim that only around 10-15 per cent of the UK population
can be considered ‘politically active’, and that traditional indicators of participation such as
civic and party memberships are found to be in terminal decline (Hansard, 2010; see also
Norris, 2002). This has led to non-participation being depicted through basic quantitative
ideal-types, ranging from the ‘alienated/hostile’ (Hansard, 2010) who are mostly
disconnected from the political process, to the ‘concerned, unmobilised’ (Jordan and
Maloney, 2007), whose political engagement and concern goes unconverted due to a lack of
confidence in the efficacy of available participatory repertoires.
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It is also found in research of this kind that young people are overrepresented in the non-
participant category, with 18-24 year-olds frequently found to be the least active age group
and displaying relatively little interest in politics. This has been challenged by researchers
who contend that young people are politically engaged and active in more ‘cause-oriented’
ways that are not so easily captured in mass surveys (Bang, 2004; Marsh et al, 2007).
Arguments have also been made to suggest that young people have had little encouragement
to get involved as their interests have been mostly ignored in electoral politics for many
years (Henn et al, 2002; Cunningham and Lavalette, 2004; Hay, 2007; Henn and Foard,
2012).
Sociological approaches to political participation have generally taken a more qualitative
approach, seeking in particular to explore the interactions, cultures and identities associated
with parties, social movements and civic associations. Studies have variously focused on
how participation is shaped by family background and schooling (Coles, 1986; Braungart
and Braungart, 1990), social networks and microstructures (McAdam, 1986; Crossley,
2008), the conversion of emotional engagement and righteous anger (Gamson, 1992; Jasper,
1997) and social and political identifications actors might have with a particular issue or
cause (Touraine, 1981; Melucci, 1988). To some extent, the same tools have been used to
explain non-participation, with studies drawing attention to how people collectively manage
negative emotions of powerlessness (Norgaard, 2006), how their lack of access to political
deliberation networks results in the non-conversion of initial engagement into action
(Oegema and Klandermans, 1994), and how certain actors dis-identify with the idea and
image of political participation (Eliasoph, 1998).
Furthermore, of growing interest is the impact of web technologies and online social
interaction, particularly the user-oriented ‘Web 2.0’ (Hands, 2011). Web technologies have
transformed the way individuals interact with one another and access information (Castells,
2009), making it easier for politically-minded individuals to access the means necessary not
only to become more politically engaged and knowledgeable, but also the tools to organise
and promote new campaigns (Nah et al. 2006; Wall, 2007). The online world has also helped
facilitate mobilising large numbers of people into taking small-scale individual actions via e-
petitions, Facebook groups and campaign slogan avatars (see Patel, 2007). The question as to
whether this mass-reach and flow of information and action is generating a ‘civic surplus’ of
enhanced political participation (Shirky, 2010) or a generation of complacent ‘slacktivists’
(Morozov, 2011) is an ongoing debate in academia and the media more generally.
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Issues of youth engagement, mobilisation, and new technologies are all important reasons for
studying campus activism. Of course, students are not exactly a typical subsection of young
people (nor are all students necessarily ‘young’), and campus activism has its own long
tradition in the UK and beyond (Boren, 2001; Hoefferle, 2013). As Crossley (2008) notes,
this owes to the unique social and spatial resources provided by the university campus via its
union, societies and dense networks. Moreover, Binder and Wood (2012) note how the
university campus – combined with more general life-cycle effects – can play a significant
role in shaping young peoples’ political interests, activities and sense of identity.
3. The fees and cuts protests as a case study
Researching the 2010/11 student protests against fees and cuts will further our knowledge
and understanding of each of the themes discussed in the previous section. Doing this
requires a basic framework for conceptualising and discussing the protests as a case study. A
good place to start is to consider the protests as the product of a collective action frame
(Snow et al, 1986; Gamson, 1992; Tarrow, 1992; Klandermans, 1997). Although its
application varies across social movement studies, a collective action frame can be broadly
defined as ‘a set of action-oriented beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate social
movement activities and campaigns’ (Gamson, 1992: 7). This considers how movements
develop from the perspective of its organisers, who ‘punctuate or single out some existing
social condition or aspect of life and define it as unjust, intolerable, and deserving of
corrective action’ (Snow and Benford, 1992: 137). According to Gamson, there are three key
components of collective action frames: feelings of injustice, a construction of identity, and
the emergence of agency. These three components shall be used to unpack the case study as
a subject for research.
Higher education funding and injustice
According to Klandermans (1997: 38), feelings of injustice usually relate to the way
authorities treat a social problem. Injustice has to become objectified in the sense that groups
and individuals frame their feelings around the legitimacy of systems or authorities judged to
be responsible for the way things are. This is because injustice may often go unnoticed if it
develops slowly and affected individuals are given little opportunity to reflect upon their
position. Consequently, a collective sense of injustice is more likely to develop from
suddenly imposed grievances, or when they sense that their moral principles have been
violated (Ibid). The former have an arbitrariness which invites a critical comparison of its
perceivable ‘before’ and ‘after’ effects, whereas the latter describes the dissonance between
actors’ personal values and a change in their treatment in a broader social context.
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The principal issue of injustice for this case study – higher education funding in England2 –
has taken the form of a ‘long revolution’ (to use McGettigan’s (2013: 10) application of
Raymond Williams’s famous term) transforming in 15 years from a system of universal free
education to a cap of £9,000 annual tuition fees for students. Policy changes during this
period can be divided into three distinct phases. Until 1998, university education was funded
by a ‘block grant’ from government, with students granted maintenance costs during study.
In the 1980s and 1990s, this funding block was slowly reduced by successive governments
whilst at the same time university participation doubled (Collini, 2012: 105). In 1997, the
Conservative Government-commissioned Dearing Report recommended the introduction of
means-tested tuition fees to help universities cover their increasing costs. The newly-elected
Labour Government took this even further, introducing in 1998 up-front tuition fees of a
maximum £1,000 per year, and replacing maintenance grants with government loans to be
repaid as a percentage of income following graduation. These reforms chimed with Labour’s
desire to see 50 per cent of young adults going into higher education in the next century, but
critics such as Barr and Crawford (1998: 81) voiced concerns that introducing fees and
saddling students with long-term debt would put off students from poorer backgrounds.
The second policy phase began in 2003, when the Labour Government announced plans to
introduce ‘variable fees’ with a maximum figure of £3,000 per year (indexed to inflation).
Unlike before, fees would now be paid after graduation via an expansion of the student loans
repayment scheme, with repayment deferred until graduates’ annual income exceeded
£15,000. Whilst these proposals brought extra income to universities, this again came from
students rather than the state. Admittedly, students no longer had to pay fees upfront and
outstanding payments were to be written off after 25 years, but the increase nevertheless
represented a controversial policy u-turn on Labour’s 2001 election manifesto. The bill
passed by a majority of only seven MPs in 2004 and the new system was introduced in the
2006/7 academic year. Despite the promise of variable fees with universities encouraged to
2 Although the case study’s principle grievance concerns higher education funding in England, the
field of study concerns the UK as a whole. This is because campus protests in 2010/11 extended to
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Since state devolution, higher education reforms have applied
differently to the rest of the UK: unaffected by the 2010 reforms, students from Northern Ireland
continued to pay annual fees of around £3,500 and Scottish students remained exempt from paying
fees altogether (although Scottish universities charge its students from the rest of the UK their own
tuition rates). Since the Welsh Assembly holds only secondary legislative powers, universities in
Wales were subjected to a 12 per cent cut in government funding, but the Assembly agreed to
subsidise the fees increase so that its students studying in the UK would not have to pay any higher
amount from 2012/13.
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‘compete on price’, all universities almost immediately elected to charge the maximum fee
(Collini, 2012: 106).
Built into the 2004 legislation was the instruction that the £3,000 fee cap would be
independently reviewed after three years. This paved the way to the third policy phase, upon
which the 2010/11 student protests were primarily focused. In 2009, the Department for
Business, Innovation and Skills (a telling departmental shift) announced plans to develop a
more ‘entrepreneurial’ higher education sector that was less dependent on public funding,
especially in the wake of the global financial crisis and the UK’s growing structural deficit.
This led to the commissioning of the Browne Review, which was tasked with designing a
sustainable system of financing higher education whilst continuing to meet demand for
undergraduate education (McGettigan, 2013: 20). Its final report was published in October
2010 and recommended the abolition of the cap on tuition fees, allowing universities to set
their own costs (subject to a progressive levy issued by government). Repayments were
pushed back to once graduates were earning over £21,000 per year. In addition, it argued for
the removal of direct public funding for arts, humanities and social science degrees.
Much of the thinking behind the Browne Review centred on a desire to ‘put students at the
heart of the system’ (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, 2011) by repositioning
them as ‘consumers’ of higher education. It was argued that linking university funding more
directly to university ‘performance’ would drive up standards as universities would work
harder to ensure that their courses offered strong employment returns and value for money.
The newly-elected Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition Government accepted the
recommendations to abolish direct funding for non-STEM subjects and alter the terms for
graduate fee repayment, but it rejected the levy system in favour of increasing the current
cap on fees to a maximum £9,000 per year for undergraduates commencing study in
2012/13. Furthermore, by using the existing architecture of the 2004 legislation the
government was able to quickly secure a parliamentary vote on the bill. This again passed
with a marginal majority, this time by 21 votes.
It was later discovered that research commissioned for the Browne Review (but excluded
from the final report) found that most students and parents believed government should pay
at least half the cost of higher education because ‘the personal benefits were seen by many to
match the benefits of society’ (THES, quoted in McGettigan, 2013: 21). As it turned out,
government funding cuts amounted to £3 billion (Collini, 2012: 106), with the University
and College Union (UCU) predicting that universities with a strong humanities profile could
lose as much as 96 per cent of their current teaching budget (Guardian, 20 October 2010).
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These reforms were not necessarily unforeseen – after all, the Browne Review had been
commissioned in 2009 – but shock was felt in the speed which legislation was passed: as
McGettigan (2013: 21) observes, by using secondary legislation from the 2004 bill, the
Government was able to hold a ‘snap vote’ in Parliament without publishing a White Paper
beforehand. This gave little time for the vagaries of the proposals to be teased out and
debated in public. Consequently, McGettigan argues that the bill went through with activists
unsure about ‘just what had been won and lost’ (Ibid).
As an overall issue of grievance, the 2010 reforms represented for many people a violation
of their moral principles. This related to the role and responsibility of the state as funders of
higher education, with NUS President Aaron Porter arguing that its reforms amounted to the
state ‘effectively pulling out of Higher Education altogether’ (NUS, 2010b). This centred
especially on the notion of fairness, with critics pointing to contrasts in the entitlements of
individual policymakers, who during their time at university had received their higher
education for free, whereas English graduates from 2015 onwards would be incur debts of up
to £27,000 from fees alone (plus maintenance repayments and interest). Moreover, higher
education campaigners once again feared that long-term student debt would put people from
poorer backgrounds off choosing seemingly-devalued degrees in the arts, humanities and
social sciences, or even studying at university altogether.
Creating identity: students, first-time voters, and the ‘jilted generation’
To convert these grievances into a collective action frame, it is necessary for some sense of
identity to develop among its affected population. Identity is a much-contested concept in
social movement studies, though for collective action frames it need only refer to the
transformation of grievances into a collective sense of ‘them’ and ‘us’ (Klandermans, 1997:
41). On the one hand, students already possess the foundations of a collective identity by
virtue of their shared social and economic status as students, and their political
representation via the NUS. On the other hand, as an interest group the student population is
hamstrung by its constant turnover of student cohorts, making it harder for students to mount
consistent mass campaigns. Moreover, governments invariably post-date higher education
reform to take effect after current students have graduated, arguably placing limitations on
the ability to build a mass movement of students who personally feel ‘disadvantaged,
threatened, ignored or badly treated’ (Klandermans, 1997: 18) by higher fees and cuts.
Of course, large numbers of students did protest in 2010/11. Ibrahim (2011: 415-6) argues
that this is because a sufficient number of students considered the Government reforms
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‘morally out of alignment with what is fair’. As students, many would have felt well-placed
to judge whether £9,000 represented an acceptable amount to charge, as well as debate
questions of ‘value’ in higher education more generally. Whilst this clearly falls under
Gamson’s definition of a ‘moral grievance’, it is more questionable whether they can also be
considered a ‘suddenly-imposed grievance’ since students’ own education costs were not
directly affected. However, it can be argued that many students in 2010 were motivated into
protesting because of a separate-but-related ‘suddenly-imposed grievance’ of their own. As
junior coalition partners co-responsible for translating the Browne Review’s
recommendations into policy, Nick Clegg’s Liberal Democrats found themselves in an
invidious position of their own making: in the run-up to the 2010 general election the party
had taken the bold step of publically opposing any increase in university tuition fees, and
even pledging in their manifesto to abolish fees altogether if elected to government
(Sanderson-Nash, 2011).
Tuition fees have for many years been a key political concern for young people (Henn and
Foard, 2012) and for the 2010 election the Liberal Democrats took a free education position.
This had the added advantage of helping build a strong electoral base for the party among
first-time voters (Furlong and Cartmel, 2012; Sanderson-Nash, 2011). For its campaigning,
the party’s election broadcasts drew attention to Labour’s ‘broken promises’ over tuition fee
increases, and Clegg made regular visits to university campuses to generate support. Along
with 400 Liberal Democrat candidates, Clegg also signed the NUS’s pledge to vote against
any rise in tuition fees in the next Parliament (NUS, 2010a). When the 2010 election result
produced no majority victory, the formation of a coalition Government between the Liberal
Democrats and David Cameron’s Conservatives suddenly placed the Liberal Democrats’
tuition fees pledge in a new light. Clegg’s decision to reverse his party’s original policy on
fees consequently represented a suddenly-imposed grievance for the first-time voters who
had only recently been swayed by the party’s youth-friendly electoral campaign. For the
NUS and higher education campaign groups, students’ sense of anger and betrayal became a
resource for mobilisation, evidenced in the number of protests taking place outside Liberal
Democrat party offices in autumn 2010 and activists’ subversion of the party’s ‘broken
promises’ electoral rhetoric in their campaigns (see Channel 4, 2010).
If higher fees and cuts appealed to many students’ sense of 'moral economy’ (Ibrahim, 2011)
and the Liberal Democrats’ policy u-turn their sense of betrayal, it also proved easy to find
connections between the two. A key part of the government’s rhetoric surrounding education
reforms was the necessity of widespread public sector cuts to help reduce the state’s
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structural deficit following the global financial crisis. For many students, it was hard not to
feel that the Government’s austerity programme was making them pay for a crisis that they
had not caused. Moreover, the fact that higher education fees and cuts would predominantly
affect young people lent credibility to the construction of ‘them’ and ‘us’ in generational
terms. For Howker and Malik (2010), this fitted into a broader narrative in which the ‘baby
boomers’ benefitted from the post-war expansion of the welfare state, whereas the ‘jilted
generation’ of young people born after 1979 have been left with escalating welfare costs, a
housing shortage and high unemployment. Together with a university system now
considered one of the most expensive in the world, Mason (2012) argued that the graduates
of 2012 were unique for being the first in the post-war era to expect to grow up poorer than
their parents.
Protest and making history: the possibility of agency
It should be clear from the previous section that students drew on a number of grievances to
assist constructions of a collective sense of ‘us’ (as students; Liberal Democrat voters; young
people; left-wingers) in opposition to ‘them’ (the Liberal Democrats; the political
establishment; the baby-boomers; neoliberals), even if the extent to which this could be
aggregated into a single pan-student ‘collective identity’ is open to debate. Mason’s (2011b)
characterisation of the London demonstrators as a ‘dubstep rebellion’ carried clear
generational properties, as did Penny’s (2011) depiction of students as the ‘generation that
was sold out’. Others, however, saw this as a media-friendly narrative that ignored the fact
that not only had austerity politics transcended generational divides, but they also affected
students in different ways: Gilbert (Gilbert and Aitchison, 2012), for instance, argued that
activists’ focus on fees reflected a loss of ‘middle-class privilege’ that did not resonate with
poorer students already faced with a reality of long-term debt repayment.
What is undeniable, however, is that collective grievance was converted into collective
action, as between 2010 and 2011 students protested in large numbers using a range of
different repertoires. According to Klandermans (1997: 18), it is through collective action
that individuals may experience a sense of agency, which equips them with a belief that their
actions have the power to transform social and political conditions. Of course, getting
individuals to convert grievance into participation can be difficult: whilst many might accept
the importance (even the duty) of collective action, this does not necessarily translate into a
sense of efficacy. Consequently, activists often devote years to building campaigns and
finding ways of mobilising individuals for protest (Rule, 1989: 157). Nevertheless,
opportunities for mass-mobilisation sometimes require certain favourable structural
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conditions that help make grievances, identities and the possibility of agency more manifest
to prospective participants. These might include changes in policy and the political
environment which lower the costs and dangers of protest participation, evidence of
sympathy and support from certain elite political figures, or the uncovering of divisions and
instabilities at state level. All of these are important tools for giving groups and individuals
the ‘cognitive liberation’ that a successful outcome might be possible (McAdam, 1982).
Since the 1990s, student activists from successive cohorts have sought to generate a sense of
agency by building and sustaining a strong and knowledgeable movement to fight
Government higher education reforms. This task has been shaped by the availability of
certain specific mobilisation causes, and struggles within the student activist community. As
has long been the case in British student politics, radical independent student campaign
groups frequently disagreed with the more conservative (and accountable) NUS over how
protests and campaigns should proceed ideologically and tactically (Crouch, 1970;
Hoefferle, 2013). In the 1990s especially, NUS was accused of failing to build an effective
movement against tuition fees because of its historical ties to the very party – Labour –
responsible for introducing them (Boren, 2001; Swain, 2011; Solomon, 2011). This reticence
precipitated the formation of the independent Campaign For Free Education (CFE) in 1995,
which in its efforts to push NUS into taking a free education position, entered into
longstanding struggles to build a ‘unity slate’ of leftist groups for annual NUS elections.
CFE succeeded in pressurising NUS to become more active on fees campaigning in the early
2000s, and consequently NUS organised national demonstrations in 2000, 2002 and 2003
that each attracted around 20,000 people. Following Parliament’s vote to increase fees in
January 2004, February 25th saw up to 2 million staff and students walk out of lectures in
protest, along with local rallies taking place across the UK (Guardian, 25 February 2004).
Though these mass-protests and the subsequent election of a CFE candidate as NUS
President might have suggested the beginnings of a more radicalised student movement,
higher education campaigning instead fell back into decline in the late-2000s. CFE dissolved
and was succeeded by ‘Education Not For Sale’ (ENS) which continued to put radical
candidates forward for NUS election. Nevertheless, after holding two poorly-attended
national demonstrations in 2004 and 2006, NUS dropped its free education doctrine in 2008,
citing a need not to ‘revert to dogma’ of militant left groups in order to debate effectively
with government (Guardian, 2 April 2008).
Student campaigning on higher education returned to prominence in 2009 following the
commissioning of the Browne Review and Government announcements that the higher
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education budget would likely face cuts of more than £500 million after the next election.
This caused some universities to make pre-emptive cuts to degree programmes and
departments, resulting in a number of protest campaigns and campus occupations (Swain,
2011). Early 2010 saw the formation of three new campaign networks: the UCL-based
National Campaign against Fees and Cuts (NCAFC), the SWP-affiliated Education Activist
Network (EAN) and the Leeds-based Really Open University (ROU), all of which shared
information about higher education funding and posted reports on their websites of
university teach-ins and occupations. These groups also helped pressurise NUS into calling a
national demonstration for November 2010.
Following the Browne Review’s publication in October, student demonstrations and
occupations started to take place across the UK, though one can argue that it was not until
the NUS demonstration on 10 November that students appeared to reach a moment of true
agency: Swain, for example, (2011) describes the event as ‘the spark for the inspirational
movement that followed’ whereas Penny (2011) quotes from a student recalling that ‘after
Millbank, the possibility of resistance became real’. From this point until the parliamentary
vote on 9 December, student protests were widespread and frequent in number. Seeking to
distance itself from the more radical aspects of the 10/11 demonstration, NUS played little
part in subsequent actions other than to arrange a ‘candlelit vigil’ on the eve of the
parliamentary vote. In its absence, NCAFC’s ‘National Walkout and Day of Action’ on 24
November saw the participation of 130,000 college and university students across the UK
(Solomon, 2011: 15). Whilst some universities were keen to stress the ‘peaceful’ nature of
their chosen activities, others used the day as a springboard for staging campus occupations.
By the end of 2010, Palmieri and Solomon (2011: 60) noted at least 51 occupations that had
taken place across the UK, many lasting for more than two weeks.
The overall aim of the protests was to build and sustain enough coverage to pressurise MPs
(especially Liberal Democrats) into voting against the fees bill. Occupations in particular
made use of Twitter, Facebook and Skype to establish online networks through which news
and information could be shared and distributed publically (Theocharis, 2012), though many
soon broadened their political discussions to include critiques of neoliberal capitalism
(Ibrahim, 2011; Salter and Kay, 2011; Hopkins et al, 2011). The protests climaxed with
Parliament’s vote on the Government’s bill on 9 December: a NCAFC and ULU-organised
demonstration in London attracted 30,000 participants and featured violent confrontations
between protesters and police – especially once news spread that the bill had been passed by
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Parliament. With the academic term drawing to a close, most campus occupations ended
soon after.
Despite the passing of the fees bill, the following term saw many students resume their
campaigns by linking up with the wider anti-cuts movement. This involved participating in
the anti-tax avoidance network UK Uncut and attending the TUC national demonstration on
26 March. Campus protest generally remained strong at universities threatened with staff
redundancies and course closures, but by early 2011 the majority of student protest networks
had stopped updating their websites, Facebook pages and Twitter feeds. The publication in
June of a Government White Paper proposing further marketisation measures to the sector
(McGettigan, 2013; Wolfreys, 2011) resulted in NCAFC calling a national demonstration for
the autumn. Whilst this demonstration – and the 15 or so occupations which soon followed –
struggled to attract the same mass-participation and media interest of the year before, student
activists were at least able to declare victory when the White Paper was shelved in early
2012 (THES, 24 January 2012). Nevertheless, activists were realistic enough to anticipate
having to resume their campaigns once the next phase of higher education reform gets
underway.
In sum, whilst student activist groups and leaders have for many years worked continually on
building and maintaining campaigns against reforms to higher education funding, episodes
of agency – that is, when students were genuinely confident of success – tended to be
framed around defending student interests when matters were about to be made worse. In
other words, anti-fees campaigns were seemingly at their strongest when there was
something specific at stake, and students felt that they could exploit disharmony in
government and thereby influence its outcome. This complements McAdam’s (1982) view
that ‘cognitive liberation’ is brought about by tensions and opportunities at a structural level.
For the 2010/11 case study especially, these tensions and opportunities – evidenced by an
untested and potentially divided coalition Government – were clear to see. Consequently, the
seven-week period between the publication of the Browne Review and the parliamentary
vote produced a collective action frame with clearly-identified grievances – higher fees, cuts
and electoral betrayal – a basic consciousness of who ‘us’ (the students) and ‘them’ (the
Government) were, and through mass-participatory events such as the NUS demonstration
and NCAFC day of action, a sense of agency among students that, for a moment, anything
was possible.
Of course, the unique conditions upon which collective action frames are based have a
natural lifespan, and the student protests were no different – once the fees bill passed,
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activists were forced to reframe their grievances and recapture a sense of mass cognitive
liberation among the student population. This dilemma relates very much to Tarrow’s (1989)
concept of the ‘protest cycle’ which describes how openness to protest and general public
sympathy provide the conditions for new political identities, activist groups, and innovative
protest repertoires to develop, and that movements fall into decline once government
responses (either concessionary or repressive) result in activist co-optation by authorities, or
a split between those seeking to consolidate their activism position and those advocating a
radicalisation of goals and tactics.
4. Researching the student protests
Although there is much potential for studying the student protests, compared to recent and
related movements such as Occupy, the Arab Spring, the Spanish Indignados, or even the
English riots, they remain relatively under-researched at present. This does not mean that
plenty has not already been written on the subject, however. Academics in particular have
produced several books and articles on higher education funding which critically analyse the
Browne Review in conjunction to arguments on the intellectual and educational purpose of
universities (see for example, Baert and Shipman, 2005; Molesworth et al, 2010; Holmwood,
2011; Bailey and Friedman, 2011; Docherty, 2011; Collini, 2012). Given the importance
attached to maintaining a public profile for student resistance, activists generated large
amounts of media content throughout the protests via online blogs and independent news
sites as well as in the mainstream press. In 2011, two edited collections of articles by Hancox
(2011) and Palmieri and Solomon (2011) were published. Assembled at a time student
protests were still taking place, both reflect activists’ esprit de corps in seeking not only to
inform readers but to inspire them into taking further collective action. In late 2011, UCL
students produced The Real Social Network, a film which chronicled the London
demonstrations and UCL’s campus occupations, and was screened at universities, activism
conferences and film festivals.
Outside the movement itself, the student protests received extended coverage in newspapers
and magazines throughout 2010 and 2011. Notable pieces include Laurie Penny’s (2011)
report on the UCL occupation for the New Statesman, and Paul Mason’s (2011a) article for
the BBC website ‘Twenty Reasons Why it’s Kicking off Everywhere’, which attempted to
trace organisational commonalities between the student protests and uprisings in France,
Greece and North Africa. This was later expanded into a book (2011b) which among other
things extolled students’ use of social media and network technologies for their protest
organisation. At present, academic research on the student protests has focused mostly on
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students’ democratic organisation of campus occupations, with accounts covering events at
Newcastle (Hopkins et al, 2011), UCL (Aitchison, 2011) and UWE (Salter and Kay, 2011),
as well as occupations’ more general use of social media (Theocharis, 2012). With the
exception of Crossley and Ibrahim’s (2012) use of social network analysis to explore activist
groups and networks at the University of Manchester, studies of student mobilisation,
participation and non-participation, however, have so far been lacking.
The research project
The basic aim of this research is to study participation and non-participation in the 2010/11
student protests, and explain why students came to participate (or not) in the way they did.
Of particular interest are students who identified as ‘activists’ prior to the case study and
came to play an important role in the mobilisation of others; students who were mobilised
(and radicalised) by the protests but had previously been mostly inactive, and students who,
whilst sympathetic to the protests’ aims, took little or no part in them. Given that these
questions carry broader relevance to issues of youth engagement and new repertoires of
collective action, it is also hoped that this research will make a useful contribution to studies
of political participation in social movements more generally. Specifically, this research
focuses around four particular questions, each of which will be dealt with in their own
chapter:
1. Of the overall student population, who participated and why?
2. What were the paths and barriers to participation?
3. Why did some people keep participating after the vote?
4. How can we explain sympathetic students who did not participate?
The research gathers two distinct but interrelated forms of data: first, it measures students’
participation and non-participation in the 2010/11 case study, along with their attitudes
towards fees and higher education funding as an issue for mobilisation. Second, it is
important that the case study is grounded in the broader context of student political
participation. This means that the research also sets out to capture students’ knowledge of
and engagement in politics, their attitudes towards the efficacy of participatory repertoires,
and their overall participation in formal and activist politics. To gather both forms of data,
the research studies students in the 2011/12 academic year, specifically via surveying a
sample of UK universities and interviewing student participants and non-participants. The
choice of these methods allows for participation to be measured quantitatively by mapping
trends of thought and action, and understood qualitatively through capturing students’
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reflections on their personal experiences of politics and activism at university. The choice of
survey and interview research also allows for data to be analysed in relation to similar
studies, notably Hansard’s (2004-13) participation surveys, and qualitative case studies of
student movements and other protest groups (e.g. Crossley and Ibrahim, 2012; Binder and
Wood, 2012; Eliasoph, 1998). Further methodological issues will be covered in more detail
in chapter three.
One must also acknowledge some of the limits and boundaries to this research project. Such
is the nature of case studies that there are always certain themes and issues which fall outside
its boundaries, even though many are worthwhile topics of study in their own right.
Consequently, movements and campaigns contemporaneously connected to the student
protests – notably Students’ Justice For Palestine (which set the template for many of the
repertoires used by students in autumn 2010); staff-led anti-cuts groups such as the
Campaign for the Public University, and wider anti-cuts groups such as UK Uncut – are
mostly excluded from the study. More regrettably, the limitations of the study necessitate
that certain populations within the student community are missing. Perhaps the most obvious
(and ironic) example of this are students who are themselves paying £9,000 fees. This cohort
was not yet at university in 2011/12 when data was collected, though some would have
participated in protests the previous year: school and college students attended the national
demonstrations in London in large numbers, and were arguably a key element to Mason
(2011b) and others’ portrayal of the protests in generational terms. Some went on to join in
with university occupations, whereas others even started their own at schools and colleges.
Also missing from the data are students from the 2010/11 academic year who were no longer
at university in 2011/12. This creates a slight disjuncture between the principal period of
study and the available research population, particularly in the case of final-year
undergraduates who graduated before research collection began. It should also be pointed out
that whilst the survey closed in June 2012 and the last interview was conducted that October,
higher education campaigning has continued into 2012/13 and 2013/14. Consequently,
recent protest events such as the NUS national demonstration in November 2012, and
December 2013’s ‘Cops Off Campus’ demonstrations are excluded from the narrative
covered in this research study.
One final point about the study’s limitations concerns its overall purpose. The research does
not seek to offer analysis as to why the student protests failed to prevent the fees bill being
passed in Parliament, or whether this was even a realistic possibility. The focus of this
research is participation and mobilisation – clearly essential aspects to making any
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movement successful – but it will be left for others to judge whether the evidence presented
suggests that increased participation or different tactical decisions might have produced a
different outcome.
The structure of the thesis
The thesis consists of eight chapters. Given the project’s aforementioned engagement across
sociology, political science and social movement studies, chapter two seeks to bring these
literatures together with a comprehensive account of existing theory and research in political
participation and non-participation. Of particular interest are approaches to explaining paths
and barriers to mobilisation, be it related to electoral, civic and protest participation, as well
as the unique properties of the student activism field. Chapter three will focuses on the
project’s methodology and research design. This involves framing the case study around the
campus field so that the participatory activities and attitudes of students studying at
university in the 2011/12 academic year can be effectively measured and explored.
The following four chapters focus on the study’s substantive research findings. Chapter four
lays out basic trends from the student survey, including general forms of political
participation as well as those specific to the fees and cuts case study. These trends are then
explored in more detail in the following chapters, which use qualitative data to trace the
narrative of the case study. Chapter five focuses on the paths and barriers of different types
of student activist, as well as those involved in little or no activism. This spans students’
lives from family socialisation to their mobilisation for the fees and cuts protests. This
narrative continues into chapter six, which focuses on students’ experience of protest
participation and the formation of collective identities around certain events and activities.
This also takes into consideration activist collective identities as perceived by non-
participants, a theme which is expanded on in chapter seven which focuses on students who
did not take part in the protests. This involves comparing supportive, unsupportive and
undecided non-participants, along with more general analysis of the social backgrounds and
social networks which might frame and contextualise their attitudes. Finally, chapter eight
will draw conclusions across the four findings chapters, as well as discuss their wider




Literature review: theory and research on
political participation and non-
participation
1. Introduction
To understand the student protests case study within a broader context of political
participation, one must go deeper into the trends, conflicts and innovations that have shaped
politics and civic engagement in Western societies over the past fifty years. Key to this is the
apparent decline of ‘mass society’ via the disembedding effects of market-driven
individualisation (Beck, 1992) which is said to have eroded individuals’ civic anchorage
(Putnam, 2000; Bennett, 1998). This runs parallel to similar changes in mass politics, as
evidence of party dealignment, low voter turnout in elections and the interminable decline of
party membership (Putnam, 2000; Norris, 2001; 2002) all suggest that society is becoming
increasingly disconnected from traditional political processes and institutions.
Decline in mass politics does not necessarily entail decline in political engagement, however.
In fact, some have claimed that it provides opportunities for greater engagement, as the
narrow and inflexible formal channels of old have slowly given way to greater choice in how
citizens can legitimately express themselves. This owes much to increases in literacy, wealth
and education which drive patterns of political participation (Norris, 2002), but also the
decoupling of identity from collective traditions (Beck, 1992). This has enabled actors to
pursue new political interests and activities in addition to their basic material interests,
including identity-based and single-issue politics (Inglehart, 1977; Giddens, 1991).
Unsurprisingly, protest and political activism has been a key part of this transformation.
Although it is disputable whether social movements in the twentieth century can be
considered ‘new’ and distinct from the long history of political struggles that preceded them
(see for example, Calhoun, 1993), compelling arguments have been made to at least suggest
that protest has now become a key part of the political process, even if depictions of a ‘social
movement society’ (Tarrow, 1998) render protest functionally wedded to Western liberal
democratic structures. This transformation also reflects how social movements as an area of
academic study began to win respect in the social sciences. According to Rootes (2012:
4864-5), the study of student movements in Europe and the United States in the 1960s was a
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key element of this development as they did not fit with orthodox Marxist theories or warrant
explanation through ‘psychosocial and reductionist’ crowd theory approaches (e.g. Feuer,
1969). Consequently, the university campus became a key site for popularising not only
post-Leninist ‘new left’ politics, but also the sorts of identity politics Giddens and others
describe. Whilst student movements struggled to maintain the activist peaks of 1968, they
did succeed in helping set the foundation for the legitimation of protest as a political activity
and the popularisation of alternative political agencies such as social movement
organisations, single-issue parties and DIY movements, particularly in Western Europe
(Ibid: 4867).
Despite the richness and variety of studies in political participation and social movements, its
fractured and messy history has arguably left us with a fractured and messy academic
literature. Political science approaches remain mostly committed to measuring participation
using formal definitions of politics. Although useful for producing measurable data that can
be repeated and compared over time, it arguably does so whilst flattening out social,
historical and generational distinctions. Conversely, social movement approaches are more
case-study oriented and often produce rich sociological findings, but researchers are
sometimes resistant to applying their findings to explain wider participation and mobilisation
trends. The same is arguably true of research on student movements given that case studies
have tended to focus on significant upsurges in protest activity (of which this project is no
exception) rather than the spaces in between. In other words, the assembled literatures
provide a wealth of social and political movement analysis, but in isolation each lacks a
crucial analytical ingredient. Furthermore, there has been a distinct lack of detailed studies of
non-participation, a deficit which this research project hopes to help resolve.
This literature review will be divided into four substantive themes. First, it will review
political science approaches to measuring political participation, with particular attention
paid to youth participation. Second, it will cover the practice of social movement
participation, and the various repertoires through which one might participate. Third, it will
discuss and critically evaluate different theoretical approaches to understanding the process
through which individuals come to participate (or not). Fourth and finally, it will consider
the usefulness of these theories in relation to the unique field of student activism and the
university campus.
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2. Measuring political participation and non-participation
The expansion of political science to include forms of protest and activism presents a
number of dilemmas to scholars seeking to measure it. For many years, quantitative studies
of political participation have focused predominantly on formal processes of engagement
(e.g. voting, party membership) as well as examples of civic behaviour (again measured in
group and association membership). Measuring and comparing these forms of participation
longitudinally has been central to major UK studies by Parry et al. (1992), Pattie et al.
(2004), and Hansard’s annual Audit of Political Engagement (2004-13). Indeed, it is this
focus that has led political scientists in the United States especially to argue that political
participation and civic engagement has been in steady decline since the 1960s (Putnam,
2000; Skocpol, 2003).
In the UK, Hansard’s 2010 audit of political engagement classifies 16 per cent of citizens as
politically active, and only 10 per cent as ‘politically committed’. The politically active and
committed tend to be white, middle-class, university-educated. By definition, they are also
more likely to be interested in and knowledgeable about politics and hold stronger beliefs in
the importance of an active citizenry than the UK average. As figure 2.1 shows, participation
for most citizens involves signing petitions and forms of ethical consumption. Repertoires
that might be considered higher in personal cost and risk (McAdam, 1986) are generally less
popular, with only 4 per cent claiming to have taken part in a demonstration, picket or strike
in the past three years.
Figure 2.1 also shows that almost half of UK citizens have participated in none of the listed
activities in the past three years. Of course, to automatically categorise this as ‘non-
participation’ is a misnomer since respondents may be involved in activities absent from the
survey’s criteria – indeed, surveys of this kind are often criticised for using a narrow and
inflexible definition of politics (Marsh et al, 2007). One can certainly argue that forms of
protest and social movement participation are underrepresented on the list, with all forms of
protest seemingly amalgamated into a single category of equivalent weighting to ‘urging
someone to get in touch with a local councillor or MP’. Of particular concern here is
Hansard’s definition of ‘being active’.  In the 2009 audit, respondents who had done three or
more activities were classified as ‘activists’ – a moniker which was revised to ‘politically
active’ in the 2010 audit. In either case, calculations prioritise range above frequency, which
means committed, frequent protesters who are cynical or resistant towards formal political
processes might not even qualify as ‘active’. Whilst this might be partly attributable to the
historical bias towards governmental systems as the more ‘legitimate’ avenues of
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participation, it also reflects more practical methodological constraints: voting and
membership are easily studied quantitatively whereas the more amorphous world of social
movements is arguably harder to capture and integrate into these sorts of measurements.
Figure 2.1 Selected percentages of forms of political activity among UK citizens from the 2010
Hansard Audit of Political Engagement
N=1,156 GB adults 18+.
Question: Which, if any, of the things on this list have you done in the last two or three years?
What Hansard’s measurements do at least capture is the large proportion of citizens’
inactivity in electoral and civic forms of politics. This can elicit some useful findings and
workable ideal-types: Hansard distinguishes between different types of non/under-active
citizens, including ‘detached cynics’ (17 per cent of British adults), ‘disengaged/mistrustful’
(24 per cent), ‘bored/apathetic’ (8 per cent) and ‘alienated/hostile’ (9 per cent). These
categories are calculated using respondents’ knowledge of electoral politics, participation
and sense of ‘civic duty’. The high percentage points of the first two categories in particular
echoes concerns raised by Hay (2007) about citizens’ dissatisfaction with the quality of
politics on offer. Explanations of this include governments’ separation of public debate and
private decision-making (Gripsrud, 2002), which also relates to critiques of parties’
preference for delivering image above content to the voting public (Hay, 2007; Cunningham
and Lavalette, 2004; Henn et al., 2002).
33
Although one might be wary of extrapolating too much from these specific categories
without the support of qualitative data, they nevertheless represent useful ideal-types which
go beyond simple participant/non-participant distinctions. Of particular interest are the
categories which indicate engagement without participation, as the issue is not so much the
valuing of politics than the inability or unwillingness to convert this into political action (at
least according to the survey’s definition). In their study of interest groups, Jordan and
Maloney (2006; 2007) identify a similar intersectional category called the ‘concerned,
unmobilised’. Drawing on the same survey data as Pattie et al. (2004), they found that only a
third of respondents who felt strongly about environmental politics were members of
environmental organisations (Jordan and Maloney, 2007: 37). Some questioned the efficacy
of such memberships, though others may instead have lacked certain pathways or resources
to become more active and consequently remain ‘unconverted’. Separating and explaining
each of these two categories will be a key consideration in this study.
Measuring youth participation
One of the most common findings from UK political participation surveys is that young
people are more disconnected from politics than any other age group. This can manifest itself
in a number of ways, with 18-24 year-olds found to be the least politically active age group
(Hansard, 2010), less interested in formal politics (Heath and Park, 1997), and less likely to
identify with any particular party (Furlong and Cartmel, 2012). This has led to (or perhaps
reinforced) social and political commentators’ portrayal of contemporary youth as an ‘apathy
generation’ or ‘Thatcher’s airheads’ (Toynbee, 1997; Hiscock, 2001), who ‘plug in, recharge
their batteries, and bop along giving not a damn about the burning world around them’
(Agger, 2009: 49). To understand the causes of such trends requires a careful avoidance of
such normative depictions, not least as there are problems disentangling specific generational
properties from more regular life-cycle effects (Henn et al, 2002).
Despite these concerns, survey research by Henn et al (2002) indicates that the majority of
young people do discuss politics with their friends and family at least some of the time.
Follow-up research by Henn and Foard (2012) supports these findings, with two-thirds
claiming to have at least some interest in politics. This calls into question the notion that
youth non-participation in formal politics is synonymous with apathy: certainly, as Eden and
Roker (2000) point out, one can be cynical and engaged at the same time. Moreover, it raises
the question of how political engagement is measured: Marsh et al (2007) claim that many
large-scale participation surveys are guilty of employing a preconceived definition of politics
which is too narrow and inflexible to take account of changes in participatory patterns. Henn
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et al. (2002) agree, arguing that surveys presuppose a common understanding between
researcher and respondent, allowing for the reproduction of certain assumptions about what
politics should mean, regardless of their applicability to all social cleavages in contemporary
society.
Interestingly, Hansard’s 2009 audit reports that younger people (18-24) are more enthusiastic
about the effectiveness of ‘campaigning’ (broadly defined) than other age groups: 57 per
cent see it as effective, compared with the overall average of 47 per cent. This creates a
contradiction between young people’s attitude towards activism, and their apparent
qualifications as activists: nearly half of 18-24 year-olds have signed a petition and the
majority are enthusiastic about the efficacy of campaigning, yet young people are apparently
less active than any other age group. This raises the question that if young people are broadly
receptive to activism, what are they doing exactly?
Norris (2003) argues that young people increasingly favour ‘cause-oriented’ styles of
politics. This is distinct from ‘citizen-oriented’ actions in that they are as likely to target
corporations and communities into enacting change as they are government. Bang (2004: 14)
takes this further, claiming that contemporary young activists are more interested in
enhancing their capacities for self-governance and co-governance than ‘submitting
themselves to an abstract social norm or mode of state citizenship’. In this sense, political
identity is acquired not through citizenship but from being ‘ordinarily engaged in the
construction of networks and locales for the political governance of the social’, making them
‘everyday makers’ of politics (Ibid: 26). Significantly, this entails a political engagement
more on individuals’ own terms: unlike the consistent, long-term commitments of party
membership, everyday makers are more likely to switch their engagement on and off
depending on their own personal interests and availabilities. This emphasis on flexibility and
short-termism not only runs parallel to the greater demands for mobility in the labour market,
but also complements Bauman’s (2000) observation that identity has transformed from a
given to a ‘task’.
Young people’s apparent disconnection from formal politics is understandably an issue of
concern for politicians and officials, who fear that this attitude will persist as they progress
through their adult lives. Yet as Howker and Malik (2010) argue, contemporary youth have
much to be concerned with when it comes to their own material interests. Whereas the so-
called ‘baby boomers’ were well placed to prosper from post-war opportunities such as free
university education, affordable housing and the services of a burgeoning welfare state,
Howker and Malik argue that today’s youth have become ‘lab-rats in a decades-long
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economic experiment’ of neoliberal policy (2010: 76). They depict a ‘jilted generation’ of
young men and women burdened by student debt, their earning opportunities stunted by a
depressed and risk-conscious employment market, and ultimately expected to make up the
difference in public sector costs as their parents’ generation grows older.
What is less clear, however, is the extent to which contemporary youth possess a
‘generational consciousness’ to match these social conditions. In their survey data, Henn and
Foard (2012) find that young people are especially concerned with issues related to the
economy, education funding and unemployment. Furlong and Cartmel (2012) find similar
results, but note also that the political concerns of the so-called ‘Generation Y’ are not
particularly different from older generations. Certainly, it is clear from both surveys that
young people are untrusting of politicians and cynical towards the efficacy of the democratic
process. This can be seen to be rooted in experience as much as perception, with Marsh et al.
(2007) noting how young people have tended to be treated more as ‘political apprentices’
than citizens in their own right. Kimberlee (2002) traces the growing marginalisation of
youth access in UK political parties, noting the scaling down of the major parties’ youth
wings, as well as the sharp decline in parliamentary candidates under the age of 30. Roberts
and Sachdev (1996) point to parties’ reluctance to target young people electorally as it runs
the risk of alienating their larger and more reliable core of older voters. Marsh et al (2007:
117) also note that attempts to bring youth back into the political process – such as the
Young People’s Parliament model – are based on a didactic model of participation and
consequently possess little or no binding effect on policymakers.
Perhaps the most prominent (and relevant for this study) example of state attempts to
enhance youth political engagement concerns the introduction of compulsory citizenship
classes in secondary schools. Despite the Government-commissioned Crick Report’s
recommendation that classes should promote ‘political engagement’ and ‘concern for the
common good’, Cunningham and Lavalette (2004) found that the citizenship curriculum
instead prioritised civic duty and obedience. This distinction was made all the more manifest
by the fact that the classes were introduced around the same time as Britain’s decision to
support the United States and invade Iraq in 2003. Protest against the war was large in scale
and reach across the world, though in the UK protests became notable for their youth
involvement: according to the journalist Libby Brooks, the protests featured ‘the most
significant child-led campaign for a century’ as ‘schoolchildren as young as 10 walked out of
their classrooms to attend what were, for most, their first political demonstrations’ (Brooks,
2003; quoted in Cunningham and Lavalette, 2004: 259-60). Whilst Cunningham and
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Lavelette’s interviews with school protest participants suggest that they were ‘showing an
awareness of international issues and events’ and a ‘concern for the common good’ as
originally envisaged by the Crick Report, they found that LEAs and teacher associations
tended to view the protests instead as a disciplinary issue.
In summary, youth political participation is subject to life-cycle effects, generational effects
and also broader trends and attitudes that transcend age groupings. All of these impact on
how we might measure youth participation. There is evidence to suggest that part of the
reason young people appear disconnected from formal politics is that they are afforded very
little attention from government and policymakers, whereas research by Bang (2004) and
Marsh et al. (2007) indicates that young people are less likely to perform well in
participation surveys because they favour a cause-oriented politics that does not necessarily
conform to consistent, repeatable forms of civic engagement. It is for this reason that the
case study of the student fees against fees and cuts is interesting: not only does it reflect in
the most part an instance of large-scale protest participation against government, it is also a
case that has its roots in attempts by the Liberal Democrats to appeal to the youth vote by
pledging to abolish tuition fees. It is therefore important to conduct research that captures
students’ engagement and participation whilst avoiding conflation or essentialism. To
effectively do this, we need to explore the nature of political activism repertoires and why
participants might find them to be more efficacious and meaningful than formal participation
repertoires.
3. Social movement repertoires: costs, risks and efficacies
Protest might be the most obvious form of social movement participation, but not all forms
of social movement participation necessarily count as protest. The basic objective of protest
is to give what Tilly (2004) calls ‘WUNC displays’ i.e. displays of worthiness, unity,
numbers and commitment directed at holders of power and influence (or society more
generally). Protest of course requires protesters, and although it is common for organisers to
set themselves mobilisation targets, one should be wary of automatically equating size with
success. It is not necessary, for example, that all 3 million Greenpeace members take part in
the shutting down of a power station for the protest to be considered successful. For a whole
host of reasons, protest rarely attracts anything close to a 100 per cent turnout of its
sympathetic public, although the inability to do so is seldom used to explain a protest’s
failure. Of course, ensuring and increasing protest turnout is undoubtedly extremely
important to its success, but participation recruitment should ultimately be seen as a means to
an end rather than an end in itself (Klandermans, 1997).
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To successfully mobilise a suitable number of participants, protest usually requires some
degree of organisation, and by proxy, organisers with the knowledge, skills and resources
for planning and publicising an event and defining its political purpose. This is certainly the
view of social movement scholars associated with ‘political process theory’: Tilly (2004), for
example, argues that social movement campaigns are often the work of ‘social movement
entrepreneurs’ e.g. actors or small groups who identify issues or grievances in need of public
attention, synthesise ideas, and deploy them in a way that can stimulate social and political
change. As this illustrates, social movement participation is more than just protesting, though
the precise nature of ‘leadership’ and ‘organising’ roles vary greatly according to a group’s
structure. In certain cases, a group’s founder(s) might become its de facto leader(s) via a
central committee, whereas others might seek to disperse power democratically throughout
its participants, with decision-making decided upon by vote or consensus (Pickerill and
Chatterton, 2006). This impacts on how an individual might be expected to participate more
generally: it might involve holding an elected position, playing an active part in consensus
meetings, or simply being willing to muck in with various aspects of day-to-day
organisation.
It should also be noted that most political groups do not require or expect equal participation
from all members. Not all prospective protest participants have the same time and resources
to devote to activism, and so must choose ways of participating which suit their own
‘biographical availability’ (McAdam, 1986). This is made easier when protest campaigns
offer a range of different protest repertoires for individuals to participate in. Differences in
how individuals participate may be more problematic, however, when they are seen by some
to also reflect differences in commitment. This is more likely to cause tension among
participants in smaller groups where social ties and affinities are strong, as they tend to rely
more on the regular participation of core members for the group to continue. Moreover, as
Crossley (2007: 228) observes, ‘high density tends to produce trust’, and consequently
should certain individuals be judged to have compromised that trust in some way, conflict
may arise.
A further source of potential tension comes from variability in the length of time individuals
are prepared to devote to participating in an activist group. ‘Participation’ might of course
entail a single, one-off act of protest, or it might amount to an entire activist ‘career’. Whilst
attracting dedicated participants might be less of a concern for campaigns that have a
relatively brief lifespan, social movement groups and organisations tend to think in the long-
term. This usually reflects the enduring nature of campaigning issues – the identity politics
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of gender, race and sexuality; global concerns such as poverty, war and the environment; and
the ebb and flow of partisan politics is not going to go away anytime soon – and so groups
seek to recruit participants that will help build or maintain a group’s stake as a mobilising
and influencing force.
Repertoires of participation
So what might social movement participants actually do? McAdam (1986) offers a useful
starting point with his distinction between activism repertoires which are low or high in cost
and risk. Cost refers to the ‘expenditures of time, money and energy that are required of a
person engaged in any particular form of activism’, and risk refers to the ‘anticipated dangers
– whether legal, social, physical, financial, and so forth – of engaging in a particular type of
activity’ (McAdam, 1986: 67). Whilst such distinctions are of course useful, categorising
activism repertoires according to these measurements raises the important question of
context, especially in relation to risk: for example, in most cases the act of signing a public
petition will be low-risk given the lack of immediate physical interaction involved, but such
actions might prove dangerous in the long-run  if one is living in certain political contexts
(such as totalitarian states, or to use McAdam’s own example, the United States at the height
of McCarthyism).
Figure 2.2: Examples of high and low-cost/risk social movement participation in a generalised
Western context
High-cost/risk participation Low-cost/risk participation
Leading/organising a protest Signing a petition
Direct action (e.g. shutting down a meeting) Writing a letter
Taking part in a strike Boycotting consumer products/ethical shopping
Staging an occupation/sit-in Wearing a campaign badge
Computer hacking/distributing classified ‘Liking’ a political campaign/group on Facebook
Information Joining a social movement organisation
The examples of high and low-cost/risk participation shown in figure 2.2 are presented as
extreme ‘ideal types’. There are many forms of participation not included in the table, such
as attending demonstrations, meetings and conferences, giving speeches, and participating in
vigils, either because they are too variable an activity to be considered wholeheartedly as
high or low-cost/risk, or they are likely to sit somewhere in between. Tarrow (1995: 98)
notes how the more ‘confrontational’ and ‘violent’ forms of protest tend to be higher in cost
and risk and consequently harder to mobilise large numbers for. Low-cost/risk forms of
participation, on the other hand, tend to be more ‘conventional’ in character and can attract
large numbers more easily – a trend that is reflected in the participation percentages shown
in figure 2.1.
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Given their longstanding popularity among student activists (ibid), it is useful to focus on
two established protest repertoires – demonstrations and occupations/sit-ins – and consider
when and why they might be used by activists. Demonstrations are perhaps the most
commonly recognised protest repertoire of all. As Tilly (1976; 1995) observes, the idea of
taking to the streets to make collective claims has existed for thousands of years, though the
modern demonstration of organising public marches to protest on behalf of a specific
grievance has its roots in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe. Demonstrations became
more frequent during the interwar years of the twentieth century, and later gained
widespread prominence in the civil rights, student and anti-war protests of the 1960s, a
prominence enhanced by the growth of mass-media news coverage which often gave
demonstrations a real-time mediated as well as physical audience. According to Meyer and
Tarrow (1998: 4), public demonstrations have now become a ‘perpetual element in modern
life’, a point exemplified by the fact in many countries they are now written into state law
and policed accordingly (see McCarthy and McPhail, 1998).
Using Casquete’s (2006: 47) definition, a demonstration is ‘a collective gathering in a public
space whose aim is to exert political, social, and/or cultural influence on authorities, public
opinion and participants through the disciplined and peaceful expression of an opinion or
demand’. In this sense, demonstrations embody Tilly’s ‘WUNC display’ very clearly. A
demonstration does not really seek to achieve its aims through the act of demonstrating per
se: rather its power depends on its mediation, visibility and symbolic salience to force others
– usually institutions of authority, or society itself – to meet its demands. Moreover, finding
oneself surrounded by a multitude of like-minded people may provide separate process
benefits to demonstrating, both strategically – participants having opportunities to sign up to
campaign mailing lists and gain new activism contacts – and also in the sense that protesting
can be exciting, empowering and fun (Jasper, 1997: 197).
When considering the cost of participating in a demonstration, one should acknowledge first
that demonstrations are a diverse tactic and certain cases will demand more from participants
than others. In general, though, demonstration participation can be understood as an activity
that takes time out of one’s day, requires a certain amount of physical exertion, and obliges
its participants to physically identify themselves with the cause in question. In the latter case,
it should be added that the cause may also end up identifying them, since the visibility of
their actions might result in activists having to defend their beliefs and actions to others
(ibid). Beyond these basics, however, the potential for increased costs and risks depends on a
multitude of factors, including where and when the demonstration is taking place, the extent
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to which the demonstration co-operates with police provision, the contentiousness of the
issue, the numbers of participants involved, and even the weather conditions on the day. Nor
are risks and costs necessarily dependent on how one participates in the demonstration: large,
uncontrolled demonstrations with too much or too little police provision may become
intimidating and dangerous places to be, whereas small, carefully-organised and peaceful
rallies might in contrast demand very little from participants.
If the goals of demonstrations ultimately depend on their ability to pressurise others to meet
demands, the goals of occupations are more closely tied to the process of protesting itself
(Pickerill and Chatterton, 2006; Hopkins et al, 2011). Put simply, occupations are predicated
on a desire to physically reclaim space and in so doing, remind authorities or society at large
of the power of individual agency. Although there are numerous different types of
occupations, they tend to draw on one of two distinct protest traditions (and sometimes
both). The first is the occupation-as-strike, which draws on the history of labour movements
and is thus predominantly demands-based e.g. calling for better pay or working conditions.
Combined as they often are with strikes and walkouts, the taking of the space becomes a
bargaining tool i.e. ‘we are not leaving until you do this’, and consequently locations are
chosen on the basis of their capacity to disrupt the normal running and output of the
organisation. Historical examples of this include the Alfa Romeo car plant occupation in
Milan in 1920, the UAW Flint Sit-Down Strike in Michigan in the 1930s, as well as student
sit-ins to protest against separate male-female dormitories at UK universities in the 1960s
(Mason, 2008: 249-50; Fine, 1965; Crouch, 1970).
The second tradition is occupation-as-camp, which takes a more long-term, communal
approach to claiming space. These are seldom framed by demands placed on others, but are
arguably more politically ambitious through their desire to build ‘futures in the present’
(Pickerill and Chatterton, 2006). In practice, this may involve practicing alternative
democratic systems, living according to certain moral and ethical ideals, or experimenting
with sustainable lifestyles ‘between the cracks of capitalism’ (Holloway, 2010). This can
serve to transform the consciousness of its participants, as well as those who come to visit
and learn about the space. As this suggests, these are also inherently social spaces, allowing
participants and visitors to ‘meet, build trust and develop shared goals and strategies’
(Schein, 2012: 337) and thus build towards a ‘revolution from below’.
Camp occupations are often formed initially around existing social movement groups,
coalitions and networks. They can also take place in a range of different locations:
occupations requiring little more than planning and discussion spaces may choose to occupy
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empty buildings as de facto squats, whereas those targeting specific locations with a view of
shutting down certain facilities and activities in the process are more resolutely protest-
oriented. Examples of this include Faslane and Greenham Common anti-war camps in the
1980s (McKay, 1996), and the Camp for Climate Action which took place at numerous UK
power stations in the late 2000s (Saunders, 2010). More recently, the occupation repertoire
has been used for occupying public spaces to visualise the ‘emancipatory possibilities’ of
new political subjectivities, as evidenced in citizens’ occupation of Tahrir Square in Egypt,
which later inspired Occupy Wall Street and the subsequent global ‘Occupy’ movement
(Kerton, 2012; Pickerill and Krinsky, 2012; Graeber, 2013).
Whilst not a new tactic (Tiananmen Square in 1989 being perhaps the most notable historical
example), public occupations have succeeded in giving radical politics a great deal of
coverage, evoking Lefebvre’s (1996) formulation of citizens’ ‘right to a city’ in a manner
that through their global mediation, dramatise ideals of autonomy and agency in ways that
might otherwise go unnoticed. As this suggests, occupations can be considered high-cost/risk
due to the time, energy and commitment they generally demand from participants to set up
and maintain camps, especially when under the threat of forced eviction or arrest. Whilst
these costs and risks might deter some from becoming involved, participation can also
produce an ‘affective commitment’ among members which often encourages continued
participation (Klandermans, 1997).
In contrast to the social and interactional properties of high-cost/risk participation, low-
cost/risk participation tends to be more individualistic in character. Although not best suited
to demonstrating protest commitment, activities such as petitions, co-ordinated letter-writing
campaigns or SMO memberships can be produced to provide quick and efficient displays of
support for an issue or cause using what Della Porta and Diani (2006: 171) call ‘the logic of
numbers’. Alternatively, grassroots repertoires such as wearing badges, consumer boycotts,
and ethical shopping can be useful for raising awareness of an issue, promoting a cause or
campaign, or helping to challenge certain everyday practices and assumptions.
In many ways, petitions have much in common with demonstrations, given that much of
their traction derives from the ability to provide evidence of the scale of public feeling.
Unlike demonstrations, however, petitions can be produced at relatively little notice and cost
and physically presented to a target. Perhaps in light of this, petitions can function as
effective snap-polls which expose democratic deficits in an authority’s decision-making.
Power often comes from the speed and the scale of the response: whereas demonstrations
require time to organise and mobilise, petitions can mobilise more people into registering
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their views without them having to do so simultaneously (see for example, Kaldor, 2000:
112). Petitions arguably also have a clarity and sincerity in which their purpose can be
articulated – whereas demonstrations can sometimes become receptacles for multiple groups
campaigning with different aims, the aims of a petition are fixed and clearly stated from the
outset giving signatories a clear, collective focus.
Online activism: creating new repertoires?
Much of the discussion so far has focused on repertoires conducted ‘offline’. Until recently
this distinction would be of little significance, but there is increasing evidence to suggest that
a fair amount of political consumption, debate and action now takes place online – especially
among young people (Banaji and Buckingham, 2012; Coleman and Blumler, 2009; Anduiza
et al, 2009). Broadly speaking, one can argue that the internet has three main uses for
activists: as a means of organisation, a means of producing and consuming information, and
as a field for political action. Increasingly, however, distinguishing between these uses has
become difficult, especially since the advent of the user-as-producer world of ‘Web 2.0’
(Hands, 2011). This section will focus on online repertoires of protest, including repertoires
of ‘communication power’ (Castells, 2009) which arguably blur the lines of media
production and protest participation.
To begin, one should acknowledge the significance of the internet for increasing the reach of
existing protest repertoires. Perhaps the most prominent example of this is the e-petition. E-
petitions are capable of speeding up the process of petitioning whilst reducing organising
costs, enabling them to be created and distributed with such speed that they can provide
almost immediate feedback to an issue of concern as it unfolds. These attributes are borne
out in recent research data: for example, the Oxford Internet Survey found that between 2007
and 2011 the percentage of people who had signed an online petition doubled to 14 per cent,
whereas those doing so offline fell from 20 to 18 per cent (Dutton and Blank, 2011).
The proliferation of e-petitions across the web is aided by the fact that they are often built
using freely-available multi-access software. In recent years, however, e-petitions have also
become useful tools for bringing multi-participatory citizenship into the governmental
process: Adams et al (2005) note how Scottish Parliament pioneered the use of e-petitions by
integrating them into the political process via a Public Petitions Committee, who screen and
forward them to relevant departments. This initiative was then introduced by the UK
Government in 2006, with the attached promise that petitions with over 100,000 signatories
would be debated in Parliament. By 2012 its website had received over 8 million signatures
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from over 5 million unique email addresses (Hale et al, 2012). Similar to this are online
groups and pages on the social networking site Facebook where users are invited to register
their support by joining or ‘liking’ them. Although primarily used to distribute information
and invitations to offline protest events, the act of ‘liking’ a politics page has begun to gain
significance for its capacity to generate large numbers. Each of the main UK political parties
now has its own official Facebook page, with Labour and the Conservatives both having
around 150,000 likes – figures comparable to their own formal party memberships (Bartlett
et al, 2013).
More expressive forms of online activism have emerged since the advent of ‘Web 2.0’,
broadly defined as ‘the proliferation of user-created content and websites specifically built as
frameworks for the sharing of information and for social networking, and platforms for self-
expression’ (Hands, 2011: 79). Web 2.0 represents a significant step in the rise of what
Castells (2007; 2009) calls ‘communication power’, which has emerged from the
exponential increase in peer-to-peer communications technology usage, from mobile phones
to WiFi networks, and now serves as a platform for individuals to produce forms of ‘counter
power’ via social networking, blogging and file-sharing. Counter power emerges from the
establishing of new norms of interaction – particularly among young people – as online
platforms provide network access on a global scale for users to both access forms of
information they wish to receive and also find and engage with like-minded people (Nah et
al. 2006; Bennett, 2008; Theocharis, 2012).
Crucially, Web 2.0 has resulted in the blurring of user and content provider, creating so-
called ‘prosumers’. This has transformed media consumption to the extent that institutional,
mainstream media increasingly looks to independent content providers for its information:
either as smartphone-equipped ‘monitorial citizens’ who act as ‘witnesses at the scene’
(Banaji and Buckingham, 2012: 168) or as alternative ‘participatory journalists’ (Deuze,
2003). There is some debate as to whether media production of this kind is a facilitator of
protest or a form of protest in itself. Certainly, it has long been part of the culture of protest,
from the Walter Benjamin-inspired proliferation of radical ‘zines’ in the 1960s and 1970s, to
the autonomist ‘be the media’ sloganeering of the alter-globalization movement in the late
1990s (Lievrouw, 2011). It is clear that participatory journalism has a significant political
objective within the media itself – namely providing first-hand accounts of events otherwise
ignored or given one-sided coverage in the mainstream press – but its efficacy as a form of
protest in its own right is perhaps more questionable. Certainly, it can ‘raise awareness’ and
influence public opinion into taking action, but taken in isolation participatory journalism is
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perhaps overly dependent on a Habermasian faith in the potential of online communication
networks to operate as a newly virtualised public sphere, facilitating the free distribution of
information and ultimately enabling the better argument to come out on top.
Comparing high and low-cost/risk repertoires
Discussions around the purpose of certain protest repertoires can easily lead to more
normative questions over what constitutes ‘good’ or ‘effective’ activism. Although social
movement scholars tend to avoid such debates, protest repertoires can at least be measured in
terms of the costs and risks they demand from participants, which can sometimes be taken as
a measure of their normative protest ‘value’. For example, high-cost/risk repertoires are
usually practiced by groups and movements who advocate a hitherto-marginalised politics,
necessitating more radical and eye-catching ways of garnering attention. Because of the
commitment involved, participants might sometimes make value judgments on groups and
individuals who are seemingly less committed than themselves (e.g. Saunders, 2008: 247).
On the flipside, Bobel (2007) found in his interviews with feminist group members how
some felt they had failed to live up to the ‘perfect standard’ of participation as practiced by
others, and consequently felt self-conscious about self-defining as ‘activists’.
If high-cost/risk participants sometimes brood over whether their involvement reaches these
perfect standards, those involved in predominantly low-cost/risk participation are sometimes
questioned over whether their activities constitute activism at all. For mobilising agencies
such as Avaaz.org which deal mostly in petitions and coordinated template letter-writing
campaigns, their defence is that low-cost/risk activism is both efficacious in its own right and
serves to mobilise individuals who do not have the time or resources to be more physically
active (Patel, 2007). This view is questioned by Morozov (2009), who claims that these
repertoires have a more nefarious effect, namely creating the illusion of having a more
worthwhile impact whilst reducing motivations to engage in higher-cost/risk (and thereby
more effective) forms. In other words, ‘slacktivism’ promises all the glory and personal
satisfaction of social movement participation, but with none of the engagement, endeavour
or responsibility that should come with it. Moreover, authors such as Putnam (2000) and
Gladwell (2010) argue that low-cost/risk forms of activism on their own are too
individualised and noncommittal to build the necessary strong social ties that are integral to
successful campaign groups and social movements in the long-term.
Of course, low-cost/risk repertoires have their limitations. One can argue that they work best
when targeting a specific issue and have a particular audience in mind. Whereas an anti-
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capitalist occupation might make sense as part of an overall ‘revolution from below’ ethos, a
petition denouncing capitalism would arguably be of little use. That is not to say petitions
cannot be deployed for the ‘big issues’: as the alter-globalization and Occupy movements
have demonstrated, petitions can operate as a useful auxiliary to other, more high-cost/risk
repertoires (Della Porta and Diani, 2006: 165). They can help illustrate a population’s
broader support and solidarity for activists engaged in high-cost forms of protest. This is
especially useful for those people unable to physically take part but who wish to register
their support in a meaningful way. ‘Slacktivist’ arguments also imply that low and high
cost/risk participation is a zero-sum relationship, meaning that individuals who ‘like’ a cause
on Facebook automatically feel extricated from the need to attend demonstrations and
suchlike. This, however, makes the doubtful assumption that both are subject to equivalent
recruitment processes. This of course leads us to the issue of mobilisation, and the context
through which individuals are invited to participate. This is a key focus for the next section.
4. Theories of political mobilisation
Explaining how people might come to participate is a separate question to explaining why
people participate – after all, most activists will state that they share a movement’s
grievances and wish to act in order to help it achieve its goals. Yet sharing grievances is not
necessarily enough to inspire individuals to participate. Given that social movements require
collective action, explaining how individuals participate requires the study of political
mobilisation. This might be self-determined (where groups of people collectively decide to
do something) or it might be brought about via invitations and call-outs from existing
political agencies. Approaches to mobilisation can cover a variety of different fields of
research, and although some focus on civic participation and electoral politics rather than
social movement activism, each is worthy of discussion here for the variety of theoretical
and empirical approaches to studying participation, as well as the ways in which they explain
non-participation.
Mobilisation as rational incentive
The first major theoretical approach to explaining political mobilisation draws on economic
theories of voter and citizen behaviour in US political science approaches in the 1960s, most
notably in Olson’s (1965) theory of collective action. Olson firmly held the view that
mobilisation was not a natural or spontaneous process for individuals. Rather, members ‘will
not act to advance their common or group objectives unless there is coercion to force them to
do so, or some separate incentive distinct from the achievement of the common or group
interest, is offered to the members of the group individually (Olson, 1965: 2, original
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emphasis). Whereas the former stimulus referred to action determined by belonging to dense
social collectives such as trade unions, the latter opened up a more nefarious aspect of
mobilisation: that given the choice, assuming a group is likely to be successful in achieving
its goals an individual’s incentive to participate is in fact reduced. This is because the actor’s
contribution is not vital to the group achieving its objectives, nor does it provide the actor
with any cost-benefit value beyond those derived from the group’s objectives, which are
likely to be achieved regardless. In this context, the rational choice is to not participate and
‘free-ride’ on the group’s successes.
Olson’s theory is arguably useful for understanding mobilisation strategies employed by
political agencies that in the pursuit of consistently-high membership strategies clearly have
incentives of their own. However, its theorisation of individual participation has been
criticised for employing a fixed definition of rationality which disregards the specificity of a
group’s political goals, strategies and repertoires. In addition, participation might appear
rational for reasons other than the realising of explicit political goals, including more
intangible social or moral benefits. Moreover, Olson’s depiction of the decision not to act
has little grounding in any sort of social and cultural context. As Crossley (2008) argues, the
theory assumes that people only participate on the condition of equal involvement, which
might not be necessary or relevant to a movement’s organisation. Additionally, participating
actors may not have the resources to make an ‘equal’ contribution to the group’s activities.
An attempt to provide more relational context to the individualistic drives depicted by Olson
can be found in resource mobilisation theory (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). It takes the view
that contentious politics is really played out by those who are the most socially connected
rather than disaffected, given that most people sympathetic to a cause seldom convert this
into sustained action. This again emphasises the importance of mobilising agencies for
explaining participation. Large and small groups and campaigns advertise participation
through the production and distribution of flyers, leaflets, posters or news articles so as to
access a critical mass of individuals, some of whom might be predisposed to take part. Acts
of protest, too, may serve partially as means of recruitment, attracting intrigued onlookers
who though conversation with activists and/or the receiving of flyers and leaflets might feel
like getting involved.
The argument put forward here is that mobilising agencies seek to present joining their group
or campaign as the rational choice for politically-minded individuals unsure of how best to
mobilise their concerns. Whilst this approach succeeds in opening up mobilisation as a two-
way relationship, it implies a process divorced from any social or cultural context such as
47
biographical availability or information access. Recalling the earlier discussion of online
activism repertoires, it is also questionable how relevant this theory is to a new, more
networked context where social movement entrepreneurship is less dependent on
professionalised mobilising agencies. Moreover, mobilisation is also depicted mechanically
and even cynically, assuming that the likelihood of mobilisation is somehow calculable – a
view perhaps not relevant to all protest repertoires.
An attempt to provide a more nuanced definition of rationality can be found in Verba and
Nie’s theory of ‘civic voluntarism’ (Verba and Nie, 1972; Verba et al. 1995). This theory
identifies three factors that account for political mobilisation and non-mobilisation. First,
access to resources (defined as time, money and civic skills) determines whether individuals
can, or cannot, participate. Second, psychological factors related to the individual’s sense of
political efficacy determine whether an individual wants to participate or not. Third, and
finally, formal and informal recruitment networks – be they social networks of friends,
family and colleagues, or the recruitment strategies of political agencies – determine whether
an individual has been asked to join or not. The core idea of this model, therefore, is that
resources which aid participation are the product of social structures of class and education,
and that individuals in possession of these resources are more likely to participate.
This model is convincing insofar as socio-economic status broadly correlates to levels of
political participation, with high-status individuals over-represented in the category of very
active participants, and under-represented among the inactive (Verba and Nie 1972: 131-3).
However, as Pattie et al. (2004) point out, using socio-economic status as a predictor of
participation and civic values fails to explain why large numbers of high-status individuals
do not participate in politics. Moreover, the theory does not account for why countries with
higher educational rates do not have consistently higher civic participation and voter turnout.
In other words, political engagement requires explanation beyond the economic capital of
participants.
In sum, one can argue that rational choice approaches to mobilisation are somewhat
restricted by the underlying assumption that individuals consciously choose whether to
participate or not from the options presented to them. According to Marsh et al (2007) this
presupposes politics as an identifiable ‘arena’ that one consciously enters into (along with an
awareness of, and respect for, the rules of the game) rather than as an evolving, multifaceted
lived experience. This arguably reflects a case bias towards electoral politics where
‘participation’ tends to be more formally represented through membership and voting. This
limits their applicability for protest participation: unlike parties or civic agencies, movements
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are often more fluid and unpredictable. Participation can come in many different forms,
making participatory incentives more difficult to predict, especially in newly-formed
movements.
Mobilisation through emotional cognition
Perhaps unsurprisingly, rational choice perspectives tend to say little about the mobilising
power of the political issues themselves – after all, if grievances alone explained
participation there would be no such thing as non-conversion. Nevertheless, authors such as
Gamson (1992), Jasper (1997) and Goodwin et al (2001) have argued for the need to look
deeper into how certain grievances might generate particular emotional responses that
become significant for mobilising individuals into taking action. To clarify the relationship
between emotion and mobilisation, Jasper (2006) adapts Giddens’s (1991) distinctions
between practical consciousness, discursive consciousness, and the unconscious. Whereas
the first relates to explicit, reflexive thought and action, the second two are more instinctive
and harder to articulate. Jasper’s key argument here is that emotions originate not singularly
from the discursive level (as is perhaps assumed in rational choice approaches) or the
unconscious level (as found in Freudian psychology) but from all three levels, often
simultaneously.
Furthering his argument, Jasper claims that this produces a range of different emotional
responses – urges, moods, reflexes – but it is moral emotions that are of most interest here.
These often arise out of individuals’ reactions to and beliefs about the world we live in, a
sort of ‘moral habitus’ that we carry around with ourselves and add to through experience.
Emotions play to our internalised sense of reason and justice, and as Jasper argues, these
‘moral shocks’ frequently lead to action. According to Gamson (1992: 32), this is because
moral emotions are the ‘hot cognitions’ that provide ‘the righteous anger that puts fire in the
belly and iron in the soul’. Moreover, acting according to one’s own moral code (especially
in the face of opposition) ‘feels good directly’ (Jasper, 2006: 167, original emphasis). In
contrast, those who do not perceive pleasures and satisfaction in such actions, or perhaps
have a more distant engagement with such moral emotions, are consequently less likely to
mobilise.
Emotions do not only come into play through individual responses to events: they can also
be used as a mobilisation device by social movement groups so as to appeal to individuals’
sense of morality, especially if the intended audience are not materially affected (Goodwin
and Jasper, 2006). Emotions can also be used to sustain participation through forging
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relations of solidarity and trust among activists, along with the enjoyment, pride and sense of
identity one might gain through belonging to certain activist cultures. As Jasper (1997: 220)
asserts, ‘virtually all the pleasures that humans derive from social life are found in protest
movements: a sense of community and identity; ongoing companionship and bonds with
others; the variety and challenge of conversation, co-operation and competition’.
Using emotions alone to explain mobilisation leaves some discernible gaps, arguably
creating opportunities for it to be used in tandem with other approaches. First, more needs to
be said about the role of knowledge in emotional and discursive engagement with a political
issue. Converting initial moral outrage into action often entails a deliberation process that
opens up a multitude of further choices – does one choose to participate in the first available
opportunity presented to them, or consider other options? If participation becomes a question
of choice, by what criteria is this decision made? Echoing the arguments of Morozov (2011)
and Putnam (2000), low-cost/risk participation often has both the reach (especially online)
and the resources (especially in professional campaigns) to get to the front of the queue when
individuals are seeking opportunities to convert their moral outrage into action – does this
represent the most effective form of participation, or simply the most accessible? Deciding
which form of participation might be a daunting task, especially where certain choices are
high in cost and risk. Consequently, the acquisition of knowledge to decide on the best form
of action can be a never-ending process – unless one makes a leap of faith, one can end up
doing precisely nothing.
As this suggests, emotions can have a demobilising as well as mobilising effect on potential
activists. Political issues worthy of our attention might also create negative emotions, such as
helplessness, guilt, insecurity, anxiety and fear – and these might not necessarily be resolved
through participating in any of the available choices for action. This is especially prevalent in
political issues that do not lend themselves easily to goal-oriented campaigning – Norgaard
(2006), for example, found in her study of non-participation in climate change activism in
Norway that negative emotions were often collectively managed by individuals through
certain shared narratives. This is because of the significant social gap that exists between
emotional cognition and political action, making emotions ‘deeply embedded in and
reflective of social structure and culture’ (Norgaard, 2006: 379). An example of this in
practice was citizens’ use of ‘selective attention strategies’ to negotiate anxieties over
climate change. For some, this involved engaging in certain environmentally-friendly
activities so as to appear to be at least doing something. For others, even face-saving acts of
tokenism represented a leap of faith too far, preferring instead to ‘protect themselves’
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emotionally by controlling their exposure to information on climate change and avoiding
thinking too far ahead. Others adopted a ‘perspectival selectivity’ to deflect personal
responsibility in favour of narratives that express either an individual’s powerlessness to
effect meaningful change (i.e. ‘my participation doesn’t make a difference so why bother’)
or the supposed neglect and culpability of others (i.e. ‘we might not be perfect, but they are
far worse’).
Certainly, the act of protest involves putting oneself politically ‘out there’, and this
commitment has consequences for how individuals choose to present themselves publically.
The desire to maintain favourable images of the self in front of others recalls the social
psychology of impression management (Goffman, 1971), which in the case of politics, can
work both ways – in some contexts, political participation can be viewed extremely
positively, as individuals’ desires to act upon their moral code might draw admiration from
others. In other contexts, however, political participation may prove more troublesome. If, as
Bauman (2000) claims, identity has indeed become a ‘task’, then political identities are
‘stickier’ – demanding greater commitment from owners – than the floating, flexible and
short-term ‘consumer identities’ he identifies in Liquid Modernity. This, of course, remains
context-dependent, and Eliasoph (1998) in her study of the American Buffalo community
illustrates how in fields where narratives of apathy dominate, the idea of being politically
active invites ridicule rather than admiration:
Buffaloes… equated citizen involvement in toxics, disarmament, and foreign
policy with ‘protesting’, which meant ‘carrying a sign’, ‘standing out in a parking
lot with a sign’, ‘wearing sandals’: making a fool of oneself, ineffectually standing
out in the middle of nowhere. People who think they can have an effect on politics
are fools, who are puffing themselves up – and that would seriously violate
country-westerners' political etiquette. (Eliasoph, 1998: 135)
In sum, it can be argued that emotions are an important and often-overlooked raw material
for explaining social movement mobilisation and demobilisation. This raises important
questions about expectations of efficacy in political campaigns, as well as how apathy is
socially produced – questions which are central to this research project. Of course,
converting instinctive emotional responses into collective action (or inaction) requires
broader cultural contextualisation, which returns us to the social level. For this reason,
discussion of mobilisation theories will close on two final themes: theories of collective
identification, and theories of mobilisation fields and networks.
Mobilisation through collective identification
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In the theoretical approaches discussed so far, the concept of ‘collective identity’ is assumed
to exist as a by-product of other processes rather than being given its own explanatory
power. As we saw in chapter one, identity is a key element in Gamson’s (1992) definition of
a collective action frame, situated as an important bridge between grievance and agency.
Explaining its importance draws on social psychology, particularly theories of symbolic
interaction: Melucci (1988), for example, argues that political ends and means are decided
collectively by actors, which involves taking into consideration the limits and possibilities
provided by the environment in which they find themselves. From this negotiation, a sense
of the collective ‘we’ is produced, a vital shared disposition for generating protest activities.
At a strategic level, the ‘we’ determines the goals and repertoires a movement might adopt,
and at an interactional level it initiates a collective evolution in the beliefs, norms and
attitudes of its participants. It is out of these social, strategic and emotional experiences
among participants that a sense of collective identity can be produced, which helps to
strengthen and sustain movements beyond their initial mobilisation (Melucci, 1988).
There is some disagreement among scholars as to the importance of collective identity in
social movement studies. Typically, collective identity refers to both social and practical
relationships in the present, though Polletta and Jasper (2001) extend this to also include
shared imaginaries. Less clear, however, is whether the concept should be applied at a group
or movement level. Certainly, Melucci (1996), Klandermans (1992) and Diani (1992) are all
of the view that a stronger collective identity produces a stronger and more productive group.
However, beyond a basic shared interest, collective identity is more difficult to apply at a
movement level, as individual groups and networks might feature significant ideological,
organisational and tactical variation (Saunders, 2008). Furthermore, McDonald (2002)
claims that anarchist ‘DIY’ activist networks that make up much of the alter-globalization
movement reject the principle of collective identity as infringing on activists’ individual
autonomy. Consequently, collective identity is produced not by its interpersonal
relationships but by its actions – a distinction that might also be true of certain occupations
and protest camps.
Whilst McDonald refutes notions of collective identity for its perceived political uniformity,
the visibility and importance of a group’s actions (especially direct actions) may still be a
necessary part of creating a collective identity ‘product’. According to Snow (2001: 4) this
can act as ‘a powerful impetus to collective action’, and ‘the constructed social object to
which the movements’ protagonists, adversaries, and audience(s) respond’. A good example
of this would be Occupy Wall Street, which positioned the occupation tactic as a central part
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of its protest identity. This identity was then adopted by copycat camps across the world,
creating a worldwide Occupy Movement (Gitlin, 2013). As this suggests, collective identity
products may also be co-produced by actors outside of the initial movement – be they
political allies, opponents, or the media – though this raises the possibility of a semantic
struggle over what a movement’s collective identity ‘product’ should look like.
It can also be argued that McDonald’s emphasis on individual activist autonomy does not
necessarily refute Melucci’s (1988) depiction of collective identity as the outcome of a
group’s interpersonal relationships and shared experiences. Whilst these relationships and
experiences might not be seen as integral to the group’s overall decision-making,
occupations and protest camps arguably benefit from building of relationships of mutual
trust, respect and commitment between participants. Moreover, even whilst upholding a
strong sense of individual autonomy, Saunders’s (2008) research indicates that groups may
still coalesce around certain related social activities and cultural ‘lifestyles’. In this sense,
these shared experiences and lifestyles might not be dissimilar from the ‘shared meanings,
experiences and reciprocal emotional ties’ which Fominaya (2010: 397) sees as defining
outcome-based group collective identities. Exploring this further arguably requires a closer
analysis of the nature of these interactions, especially when considering how product and
outcome collective identities might facilitate (or prevent) mobilisation. This is the subject of
the final theoretical approach to be discussed.
Mobilisation through field and network access
The final discussion draws on two interrelated approaches to studying social movement
participation. The first is Crossley’s (2002) adaptation of Bourdieu’s (1977) theory of
practice to bring concepts of habitus and field into social movement analysis, and the second
concerns Diani and McAdam’s (2003) attempts to combine a unified theory and method of
social networks. Although possessing different theoretical backgrounds, both are arguably
trying to achieve the same thing, namely a micro-structural approach to social movement
mobilisation. Bourdieu’s theory holds that individuals make themselves in response to the
conditions that they find themselves in, and that become characterised by the knowledge and
dispositions they acquire and the concrete preferences they make. This reflects the
interaction and negotiation of one’s personal ‘habitus’ – the ongoing acquisition of schemas,
interests and dispositions that inform our social instincts – and the particular fields we enter,
which have their own norms and hierarchies of knowledge and behaviour.
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Applied to social movements, Crossley (2003) argues that this proposes an intuitive rather
than rational basis for mobilisation, with individuals acting according to what feels
appropriate personally and socially. To be an activist therefore requires a ‘radical habitus’
which is acquired through sustained engagement with activism fields. There are two
significant points here. First, the theory places important emphasis on the process of
acquiring an activist identity or disposition. One does not become an activist simply by
choosing to be one – he or she is expected to acquire distinct forms of political knowledge
(why one is supporting a cause and the ideals behind it), the social and cultural capital that
generate opportunities to participate, and the practical knowledge and experience of
participating. These cannot be acquired easily, and new recruits may find themselves under-
resourced in their initial experiences of activism. Second, this theory highlights the
embeddedness of social agents, where choices, priorities and opportunities are framed by the
fields and networks they belong to. This directly challenges the rational choice assumption
that decision-making processes are highly individualistic, whilst breaking down the
participatory opportunities provided by collective action frames to a more interactional,
micro-structural level.
For some activists, embeddedness in activism fields has its roots in their family and
upbringing. Coles (1986), for example, observes how children learn about the political world
through the experiences and attitudes of their parents and family. Political socialisation can
be understood at different levels: for some, it might mean the specific and comprehensive
absorption of values, ideologies and practices, whereas for others it might simply mean a
basic appreciation of political engagement and an encouragement to express oneself
politically. In their life-course study of youth activist leaders from the 1960s, Braungart and
Braungart (1990) found that most had followed the political direction of their parents’
politics, albeit in different ways and to different degrees. Some reflected on the influence of
their early exposure to activism through parents taking them picketing, whereas for others a
more general inspiration came from activism having played a part in their family history. In
their early familiarity with political texts and ideologies, the emotional inheritance of a
family political history, or the practical experiences gained through participating in protest
activities, it is clear that political socialisation equips activists with a habitus that gives them
a head-start for activism opportunities later in life.
Given this variation in socialisation narratives, there is a need to explain mobilisation beyond
simple cultural reproduction. Crossley draws inspiration for his approach from McAdam’s
(1986) study of the conditions that facilitated high-cost/risk participation in the 1964
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Freedom Summer project. McAdam argued that applicants were more likely to end up
participating if they already had memberships in other political organisations, had prior
activism experience, and knew other people also involved in the project. This places greater
emphasis on the social costs of decision-making, where fulfilling social obligations and
expectations might initially seem more important than the politics of the issue itself.
McAdam found that applicants with personal links, a political background and prior
experience of activism were better equipped to perceive and prepare for participation,
especially when it is high-cost/risk. In contrast, those without such attributes were more
inclined to lose their nerve and withdraw their application, which given their lack of social
connections, carried less social burden of ‘letting the side down’. This case study led
McAdam to theorise a model of recruitment for high-cost/risk activism (see figure 2.3).
Figure 2.3: McAdam’s (1986) model of recruitment to high-cost/risk activism
Although one can argue that individuals already equipped with an activist habitus through
family political socialisation might be fast-tracked through this recruitment process,
McAdam’s model is useful for visualising the paths (and barriers) to activism mobilisation,
as well as how participants develop into committed activists. Given its emphasis on
accessing participatory opportunities, as well as the social context of decision-making, it is
perhaps unsurprising that both Crossley (2002, 2007) and McAdam (Diani and McAdam,
2003) are drawn to studying social networks. This is a growing area of study in social
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movements (Diani, 2004; Crossley and Ibrahim, 2012) with scholars applying McAdam’s
initial model to other empirical cases and, in so doing, separating predictive processes from
relational ones. In their study of Italian environmental activists, Diani and Lodi (1988) found
that 78 per cent had been recruited through private or associational networks, a finding
supported in similar work carried out by Della Porta (1988). Network theorists have also
pointed out a potential weakness in McAdam’s initial model, where the recruitment process
appears to exist separately from other networks. In particular, the relationship between
‘biographical availability’ – which might contain ties with different networks – and the
activism one is considering participating in, warrants further exploration. This led McAdam
to qualify his position somewhat by arguing that commitment to a particular identity,
reinforced by ties to participants, was a stronger predictor of participation than prior
organisational involvement on its own (McAdam and Paulsen, 1993).
As recalled in the previous discussion, ‘outcome’ collective identities arguably play a key
role in how individual protest networks sustain participation and membership. Returning to
figure 2.3, taking part in high-cost/risk activism enters the participant into a cycle of network
integration, which increases the chances of deepening ideological socialisation and
identification, which in turn leads to further participation. From a network perspective, this
entails the accumulation and strengthening of ties with other activists whilst simultaneously
diluting the effect of non-network ties that might discourage activism. These strong activist
ties may exist both objectively and symbolically, as the practice of shared activities helps
strengthen personal affinities and vice-versa. Consequently, the overall network becomes
denser as individual ties strengthen, producing relations of trust which set the foundation for
further acts of high cost/risk participation (Crossley, 2003; 2007) and discourage members
from leaving (McPherson et al, 1992).
Whilst dense networks clearly have their advantages for building and sustaining movements,
they also carry risks when networks start to operate as ‘cliques’. This may depend on a
group’s internal structure, as dispersed democratic groups might be more eager to reflect on
their decision-making processes than strictly hierarchical groups, but this can only help
negotiate rather than overcome the probability some activists will be more experienced,
better resourced or more ‘biographically available’ than others. Saunders (2008) found in her
study of radical environmental groups that network relationships can incorporate subcultural
elements which help legitimise and reinforce group relationships. These elements might
make groups seem inaccessible to newcomers, especially when social dynamics and values
are assumed or unspoken (such as informal hierarchies, language choices etc).
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Network approaches can also explain aspects of non-participation. First, a primary
socialisation that pays little or no attention to politics, or perceives social movement activism
to be illegitimate or dangerous is likely to discourage individuals from participating unless
they find themselves in strong and persuasive networks where activism is strongly valued.
Second, individuals with political interests but no network context through which to
participate might find it difficult to seek out protest opportunities, and if they do, the
experience of protesting alone might seem boring or alienating (McAdam, 1986). Moreover,
activist participation draws on knowledge and debate to help form individuals’ opinions.
Oegema and Klandermans (1994) surveyed individuals in the Netherlands to find whether
they planned to sign a national petition against cruise missiles. For those who had expressed
an initial willingness to sign but ultimately failed to do so, Oegema and Klandermans
identified two explanations – ‘nonconversion’ and ‘erosion’. The first can be explained by
individuals’ lack of opportunities to convert their support into action. This might include not
being targeted for an organisation’s campaign drives, as well as lacking access to networks
which might discuss the issue and what they might do about it. As a result the lack of social
pressure to think or act results in nonconversion. Erosion, on the other hand might be caused
by facing the ‘reality’ of participation, which might stimulate the sorts of negative emotions
described earlier in Norgaard’s work. Alternatively, erosion might be the result of network
‘cross pressures’ where cynics or opponents of the issue might dissuade or discourage
individuals from acting upon their original willingness. In other words, participating might
cause too much social pressure and antagonism, resulting in non-participation becoming the
easier option.
In sum, network and field approaches provide a microstructural theory of participation and
non-participation where participation in protest opportunities is largely dependent on the
social circumstances that individuals find themselves in. As a method of research, these
approaches pose challenges for how networks can be identified as providing greater
explanatory power than other variables used to explain mobilisation. This is no easy task,
and Diani (2004) admits that network approaches risk providing tautological analysis,
especially when using protest case studies. This is because if one looks for networks in
protest groups, it is likely that networks will be found, but this alone does not prove that any
causal mechanism. As Diani notes, a better testing of the theory might be found by looking
for cases where activist networks do not produce participation. Similarly, adopting an
approach similar to Oegema and Klandermans (1994), where variables of participants and
non-participants might yield more reliable results. One can argue that the densely networked
context of the university campus provides such an opportunity to study participation and
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non-participation side-by-side. This necessitates a further exploration of the essential
properties of the university campus as a field, and the culture of activism it facilitates.
5. Exploring the field: protest participation and non-participation on
the university campus
Student activism has for many years been a significant form of social movement
participation – indeed, its prominence in Europe and the United States the 1960s was a key
factor in establishing some of the social movement theories covered in the previous section.
This final section focuses on three issues: first, it reflects on the history of student
movements, paying particular attention to specific properties which have characterised cases
in the UK. Second, it considers the university campus as a field for mobilisation and protest
participation, taking into account aforementioned social movement theories and concepts.
Finally, it discusses direct and indirect outcomes of student activism on politics, the
university and the students involved.
Student activism in Europe and the United States
At some level, student protest has existed for as long as there have been students, but as an
organised and influential form of political contention in its own right, student activism is a
relatively modern phenomenon (Boren, 2001). Broadly speaking, student politics can be
divided into two distinct but interrelated traditions. The first concerns students as an interest
group, focusing on political matters related to the university campus and higher education
more generally. The second concerns students as de facto vanguards, which often relates to
campaign issues beyond the campus including matters of government policy, foreign affairs
or identity politics. As Rootes (1980: 475) points out, students hold some degree of political
significance in a society as ‘an incipient, if not always actual intelligentsia’, acting as
society’s progressive moral arbiters. In these cases, the student protest can act as a
forerunner to more widespread national or international movements.
Until the twentieth century, occurrences of student unrest – at least in Europe – reflected the
sometimes uneasy birth of universities as institutions, as students became increasingly
dissatisfied with their declining social power relative to that of a university’s administration
(Boren, 2001). In certain historical cases – notably the 1848 revolutions in Europe – students
played an important contributory role to wider political movements. The rise of student
activism in the twentieth century owed much to the expansion of the university system,
which among other things increased the population of students to the point that they
represented a critical mass in society. Moreover, the integration of universities with
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government, state and society formalised the hierarchy of university governance, a
transformation that arguably left students cast as too transient a population to warrant a role
in decision-making processes.
Along with these systemic conditions, the rise of student activism in the 1960s was also
shaped by broader social processes, notably the expansion of welfare provision and the
emergence of the post-war ‘baby boomer’ generation. Out of this grew a frustration with the
values of their elders who they considered morally conservative, politically authoritarian and
socially paternalistic (Hoefferle, 2013). This rose to sudden and spectacular prominence in
1968 when, in France, student protests against authoritarianism in the university system
dovetailed with trade unions to force nationwide strikes, resulting in riots in Paris and
President Charles De Gaulle briefly fleeing the country. Although defeated soon after, the
events helped spark student-led protests in Germany, Italy, Poland, Yugoslavia, the United
States and others throughout 1968 and 1969 (Gordon, 1998; Boren, 2001).
In the UK, student activists were arguably less coordinated and their protests less violent
than their international counterparts, though they still mobilised in large numbers on a range
of issues throughout the late 1960s (Ellis, 1998; Hoefferle, 2013). Campaigns were
somewhat hampered by the lack of leadership from the NUS, which at the time had a limited
political mandate. This leadership vacuum saw the formation of alternative student
organisations such as the Radical Student Alliance and the Vietnam Solidarity campaign.
The latter set up local branches in most major campuses across the UK and helped organise
three anti-Vietnam War national demonstrations in London’s Grosvenor Square between
1967 and 1968. For the October 1968 demonstration, students inspired by events in France
helped draw a crowd of around 100,000 people, even though it was condemned by the NUS
on the grounds that it was led by ‘political hooligans’ seeking a ‘weekend revolution’ (Ellis,
1998: 66).
For many in the UK, student protest was a new and alarming development. Hoefferle (2013:
205-6) notes that the press preferred to characterise activism as another example of the
nefarious influence of ‘Americanism’ on British youth. This sidestepped the fact that student
activism in France, the United States and elsewhere spoke of a wider politics – namely
opposition to paternalistic authoritarianism and the right to freedom of speech – that British
students recognised in their own universities. Consequently, students adapted the
generational spirit de corps and, protested on issues such as the provision of same-sex
accommodation and increasing student democracy on campus.
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By the 1970s, student activism had lost much of its ‘countercultural’ identity and many of its
‘rank-and-file’ participants but its campaigns had begun to effect changes in university
policy, as well as help consolidate student protest and activism as a normal feature of UK
campus life (Yettram, 1981). The early 1970s saw the NUS amend its constitution to allow
for political debate on a greater variety of issues, whilst campuses saw the expansion of
political party branches, leftist factions and social movement organisations. By the 1990s,
student activism had become a firm fixture in UK universities but was struggling to gain
traction beyond its campuses. As noted in chapter one, the Labour Government’s
introduction of tuition fees in 1998 failed to provoke the scale of contention or media interest
that one might have expected, causing activists to once again question the leadership
qualities of the NUS (Boren, 2001: 227). Despite this, however, the university campus
continues to offer a range of opportunities for social movement participation unmatched in
most other social fields – a topic which we turn to next.
The campus field – opportunities and constraints
As a field for mobilisation, the university campus has many advantages. Its students are
mostly at the same point in their life-cycle which, in the UK at least, tends to result in a
relatively homogenous core of white, middle class, full-time undergraduates who either live
on, or close to, the university campus (see HESA, 2012). There are, of course, many other
categories of student – postgraduates, international students, students living at home,
students studying part-time and working part-time – and they might find basic shared
experiences of university life in other ways. These include attending lectures and seminars
on campus, using study facilities, following course curricula and assessment, receiving staff
contact time, sharing accommodation, attending student social events, belonging to the same
student union, and ultimately above all else, seeking to graduate with a university degree. It
is from these shared experiences that one can identify a basic student disposition which has
the potential to create a collective sense of the student ‘we’, even if the heterogeneity of the
student population arguably precludes this from being converted into an overarching
collective identity.
The university campus also provides clear social opportunities for students to interact and
form a critical mass. Crossley (2008: 32) notes that entering university structurally ‘frees up’
young people for activism as they are liberated from the controlling influence of
parental/family ties. From this starting point, ‘the typical campus concentrates a large
population and affords mechanisms which allow the politically motivated to find one another
and form networks’ (Crossley, 2008: 29). Network-making can operate formally and
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informally – on the one hand, campuses feature identifiable network foci for politically-
engaged students to find one another, such as student groups and societies, as well as the
student union. On the other hand, dense networks can also exist within halls of residence and
course classes, leading students to make friends based on shared interests.
Opportunities for finding students with common interests in many ways depend on the nature
of the campuses themselves. Larger campuses, for example, are more likely to attract
sufficient numbers of students with minority interests enabling them to ‘form the networks
necessary for whatever forms of collective action inspire them’ (Crossley and Ibrahim, 2012:
610). Larger campuses are also likely to feature a wider range of different political societies,
as well as a student union with the resources to fund full-time union sabbatical officers
responsible for academic affairs, student democracy or campaigning. Van Dyke (1998)
claims that this becomes self-reproducing, having found that American universities with a
history of past activism were four times more likely to host student protest in the 1960s.
This, she found, was attributable to social networks facilitated by a critical mass of students;
a university’s historical reputation for liberal values; the presence of politically active faculty
members, and a sufficient number of elite students whose greater self-confidence in their
actions enabled them to take positions of leadership in student groups on campus. Although
usually in the minority on campus, Binder and Wood (2012) observed a similar effect with
regard to right-wing students, with particular types of university inclined to foster the
development of particular ‘styles’ of conservative activism.
Although the university campus provides unique opportunities for student activism, it also
provides unique constraints. Most obviously, student groups are permanently limited by the
fact that a campus’s population is in a permanent state of flux, with undergraduates expected
to graduate after three or four years, and a cohort of new undergraduates arriving each year.
This creates obstacles for political groups and societies wishing to build and sustain skills,
resources and knowledge across successive cohorts. This is made easier when a campus’s
existing activism structures can keep attracting politically-active young people to study
there, either through the public prominence of its campaigns or social networks operating
between school and university students. As Biddix and Park (2008) argue, the recent
proliferation of online technologies such as websites and mailing lists make it easier for
student activists to overcome ‘generational mortality’ and maintain unbroken chains of group
campaigns and organisational management.
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Paths to mobilisation
The political agencies responsible for maintaining activism across cohorts are a campus’s
political groups and societies, and its student union. For issues where there is common
ground between these units, temporary or long-term coalitions are sometimes formed,
enabling activists to pool their collective skills and resources to create large protest events in
and around campus. In cases where an issue may be of national or international concern to
students, these groups and coalitions might collaborate with or inspire groups and coalitions
from other universities to create simultaneous protest events, such as campus occupations
(e.g. those which took place in UK universities and art colleges in 1968 out of solidarity with
French demonstrators) or nationwide ‘days of action’.
As with most movements, students mobilise for a range of low and high-cost/risk protest
repertoires including petitions, rallies, teach-ins and demonstrations, with different groups
favouring certain repertoires over others. For local and national student unions, their status as
representative and semi-independent bodies means that they usually favour peaceful protest
organised in consultation with university management and the police. In contrast, radical
repertoires such as occupations, acts of vandalism and speech disruptions are more likely to
be the work of independent groups and networks. According to Clarke and Egan (1972),
there is usually correlation between repertoire choices and certain political attitudes, with
demonstrators being most likely to show signs of discontent with formal political institutions
than those engaging in forms of low-cost/risk activism.
Although social movement research into campus protest tends to be case-study based,
student groups and societies organise inside and outside of specific protest opportunities to
find ways of engaging and mobilising the wider student population. Even in times of high
struggle, however, evidence suggests that only very low numbers of students can be
mobilised into protesting. Hoefferle (2013: 204-5) claims that opinion polls carried out in the
1960s and 1970s showed potentially radical student activists consisting only of around one
or two percent of a university’s overall student population. Clarke and Egan’s (1972: 507-8)
study of students at Florida State University found activism to be more widespread, albeit
divisible into distinct layers. At its core were student demonstrators who amounted to 22 per
cent of the student population (less than 20 per cent of whom had participated in ‘illegal’
demonstrations). Outside of this was a layer of ‘conventional activists’ (19 per cent) engaged
in relatively low-cost forms of participation. The majority of students, however, were those
categorised as ‘politically passive’, claiming to follow politics in the media without being
politically active. Participation also featured certain demographic trends, with Altbach
62
(1989) and Blackstone and Hadley (1971) finding that student activists in Britain and the
United States were more likely to have a non-religious background and study social science.
Blackstone and Hadley’s research also supports the political socialisation thesis, finding that
activists were considerably more likely to have left-wing parents (see also Sherkat and
Blocker, 1994).
Beyond activist socialisation, there is evidence in the student movement literature of the
importance of social networks in activism mobilisation. Crossley and Ibrahim (2012) depict
the modern university campus as consisting of multiple interrelated social networks. Activist
networks may coalesce around certain identifiable foci such as the student union and
political societies, but it is the overall network that is ultimately responsible for developing
and sustaining activist identities on campus. This is because it operates as a tightly integrated
political world where ‘information, rumours, resources and directives are likely to pass very
quickly around’ (Crossley and Ibrahim, 2012: 603). Like McAdam (1986), Crossley and
Ibrahim (2012: 606) find that denser networks enhance activism opportunities, as they
‘afford greater potential for solidarity, support and participation incentives to emerge within
a network’. Once established, these networks can become self-sustaining, as ‘networks
facilitate actions and actions (qua foci) generate networks’. This might be exemplified by
student activists living together, forming relationships or running societies, which helps them
keep one another ‘in the frame’ (Ibid: 607). Moreover, these networks may draw in students
who are connected to activists in other ways, such as housemates, course-mates, friends and
partners.
Given the emphasis placed on strong personal affinities within these activism networks,
Crossley and Ibrahim (2012: 608) issue a word of caution, acknowledging that ‘networks can
perhaps become too cohesive for purposes of collective action’ and appear inaccessible to
newcomers. Research by Hirsch (1990) links network density among activists on campus
with the development of a shared ideological commitment, the practicing of high-cost/risk
protest repertoires, and the collective eschewing of self-interest. Interestingly, Hirsch also
finds that the activist collective identity is reinforced by members’ social polarisation from
the rest of the student population, which supports the view that student activism features
subcultural properties comparable to those identified by Goffman (1971) and Becker (1991).
In this context, ‘collective identity’ refers not to a student movement as a whole but rather
the specific networks that form around and draw in specific groups or activities. Network
density is also affected by how much political consensus there is between members. In some
cases, dense networks that incorporate, say, an environmental group, an LGBT group, a
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political party and a free education movement might appear at first glance relatively
heterogeneous. However, such networks might be strong because none of these groups are
politically incompatible with each other. Instead, fault lines emerge when there are
philosophical, ethical or tactical contradictions between groups and campaigns. As a result,
larger campus coalitions which incorporate groups and campaigns with more fragile political
compatibilities have to be managed more carefully, and as such are less likely to produce a
shared collective identity.
A good example of these tensions can be found in Crouch’s (1970: 78) critical reflections on
student activism at the LSE in the 1960s. He identifies clear political distinctions between
activists working with the student union, who campaigned on more manageable political
targets such as increasing student representation, and activists associated with the ‘New
Left’, who advocated a more radical and spontaneous politics and were prepared to use the
threat of violence as a political weapon. According to Crouch, this often resulted in the
university’s critical mass of left-leaning students being split along ideological lines. In cases
where common ground could be found between both sides – such as an opposition to the
Vietnam War – coalitions could be established, even if conflicts would often again arise over
the choice of protest tactics (see also Van Dyke 2003).
Outcomes of student activism
Although the campus provides unique resources and opportunities to mobilise, the transitory
nature of the student population places limitations on activists’ capacity to sustain an activist
base on campus. Nor do students possess the same power to withdraw their labour as
unionised workers, and so have to find different ways of building influential movements. For
protests that issue demands to university management, its intended goals are clear to see,
whereas for sit-ins and occupations the process of protesting might become their most valued
outcome. Activist groups also sometimes face pressure to put to one side grander political
ideals in the pursuit of goals which might be considered more achievable. This does not
always go down well, with Crouch (1970) observing that the popularity of the existentialist
maxim that action should be true to one’s ultimate values sometimes resulted in activists’
attaching greater value to radical and uncompromising protests which brought disastrous
failure than protests with more achievable aims that were partially successful.
Campus-based student protests often seek to establish channels of communication with
university management. Interestingly, negotiations often draw on the opinion of the wider
student body (or in Clarke and Egan’s terms, the ‘politically passive’) as de facto arbiters.
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For the protesters, their task is to achieve leverage through mobilising students to sign
petitions or vote for motions of support at the student union, as well as through everyday
interaction and debate with non-protesting students. On the other hand, university
management will often challenge the assertion that activists are speaking ‘for’ a wider
community if they feel they have neither the mass-turnout nor the democratic mandate to do
so. A good example of this dynamic can be found in Crouch’s (1970) account of how an act
of political vandalism on campus by radical activists provoked the LSE’s director to write a
series of letters to all students calling for a condemnation of their actions. After the student
union failed to agree on any organised response to the letters and ‘ordinary’ students took no
collective response either, this overall non-response was ultimately considered as a victory
for the activists.
For issues bigger than the campus – such as anti-war demonstrations – building popular and
coherent campaigns is harder than it might first seem. Of course, the ultimate goal of anti-
Iraq War student activists was the prevention of the Iraq War, but the vast majority were
realistic enough to accept that this was unlikely to be realised by students alone.
Consequently, the goal of student campaigns of this kind – explicitly or implicitly – is to
kick-start a wider movement that mobilises all sections of society. This can cause tensions
between activists, university management, and the wider student body, especially when the
campus is co-opted as a protesting or recruiting space. Crouch (1970) reflects on the
difficulties activists at the LSE faced in mobilising against the Vietnam War because many
ordinary students struggled to see the relationship between the protests’ anti-war goals and
the university as a site for protest. As with protests more closely related to student matters,
the public opinion of the wider student population – even in times of wider political
‘opportunities’ – can be volatile, easy to misjudge, and hard to measure.
In these cases, a further task for student activists is to persuade the wider public of its views.
As already noted, the specific societal positioning of students as an ‘incipient intelligentsia’
has sometimes given them the role of de facto vanguards, tasked with drawing the public’s
attention to hitherto-underappreciated moral grievances.  As this suggests, activism of this
kind depends heavily on awareness-raising repertoires designed to gain traction through
media coverage. For students especially, this has advantages and disadvantages. On the one
hand, national and international media coverage undoubtedly helps to inflate a student
campaign’s voice far beyond what it is typically capable of, and thus provide it with an
important opportunity to influence public opinion and political debate. On the other hand, the
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media can also be a capricious and impermanent platform on which to base a campaign,
especially if the media turns on the activists or loses interest in them (see Gitlin, 1981).
The notion of students appealing to the wider public also has its difficulties. Echoing
Norgaard’s (2006) findings, students speaking out on non-student matters face ad hominem
dismissals on the grounds that their ‘naïve’, ‘privileged’ and detached position from the rest
of society renders them unqualified to comment on such matters as war, public policy or the
economy. This also gives rise to the popular assumption that once students graduate and
become part of the ‘real world’ their radicalism or idealism will fade. Whilst it would be
wrong to assume that student activists are not prone to changing their politics over time, the
logic of the argument returns us to the rational-choice assumptions that the politics of youth-
based movements are somehow a product of self-interest, be it material benefit, egoistic
attention-seeking or Bakhtinesque countercultural performance. Nevertheless, such
criticisms do point out structural tensions in instances where students seek to tell others why
they should think or act in a different way.
In sum, one can argue that the dual role of student activists as a self-representing interest
group and society’s de facto vanguards makes it sometimes difficult to separate and identify
clear political outcomes. Recalling the discussion of the 2010/11 student protests case study
in the previous chapter, one can argue that they occupied both roles. As an interest group,
activists appealed to citizens in highlighting the moral grievance of £9,000 fees in a time of
austerity to a society where many had received their higher education for free, and asking
them to help put pressure on Parliament to vote down the fees bill and revise its position on
higher education funding. But for more radically-minded students, fees and cuts were merely
symptomatic of a broader struggle against neoliberal capitalism, and so were engaged in
finding ways of kick-starting a wider movement against the coalition Government’s austerity
programme. In this sense, students took the role of de facto vanguards. Clearly, this duality
has clear consequences for how we take this study forward.
6. Conclusion
The literature review provides important pointers for the design and analysis of this research
study. It also reveals certain aspects of the current literature which warrant further
exploration. First, the discussion of contemporary patterns of political participation
demonstrates the need to contextualise new findings within existing studies. This involves
comparing not only student participation to the UK average as presented in Hansard (2010),
but also students in the 1960s and 1970s. Comparisons with the latter enables us to consider
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the impact of online communications as a possible means of enhancing mobilisation
opportunities, along with how much the fees and cuts issue was able to mobilise students
outside of traditional social demographics.
Second, the literature provides important pointers as to how one should approach the
production of agency in the student protests, including paths and barriers to mobilisation
students might have encountered. This includes the role played by family socialisation,
schooling, as well as the broader context of the Iraq War, which coincided with the majority
of undergraduates’ early teenage years. On campus, the mobilising power of unions and
alternative campaign groups and networks is an area of interest. The work of McAdam
(1986) and Crossley (2007) is important for framing the social processes through which
students came to take part in the protests, especially high cost/risk protest repertoires. One
might also consider how Oegema and Klandermans’ (1994) concept of network erosion or
nonconversion might help explain students who remained ‘concerned, unmobilised’ (Jordan
and Maloney, 2007).
Third, the subject of participation itself is a key area for exploration in this research project,
particularly in comparing students’ experiences of high and low-cost/risk forms. The
literature has uncovered interesting insights into the culture of high-cost/risk activist groups,
including the evolution of norms and standards of activist behaviour (Bobel, 2007), and the
strong ties and clique cultures that can evolve out of densely networked and committed
groups (Crossley and Ibrahim, 2012; Saunders, 2008). Comparing this to the experience of
low-cost/risk participation offers an opportunity to add to the gaps in the literature, especially
given debates over the efficacy of so-called ‘slacktivist’ repertoires (Morozov, 2009). The
student protests featured a range of different protest tactics – from occupations to Facebook
pages – and this raises questions about the extent to which they succeeded in creating a
cross-repertoire, movement-level ‘collective identity’ (Saunders, 2008).
Fourth, the experience of non-participation is a key interest in this research project. The
existing literature in this area is quite patchy, with very few studies directly devoted to the
subject. The literature does, however, provide some pointers: the useful, if sketchy, ideal-
types put forward by Hansard (2010) provide a template for exploring different shades of
non-participation. Jordan and Maloney (2007) expound on those who are ‘concerned,
unmobilised’ and question whether this can be explained by a lack of faith in the efficacy of
participation. This, too, invites cultural analysis of the kind taken by Eliasoph (1998) and
Norgaard (2006), both of whom pay close attention to the narratives of powerlessness and
self-preservation among non-participants.
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Fifth and finally, the literature review identifies a number of important methodological
considerations for this research project. On the one hand, the discussion of political survey
data reveals the limitations of measuring participation, especially the capacity to incorporate
new repertoires. On the other hand, using consistent measurements of participation is clearly
useful for comparing patterns and trends uncovered by Hansard (2010) and Pattie et al.
(2004), as well as student case studies (Blackstone and Hadley, 1971; Clarke and Egan,
1972). For this reason, it is important to build a survey that combines objective and
subjective elements of participation, as well as one that captures the specifics of the fees and
cuts case study. Interviews, too, should capture aspects of participation unsuited to
quantitative research. This is especially relevant to potentially sensitive topics such as clique
cultures, ghettoization, political violence and dis-identification, which may involve
critiquing aspects of their own social identities and relationships, and the identities and
relationships of others. Both forms of data collection require a robust research design, and it
is this which we turn to in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
Methodology and research design
1. Introduction – framing the case study
It was posited in chapter one that the student protests case study required a mixed method
research design to capture the different aspects of the research questions. To recap, the
project makes specific use of two methods of research:
1. Online survey questionnaire to measure protest participation and non-participation,
sources of information and communication, attitudes towards protest repertoires, and
social background. The survey was open to all undergraduate and postgraduate
students from a selected sample of universities.
2. Semi-structured interviews focusing on participants’ and non-participants’
experiences of, and attitudes towards, the student protests and political participation
more generally. Interviewees were recruited principally through invitations included
in the questionnaire, with additional recruitment coming via purposive and snowball
sampling to access hard-to-reach populations, such as protest organisers.
As demonstrated in the last chapter, population surveys and semi-structured interviews are
common tools for research into political participation. Case studies, too, are frequently
employed in studying social movements, both as a means of exploring activism cultures (e.g.
Saunders, 2008) and for comparing participants and non-participants (e.g. McAdam, 1986).
Although social movement case studies frequently employ triangulation, they tend to favour
a blend of different qualitative approaches (Snow and Trom, 2002). The scarcity of
quantitative/qualitative triangulation owes in part to constraints in framing and accessing a
case study’s membership for surveying purposes, especially when ‘members’ might be
difficult to identify. At another level, both methods reflect different methodological
preferences in political science and social movement research. The use of survey data in
social science is useful for producing data from which one can easily identify long-term
trends, but has also been criticised for flattening out the specificities of certain case studies
and personal narratives which might uncover participatory causation. Conversely, qualitative
studies provide more scope for understanding how social movements emerge, but risk
becoming too bound up in the specificities of individual cases to facilitate generalisation. In
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other words, the methodological limitations of one method are in many ways the strengths of
the other.
This research project – perhaps ambitiously – sought to build a research design which
incorporated both statistical generalisation and analytical validity under a single case study.
This opportunity owes greatly to the advantages of studying the field of student activism.
First, since my focus is on student participation/non-participation, their status and university
affiliation makes them relatively easily locatable as a research population. Second, this
research project is focused on participating and non-participating students. By focusing on
university campuses as the principal field of access, student participants and non-participants
can be studied side-by-side. Moreover, given debates around what constitutes ‘participation’
covered in the previous chapter, approaching students via their institution rather than through
certain specific actions (e.g. Walgrave and Verhulst, 2011; Favre et al, 1997) allows for a
more subjective notion of ‘participation’ to emerge.
Although the student protests might appear a worthy subject for a case study, researchers
should always make clear what they consider their study to be a ‘case of’. According to
Snow and Trom (2002: 149), case studies involve the detailed and holistic study of an
‘instance or variant of some more generic phenomena’. One can argue that the student
protests case study covers both typical and atypical elements. First, it represents an instance
of a suddenly imposed grievance which mobilised large numbers into taking collective
action, even though the majority of students who shared those grievances did not participate.
This is arguably a common feature of most social movements, for as Klandermans (1997)
notes, campaigns seldom, if ever, successfully mobilise an entire affected population.
Second, and perhaps less typical, is students’ status as an ‘affected population’. Due to
constant cohort turnover, they are often placed in the position of representing ‘students’
without necessarily representing their own material interests. This is true of the £9,000 fees
grievance, making the case study in some ways comparable to post-material social
movements. Third and finally, the case study is something of a deviant case in UK student
politics insofar as the fees and cuts protests succeeded in mobilising students – albeit for a
short period – on a scale arguably not seen since the 1960s. Analysing why this collective
action frame mobilised large numbers of students is key to not only explaining its
abnormality, but also possible reasons for lower rates of participation in other movements
and campaigns.
In more practical terms, studying students in the 2011/12 academic year meant that research
had to be completed before the academic year closed (30 June 2012) so as to maintain a
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unitary cohort sample. As noted in the first chapter, this creates a slight disjuncture between
the year of data collection (2011/12), and the year in which fees grievance principally took
place (2010/11). Although the bill was passed by Parliament in December 2010, this did not
mean student activism simply stopped – groups such as NCAFC were especially keen to take
its campaign into 2011/12, and so the case study would have to be relatively flexible and
open to the possibility that new major protest events might occur during fieldwork. As it
turned out, the principal post-fees grievance for student campaigners – the Higher Education
White Paper – was indefinitely shelved by the Government shortly before fieldwork began,
resulting in no major higher education protest events or campaigns coinciding with this
timeframe. This meant the case study became principally retrospective, with first year
students likely to have had fewer opportunities to participate than those who had been at
university the previous year. Rather than accepting this as a weakness of the research per se,
I decided to test this cohort effect by incorporating the study of how groups sustained
campaigns and promoted higher education activism to new students after the fees bill had
passed.
To take things further, this chapter will next focus on the two research methods in more
detail. For both I will outline the reasons for their selection along with each method’s
research design, sampling, access and ethical considerations. Both sections will also include
evaluations of the data collection process. The fourth section will focus on approaches and
tools for research data analysis. This incorporates a basic presentation of the survey and
interview data, as well as a discussion of strategies employed to triangulate the data to
address the research questions.
2. The survey
A fundamental aim of this research project was to measure participatory trends among the
UK student population, both in relation to the case study and more generally. Broadly
speaking, survey questionnaires offer ‘standardised measurement that is consistent across all
respondents’ which ‘ensures that comparable information is obtained about everyone who is
described’ (Fowler, 2009: 3). As we saw in chapter two, surveys are a key tool in political
science participation studies. At a basic level, the choice of survey research for this project
reflected a desire to engage directly with trends and findings from this body of literature, as
well as help frame and contextualise qualitative accounts from student interviews.
In recent years, the reach and consistency of surveys has been enhanced further by the
popularisation of online questionnaires. As Bethlehem (2009) observes, online surveys have
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become increasingly popular in social research due to the speed with which they can be
launched and their low cost of distribution compared with postal surveys. A familiar note of
caution concerns questions of coverage, as populations without easy access to the internet
are automatically excluded from the survey’s reach, but this did not present a problem for
this research project. Kaplowitz et al. (2004) found that using online surveys is aided by the
fact that all students are given a university email account and free on-site internet access.
Should access to mass-student mailing lists be obtained, online surveys would not
automatically exclude any relevant groups within the overall student population.
Research design
To begin, it is important to establish what the survey aimed to measure, and the sort of data it
sought to capture. To address the project’s research questions the survey covered six themes:
the student experience (covering extra-curricular activities and union involvement); attitudes
towards higher education funding policy; political attitudes and activities; students’ general
political participation; students’ participation in the student protests, and personal questions.
These themes consisted of three types of data: measurements of participation, attitudinal
questioning, and social demographics. This incorporated two broad categories of
participation – ‘general’ (including formal, civic and protest politics), and case-study
specific. As we saw in the last chapter, one should be mindful of presupposing definitions of
participation in the survey’s questioning, as this runs the risk of blindly reproducing
preconceived notions of participation whilst ignoring emerging forms. At the same time,
there are also advantages to employing some standardised measurements and definitions via
the adaptation of previous survey questionnaires. Not only can these draw on tried-and-tested
questions which are proven to elicit useful responses, they also allow for cross-case
comparisons (Klandermans and Smith, 2002: 24).
As a result, the survey employed a combination of new and old survey questions,
incorporating both survey-defined and respondent-defined interpretations of participation.
The questionnaire (see appendix A) measures general participation by adapting the model
employed by Hansard (Q23). The selection of political activities offered a greater range of
‘activist’ repertoires than Hansard (see chapter two, figure 2.1) though as we shall see in the
next chapter categorisations of the ‘politically active’ differ. For case study participation
(Q32), respondents were invited to select from any of the twelve listed options, which
reflected the different repertoires employed by students as part of the protest, from high-
cost/risk to low-cost/risk activities. Given the case study’s flexibility, its participation is
measured more subjectively than for general participation. In addition to the listed activities,
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respondents were invited to input their own activities via the ‘other’ open dialogue box. This
flexibility reflected the intention for respondents’ participation to be defined as much by the
respondent as the survey criteria, exemplified in the fact that prior to this question
respondents were asked ‘have you participated in any way in the student protests against
fees?’ (Q31). From this point, the survey temporarily split, with respondents who answered
‘yes’ being asked questions about their participation, and respondents who answered ‘no’
asked questions about their non-participation. This had the effect of inviting respondents to
predefine ‘participation’ independently of any stated activity, thereby opening up possible
gaps between activities listed in the survey and activities included in the ‘other’ category.
Although the case study included notable events – the 2010 NUS demonstration, for example
– survey questions focused on participation in activities rather than specific events. Relying
on the accuracy of respondents’ memory is a common problem for political surveys (Fowler,
2009: 87), and a survey that records attendance for specific protest events 18 months ago
might produce unreliable data if respondents struggle to accurately recall which particular
events they attended. Moreover, unlike studies by McAdam (1988) or Oegema and
Klandermans (1994), the student protests did not coalesce around any one single measurable
action or event. This also allowed the survey to accommodate any new participatory
opportunities which might emerge during data collection.
The second category of data captured in the survey was attitudinal, focusing on students’
perspectives on politics, protest and the fees grievance. For more general themes related to
trust, political background and political efficacy, certain questions were adapted from
existing participation questionnaires such as Pattie et al (2004), Hansard (2010) and
Klandermans et al (2011). To make more complex political attitudes broadly measurable,
questions were presented as a series of statements which respondents were invited to select
from a sliding scale to indicate how much they agreed or disagreed. This provided a richness
of different possible articulations, with respondents encouraged to feel more comfortable in
selecting truthful answers from a range of political statements to agree or disagree with
(Fowler, 2009).
The third category of data related to respondents’ personal details and social demographics.
It is important to situate survey trends within the context of the different types of student
studying at university, as well as sociological categories of sex, age, and class. These needed
to be clearly presented, but in a way that did not provide any issues with respondents’
anonymity – especially given the nature of the participatory data recorded. One issue worth
expanding on here is how social class was measured: although surveys traditionally use an
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employment-based model (e.g. Goldthorpe et al’s (1980) scheme), this does not easily
translate to students without asking more detailed questions about respondents’ parents. As a
result, the survey adapted the method used by Klandermans et al. (2011) whereby
respondents were invited to categorise themselves as belonging to a particular class category
(or not). This introduced the variable of ‘class identification’ which could also be compared
with respondents’ participatory patterns.
The survey was built using Bristol Online Surveys (BOS) which allows for the flexible
creation and customisation of questionnaires, which are then hosted on a secure, unique and
easily accessible web address. BOS was found to be flexible and practical for building a
questionnaire that reproduced the basic research design, though its lack of ‘smart surveying’
meant that the questionnaire was not able to subdivide according to respondents’
participation or non-participation in the case study. This meant that respondents who clicked
that they did not participate would still see – and have to skip over – follow-up questions
specific to participants, and vice-versa.
Totalling 46 questions, many of which feature multiple sub-questions, the questionnaire is
considerably large. To encourage respondents to complete in full, the survey’s first page
notified users that the questionnaire consisted of five web pages of questions. Respondents
could not access latter pages without having completed questions from each preceding page.
The first question page concerned the most inclusive theme in the questionnaire – the student
experience. This theme, and the page’s relatively short length, aimed to encourage
respondents to continue with the questionnaire as it became more detailed in the latter pages.
Questions related to personal details and social demographics were placed at the end of the
questionnaire. Given that respondents had by this point seen and answered its attitudinal and
behavioural questions, it was felt that they would feel less wary of disclosing more personal
information.
The survey’s length also created possibilities for ‘order effects’ where the sequencing of
attitudinal and participatory questions might have primed respondents to answer the latter in
certain ways (Klandermans and Smith, 2002: 24). Consequently, efforts were made to
sequence questions capturing electoral and civic participation before attitudinal questions
dealing specifically with the efficacy and value of such activities. It was felt that answering
attitudinal questions first might oblige respondents to over-estimate their participation so that
it more closely matches their beliefs in the importance of taking part. Similarly, questions
regarding attitudes towards higher education funding were placed at the beginning of the
survey, and questions about participation placed at the end.
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Sampling, access and ethics
Effective questionnaire design is of course necessary for building a workable survey, but its
usefulness arguably depends most on its distribution. As we saw in the previous chapter,
student protest surveys have tended to sample only one campus (e.g. Blackstone and Hadley,
1971; Clarke and Egan, 1972), which inevitably limits their broader representativeness.
However, the speed and economy of online surveys makes it easier for questionnaires to be
sent out to multiple institutions via mass emails – even if undertaken by a single researcher.
This standardised method of communications means that students can be potentially reached
quickly, directly and on a mass-scale.
As this suggests, the scale of the sample is dependent on the sort of access the researcher is
able to gain to a university’s student mailing lists. To test this, I undertook an access pilot
study three months prior to the survey’s launch. The pilot sampled three universities and
involved emailing the same request for the survey to be distributed to students to three
different access points – registry, the student union, and academic departments. The first two
access points received no responses at all. Academic departments – which were approached
by emailing academic staff members such as heads of department – were more successful
with 2-3 responding that they would be willing to forward the survey either to students from
a single degree programme or an entire department. This confirmed my view that academic
staff members represented the most promising ‘gatekeepers’, even though it would require
over-sampling potential gatekeepers to overcome the likelihood of non-responses and
refusals. Building a representative sample would require multiple gatekeepers from different
departments. Given the desire to achieve UK-wide representativeness, I designed a basic
sample of 20 universities which covered the different regions, campus types, and
institutional age (the final sample is shown in figure 3.1; initial university coding is found in
appendix E). For each university, at least three departments or degree programmes from the
arts and humanities, the social sciences, the natural sciences, and logic and technology
subjects were sampled.
Of course, the projected size of the sample depended to a large extent on the sort of response
rate each department could be relied upon to produce. As online survey questionnaires are
self-administered, response rates tend to be low – even with advance notifications and
reminders – at around 20-23 per cent (Kaplowitz et al, 2004; Bethlehem, 2009). To test
response rates, as well as the functioning of the questionnaire and BOS software, the survey
was piloted in January 2012 using the University of Edinburgh sociology postgraduate and
senior honours undergraduate mailing lists. An incentive was provided for questionnaire in
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the form of a prize draw for a £10 book token. Out of a combined mailing list total of 220
students, the survey received 19 respondents. The response rate of 8.6 per cent was
significantly lower than expected, but the number of students accessed was considerably
higher. From this, I concluded that by targeting 20 respondents per department sampled,
each university could be expected to achieve 60 respondents overall, providing an estimated
survey total of 1,200 across all 20 universities. Achieving this target would require 60
different gatekeepers, and given the mixed response from the pilot survey it was decided that
the university list would have to be flexible, with like-for-like substitutions lined up should
certain institutions prove unsuccessful for securing gatekeepers.
The distribution of the survey to a large UK-wide sample of students inevitably created
ethical considerations. Survey data was anonymous and the questionnaire design avoided
capturing any data where criminal activity might be disclosed, but as an incentive for survey
completion respondents were invited to leave a personal email address that could be entered
into a prize draw to win £50 of book tokens. Although a common practice in surveying
(Klandermans and Smith, 2002: 17) completion incentives risk creating response biases,
though book tokens were felt to represent a relatively ‘neutral’ (and apolitical) incentive for
students. The presence of email addresses on the survey dataset (some of which were
personal accounts) meant that survey data had to be stored on secure servers with all
documents password-encrypted. Following the survey’s completion and the prize awarded,
email data from non-interviewees was permanently deleted.
Survey distribution and evaluation
The survey was distributed in two broad phases – the first spanning 5 February 2012 until
the Easter holidays in early April, and the second beginning on 30 April and lasting until the
end of term/semester in late June. A spreadsheet was created to monitor the sampling process
which included a list of possible gatekeepers from a variety of different subjects for each of
the universities. Potential gatekeepers were identified on the basis that they were most likely
to have first-hand access to their departmental student mailing lists, thereby increasing the
likelihood that the survey could be forwarded to students quickly and directly. This meant
heads of department and directors of undergraduate/postgraduate studies were key targets.
For humanities and social science departments, staff members with research interests
complimentary to the project were prioritised, whereas for natural science and technology
departments staff union representatives were targeted on the basis that they might be more
likely to sympathise with the case study’s fees grievance.
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Gatekeepers were sent two emails in quick succession: first, a personalised request for
distribution which contained details of the project and supervisor contact details; and second,
a copy of the standardised student email containing information on the project, details of the
prize draw and the link to the survey’s website (final versions are found in appendix B). The
construction of the student email was crucial for the project’s aim of achieving a
representative ratio of participants and non-participants. As Rüdig (2010) reminds us, activist
survey respondents tend to be skewed towards those who have borne higher ‘cost’ for their
participation, and therefore seek recognition. The student email deliberately downplayed the
questionnaire’s political content so that less-active students would not feel discouraged from
taking part. Instead, it emphasised its more universal and inclusive aspects – notably ‘the
student experience’ and students’ attitudes towards the cost of higher education.
The preferred means of distribution was for the survey email to be forwarded to students
using group departmental mailing lists – the intention being that gatekeepers would have to
do as little as possible. This was found to be overwhelmingly successful among willing
gatekeepers, though in 4-5 cases it was requested that the survey was distributed via other
means (e.g. weekly departmental bulletins, WebCT course homepages) due to departmental
restrictions on ‘spamming’ student email accounts. These alternative methods were found to
be considerably less successful for drawing strong response rates and so were discouraged
whenever possible. Another issue was that the first phase clashed with the distribution of the
National Student Survey, for which many universities had their own quotas and incentive
schemes. This resulted in the postponement of the survey being distributed to around ten
departments until the second phase.
Between the two phases, the surveying strategy – including the content of both emails – was
revised to take account of emerging issues from phase one. Only minor aspects of the
questionnaire itself were altered – mostly additional information on how to answer certain
questions – though one statement was added to question 12 to test students’ generational
consciousness by including the statement ‘politicians don’t care about the interests of young
people’. It was concluded that the request email was too long and detailed, and asked too
much from gatekeepers. Additional requests that gatekeepers indicate the number of students
on each mailing list (so as to calculate response rates) and forward the survey onto potential
gatekeepers in other departments, were both removed. Neither had elicited strong responses
during phase one – few were sure of the size of mailing lists or had contacts in other
departments – and so it was felt that simplifying the request would increase the chances of
the survey being automatically forwarded onto students.
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As anticipated, the malleable nature of the access strategy meant that the survey had to be
constantly monitored so that targets were achieved and certain groups and universities were
not significantly under or over-subscribed. The nature of mass-mailing departments
sometimes meant that the survey would be forwarded onto students without my knowledge,
by which time I had already approached a different department. This meant that some
universities – such as Nottingham and York – achieved a wider range of departments simply
because a higher rate of staff members simultaneously sent out the survey email. In other
cases, university sampling was interrupted by emails being forwarded onto ethics
committees. As a standard procedure for many universities this issue had been anticipated,
and all requests were complied with. In some cases, this only resulted in a temporary delay
in the sampling process, though for others the committee process took too much time for the
survey to be distributed before the end of the academic year. This meant that some
universities only achieved a sample of one department (sampled prior to referral), whereas
others had to be dropped from the sample altogether and substituted by an equivalent
institution. As a result, the final number of universities sampled increased from 20 to 22.
The first phase was overwhelmingly successful, achieving 1,514 responses despite the
survey having only been distributed to around 60 per cent of the total targeted gatekeepers.
This owed in part to the conservative estimation of response rates from the January pilot
study, as well as the fact that the sampling process – where emails were sent out in blocks of
ten to potential gatekeepers each morning – was found to be successful and easily repeatable.
This resulted in an expansion of the original sample to four departments per university,
thereby increasing the target to approximately 2,000 respondents (from 22 universities). By
the point at which the survey closed, it had achieved a total of 2,493 responses. Details of the
sample, including selection criteria, are shown in figure 3.1.
To summarise, the survey research design and method of distribution proved extremely
successful, achieving a total number of respondents more than double the size of the initial
target. This owed to the flexibility of the basic sample design, the speed and efficiency of the
process through which gatekeepers were approached, and the generosity of the gatekeepers
themselves. The large dataset increased the scope for the sorts of analysis the survey could
be used for. These large numbers did not necessarily reflect high response rates, however. As
noted before, it proved prohibitively difficult to keep track of all response rates throughout
the data collection process, but available data shown in figure 3.2 suggests that rates were
well below standardised response rates for postal surveys. This suggests that the high yield
of respondents owed to the significant amount of access achieved through departmental
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mailing lists – most of which averaged at around 200 students – which meant that a response
rate of around 5-8 per cent still produced a reasonable number of respondents.
Another issue concerned the large number of ‘uncompleted’ questionnaires3, which totalled
323. Given the length of the survey and its political content, this was perhaps to be expected,
though there may be the problem of self-selection bias, as students without political interests
may have felt less compelled to continue with the survey than those with more political
interests and activities to record4. Of course, this did not prevent the number of completed
questionnaires from exceeding its original target, nor did it affect the survey’s demographical
representativeness (see section four). Certainly, one aspect of the survey that did achieve a
high response rate was the number of respondents who expressed an interest in being
interviewed for the research project – a total of 32.2 per cent. This brings us to the project’s
second research method.
3 BOS surveys has a ‘save’ option, enabling respondents to resume and complete the questionnaire
at a later date. This was felt to be a significant advantage given the questionnaire’s length, but BOS
also captured data on those which were left uncompleted.
4 Nevertheless, adding incomplete questionnaires to the overall survey data produced only a 0.1 per
cent shift in overall results from the question ‘have you participated in the student protests?’
Figure 3.1 Survey sample of UK universities and academic departments







1 University of Edinburgh Scotland 1583 Multi-site city 457 4 Social and Political Science, Arts, Biological Sciences, Chemistry
2 University of Nottingham East Mids 1948 Multi-site city 248 10 Sociology, Physics & Astronomy, Music, Theology & Religious Studies,
Computer Science, Philosophy, Mathematics, Biology, Education, History
3 Plymouth University South
West
1992 Multi location 157 4 Social Science, Psychology & Criminology, Marine Science & Engineering,
Arts
4 University of York North 1963 Single campus 155 4 Sociology, Health Science, Mathematics, History
5 Aberystwyth University Wales 1872 Dual campus 149 4 Management & Business, Geography and Earth Sciences, International
Politics, Art
6 University of Liverpool North
West
1903 Single campus 141 5 Dentistry, Veterinary Science, Biological Sciences, Politics, History
7 University of Warwick West Mids 1965 Multi-campus 138 6 Economics, Sociology, Classics & Ancient History, Law, Medicine,
Engineering
8 Nottingham Trent University East Mids 1992 Multi-campus 123 4 Arts & Humanities, Education, Physics, Mathematics
9 University of Cambridge East 1209 Multi-site city 118 7 Social & Political Science, Divinity, Economics, Archaeology, English,
Geography, King’s College
10 Newcastle University North East 1963 Single campus 116 4 Geography, History  & Classics, Psychology, Modern Languages
11 University of Sussex South East 1961 Single campus 105 7 Sociology, Physics & Astronomy, Law, Informatics, English & Drama,
Politics, Philosophy
12 University of Leeds North 1904 Multi-site city 93 3 Politics & IS, Food Science, Biological Sciences
13 University of Roehampton London 1992 Dual campus 91 4 Social Sciences, English & Drama, Education, Business
14 Cardiff University Wales 1883 Multi-site city 69 4 Social Sciences, Welsh, Law, Computer Science & Informatics
15 University of Abertay Dundee Scotland 1994 Single campus 69 1 Social Sciences
16 University College London London 1826 Multi-site city 61 5 Engineering & Computing, English, Anthropology, Philosophy, History
17 Brunel University London 1966 Multi-campus 57 4 Health Science, Sports Science & Education, Law, Sociology
18 University of Derby East Mids 1992 Multi-site city 48 4 Sociology & Cultural Studies, Geology, Film & Television Studies, Biological
Sciences
19 Birmingham City University West Mids 1992 Multi-campus 42 2 Social Science & Education, Health Science
20 Queen Margaret University Scotland 2007 Single campus 29 2 Sociology & Psychology, Nursing & Occupational Therapy




1992 Multi-campus 14 1 Journalism & Creative Writing
22 Swansea University Wales 1920 Single campus 5 1 Computer Science
N=2,485; errata removed.
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Figure 3.2 Selected response rates from university departmental mailing lists
3. Student interviews
As found in chapter two, qualitative research methods are perhaps the most common method
of social movement research – especially for case studies. This is because, as Mason (2002:
62) argues, they operate on the basis that knowledge is situated and contextual. In this sense,
the use of semi-structured interviews provides an opportunity to access this context from the
perspective of those involved in making it, be they high-cost/risk participants involved in
campaign groups or non-participants socially embedded in networks of apathy or distrust.
Examples of the former include Saunders’s (2008) study of activists in radical environmental
groups and Crossley and Ibrahim’s (2012) analysis of activism networks at the University of
Manchester, whereas the latter can be found in research by Eliasoph (1998) and Norgaard
(2006). In both applications, Burgess’s (1984: 102) depiction of semi-structured interviews
as a ‘conversation with a purpose’ neatly captures the opportunities for uncovering and
understanding how students perceive and experience politics and participation.
Research design
Broadly speaking, the research project sought to ‘bring to life’ the attitudes and experiences
of students from the survey. This required accessing a depth and range of different
interviewees so that common themes and narratives could be found and used to make
generalisations about types of participant and non-participant. The principal means of
interviewee recruitment – an invitation via the survey – helped satisfy this need for breadth,
and was augmented by forms of purposive sampling to capture types of participant (or non-
participant) that might be under-represented among the survey’s list of willing interview
candidates. The research design targeted 30-40 interviews, including participants in the
protests (from petition-signers to protest organisers), as well as supportive and unsupportive
non-participants. A range of different demographical voices – including sex, domicile, age,
degree subject – were also sought. In order to achieve this range of interviewees, the
selection of interview candidates was broadly purposive, using survey respondents’





Social Science, Abertay 500 69 13.8%
Social & Political Science, Cambridge 500 44 8.8%
Physics & Astronomy, Sussex 300 21 7.0%
Sociology, York 522 36 6.9%
Classics & Ancient History, Warwick 200 12 6.0%
Geography, Newcastle 321 16 5.0%
Politics, Liverpool 220 11 5.0%
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individual questionnaires, as well as information ascertained through purposive or snowball
sampling. To help frame the research (as well as make it more practically realisable),
interviews focused around 5-6 universities selected from the survey sample.
Much like the survey, the research design for interviews incorporated a certain amount of
flexibility. This reflected potential issues around gaining sufficient access to political
networks on individual campuses (which will be discussed in the following section), but also
a desire for freedom to follow-up and expand on emerging themes and narratives during the
interview process. This created multiple possibilities in how the research design could be
framed: they could support and expound on survey trends, or take a more micro-case study
approach by focusing more on campuses as distinct social fields. This, too, could take
different forms, such as an in-depth study of how students join and interact inside campus
activist networks (comparable to Crossley and Ibrahim’s study), or a comparative study of
how activist networks might differ according to different types of campus (echoing the work
of Van Dyke (1998)). In other words, incorporating flexibility into the research design was
felt to be necessary to pursuing the sorts of data that might be found once in the field.
Given the need for flexibility, there are clear benefits in taking a ‘semi-structured’ approach
to interviewing. Operating informally from a general interview guide rather than a fixed set
of questions (Blee and Taylor, 2002) interviews sought to capture three broad forms of data.
First, recruiting interviewees via the survey provided the opportunity for certain aspects of
their questionnaire responses to be to elaborated on, challenged or contextualised. For
example, further detail could be ascertained on the meaningfulness of ‘political’ family
backgrounds as well as reasons why certain forms of participation might be considered more
efficacious than others.
Second, interviewing multiple students allowed the research to gather information about the
different political groups and societies on campus (including the student union), as well as
recent campaigns. This also included gaining an understanding of the sorts of mobilisation
strategies groups employed, and the way these groups were perceived by non-participants.
Interviews also set out to use multiple perspectives to construct a collective narrative of the
fees protests on each campus, including the role played by the union and student societies,
the origins of the key protest events such as demonstrations and occupations, and the extent
to which activists continued with their campaigns after the fees vote. Moreover, interviewees
who attended UK-wide protest events such as the London demonstrations were invited to
recount their experiences in detail, so as to build a multi-perspectival account of the events
on that day.
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The third and final aspect of interviews focused on interviewees’ personal narratives and
political ‘life history’. For self-defined activists in particular, this involved tracing the roots
of their politicisation via the groups, causes and parties they were involved in, and their
interactions with certain potentially-political fields such as school and university. As Blee
and Taylor (2002: 92) observe, this approach is especially useful for capturing the causal
nature of mobilisation, including the available resources and social context which
surrounded their decision-making. At the same time, tracing this narrative also created space
for spontaneous reactions and themes to emerge which were not part of the research design.
By maintaining a flexible interview schedule, interviewees were encouraged to self-evaluate
and ‘convey intangible feelings’ (Blee and Taylor, 2002: 99). This was particularly valuable
in the case of non-participants, as their lack of involvement meant that they had seldom
reflected on their own ‘political narrative’ before.
Of course, eliciting this sort of information and self-reflection from interviewees requires a
comfortable and non-judgmental interview environment so that conversations can flow as
naturally as possible. This places great importance on the positioning of the interviewer. As a
UK student, my position can be understood as being simultaneously an ‘insider’ – in the
sense that I have long-term knowledge and experience of belonging to a student community
– and an ‘outsider’ – in that to interviewees, my status as a researcher ultimately overrode
that of a fellow student. Given the breadth of different types of interviewee, it was felt that
the interviewer should appear to embody the sort of interviewer each would like to see. This
meant appearing generally sympathetic towards their disposition, be they high-cost/risk
activists or disengaged non-participants. Such an approach is not disingenuous given that my
principal aim was to understand their political disposition, though I was sometimes able to
challenge interviewees by drawing on arguments made by other interviewees (activists who
defended direct action, for example). In other words, the flexible positioning of the
interviewer facilitated a ‘mediated’ debate between different types of participant and non-
participant. Nevertheless, the ultimate goal in the positioning of the researcher was to ensure
the interview was as close to a ‘natural conversation’ as possible.
Sampling, access and ethics
The sampling of campuses and interviewees was driven by a desire to achieve
‘completeness’ in terms of students’ different experiences of protest and the fees case study.
This involved, in Blee and Taylor’s (2002: 100) words, following the principle of ‘similarity’
and ‘dissimilarity’, so that contrasts and conflicts between groups and actors were identified
and general themes and trends corroborated. In addition, it was felt that the selection of
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universities for interviewing should include a range of university types – including different
geographical locations, campus types (e.g. unitary or dispersed) and age (e.g. ancient,
modern, post-1992). Fulfilling these ideals, however, was affected by accessibility
constraints – both in terms of available campuses and the diversity of prospective
interviewees.
As noted earlier, the qualitative research design had a malleable target of 5-6 universities and
30-40 interviewees for its sample, which was considered a realistic field saturation point
within the available timeframe. Given that the bulk of interviewees were to be recruited via
the survey, the selection of universities had to be drawn from the survey sample. A further
constraint was the fact that interviews were scheduled to take place mostly concurrently to
the survey. This meant that universities would have to be selected from those which had
already yielded a high number of respondents. With the overall percentage of respondents
willing to be interviewed hovering at around 30-35 per cent throughout the survey’s
duration, I estimated universities with total of around 90-100 survey respondents would
ensure a healthy enough sample size of potential interviewees.
With an average of around 25-35 students per university to select for interview, it was
quickly found that survey recruitment alone could not provide sufficient access to a
campus’s activist networks. This is because very few students involved in student union
politics or organising campus occupations were recruited for interviews – reflecting, of
course, their tiny proportionality to the overall student population. Unlike non-participants or
petitioners who were numerous enough to be generalised, protest organisers and high-
cost/risk activists represented a finite group of individuals on campus who warranted
approaching directly. Two selections – Edinburgh and Warwick – were quickly made as I
had already established links with gatekeepers involved in their respective campus
occupation groups in autumn 2011 via each group’s Twitter account. Both were receptive to
the research project and indicated that they would be able to give me email addresses of
students involved in organising protests on campus, including occupants and union officers.
This was augmented by the fact that both quickly achieved more than 100 survey
respondents, indicating that both would be able to provide a suitable diversity of active and
inactive interview candidates.
Two further universities – Cambridge and Roehampton – were selected for the sample
without the aid of gatekeepers, though in each case one interviewee would be recruited
through purposive sampling via personal connections and Twitter. Both achieved a survey
response in excess of 90, and featured a diversity of different academic departments
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sampled. Cambridge was an interesting case because its higher education activism
campaigns had prominently extended into the 2011/12 academic year – exemplified in the
shutting down of the Universities Minister David Willetts’s talk in November 2011.
Roehampton, on the other hand, was notable for having announced its intention to close its
Human Rights undergraduate course within weeks of the Browne Review, provoking
protests by students on campus. Since autumn 2010, however, there had been little evidence
of student protest campaigns. Roehampton also represented the only post-1992 university in
the sample.
The selections of UCL and Leeds represented a desire to engage with some of the student
protests’ UK-wide campaigns. Both hosted prominent student-led campaign groups –
NCAFC and the Really Open University (ROU) – that had been active in campaigning for
free education and against higher tuition fees prior to the Browne Review. Although UCL
achieved a below-par survey response, it warranted inclusion on the basis that its prominence
in the UK media coverage of the student protests provided interesting opportunities to
compare attitudes of participants and non-participants. Moreover, the securing of a
gatekeeper to its activist network provided access to a large number of high-cost/risk
participants. This provided the opportunity to study this network in some depth, especially in
terms of students’ paths to mobilisation. Leeds achieved 93 survey responses, including
many studying natural science which would help restore balance to the range of subject
background in the overall sample. Activists at Leeds were accessed via its occupation
group’s Facebook page, which was still relatively active in spring 2012. This, however,
proved comparatively unsuccessful in practice, with only one of the arranged interviews
taking place after two cancellations and one no-show. Attempts to contact ROU also proved
unsuccessful as their website appeared not to have been updated since summer 2011.
UWE and Newcastle University had also been shortlisted as possible campus selections. The
latter proved unsuccessful in gaining access to an activist gatekeeper, whereas the former
failed to secure more than one department for the survey’s distribution. Although a
gatekeeper was secured, the low survey response meant that achieving a range of participants
and non-participants would not be possible. As this might suggest, the constraints in
selecting campuses had a strong effect on shaping the interview research design. Although
geographically diverse, the final selection of universities was dominated by large Russell
Group universities in major cities. At the same time, however, the list reflected a higher
number of activist gatekeepers secured than originally anticipated. Both of these factors
resulted in the research design moving away from comparing activism according to different
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campus types, and more towards a comparison of participants and non-participants within
campuses where opportunities for activism were relatively abundant. The effect this shift had
on the analysis will be discussed in more detail in the fourth section of this chapter.
The selection of interviewees from the survey sample required a range of different types of
student. To do this, survey results from each university’s willing interviewees were
downloaded onto a spreadsheet and analysed manually. Among students who had
participated in the protests, a range of different participatory types were sought, such as
students involved in high-cost/risk activism (augmenting purposive sampling), students
involved mostly in low-cost/risk activities, and students who were seemingly more active in
the protests than in politics generally (and vice-versa). The selection process also paid
attention to which parties students had voted for in the 2010 election, and which party (if
any) they now identified with – in particular, Liberal Democrat voters who had since dis-
identified were a key group of interest.
Among non-participants, certain key indicators were sought. In particular, it was important
to sample a range of students who were ‘supportive’, ‘undecided’ and ‘unsupportive’
towards the protests. Also targeted were ‘pure’ non-participants i.e. those who had
participated in none of the general activities listed in the questionnaire. Perhaps inevitably,
very few of these students expressed a willingness to be interviewed, though three interviews
were secured with students who had participated in nothing beyond ‘ethical shopping’. For
participants and non-participants, attention was also paid to achieving a range of different
types of student including international students, postgraduates, students from science and
technology backgrounds and mature students, as well as a 50:50 male-female ratio.
Finally, the research design took careful consideration of possible ethical issues, and was
conducted in compliance with BSA ethical guidelines. Since interviews were due to be
recorded, all interview material was anonymised for the thesis and related publications, with
interviewees assigned false names. Given the use of snowball sampling to recruit some
interviewees, information regarding interpersonal relationships was also excluded from the
writing-up process. One potentially contentious aspect of the interview process concerned
the disclosure of illegal activity – a possibility in the event of students’ recollection of protest
events that had resulted in arrests and convictions. To deal appropriately with all ethical
issues, interviewees were presented with an ‘Interview Information Sheet’ outlining the
purpose of the study, and a Consent Form (see appendix D) inviting them to state that they
understood and accepted the terms of the interview. In cases where illegal disclosure were
felt to be a potential issue, students were informed that the interviewer did not wish to be
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privy to such information, and that when relevant, interviewees either avoided disclosing
such information or depersonalised and anonymised their recollections.
Reflexivity
To help prepare for interviews with high-cost/risk activists, between June and December
2011 I undertook informal participant observation in a series of activism activities. Although
not formally part of my data collection, this ‘background ethnography’ proved extremely
valuable for furthering my knowledge and experience of protest participation. Activities
included attending local and UK-wide student and anti-cuts demonstrations (including the
NCAFC student demonstration, recounted in chapter one); attending student activism
conferences; visiting the 2011 Edinburgh student occupation groups and conducting an
informal focus-group interview with participants, and visiting Occupy London throughout
October/November 2011 to discuss with participants the working group structure and
observe consensus meetings. These experiences enabled me to put myself in the position of
an activist, so that I could gain a first-hand understanding of some of the experiences one
might encounter when involved in occupations and large-scale demonstrations. Participant
observation was supplemented with more discourse-oriented research, including following
protest groups on Facebook and Twitter and interacting with users over certain political and
organisational issues. All of these experiences were found to help me ‘perform’ as an
engaged and knowledgeable interviewer, so that high-cost/risk activists in particular would
feel comfortable in discussing activist politics openly and candidly.
For the interviews themselves, efforts were made to choose locations that were comfortable
and accommodating. This meant that the majority of interviews took place at public, central
campus locations – usually small cafes. For one student – who was away from university
during my campus visit – our interview was conducted via Skype. Interviews at Leeds,
Warwick and Cambridge were conducted during 3-5 day field visits to each city between
March and July. For Edinburgh, Roehampton and UCL, their locations were more easily
accessible for me, resulting in interviews taking place at various times throughout April and
October. Initially, interviews tended to last between 40 and 80 minutes, but towards the end
of fieldwork they had extended to a minimum of 60 minutes, with some extending beyond
two hours. It was quickly found that my open and flexible interviewing style, combined with
comfortable locations, resulted in interviews extending longer than I had originally
anticipated. The time flexibility often allowed interviewees the freedom to talk openly and
candidly and the interviewer the opportunity to explore emerging themes and experiences in
more detail. As a result, over the course of the interview schedule more time was allotted for
87
each interview and fewer interviews were timetabled for each day so that longer interviews
could be accommodated.
Flexibility was necessary for the interview guides, though this did not come at the expense of
preparation. For non-participants and moderately-active participants, interview guides had a
generic narrative structure which was then adapted for each interviewee using their
individual questionnaire responses. This might include information on the party they had
voted for, the sorts of protest activities they might have undertaken, and their attitudes
towards higher education funding and the student protests. These were not necessarily all
discussed in the interview – I was conscious throughout of minimising the amount of time I
checked my notes so as to ensure conversation remained as free-flowing as possible – but
were sometimes invoked in order to lend concreteness to some of the discussions. This was
often a necessary tactic for non-participants or occasional participants, as discussion would
easily lapse into ‘generic’ discussions unmoored by any specific experiences of events or
encounters. Interviews with high-cost/risk activists presented a slightly different challenge.
Interview preparation required research into specific campaigns and protests that took place
on their campus, so that the interviews could follow a personal life history/case study
narrative. Some activists were scholars of social movements and political philosophy, and so
would often draw links to other concurrent events such as Occupy, the Arab Spring and the
English Riots. Whilst these regularly provided interesting insights, they were often beyond
the scope of the study, and so my task was often to maintain focus on personal/case study
narratives.
My positionality as an interviewer was a regular subject for self-reflection. As a student who
was supportive of anti-fees protest campaigns but had only minor involvement as a
participant prior to data collection, I was conscious of the need to conduct interviews in a
manner that drew sparingly from my own personal experiences and attitudes. As noted
earlier, my strategy was to reflect the sort of interviewer interviewees wanted to see, albeit
without providing hard evidence that my positionality necessarily matched this. This strategy
proved broadly successful, though in certain interviews I found it useful to disclose personal
attitudes and experiences. This was because of the need to maintain a relaxed and natural
interview environment, and so personal disclosure became an appropriate means of showing
sympathy and empathy to interviewees’ own experiences and reflections. For high-cost/risk
participants especially, recalling personal experiences of major demonstrations (e.g. the 2011
NCAFC march) and occupations proved useful for putting the interviewee at ease when it
came to building a basic level of trust. This trust often facilitated further discussion of more
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contentious tactics and events. Occasionally, interviewees would directly question my own
positionality: at Edinburgh, some high-cost/risk participants asked me whether I had
personal connections to activism groups and campaigns on campus. In these instances, I
chose to be honest in explaining my limited activism involvement. In general, though, I
found that high-cost/risk participants were more trusting of me as an interviewer for the
knowledge of their occupations and campaigns I was able to demonstrate during interviews,
rather than my own activism participation. This gave them the confidence that I understood
their perspective, and had no preconceived impression or ‘agenda’ regarding their campaigns
or tactics.
To evaluate, the interview research design – much like the survey – benefitted from a robust
data collection strategy that also allowed for certain flexibilities of focus. The ease of access
and repeatability of the interview process resulted in a higher number of interviews
conducted – 56 – than originally anticipated. Moreover, as we shall see in the next section,
the richness of narrative data from these interviews – both at a personal and case study level
– strengthened my view that the survey should support the interviews rather than vice-versa.
Despite this richness, there were some shortcomings in the interviewing process. Although a
50:50 male-female ratio was achieved, sampling strategies secured fewer female high-
cost/risk activists than males. This imbalance was not felt to be necessarily representative of
activist networks, but placed limitations on the extent to which gender could be adequately
studied as a variable in high-cost/risk mobilisation. More generally, Roehampton and Leeds
yielded a lower number of respondents than the others (see appendix C), which limited their
capacity to be analysed as micro-case studies in their own right. All of these issues had to be
taken into consideration for converting raw data into analysis and narrative formation. This
is the focus of the final section.
4. Research data analysis
The following discussion will be divided into three categories: the first deals with survey
data preparation and analysis; the second does the same for interview data, and the third
covers the translation of this data into the formation of narratives and themes which form the
basis of the four findings chapters.
Survey data coding and analysis
The first task of survey data was to prepare it for analysis. To allow for the questionnaire to
be edited between phases one and two, the survey was divided into two separate datasets
which had to be joined together. Since the raw data contained mostly multiple-word variable
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names, the dataset had to be coded into binary using Excel before being converted into SPSS
19. The raw dataset also contained numerous ‘open box’ questions – e.g. parties voted for
and supported, degree subjects – which had to be coded manually. Excel was used to identify
duplicate and voided questionnaires, and certain clusters of variables were analysed in order
to detect mono-response questionnaires. This resulted in the dataset being reduced from
2,493 to 2,485 respondents.
During the coding process it was found that certain survey questions had failed to produce
reliable data. This owed to the poor construction of certain questions – notably the question
regarding student democracy within the university (Q7) – and so had to be excluded from
further analysis. It was also found that survey questions failed to capture key variables
related to ‘biographical availability’ (McAdam, 1986) – e.g. whether students were studying
full or part-time, or lived on/close to campus – which restricted the usefulness of quantitative
analysis for studying paths and barriers to protest participation. Another problem was that
the manual process in which the survey ‘split’ questioning between student protest
participants and non-participants (where all questions were still visible to all respondents)
meant that a minority of participants completed survey questions intended for non-
participants and vice-versa, though this ‘leakage’ was not found to have produced any
statistically significant patterns.
Another problem related to missing data from questions directed at non-participants. Up until
the participant/non-participant split, all questions were compulsory, with respondents’ unable
to progress to the next page without having completed all previous questions. For
participant/non-participant-specific questions this was not possible, which meant around 30-
40 of the 1,932 non-participants failed to fully answer question 37. Again, this did not
conform to any particular pattern, suggesting that this could be attributed to respondent error
in following the questionnaire’s instructions.
Converting the dataset into SPSS 19 allowed for the sample to be tested for its
representativeness. As we can see from figure 3.3, the survey amounts to a 0.1 per cent
sample of the UK student population as a whole. In the most part, it reproduces
demographical proportionalities of the overall UK student population, including a
comparable split of undergraduates, postgraduates, English, Scottish, Welsh and Northern
Irish-domiciled students, EU and non-EU international students. There is also a comparative
distribution of science students and arts, humanities and social science students. There are,
however, response biases, most notably a clear slant towards female students, and a slightly
above-average proportion of students domiciled in Scotland – no doubt reflecting in the fact
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that nearly one in five respondents studied at the University of Edinburgh. This necessitated
specific analysis of these variables so that any trends specific to gender or domicile were
clearly identified for any impact they might have on skewing UK-wide representative
statistics.

















































































UK population statistics are taken from http://www.hesa.ac.uk/. * UK population statistics are taken from first
year enrolment only.
Survey analysis was divided into basic themes, each of which is covered in the four findings
chapters: basic demographics of participation (in the case study and in general), attitudes
towards the civic ideal and the efficacy of protest repertoires (chapter four); cultural and
network-based paths and barriers to political participation in the case study and in general
(chapter five); the uniformity of political attitudes and collective identification among case
study participants (chapter six), and the social origins of non-participation (chapter seven).
The tools of data analysis consisted mostly of frequency tables, cross-tabulations, and the
aggregation of multiple variables into ordinal ideal-types. All cross-tabulations were tested
for statistical significance using the Pearson Chi square statistic, with significance levels set
at either 1 or 5 per cent. Ideal types were especially useful for generating two participatory
measurement scales – the ‘general participation index’ and the ‘student protest participation
index’ – as it condensed large amounts of data into three categories (plus non-participants).
These ideal types also helped frame and contextualise interviewees, so that the accounts of
survey-recruited interviewees could be used to speak for and explain the actions and
motivations of each category.
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It was felt that the initial decision to seek a representative sample limited opportunities to
make use of more advanced quantitative data methods. For example, the survey captured
only 101 respondents who participated in campus occupations or sit-ins in the student
protests. This low yield consequently limited the survey’s ability to compare social
demographics of different participatory types. Of course, this small sample could have been
boosted by purposive sampling via messaging activism group Facebook pages, as well as
encouraging the 20+ high-cost/risk interviewees recruited via gatekeepers to fill in the
questionnaire. This, however, would have distorted the survey’s claim to representativeness,
whilst also risking asking too much from interviewees and gatekeepers.
Interview data analysis
Interview fieldwork was completed by the end of August 2012 (with one additional
interview conducted in October). Transcription began whilst fieldwork was still taking place,
which enabled certain emerging themes to be tackled more directly in subsequent interviews.
To help organise the interview data, a spreadsheet was set up to detail basic demographical
information from each interviewee, as well as certain categorical data from the survey e.g.
which group in the general participation/student protest indexes they belonged to. This
helped categorise interviewees by their participation, making it easier to identify which
transcripts might be most useful for clarifying or elaborating on certain survey trends.
Interviews were transcribed in full, with some transcripts extending to around 20,000 words.
Each transcript was analysed and annotated at two levels. The first involved providing
citations (including academic publications, news reports and activist blogs) to clarify or
correct interviewees’ references to groups, events and individuals. The second level was
more analytical and thematic. This involved coding certain themes which had been part of
the standard interview schedule e.g. political family background, the 2010 election, views
towards higher education funding, Millbank, and the use of direct action. Interview
transcripts were also annotated for the purposes of identifying emerging themes – such as the
role played by ‘secret Facebook groups’ (see chapter six) or specific events occurring on
certain campuses (i.e. Cambridge’s strategy for occupation – see chapter five).
To help build collective narratives, timelines of activism on each campus were created
through combining interview quotes and research taken from contemporary media and
student sources. These proved useful for corroborating information related to sequencing
events, and constructing a multi-perspectival account of demonstrations and occupations, as
well as identifying aspects of interviewee recollections which proved unreliable. Moreover,
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these timelines were key resources for organising the case study for chapter analysis, so that
it was easy for me to look up and compare events which might have taken place on any of
the campuses at any particular time.
One consequence of this chronicling process was a deepening awareness that some
universities functioned better as micro-case studies than others. As noted earlier, Leeds and
Roehampton yielded fewer interviews than Cambridge, Edinburgh, Warwick and UCL. This
deficit became more apparent when constructing timelines for Leeds and Roehampton as it
became clear that interview material did not coalesce around shared experiences to the same
extent that the others did. For Leeds, this reflected the aforementioned failure to secure
gatekeepers to high-cost/risk activists and protest organisers. This meant that I mostly drew
on secondary sources to construct a timeline of protest events on campus – an issue
compounded by the fact that a higher proportion of interviewees secured were non-
participants. Roehampton interviewees, on the other hand, were mostly participants, but did
not coalesce around common themes or experiences (apart from the NUS demonstration).
Moreover, interviews amounted to a relatively diverse sample, including mature students,
international students and students living some distance from campus.
In contrast, the timelines constructed for Cambridge, Edinburgh, Warwick and UCL bore
strong similarities to each other: all four had sent large numbers of students to the NUS and
NCAFC demonstrations, hosted occupations in 2010 and 2011, and seen occupation
subgroups go onto stand for student union elections. This also meant that the narratives of
non-participants at the four universities were similar as they were often reacting to similar
events, disputes and mobilisation opportunities. This allowed for a core, multi-campus and
multi-perspectival narrative of the student protests to emerge, and the experiences of
participants and non-participants aggregated and generalised to some extent. Put together,
these narratives were vital to the construction of an overall findings narrative that covers
each of the research questions set out in chapter one. This process is the subject for the final
section.
Triangulation and narrative formation
As has been noted throughout this chapter, the basic approach to triangulation was to use the
survey data as a means of framing and contextualising narratives uncovered in the qualitative
research. During the process of fieldwork and data collection, the primacy of the latter over
the former strengthened. This is because interviews generated a greater richness of personal
reflections among participants and non-participants than had originally been anticipated.
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This owed in part to the access I was able to gain to a range of different interviewees, the
extended length of many of interviews, and the candidness of the interviewees themselves.
Interviews’ breadth and richness also made it easier to construct collective narratives out of
interviewees’ corroborated accounts. The aforementioned multi-perspectival narrative
concerning the autumn 2010 fees at Cambridge, Edinburgh, Warwick and UCL was arguably
the strongest to emerge. Its strength came from the fact that interviewees generally had
access to the same participatory opportunities, both on campus and nationally. This
coalescence made it easier to identify and analyse key variables which separated participants
from non-participants, and as a result, this narrative formed the core basis of analysis of
paths and barriers to mobilisation (chapter five) and collective identity formation (chapter
six). Chapters four and seven – which deal with participatory trends and non-participation
respectively – are less narrative-driven and therefore benefit from discussion being framed
by the categories constructed from survey data. This lack of narrative also allows interview
data from Roehampton and Leeds to be more easily incorporated into the discussion.
In terms of triangulation, the general approach was to use survey trends as a backdrop for
contextualising qualitative findings. For example, the experiences uncovered in interviews
with high-cost/risk participants or supportive non-participants could be framed according to
each category’s overall proportionality to the overall UK student population. In other words,
the survey served to enhance interviews by extending the significance of their findings
beyond the boundaries of the campuses sampled. Nevertheless, as we have seen, the focus on
protests in autumn 2010 created a disjuncture between the period of study and the survey’s
sample. This made it important to use survey data carefully when testing or contextualising
findings specific to autumn 2010 – for chapter four especially this involved separating first
year students from the survey sample to see how it might affect trends.
A final point concerns the study’s claim to representativeness. First, whilst the survey can be
claimed to be a representative sample of the overall UK student population, the same cannot
necessarily be said about the qualitative data. Although I consider findings related to the
campuses studied in chapters five and six broadly representative of large Russell Group
universities in general, this does not necessarily extend to all UK universities. This owes to
the fact that the qualitative research shifted its focus from comparing campuses to comparing
students within campuses, as well as the relative failure to successfully capture activism
culture at the only post-1992 university in the sample. Second, despite a sampling strategy
designed to achieve a diversity of demographics, the interviews do not necessarily capture
the full range of student voices in the UK today. In particular, female high-cost/risk activists,
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right-wing activists, students studying business and technology subjects, non-EU students
and students from different ethnic backgrounds are under-represented in the forthcoming
chapters, whereas students who graduated in 2011 are absent entirely. This, of course, owed
to the unique time constraints of needing to complete fieldwork by the end of the 2011/12
academic year, as well as the resources available to a single researcher. Nevertheless, I am
confident that the following findings chapters provide a richness of data that goes some way
to addressing this project’s research questions.
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Chapter 4
Survey patterns of student political
participation in the UK
1. Introduction
Given that this study focuses on the relationship between participation and non-participation,
it is appropriate that analysis should begin by considering the student population as a whole.
The survey, which has sought to achieve broad representativeness of universities in the UK,
enables us to do this. Consequently, this chapter has two basic aims. First, it considers
political participation in general, drawing comparisons between student constructions of a
‘participatory ideal’ and their participatory practice. By mapping out patterns of political
engagement among all university students, it is hoped that this will provide the broader
context through which the student protests against fees and cuts can be understood. In
particular, this involves identifying which forms of participation students consider the most
efficacious. In addition, efforts have also been made to break down participation as a basic
category and explore trends and patterns within it.
The second aim of this chapter is to provide basic attitudinal and participatory trends in the
2010/11 student protests against fees and cuts case study. The intention here is to map out
who participated and what they did. An advantage of the scale and scope of this survey
research is that it provides an opportunity to study the full range of student categories
currently studying in the UK – home and international students, younger and mature
students, undergraduates and postgraduates – and compare their participation patterns and
attitudes. Previous student surveys have tended to be fairly small-scale and date mostly from
the late 1960s and 1970s and, as such, focus on what was then a smaller population of mostly
‘home’ undergraduates (e.g. Blackstone and Hadley, 1971; Clarke and Egan, 1972).
It is also an aim of this chapter to introduce basic trends and patterns related to student non-
participation. This has been an under-researched topic in political science, if not necessarily
under-theorised given the influence of Olson’s (1965) ‘free-rider’ concept. This chapter will
therefore seek to flesh out some of the demographic and attitudinal properties of non-
participants, both in terms of the case study and in general. These properties are then
explored in more detail in the following chapters.
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2. Civic engagement and forms of political participation
A participatory ideal?
Adapting questions from the survey used by Pattie et al. (2004), students were asked a
variety of questions related to participatory duty and responsibility. Respondents displayed
little evidence of apathy towards political participation in principle, with 65.8 per cent
agreeing that ‘if a person is dissatisfied with the policies of the government, he/she has a
duty to do something about it’ – more than the 59 per cent found by Pattie et al. (2004: 159).
In terms of converting this duty into effective participation, there appears to be more
confidence in collective rather than individual action: 52.2 per cent agree that ‘my
participation can have an impact on government policy in this country’, whereas 68.8 per
cent agree that ‘organised groups of citizens can have a lot of impact on public policies in
this country’.
Although these statements do not specify any particular forms of action, they do centre on
influencing public policy and government. Questions related to formal political participation
elicited a decidedly mixed response. For example, 79.8 per cent agreed that ‘most politicians
make a lot of promises but do not actually do anything’ and 60.4 per cent claimed to distrust
political parties in general. For a third of respondents, this distrust extended to a cynical view
of electoral participation, with 33.9 per cent agreeing that ‘I don’t see the use of voting,
parties do whatever they want anyway’. That said, 53.4 per cent disagreed with this
statement, suggesting that the majority still believe in the principle of voting, even if this has
not been lived up to so far in practice by the available politicians and parties. This is
illustrated further in figure 4.1, which shows that voting is considered by some distance to be
the most effective form of political participation of the available options, with 85.7 per cent
considering it to be effective.
Comparing results from figure 4.1 with those of Hansard (2009: 68) it is noticeable that
student respondents are more positive about the effectiveness of voting (85.7 to 72 per cent),
and signing petitions (69.3 to 47 per cent) than the general UK population. Beyond petitions
and generically-defined ‘campaigns’, Hansard does not measure in any great detail the
perceived effectiveness of civic or protest repertoires. Figure 4.1 indicates forms of protest
divide respondents: on the one hand, a higher proportion considers strikes and direct action
‘very effective’ compared with letters to MPs and civic associations. On the other hand, a
higher proportion of respondents consider direct action, strikes and protest marches to be not
at all effective compared to all other presented options. There appears to be no recognisable
correlation between effectiveness and the costs and risks of the participation repertoires
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themselves, with petitions and SMO membership considered overall to be as effective as
strike action.










Voting in elections 37.7% 48.0% 10.0% 2.4% 1.8%
Petitions 10.2% 59.1% 23.4% 4.0% 3.3%
Consumer boycotts of products
and services
15.6% 45.8% 25.7% 7.0% 6.0%
Contacting an MP 8.0% 45.6% 26.9% 8.2% 11.3%
Joining/financially supporting an
SMO
10.5% 51.6% 21.5% 5.9% 10.5%
Joining or forming a civic
association (e.g. Fathers 4 Justice)
6.1% 45.1% 24.3% 6.0% 18.6%
Protest marches 8.4% 45.4% 30.2% 11.0% 5.0%
Strike action 17.0% 48.5% 20.9% 8.5% 5.2%
‘Direct action’ protest (e.g.
occupations, sit-ins, blockades)
10.7% 36.8% 29.1% 15.2% 8.2%
N=2,485. Note: Percentages by row.
Question: How effective a form of political participation do you think are each of these activities?
With voting considered more effective than other forms of participation, it was important to
test respondents’ attitudes towards UK democracy. Focusing only on UK-based students,
figure 4.2 shows only 23 per cent agree that ‘no problem exists with the current democratic
system’. There is clear support for increasing referenda for major issues of public interest, as
well as introducing proportional representation for UK elections (though it is noticeable that
a third appear unsure about their position, despite electoral reform having been an issue of
public debate throughout 2010 and 2011). Interestingly, support for the abolition of
parliament in favour of a system of direct democracy – a fairly radical notion – received 18.2
per cent support. In general, these findings suggest that students see voting as the most
effective means of political participation but that its current means of delivery is inadequate.
This has led to students’ openness to alternative models of democracy, even if the true extent
of their engagement in such debates is less clear.
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Democracy in the UK would be improved by having more
referenda on major issues of public interest
66.7% 20.3% 13.0%
Democracy in the UK would be improved if a system of
proportional representation was introduced for general
elections
51.2% 32.5% 16.3%
True democracy in the UK is only possible through the
abolition of parliament and the creation of a new system
of direct democracy
18.2% 35.4% 46.4%
I see no problem with the current democratic system in
the UK
23.0% 27.0% 50.0%
Democracy in the UK already gives people too much of a
say on political issues
5.6% 21.1% 73.3%
N=2,104. Note: Percentages by row.
Question: It has sometimes been argued that democracy in the UK needs to be reformed to allow for
greater voice from its citizens. What is your view of the following?
Of course, in the absence of a fully-functioning democratic system students might see protest
as the best alternative means of making their views heard. Figure 4.3 shows that respondents
have an overall positive view of protest, with 58.5 per cent seeing it as an ‘essential’ form of
political engagement, and only 11.3 per cent considering it ‘illegitimate’. Questions
regarding the uses of protest, however, draw more mixed feelings. Respondents see virtually
no difference between the capacity of protest to change the policies of government or
corporations: in each case around 45 per cent think they can, which is lower than the overall
effectiveness attributed to voting in elections or contacting an MP. Furthermore, 34.1 per
cent agree that ‘there are always better ways of making your views heard than by protesting’,
with 32.7 per cent disagreeing and 33.2 per cent unsure. This suggests that although protest
in principle represents a necessary form of political participation, in practice it might be
considered more effective in certain circumstances than others.
Exploring what effective protest might look like, figure 4.3 indicates a preference for what
one might call ‘peaceful’ tactics: 72 per cent disagree with the view that effective protest
requires taking power by force, and 69.3 per cent agree that ‘protest suffers because the
actions of a minority usually spoil it for the majority’ (though admittedly it is not implied
what such actions might refer to). Again, it would seem that whilst students uphold the
principle of protest, they are less certain over the arguably messier practicalities of protest
participation. This is borne out by the most popular statement in figure 4.3 being ‘protest can
increase the wider population’s knowledge and awareness of an issue’. In many ways, this
chimes with the perceived legacy of much of 1960s and 1970s student activism, where
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gender equality and sexual politics slowly gained broader acceptance in society after initial
protest campaigns brought these issues to public attention (Altbach, 1989; Hoefferle, 2013).
In other words, protest might achieve a diffusive effect over society, with its ideas and values
contributing to citizens’ overall thought and behaviour over time, even if the actions
themselves are more difficult to explain or defend at the time.





Protest can positively influence the views and
interests of the wider population
71.2% 16.5% 12.3%
Protest can increase the wider population’s
knowledge and awareness of an issue
90.6% 6.8% 2.6%
Protest can help change UK government policy 45.8% 28.0% 26.3%
Protest can help change the policy of corporations 44.9% 26.5% 28.5%
Protest is an essential form of political engagement 58.5% 23.6% 17.9%
Protest is not a legitimate form of political
participation
11.3% 23.6% 65.1%
Protest can only be effective if it involves taking power
by force
10.8% 17.2% 72.0%
There are always better ways of making your views
heard than by protesting
34.1% 33.2% 32.7%
Protest suffers because the actions of a minority
usually spoil it for the majority
69.3% 18.1% 12.5%
N=2,485. Note: Percentages by row.
Questions: People might choose to protest for a variety of different reasons. What sort of impact do
you think protest can have? To what extent do you agree with the following statements about
protest?
Students’ participatory practice
According to Hansard (2009: 20), there is a strong correlation between interest in politics
and the likelihood of participating politically. The 2009 audit shows that only 30 per cent of
young people claimed to have ‘discussed politics or political news with someone else in the
last two or three years’ – lower than any age group apart from the over-75s. Given their
decision to stay on in education, it is perhaps unsurprising that the student survey shows
much higher levels of political engagement: only 3.6 per cent claim to ‘never’ discuss
politics, with 76.3 per cent claiming to do so at least ‘sometimes’. Around a quarter of
students claim to discuss politics regularly. The most significant variable in separating those
who discuss politics and those who do not in Hansard’s survey is social class, with a 48 per
cent gap between ABs and DEs who discuss politics. Although the student survey employs a
subjective definition of class, the discrepancy in political interest between those identifying
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as ‘upper middle class’5 and ‘working class’ is narrower: 49.1 per cent of the former claim to
discuss politics often, whereas for the latter the figure is 43.9 per cent6. Again, this suggests
certain attitudinal similarities between university students which to some extent transcend
class background.
As discussed in chapter one, the 2010 general election was notable for the Liberal Democrats
bucking recent trends and appealing directly to young voters about tuition fees. This appeal
was arguably borne out in UK voting behaviour, Ipsos-MORI (2010) finding that turnout
among 18-24 year-olds was 7 per cent higher than in 2005 at 44 per cent. The most popular
party were the Liberal Democrats with 30 per cent of the vote, an increase of 4 per cent
compared to 2005. Opinion Panel’s (2010) student survey found the Liberal Democrats
achieved a 39 per cent share of the student vote, 15 per cent more than Labour, the second
most popular party. Using my own survey, electoral turnout was much higher among
students than the UK average at 74.7 per cent (excluding ineligible respondents). Again, the
Liberal Democrats were found to be by far the most popular party, achieving a 45.6 per cent
share of the vote (among those willing to reveal their choice) – 16.7 per cent of the survey
sample overall.
Moving onto other forms of political participation, figure 4.4 shows students to have
engaged in a wide range of civic and activist practices. Comparing findings with those from
Hansard’s 2010 audit, it would appear that students are far more politically active than the
UK average: students are ten times more likely to have attended a protest march, and more
than twice as many have signed a petition in the past three years. Of course, this partly
reflects a difference in ‘biographical availability’, for as Crossley (2008) argues the majority
of students entering university are ‘structurally freed up for activism’, with the campus likely
to provide multiple opportunities to become more politically involved.
5 Since only 19 respondents (0.8 per cent of the sample) identified as ‘upper class’, this category has
been excluded from comparative analysis in this study.
6 p=0.05.
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Signed a petition 66.0% 18.6% 15.5%
Boycotted certain products and services for political,
ethical or environmental reasons
38.5% 12.5% 49.0%
Bought certain products and services for political,
ethical or environmental reasons
52.5% 9.2% 38.3%
Worn or displayed a campaign badge or sticker 26.5% 14.0% 59.4%
Presented my views to a local councillor or MP 15.7% 13.0% 71.2%
Been a member of a social movement organization
(e.g. Amnesty, Greenpeace)
17.8% 11.4% 70.8%
Worked or campaigned on behalf of a political party 6.5% 9.0% 84.5%
Stood as a candidate for school/student/local
elections
12.3% 14.2% 73.5%
Distributed flyers for a political campaign 8.6% 8.7% 82.7%
Taken part in a protest march 16.2% 14.0% 69.9%
Taken part in strike action 6.7% 9.3% 84.1%
Taken part in an occupation/sit-in 4.4% 8.2% 87.4%
Taken part in the blockade of a building or meeting 2.5% 7.4% 90.1%
N=2,485. Note: Percentages by row.
Question: Please tick if you have done any of the following political activities in the last three years
(select all that apply).
Returning to the issue of effectiveness, the survey tends to find a correlation between
perceived effectiveness in certain activities and respondents’ participation in them. For
occupations, 63.7 per cent of occupants consider ‘direct action’ tactics effective compared to
45.2 per cent of non-occupants7. Similarly, 67.6 per cent of marchers think protest marches
are effective compared to 47.9 per cent of non-marchers8, and 71.7 per cent of petitioners
think petitions are effective compared to 56.1 per cent of non-petitioners9. The disparity is
notably narrower, however, in the case of strike action: 74.7 per cent of strikers see it as
effective, compared to 63.7 per cent of non-strikers10. This may owe to the likelihood that
students will have had relatively few opportunities or invitations to take strike action in the
past three years, save for striking in solidarity with academic staff. Non-strikers might also
oppose strike action precisely because of its effectiveness.
Although the survey question presented in figure 4.4 derives from Hansard’s (2010)
questionnaire, it differs by drawing a distinction between repeated and one-off activities.
What becomes clear is that certain repertoires are likelier to be practiced more than once,






In contrast, taking part blockades, distributing flyers, occupying, working/campaigning for a
political party are comparatively less likely to be practiced more than once. To some extent,
this reflects differences in the supply of, and access to, certain activities: petitions (especially
e-petitions) are widely available via different campaigning organisations, and repeated action
is essential to ethical shopping and consumer boycotts.
Nevertheless, there is also evidence to suggest that in general, one-off participants found
their particular experience less meaningful and efficacious than those who chose to repeat
their participation. If we cross-tabulate respondents who took part in an occupation or sit-in
(N=314) with their personal perceptions of efficacy towards direct action repertoires, a clear
distinction emerges: 78 per cent of repeated participants consider direct action effective (34.9
per cent considering it ‘very effective’) compared with 56.1 per cent of one-off participants
(with only 14.1 per cent considering it ‘very effective’11). A similar pattern can be found
when comparing attendees of protest marches: 73.9 per cent of repeated participants consider
protest marches effective (16.7 per cent seeing it as ‘very effective’), compared to 60.2 per
cent of one-off participants (only 8.1 per cent of whom seeing it as ‘very effective’12). This
suggests that although one-off participants might have done enough to qualify as activists
according to Hansard’s (2009) calculation, it would appear that not all of them found their
experience positive enough to make them want to participate again.
Measuring participatory cost and risk
In large-scale surveys, it can be useful to group or index forms of participation to allow for
respondent types to be more easily measured against each other. One can of course identify
numerous ways of defining the ‘politically active’. Hansard (2010) measures participation
according to the range of activities an individual is involved in. However, as argued in the
previous section, measurements of participation should also take into consideration repeated
activity. Participation can also be measured in terms of the characteristics of individual
activities, though as noted in chapter two this can run the risk of attaching normative
classifications on what might constitute ‘proper’ or ‘meaningful’ activism. Arguably a more
consistent means of measuring participation is to adopt McAdam’s (1986) classification of
protest repertoires in terms of cost and risk. This might also carry the assumption that the
higher the personal cost and risk incurred through an individual’s participation, the more




this assumption, the purpose of this participation index is to test it by comparing categories
with perceptions of efficacy and individuals’ politicisation.
For the construction of this model, figure 4.5 shows how each participation activity has been
given a score of 1 (low-cost/risk), 3 (medium-cost/risk) or 6 (high-cost/risk), with scores
doubled for repeated activity. Scores correlate to those set out in figure 2.2 of chapter two,
which sought to broadly categorise participation by cost and risk in a Western context.
Categories of participation are then calculated based on the cumulative aggregate of each
score type. This means that low-cost/risk participants are identified on the basis that they
score between one and ten, ten being the highest an individual can score whilst only
engaging in low-cost/risk forms of participation. Consequently, medium-cost/risk
participants are those with scores between 11 and 32, and high-cost/risk participants are
those who score between 33 and 92, 92 being the aggregation of every (repeated) activity on
the list.
Figure 4.5 Scoring participation repertoires by cost and risk to participants.





Signed a petition 1 2
Boycotted certain products and services for political, ethical or
environmental reasons
1 2
Bought certain products and services for political, ethical or
environmental reasons
1 2
Worn or displayed a campaign badge or sticker 1 2
Presented my views to a local councillor or MP 3 6
Been a member of a social movement organization (e.g. Amnesty
International, Greenpeace)
3 6
Distributed flyers for a political campaign 3 6
Taken part in a protest march 3 6
Worked or campaigned on behalf of a political party 6 12
Stood as a candidate for school/student/local elections 6 12
Taken part in strike action 6 12
Taken part in an occupation/sit-in 6 12
Taken part in the blockade of a building or meeting 6 12
Question: Please tick if you have done any of the following political activities in the last three years
(select all that apply)
Applying this measurement to all survey respondents, figure 4.6 shows the overall mode
score for participation as 2 – equivalent to having signed a petition more than once. From
this point on, there is a fairly consistent downward curve the higher the participation score.
Dividing these scores into low, medium and high-cost/risk participants and non-participants,
figure 4.7 shows that 83 per cent of students have engaged in some form of political
104
participation in the past three years. Around half of students qualify as low-cost/risk
participants, with medium and high-cost/risk participants totalling at 30 and 15 per cent
respectively. This pattern broadly correlates to the ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ cores identified by
Clarke and Egan (1972) in their survey of Florida State University students. Of course, there
is the possibility for overlap in the index between these participatory categories: for instance,
a student who has done nothing apart from take part in a one-off high-cost/risk activity
would be categorised as a low-cost participant. Such cases are rare, however, as students
who engaged in high-cost/risk forms of participation were also likely to have engaged in
low-cost/risk forms: 98.4 per cent of occupiers, for example, have also signed petitions. This
means that a student who has helped occupy a building is likely to score enough elsewhere to
at least be categorised as a medium-cost participant.
Figure 4.6 Range of scores for student participation measured by cost and risk
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Non-participant 0 174 7.0%
Low-cost/risk participant 1-10 1,195 48.1%
Medium-cost/risk participant 11-32 739 29.7%
High-cost/risk participant 33-92 377 15.2%
Total 2,485 100.0%
N=2,485.
The participatory index enables us to compare these four categories according to a variety of
different variables. Figure 4.8 compares participatory categories by social demographics and
student statuses. There is little difference in participation measured (subjectively) by class,
other than to note that the number of non-participating students who did not identify with
any class grouping was double that of non-participants overall. Exploring this figure, it was
found that this figure had an above-average percentage of non-UK students, implying that
many may have identified little with the concept of a class system. This lack of identification
might also have been compounded by their apparent lack of political engagement, causing
class to hold little significance for them. Either way, counter to Hansard’s (2010) findings,
class identification was found to be a relatively weak indicator of participation among the
student population13. There are also significant distinctions to be found when looking at
students’ age: although the ratio of participants and non-participants both above and below
23 is near identical, the proportion of high-cost/risk participants over 23 is almost twice that
of students under 23. The same pattern also emerges when comparing undergraduates and
postgraduates. Both trends warrant contextualisation: given that the index partly measures
participation by the frequency and the range of individuals’ activities, one can argue that
older students are generally likely to have had more opportunities to accumulate multiple
participatory experiences in the past three years than younger students. These opportunities,
in turn, may depend on the fields and frames he or she has access to.
13 It should be acknowledged that comparing the student survey with Hansard’s 2010 audit raises
questions over the timing of such data collection. Whereas data from the latter was collected during
a relative fallow-period for social movement participation, the former captures a period of multiple
participatory opportunities.
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Class Upper middle class (N=701)
Lower middle class (N=1,035)
Working class (N=503)

















N=2,485. Note: Percentages by row. *p>0.0514.
One such field is the university campus itself. Figure 4.8 also shows that there is a much
higher distribution of medium and high-cost/risk participants among students from the arts,
humanities and social sciences than students studying science and technology subjects. This
distribution supports the similar findings of Blackstone and Hadley (1971) and Altbach
(1989) which indicated that certain degree courses attract more politically-engaged students.
Moreover, as Crossley and Ibrahim (2012) argue, degree courses can also operate as
recruitment networks for politically-active students wishing to build wider campus support –
especially for higher cost/risk activities such as demonstrations and occupations. Assessing
the recruitment potential for certain courses is a theme we will return to in chapter five.
Networks may also play a part in explaining the large proportion of non-EU students who are
non-participants: 17.9 per cent, compared with the overall figure of 7 per cent. Non-EU
students are by nature an amorphous social category, united by the fact that they pay more
expensive tuition fees and require a student visa to study in the UK. Given these added costs
and risks, it is possible that international students might feel cautious about engaging in the
sorts of political activities which might put their visa status in jeopardy. Conversely, figure
14 All cross-tabulated survey data used for figures in chapters 4-7 is statistically significant using the
p<0.01 threshold, unless specified otherwise.
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4.8 also shows that non-EU students make up an above-average proportion of high-cost/risk
participants. To help explain this, it is worth comparing students’ countries of origin: around
two-thirds of non-participants come from East Asian states, particularly China, Hong Kong
and Malaysia, whereas the majority of high-cost/risk participants come from Canada and the
United States. One can argue that political activism is more commonplace in the latter states
than the former, meaning that American and Canadian students might also be referring to
high-cost/risk participation in their own countries. Another interpretation is that this reflects
certain cultural differences in terms of how western and non-western international students
assimilate (and are assimilated) onto UK campuses – a theme that will be discussed in
chapter seven.
Students’ consumption of political news and media is analysed in table 4.9 and shows a clear
and consistent correlation between political participation and ‘omnivorous’ political media
consumption. High-cost/risk participants access political information from a range of
different media sources, displaying similar patterns in their consumption of television,
alternative news websites and social networking sites. In contrast, there is a clear hierarchy
in the news consumption of non-participants and low-cost/risk participants, with most
accessing their political news through television and newspapers. Perhaps reflecting their
more varied political interests, high-cost/risk participants are more likely to seek out political
blogs and newsletters: as more niche forms of political information, these arguably require
more political knowledge to be located and accessed (see Anduiza et al, 2009).
It is also notable that despite young people’s widespread usage of social networking sites
(Dutton and Blank, 2011) comparatively few non-participants and low-cost/risk participants
use sites such as Twitter and Facebook to access political information. This perhaps reflects
the reciprocal nature of social networking, and how this relates to personal interests: students
with little interest in politics are less likely to have politically-active Facebook friends or
‘follow’ political Twitter feeds, and students with few politically-active Facebook friends
and follow few political Twitter feeds are consequently less likely to receive political
information through social media and foster an interest in politics.
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N=2,485 Note: Percentage by column.
Figure 4.10 compares participation categories with attitudes towards efficacy and the
participatory ideal. It generally appears that the more high-cost/risk participation students
engage in, the more likely they will feel positive towards the importance and efficacy of
political participation (including protest). It also seems the case that the more students
participate in high-cost/risk activities the more they will have misgivings over the current
democratic system in the UK. Focusing on non-participants, it seems there is more
ambivalence over the ‘duty’ of political participation than those who do participate, though
only 17 per cent outright disagree with the notion. If disregard for the participatory principle
appears a relatively weak explanation for students’ non-participation, concerns over a lack of
knowledge appears much stronger: 69 per cent agree with the statement ‘I often feel that I
don’t know enough about politics to engage in it’. This apparent knowledge deficit will be a
key theme for chapter seven.
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Compared to non-participants, low-cost/risk participants are more positive about the efficacy
and importance of political participation. They are also more likely to take a critical position
on the health of the UK’s democratic system, even though 63.7 per cent claim to lack
confidence in their political knowledge. Students engaged in medium and high-cost/risk
participation share broadly comparable attitudes towards participation, displaying a similar
concern for the state of democracy in the UK, a belief in the duty to participate, and a faith in
its wider impact. Perhaps unsurprisingly, high-cost/risk participants possess the strongest
sense of civic duty, and are notably more confident in their political knowledge. They are
also more positive about the ability of protest to directly affect UK policy, though at 60.5 per
cent this is perhaps lower than one might expect. This might reflect the index’s conflation of
electoral, civic and protest participation: for example, students who have worked or
campaigned for a political party (who make up 76.1 per cent of high-cost/risk participants)
might take a more critical view of extra-parliamentary protest. In other words, whilst high-
cost/risk participants in this index are seemingly more active than other participants, they are
not necessarily more politically radical. At the same time, however, students’ participation
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in these activities might belie their shifting attitudes towards electoral and protest politics
since the fees and cuts grievance. This will be a key issue for the next section.
Summary
Whilst it is clear that most students have some sense of a participatory ideal insofar as most
believe it to be a duty to act upon one’s political beliefs, there appears to be a lack of
consensus on how best to put this principle into practice. On the one hand, voting is
considered the most effective available participatory repertoire, despite the fact that most
respondents are critical of politicians and parties. Moreover, the majority find fault with the
current democratic system, suggesting that more effective opportunities to vote and
participate should be possible. Survey findings indicate that efficacy of citizen participation
increases with the practice of citizen participation, which raises questions over the nature of
its causality: do people participate because they perceive it to be worthwhile, or do feelings
of efficacy develop through sustained participation? These are important questions to be
dealt with in the following chapters.
Respondents consider protest to be a legitimate form of political participation, albeit one
with comparatively little power to directly influence governmental or corporate policy in the
short-term. There is also evidence to suggest that a large proportion of respondents see
protest as secondary to formal participation processes, possibly as a last resort. Attitudes
towards protest are generally more positive among those who have taken part in it –
especially in activities categorised as high-cost/risk.
The participatory index shows a correlation between political knowledge and the cost/risk of
participation students engage in, with those engaged in high-cost/risk activities most
confident in their views. This is demonstrated in the range of different sources of political
information they claim to regularly consume. There are a higher proportion of older students
among high-cost/risk participants, along with students studying arts, humanities and social
sciences. In contrast, non-participants feature a higher proportion of East Asian international
students, and students studying sciences subjects. This opens up the possibility that certain
campus networks and fields draw in and cultivate a culture of political activism more than
others – a theme we shall explore in more detail in chapters five and six.
3. Participation and non-participation in the student protests against
fees and cuts
The second substantive section of this chapter focuses on participation and non-participation
in the student protests against fees and cuts. Although the survey included a separate section
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on the fees and cuts in addition to general participation questions, the fact that both were
collected as part of the same questionnaire means that there will be clear overlaps between
case study data and general participation data. This places limitations on the extent to which
the two can be compared. As a result, this section seeks to deal with similar questions to
those of the last, only this time linking them explicitly to the field of the university and the
fees and cuts grievance.
Students’ attitudes towards the university, tuition fees and higher education funding
It was found in the previous section that the majority of students – from non-participants to
many medium cost/risk participants – often felt they lacked sufficient knowledge to
participate fully in politics. One can argue that this is where the case study differs from
general trends in one important aspect: although Government proposals to treble the tuition
fees cap did not materially affect students in higher education during the 2010/11 and
2011/12 academic years, it did focus on an issue about which many students could claim
both knowledge and experience, namely, the cost and value of higher education. Most
current students possess first-hand experience of university life and studying for a degree,
and are likely to start repaying tuition fees at some point after graduation. Furthermore, as an
educational institution with its own history of political activism, the university campus can
be said to have its own political culture and participatory repertoires (Boren, 2001). All of
these issues play into wider and more longstanding debates about the role of the university
and what students should seek from it: should it represent the Humboldtian ideal of
institutional autonomy and academic freedom (Baert and Shipman, 2005), or does it need to
serve students and the economy in more transactional terms?
In many ways, survey findings reflect both ideals. Respondents were asked what they felt the
purpose of university was. Of the five functions, the two most popular were ‘to prepare
students for a career’ (55.1 per cent strongly agree) and ‘to make students more free-thinking
and independent’ (60.5 per cent strongly agree). Although the more contentious claim that
university should ‘make students better citizens’ was the least popular choice, it still scored
surprisingly strongly, with 52.3 per cent considering it to be important and only 19 per cent
considering it unimportant. Tailoring the role of university to students’ own personal
experiences, respondents were asked how important a series of options were in their decision
to study at university (see figure 4.1115). Again, the most popular options arguably reflect a
split between a Humboldtian and market-based rationale of higher education: more than two-
15 An unfortunate oversight in the questionnaire design was to not ask respondents to rank these
functions in order of importance.
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thirds considered ‘improving career chances’ and ‘hav[ing] a passion for the subject I am
studying’ as ‘very important’. As with the citizenship statement, the option ‘an opportunity
to become more socially and politically aware’ drew the least popular response from the
available options, yet 63.8 per cent still considered it to be an important reason and only 14.3
per cent found it unimportant. This again arguably supports the notion of politics as a
learning process for young people, one that is dependent on certain opportunities to further
their knowledge.












Improving career chances 66.0% 24.8% 5.2% 2.8% 1.2%
An opportunity to meet new
people
36.6% 37.7% 15.8% 6.8% 3.1%
I have a passion for the
subject I am studying
73.6% 21.4% 3.8% 0.9% 0.3%
An opportunity to become
more socially and politically
aware
24.6% 39.2% 21.9% 9.5% 4.8%
A chance to learn about the
world
38.6% 37.7% 15.6% 5.5% 2.7%
A chance to discover a new
town/region
23.8% 31.9% 19.2% 11.6% 13.5%
An opportunity to have fun 33.0% 38.3% 15.5% 8.0% 5.2%
N=2,485. Note: Percentage by row.
Question: How important were the following in your decision to study at your current university?
The desire to become more socially and politically aware, combined with experiences of the
demands of university life, would perhaps give students a strong bedrock of knowledge and
understanding on the subject of university funding. Focusing on students’ own experiences,
73.4 per cent claimed that the cost of fees and subsistence had factored in their thinking
when deciding whether to go to university or not. This appears to have given students strong
views about the cost of a university education: according to figure 4.12, 83.2 per cent agree
that ‘access to an affordable university education is a right, not a privilege’. Significantly,
there appears to be little neutrality on the issue: only 5.5 per cent claim to neither agree nor
disagree. It of course remains open to interpretation what constitutes an ‘affordable’
university education – NUS advocated a graduate tax instead of tuition fees, whereas student
campaigning groups such as NCAFC have campaigned for tuition fees to be abolished
altogether, a policy which was also part of the Liberal Democrats’ 2010 election manifesto.
Indeed, students familiar with the cost of a university education in countries such as the
United States might consider £9,000 annual fees to study at world-renowned institutions to
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represent good value. Nevertheless, there is strong evidence that students considered these
increased fee costs to be too expensive: 84.3 per cent agreed that they were ‘concerned’ that
higher fees would ‘put some strong candidates off applying for university altogether’. This
supports the view put forward in the first chapter that the fees issue represented a ‘moral
grievance’ (Gamson, 1992; see also Ibrahim, 2011). This also enables one to draw
comparisons between this and forms of ‘cause-based’ politics that Bang (2004) and others
see as especially appealing to young people.
As discussed in chapter two, there is debate over whether young people’s political
participation reflects a ‘generational consciousness’. Figure 4.12 shows that 63.6 per cent of
students agree with the view that ‘politicians don’t care about the interests of young people’.
Of course, agreeing with this view does not necessarily reflect a generational consciousness
among students: certainly, there is little difference between the percentage of 18-23 year-old
students who agree with this view (63.8 per cent) and the percentage of students above the
age of 23 (61.8 per cent). Moreover, 55.5 per cent of students above the age of 30 also agree
with this view. This suggests that whilst the majority of students appear dissatisfied with the
representation of youth in electoral politics, this attitude is not necessarily a reflection of
students’ own age. Moreover, attitudes related to the right to an affordable university
education and the importance of political parties keeping their electoral pledges drew
stronger approval from students of all ages. This suggests only limited importance afforded
to the fees grievance as an indicator of wider generational discontent.





Access to an affordable university education is a right,
not a privilege
83.2% 5.5% 11.3%
I am concerned that higher fees will put some strong
candidates off applying for university altogether
84.3% 6.0% 9.7%
I feel let down by the Liberal Democrats over their
reversal of tuition fees
72.9% 19.2% 7.9%
Politicians don’t care about the interests of young
people*
63.6% 16.1% 20.4%
Parties should always be held accountable for their
election pledges once they become part of government
85.5% 9.6% 4.9%
N=2,485 (* N=97716). Note: Percentages by row.
Question: To what extent do you agree with the following statements about recent changes to the
funding of higher education in the UK?
16 As discussed in chapter three, this question was added to the survey’s second phase, and so is
drawn from a reduced sample of 977.
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The 2010 general election and the Liberal Democrats
Recalling arguments made in the first chapter, for many UK-based students the moral
grievance of tuition fees was compounded by the personal grievance of having voted Liberal
Democrat in the 2010 election because of their anti-fees stance. Given that the party received
a 45.6 per cent share of the student vote, figure 4.13 tests this relationship by focusing on
student attitudes towards higher education funding whilst also comparing responses from
Labour and Liberal Democrat students. Although Labour were by no means vanguards of a
free or fair-funded education perspective – having commissioned the Browne Review in
2009, their only policy response to the student protests was to pledge a maximum annual fee
cap of £6,000 – they nevertheless competed with the Liberal Democrats for the position of
students’ most popular left-leaning alternative to the Conservatives in the 2010 election.
What is clear from the table is that the political views of Liberal Democrat and Labour voters
differ very little in their views on fees and funding: the vast majority of both believe access
to an affordable university education is a right, not a privilege (both above the average for all
students). Perhaps more surprisingly, both hold very similar views on how higher education
should be funded: both express similar level of support for the idea for higher taxation and
both are similarly opposed to an opt-out for taxpayers who did not go to university. Both
similarly reject the view that maintaining higher education funding is not a priority in the
current economic climate.
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Access to an affordable university education
is a right, not a privilege
86.0% 90.1% 68.9% 83.2%
I feel let down by the Liberal Democrats over
their reversal of tuition fees
88.7% 85.6% 43.3% 72.9%
Parties should always be held accountable for
their election pledges once they become part
of government
90.4% 93.8% 79.9% 85.5%
Maintaining higher education funding is not a
priority when public service cuts have to be
made
28.2% 23.0% 43.3% 28.1%
Higher education funding should be
maintained through higher taxes
41.0% 44.0% 15.2% 33.2%
Taxpayers who did not go through higher
education should not be expected to pay for
the higher education of others
19.5% 14.8% 26.8% 19.2%
N=2,485.
Question: To what extent do you agree with the following statements about recent changes to the
funding of higher education in the UK?
This suggests two things. First, it strongly supports the view that student voters were swayed
into voting Liberal Democrat by the party’s pledge on tuition fees. Second, it would seem
that many of these voters were closer in their politics to Labour than the Conservatives,
indicating that coalition with the latter party was as much an unanticipated consequence of
the 2010 election to Liberal Democrat student voters as their subsequent u-turn on its tuition
fees pledge. This is supported by the finding that 88.7 per cent admit to feeling personally let
down by their party over their u-turn, with 90.4 per cent also agreeing that ‘parties should
always be held accountable for their election pledges once they become part of government’.
Evidence of antipathy can also be found in interviews with voters, as well as the survey’s
more qualitative aspects:
I was hoping for a Labour-Lib Dem coalition instead of what we ended up with – I
didn’t think that they would go in with the Conservatives. I wouldn’t ever vote Lib
Dem again, as a matter of principle now. They're dead to me! (Mick, Cambridge)
I voted Lib Dem and I think a lot of people felt so betrayed … and still feel
betrayed. They’ve completely ruined themselves as a party. The amount of people
I know who said ‘I voted Lib Dem, I’m never voting Lib Dem ever again…’
(Angie, Cambridge)
‘Foolishly, Liberal Democrats’; ‘Lib Dem (Wasted Vote)’; ‘lib dem....i feel
betrayed’; ‘Lib Dems (BIG MISTAKE)’; ‘Lib Dems (unfortunatley) [sic]’;
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‘Liberal Democrats...tactically!’; Liberal Demofucks’; ‘Liberal lying Democrats’
(extracts from pre-coded survey data17)
In more practical terms, the hypothesis that most Liberal Democrat voters were more aligned
to the centre-left than the direction their party took after the 2010 election is supported
through cross-tabulating voting with current party identification. It should first be noted that
in polling data respondents’ party identification tends to atrophy between election cycles,
which the findings of this survey broadly reproduces. Despite this, however, one can
compare the extent to which the Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats have
retained voter support in the two years since the 2010 election. Whereas the Conservatives
and Labour have retained the support of around 73 per cent of their 2010 voters, the Liberal
Democrats have retained 14.2 per cent. This represents a significant atrophying of their
electoral support, with most either jumping ship to Labour and the SNP, or declining to
identify with any party. Although representation of the latter party is likely affected by the
survey’s bias towards Scotland-based students, it may also indicate a desire to support a
party with a more fair-funded fees agenda: Labour represents the only mainstream English
party who have pledged to at least reduce the fees cap, whereas the SNP sought to make
political capital out of the student protests by emphasising Scotland’s free education policy
(see The Journal, 27 October 2010).
Figure 4.14 Cross-tabulating current party identification with Conservative, Labour and Liberal
Democrat voters in the 2010 general election (UK domiciles only)
UK domiciles
Current party identification












73.5% 6.2% 1.2% 1.9% 13.6%











4.4% 30.1% 14.2% 18.1% 26.2%
N=1,670. Note: Percentages by row.
Question: With which political party, if any, do you most closely identify with right now?
17 The question in the survey asking who respondents voted for in the 2010 election (Q19a) was an
open-dialogue box and required manual coding prior to being imported to SPSS.
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The protests against fees and cuts: participation/non-participation
It should be clear from the previous section that the majority of students had reasons for
opposing Government proposals to raise tuition fees. Translating this anger or betrayal into
political action, however, represented a different step entirely. Of course, in the aftermath of
the 2010 election some students may have felt unsure of how they might legitimately or
effectively express their views. For others, the answer was clearer: not only did protest
symbolise a rejection of formal processes of political participation, it also arguably
represented a more direct means of influencing governmental decision-making – especially
during the autumn term of 2010, when students had the task of exerting pressure on MPs to
vote down the fees bill in Parliament.
Figure 4.15 breaks down participation in the student protests into different social categories
in a similar fashion to the general participation trends shown in figure 4.8. Whereas this
initial set of participation statistics sought to objectively measure participation in largely-
established repertoires, questions related to the case study sought to capture a mixture of the
objective and subjective. In the survey, respondents are asked if they participated in the
protests against fees and cuts before being asked to specify what they did. The survey
records that overall, 22.3 per cent of students claimed to have participated in the student
protests against fees and cuts. To some observers, this figure might seem quite high for a
single campaign, though it is of course far fewer than the 83 per cent who claimed to have
participated politically in the past three years. More significantly, however, the figure is far
below that of students believing an affordable higher education to be a right not a privilege.
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Class identification Upper middle class (N=701)
Lower middle class (N=1,035)
Working class (N=503)



































UG by year of study First year (N=717)
Second year (N=590)





It should be noted that the survey question does not specify a timeframe for participation in
the student protests, allowing respondents to base their answer on activities undertaken at
any time they see as relevant. It is therefore possible that older students and postgraduates
might include protest participation dating back to campaigns circa 2008-10. Given this
subjective timeframe, it is perhaps unsurprising that figure 4.15 shows that first year
undergraduates have a lower participation rate than second and third year undergraduates.
This is because the supply of protest opportunities arguably disadvantages first year
undergraduates as they were not yet at university in 2010/11 when the protests were at their
peak. Consequently, their participation that year would have depended on accessing
opportunities via friends and family or through campaigns taking place at school or college.
Moreover, by the time they arrived at university, opportunities to participate would largely
depend on whether their university had a still-active anti-cuts movement in 2011/12.
A finding of the general participation index was that postgraduates scored more highly as
high cost/risk participants than undergraduates. It is therefore surprising that participation in
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the student protests was below average for postgraduates (17.9 per cent). Of course, this may
disadvantage first year (or one year) postgraduates who were not at university in 2010/11,
though it is likely that at least some would have been in their final year of undergraduate
study at the time. This arguably suggests that postgraduate participation had less to do with
the general supply of protest opportunities on campus than their overall connectedness to
activism on campus. One possibility is that these students had a more limited biographical
availability at the time of the protests, though given that postgraduates demonstrated a
similar level of support for affordable higher education and had recently participated in other
forms of political action, their failure to be mobilised in larger numbers might be considered
something of a missed opportunity for the student movement, especially given their general
participation elsewhere.
An alternative way of interpreting the lower percentage of postgraduate involvement is to
argue that it shows just how popular protest participation was among undergraduates: almost
one in four took part in some way, a proportion which might have been even higher had the
survey been conducted in 2010/11. Among undergraduates, the proportion of participants
was at its highest for students studying social science (30.4 per cent), students who identified
as ‘working class’ (30.9 per cent – challenging to some extent Gilbert’s (Gilbert and
Aitchison, 2012) allegation that the protests were middle-class dominated), and students who
voted Labour (38.7 per cent) or Liberal Democrat (32.7 per cent). Although participation
among Conservative-voting undergraduates was notably lower (14.8 per cent18), it still
represented a significant enough proportion to argue that the issue of increased tuition fees
and higher education budget cuts partly transcended party tribalism.
Returning to the theme of the Liberal Democrat u-turn, it is notable that around a third of the
party’s student voters took part in the protests. Among those participants, a third now claim
to identify with Green or Socialist parties (more so than those now identifying with Labour),
suggesting that their experience of the protests served to push their politics further from the
established political centre-ground. Figure 4.15 also finds that only 15.1 per cent of students
who did not vote (when eligible to do so) participated in the student protests – a similar
proportion to participants who had voted Conservative. This rather goes against some of the
journalistic hyperbole claiming that the protests had woken up the ‘apathetic youth’: on the
contrary, the fees and cuts issue was much more likely to mobilise students who were
already politically active in some way. That said, it is perhaps significant that 33.2 per cent
of students whose protest participation qualified as medium or high-cost/risk (using the
18 All cross-tabulations are p=0.00.
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participatory index outlined in figure 4.19) had worked or campaigned for a political party in
the past three years19. This suggests that the fees grievance might have caused many students
to switch from ‘electoral’ to ‘protest’ activism, although the long-term effects of this remain
unclear at present.
Although we have already seen evidence that the vast majority of students were concerned
about the potential trebling of tuition fees, it remains possible that non-participants made a
rational choice not to take part. Figure 4.16 compares the attitudes of participants and non-
participants towards higher education funding, protest participation and the legacy of the
student protests themselves. Focusing on the first theme, participants generally demonstrate
moderately stronger opposition to higher tuition fees and cuts than non-participants. The
attitude gap is notably wider, however, on the subject of raising taxes to pay for higher
education. This indicates that for at least half of participants their opposition came from a
more politically developed left-wing perspective. Others, on the other hand, may have either
favoured alternative means of resolving the funding issue, or had few thoughts beyond their
basic opposition to it.
There is a noticeable difference between participants and non-participants’ attitudes towards
protest. Certainly, a far higher proportion of participants consider protest to be an essential
form of political engagement than non-participants. One could argue that a sizeable number
of students opposed to higher fees did not participate because they lacked belief in the
effectiveness of protest to influence government policy. There is also evidence to suggest
that they take a more critical view towards formal political participation processes – only
12.7 per cent see no problem with UK democracy whereas 39.1 per cent take the view that
protest represents the ‘last meaningful form of political engagement available in the UK’.
Although this suggests a small but significant proportion of politically active students have
strong misgivings over the health of democratic participation in the UK, it appears not to
have caused an outright rejection of it: 82.8 per cent of activists claim that they will
‘definitely’ vote in the next general election.
19 p=0.00.
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Access to an affordable university education is
a right, not a privilege
92.9% 80.4% 83.2%
I am concerned that higher fees will put some
strong candidates off applying for university
altogether
94.8% 81.3% 84.3%
Higher education funding should be maintained
through higher taxes
50.8% 28.2% 33.2%
I see no problem with the current democratic
system in the UK
12.7% 26.0% 23.0%
Protest is an essential form of political
engagement
79.9% 52.4% 58.6%
Protest can help change UK government policy 55.9% 42.9% 45.8%
Protest is the last meaningful form of political
engagement available in the UK
39.1% 24.7% 27.9%
The tuition fees issue has made me more
politically engaged
70.2% 35.2% 43.0%
The student protests have made me more
politically engaged
61.3% 23.6% 32.0%




Although many student activists are uncomfortable with self-identifying as political
vanguards for the wider student population, anti-fees campaigns were keenly focused on
raising awareness of the issue of higher education funding. Occupations in particular were
keen to reach out to students ‘biographically unavailable’ to participate physically, and
consequently members made full use of online communications technologies to ‘expand the
room’ (Mason, 2011b: 45). Although the survey data cannot account for non-participating
students who already considered themselves well-informed about the fees grievance, figure
4.16 shows that 35.2 per cent of non-participants became more politically engaged as a result
of the fees issue. Perhaps more significantly, 23.6 per cent felt that the protests made them
more politically engaged. Analysing the subsection of engaged and ‘supportive’ non-
participants will be a key area of focus for chapter seven.
Participation in the student protests: what did students do?
So far, analysis of the student protests has focused only on a basic participation/non-
participation binary. This is useful for identifying some of the essential properties of
students who did not take part, but one should be mindful of depicting those that did as a
homogenous group: after all, participation might involve repeated participation on a variety
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of activities, or it can mean doing a single activity once. Moreover, students may also have
taken a variety of different political positions within a basic ‘anti-fees’ standpoint. In other
words, it would certainly be unwise to automatically equate the 22.3 per cent of student
protest participants to a collective social movement identity. This final section will therefore
map out basic attitudinal and participatory trends within the basic participatory category so
that certain ideal types can be identified and explored in chapter six.
Survey respondents who answered ‘yes’ to having participated in the student protests were
asked specific follow-up questions about the nature of their participation and their
experiences more generally. Figure 4.17 shows students’ participation in a range of activism
activities put to them in the questionnaire. Once again, the most popular activities are
predominantly low-cost/risk – 84.9 per cent of participants signed petitions, and 63.6 per
cent ‘liked’ campaign Facebook pages – and the more high-cost/risk activities such as
organising protests and participating in blockades were the least popular. Somewhat bucking
this trend, nearly half of participants attended local, regional and national marches and
demonstrations – around 10 per cent of the student population as a whole. This broadly
reflects the large number of marches and demonstrations that took place in 2010 and 2011,
particularly in autumn 2010 when the fees campaign was still ‘live’.
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as % of all
students
Signing a petition 42.9% 42.0% 18.9%
Wearing or displaying a campaign badge or sticker 17.5% 20.3% 8.4%
Distributing flyers 8.9% 9.4% 4.1%
Attending a national or regional level student
march
15.6% 25.1% 9.1%
Attending a student march in your own/nearest
town or city
15.6% 31.3% 10.4%
Taking part in the blockade of a building or
meeting
4.5% 7.4% 2.7%
Taking part in an occupation/sit-in 6.5% 11.8% 4.1%
Taking part in the organizing of a protest event 6.1% 6.3% 2.8%
Attending a student-led teach-in or activism
workshop
6.1% 8.7% 3.3%
Attending a university or union-arranged debate or
meeting about student fees
10.5% 17.5% 6.2%
Like/join a protest page/group on Facebook 26.9% 36.7% 14.2%
Follow a protest group on Twitter 11.0% 10.5% 4.8%
Other 3.6% 2.5% 1.4%
N=553.
Question: If you clicked 'YES' to the last question, please tick if your participation in the student
protests involved any of the following activities.
Going deeper into this data, it is found that a slightly higher proportion of undergraduate
participants in their second year or more attended national/regional demonstrations than first
year participants. The trend is unsurprising given that most student marches and
demonstrations took place in the 2010/11 academic year, thus giving students in their second
year or above greater access to multiple participation opportunities than students who started
university in autumn 2011. What is more surprising is the narrow marginality of difference –
only 3.5 per cent20 – which suggests that being on campus did not make a huge difference to
whether protest participants took part in national/regional demonstrations. This is even borne
out in the data on repeated participants, with only 1.5 per cent 21 more undergraduates in their
second year or more having attended multiple demonstrations than first year undergraduates.
It would therefore seem that repeated first year undergraduate demonstrators were likely to
have attended a national or regional demonstration prior to coming to university, and had a
20 7.3 per cent of first year undergraduates took part in national/regional demonstrations, compared
with 10.8 per cent of undergraduates in their second year or more (p=0.01).
21 2.4 per cent of first year undergraduates took part in more than one national/regional
demonstration, compared with 3.9 per cent of undergraduates in their second year or more
(p=0.01).
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sufficiently positive experience to take part in another one, either the same year or following
their arrival at university in autumn 2011.
In terms of case numbers, occupations in the autumn of 2010 were more widespread on UK
campuses than they had ever been in the UK – including 1968 – but only 4.1 per cent of
students took part in them. This seeming disparity is partly explained by the fact that unlike
demonstrations, occupations do not depend on mass participation to be considered effective.
Moreover, occupations took place in fewer than half of UK universities between 2010 and
201222. As with marches and demonstrations, more occupations took place in 2010/11 than
2011/12. To some extent, this is reflected in the fact that among undergraduate participants
in their second year or more 19.4 per cent of took part in occupations compared with 11.5
per cent of those in their first year23. Unlike marches and demonstrations the vast majority of
occupations were located on campus. Consequently, the lower numbers of first-year
occupation participation may be attributed to the fact that their campus location made it less
likely for activists not yet at university to access what might have seemed a ‘campus-only’
event.
As with the general participation index, it is useful to aggregate student protest participation
in terms of cost and risk as a means of comparing political attitudes and social
demographics. Using respondents’ answers to the survey question outlined in figure 4.17,
figure 4.18 scores each form of participation according to the general costs and risks
involved24. Forms of participation in figure 4.18 have been scored the same as in the general
participation index (see figure 4.5) other than to distinguish between ‘local marches’ and
‘national or regional marches’. The former has been categorised as medium-cost/risk on the
basis that these events required only moderate cost in time and money as they were local to
the students’ university. The latter, on the other hand, has been categorised as high-cost/risk.
There are three reasons for this. First, these events mostly took place in non-campus
22 Of the 101 occupying students, 9 came from universities where no campus occupation was
recorded by Palmieri and Solomon (2011: 60). Given the small sample size, attempts to compare this
with universities with occupation generated no statistically significant results.
23 p=0.03.
24 The category of ‘other’ was not included the participation index due to problems found with
incorporating its coded activities into the overall scoring of participants. This is because not all
respondents would have had the same range of activities to choose from: some respondents saw fit
to count certain activities as ‘other’ participation when others probably did not, either because they
personally did not consider the activity as ‘participation’, or they simply forgot to include them. The
subjective element here is interesting – especially the prevalence of forms of ‘media production’
among many students’ answers – but the low yield of responses (N=34) limits the scope for any
further statistically robust analysis.
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locations, namely the city centres of London (six demonstrations between 2010 and 2011),
Manchester (one in January 2011) and Edinburgh (two). As a result, the majority of students
had to travel some distance to attend these events. Second, students were not always well-
supported in being able to attend these demonstrations. Whilst provision of coach travel to
the ‘official’ NUS demonstration on 10 November 2010 was facilitated by most student
unions, students wishing to attend NCAFC-organised national demonstrations (of which
there were four in 2010 and 2011) were dependent on belonging to a student union willing to
fund travel to ‘unofficial’ protests, or they would have to make their own way there. Third,
national demonstrations in London following ‘Millbank’ were associated with risks and
uncertainties related to forms of direct action used by some activists and police tactics used
on protesters (notably ‘kettling’). Given the amount of media coverage this attracted, one
can reasonably argue that in the context of this particular case study national and regional
demonstrations were a more high-cost/risk activity than had been the case in previous years.
Figure 4.18 Scoring participation repertoires in the student protests by cost and risk to participants





Signed a petition 1 2
Wore or displayed a campaign badge or sticker 1 2
Liked/joined a protest page/group on Facebook 1 2
Followed a protest group on Twitter 1 2
Distributed flyers 3 6
Attended a local student march 3 6
Attended a student-led teach-in or activism workshop 3 6
Attended a debate or meeting about student fees 3 6
Attended a national or regional student march 6 12
Took part in the blockade of a building or meeting 6 12
Took part in an occupation or sit-in 6 12
Took part in the organising of a protest event 6 12
Question: If you clicked 'YES' to the last question, please tick if your participation in the student
protests involved any of the following activities.
Figure 4.19 categorises students’ participation using low, medium and cost/risk score
aggregates in the same way as the general participation index. Aggregating these scores
reveals the anomaly that seven respondents participated without appearing to specify any
particular activity: this can be partly explained by the fact that four of these had recorded
their participation using the ‘other’ category. Comparing participatory groupings in figure
4.19 with the general participation index in figure 4.7 one can again see that the majority of
participants reside in the low-cost/risk category (the most frequent participation score is
again 2). Figure 4.19 also posits a percentage of high-cost/risk participants that is
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comparable to Hoefferle’s (2013) estimate for radical student activists in British universities
in the 1960s and 1970s. This suggests that whilst the range of political participation has
perhaps expanded in UK universities since this time (witness the higher percentage of high-
cost/risk participants in the general index), the proportion of students able and willing to
mobilise for student-focused, left-of-centre protest campaigns remains broadly the same.
Figure 4.19 Participation in the student protests against fees and cuts measured by cost and risk
Score range Frequency Percent % of all
students
No specified participation 0 7 1.3% 0.3%
Low-cost/risk participant 1-8 281 50.8% 11.3%
Medium-cost/risk participant 9-32 200 36.2% 8.0%
High-cost/risk participant 33-80 65 11.8% 2.6%
Total 553 100.0% 22.3%
N=553.
Figure 4.20 compares the social demographics of each participatory category. Findings
suggest no statistically significant difference in the level of participation between
undergraduates and postgraduates, as well as degree subject categories. What is significant is
that a higher proportion of male students take part in high-cost/risk participation than
females (p<0.05). This raises questions over whether groups and activism networks
responsible for organising high-cost/risk activities featured any male bias in their politics and
organisation. Certainly, there are factors which might discourage high-cost/risk female
participation: the literature on social movements and gender has identified women’s often
‘auxiliary’ role to men in groups’ leadership and organisation (Lawson and Barton, 1980), as
well as the gendered stereotyping female activists have historically endured from political
opponents and third parties designed to de-legitimise their status as political actors
(Einwohner et al; 2000; Yulia, 2010). The theme of gender and non-participation will be
explored further in chapter seven.
































N=553. Note: Percentages by row. * p>0.05; **p<0.05.
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Turning to figure 4.21, which compares political attitudes between low, medium and high-
cost/risk participants, it is perhaps unsurprising to find no statistically significant difference
in students’ opposition towards fees and the Liberal Democrats’ policy u-turn. There is
general dissatisfaction towards democracy in the UK, but lower-cost/risk participants are
notably more cautious in their views regarding direct democracy or protest as participatory
alternatives. In contrast, more than half of high-cost/risk participants are supportive of a
system of direct democracy. Whilst these do not necessarily represent pre-eminent
alternatives, it does suggest a certain ideological divide between high-cost/risk participants
and the rest of the participating students. This is also very noticeable in the proposal that
‘higher education funding should be maintained through higher taxes’: 80 per cent of high-
cost/risk participants agree with this view, compared to less than half of low-cost/risk
participants. This provides strong evidence that protest participants, whilst united in
opposition to fees and cuts, were more divided when it came to advocating ideological or
policy-based alternatives. Certainly, it would seem that the more radical leftist politics of
high-cost/risk participants – typified in the free education, ‘tax the rich’ politics of many
occupations and alternative campaign groups – only found limited support among the wider
population of protesters. One can argue that it was this lack of ideological or policy-based
unity that played a significant role in the student protests’ decline as a mass campaign
following the tuition fees vote on 9 December 2010.
















Access to an affordable university
education is a right, not a privilege
92.5%* 92.0%* 100.0%* 83.2%
I feel let down by the Liberal Democrats
over their reversal of tuition fees
90.0%* 91.0%* 96.9%* 72.9%
Higher education funding should be
maintained through higher taxes
44.8% 51.5% 80.0% 33.2%
I see no problem with the current
democratic system in the UK
17.1% 7.5% 7.7% 23.0%
True democracy in the UK is only
possible through the abolition of
parliament and the creation of a new
system of direct democracy




It should be clear from the evidence presented that the politics of higher education funding
are of interest and concern to the vast majority of students, most of whom have themselves
given the affordability of their own education some serious thought. Students’ widespread
engagement in, and position-taking on, the Government’s plans to treble fees and cut
university funding therefore comes as no surprise, and can be presented as a ‘moral
grievance’ (Gamson, 1992). Moreover, engagement with the issue was clearly bolstered by
the ‘suddenly imposed grievance’ felt by the majority of Liberal Democrat voters, who had
been attracted by the party’s election pledge to abolish fees and vote against any increase in
Parliament. Liberal Democrat voters expressed strong views against higher fees and have
since deserted the party in large numbers, feeling a strong sense of betrayal towards their
policy u-turn. Consequently, one can argue that the high proportion of Liberal Democrat
voters – almost one in five of students in 2011/12 – was a significant factor in building a
critical mass of anti-£9,000 fees sentiment on UK campuses.
Converting this sentiment into mass action, however, was a different matter. Whilst the
percentage of students who claimed to have participated in the protests – 22.3 per cent – is
not inconsiderable, it is significantly lower than the percentage of students who have
participated in activism elsewhere, and far below the percentage of those who registered
their opposition to the Government’s proposals. In other words, there is a sizeable proportion
of the student population who were politically predisposed for activism but did not even sign
a petition. To some extent, non-participation reflected certain social demographic patterns –
students studying science, postgraduate students, non-EU international students, and non-
voters were generally less likely to participate than undergraduate, Labour or Liberal
Democrat-voting working class-identifying students who studied arts, humanities and social
science subjects. Non-participants were also less sure of the value and efficacy of protest
participation, though around a quarter became more engaged as a result of others’
participation. Non-participant attitudes and demographics will be explored in greater detail
in chapter seven.
For students who did participate, the majority took part in low-cost/risk activities. Despite
this, attendances for marches and demonstrations were high – amounting to 10 per cent of
the total student population – which was no doubt helped by the fact that students could
choose from a range of local, regional and national-level marches to attend, especially in
autumn 2010. Moreover, students not yet at university as of 2010/11 also participated in
healthy numbers, an experience which seemed to encourage further participation once they
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arrived at university. High-cost/risk participants – classified as having taken part in national
marches, occupations and blockades – were a very small minority of students overall but
were responsible for generating multiple activism opportunities – such as petitions, meetings
and local marches – for larger numbers of students to participate in. That said, beyond a
shared opposition to cuts and higher tuition fees, high-cost/risk participants and the rest
notably differed in opinion when it came to alternative means of funding higher education or
improving democracy. This may have restricted activists’ ability to create a sense of
collective identity among students – an issue which will be analysed further in chapter six.
Finally, it was found that students were uncertain about the efficacy of protest participation
in general, even if most saw it as a legitimate and important form of political expression.
Students appeared confident that protest could have a diffusive effect in terms of raising
public awareness of issues (recalling the efficacy of 1960s student activism discussed in
chapter two), but there was considerably more doubt over its ability to directly influence
governments and corporations. Moreover, there was disagreement over what an effective
protest might look like – for example, the majority appeared uncomfortable with ‘direct
action’ tactics. This raises the question of why some students might feel more positive about
the power of protest than others. Certainly, findings from the general participation index
indicated that students were more positive about the efficacy of political participation the
higher the cost/risk of activities they were typically involved in. This arguably points to the
importance of specific participation cultures which surround certain groups and activities,
though it would seem that some students have greater access to these cultures than others.
Social paths (and barriers) to protest mobilisation are therefore of paramount importance to
answering this question, and form the focus for the next chapter.
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Chapter 5
Mobilisation and the university campus:
paths and barriers to participation in the
student protests
1. Introduction
The previous chapter identified the range of activism repertoires practiced by students, both
in the fees and cuts protests and more generally. It also found that the majority of non-
participants were broadly opposed to a trebled cap on tuition fees and higher education cuts.
The task of this chapter is to explain how and why certain students were more easily
mobilised than others. Mobilisation has long been an area of interest in the social and
political sciences, with researchers seeking to expound on what lies between grievance and
action. This chapter focuses in particular on two key drivers of mobilisation: pre-university
socialisation, and social networks within the university campus. The former is important
given the knowledge and resources generally required for activism participation. One can
argue that students already equipped with a political background via family or school are
well-placed to quickly make the most of activism opportunities at university (Coles, 1986;
Braungart and Braungart, 1990; Crossley, 2002). In the case of the latter, authors such as
Verba and Nye (1972) and Oegema and Klandermans (1994) have argued that outside of the
family, an individual’s mobilisation is heavily dependent on being targeted by recruitment
strategies, both formally (via unions or professionalised agencies) and informally (via
friends, family or social networks). In both forms, mobilisation is more likely when
participation appears desirable, efficacious and legitimate. At university, recruitment takes
on a distinct character given students’ sharing of the campus field. For Van Dyke (1998) and
Binder and Wood (2012), the campus has been shown to provide opportunities for political
engagement and activism on a range and scale that the majority of students are unlikely to
have experienced before.
This chapter will be divided into two substantive sections. The first focuses on students’
pathways to becoming politically active at university. Using survey and interview data, this
considers the importance of family background and political upbringing on students’
expectations of coming to university and getting involved in activism. The second section
considers paths and barriers to mobilisation in the fees and cuts protests – specifically events
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taking place between October and December 2010. Drawing on interviews from four
universities in particular – Cambridge, Edinburgh, UCL and Warwick25 – this section
focuses on how student activists generated protest events and activism opportunities on their
respective campuses both inside and outside of unions. In particular, it looks at how
campaigners mobilised for two notable protest events: first, the NUS national demonstration
on 10 November 2010, and second, the NCAFC-facilitated ‘National Walkout and Day of
Action’ on 24 November which led to occupations of university buildings on each of the four
campuses.
2. Student paths and barriers to political engagement and
participation
Politicisation and the family
In Distinction, Bourdieu (1984: 439-40) argues that ‘political education… is always partly
received from the family, from the earliest days of life’. For activists, political socialisation
can be particularly valuable for normalising and legitimising certain repertoires of political
action – especially those higher in cost and risk – and thereby providing them with the
knowledge and resources to participate from a young age (Braungart and Braungart, 1990).
Although this conversion is to some extent dependent on individuals’ access to certain fields
and campaigns, it is worth testing the relationship between family background and pre-
university activism. Figure 5.1 aggregates respondents’ pre-university participation in a
range of different campaigns into a basic participation/non-participation binary. Respondents
who recorded having participated in any of the listed issues – as well as those specified as
‘other’ – are counted as politically active prior to arriving at university. There are admittedly
limitations to measuring pre-university participation in this way: the listed choices focus on
social movement activism rather than formal politics, and are also biased towards what
might be considered ‘left-wing’ campaign issues26. Nevertheless, a wide range of campaigns
was well-represented via the ‘other’ category (such as Help For Heroes, the Countryside
Alliance, and anti-bullying campaigns) though it remains possible that the framing of the
question caused some respondents to exclude certain forms of participation.
25 As noted in chapter three, the narrative which emerged out of interviews from these four
universities was found to be the most comprehensive and multi-perspectival for understanding
student protest mobilisation, albeit not necessarily representative of UK universities overall.
26 By way of an illustration, among those in the survey eligible to vote in the 2010 general election,
9.1 per cent voted Conservative. Among those in the ‘pre-university activism’ group, the rate drops
slightly to 6.5 per cent.
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At the time when
you were growing
up, how often was
politics discussed at
home?
Regularly 28.0% 14.2% 19.4%
Fairly often 25.3% 18.7% 21.2%
Sometimes 23.1% 32.4% 28.9%
Rarely 19.0% 27.5% 24.3%






Very active 8.9% 3.9% 5.8%
Fairly active 36.5% 25.0% 29.3%
Not very active 38.6% 46.5% 43.5%
Not at all active 13.7% 21.4% 18.5%
Don’t know 2.3% 3.3% 2.9%
N=2,485. Note: Percentages by column.
Questions: Please tick if you have been involved in any campaigns and protests relating to the
following issues (select all that apply): human rights/global justice; the environment; anti-
racism/ethnic discrimination; gender rights and sexual politics; anti-war campaigns; anti-
capitalism/neoliberalism; campaigns against cuts to the public sector in the UK; other (please
specify).
Figure 5.1 shows that 37.5 per cent of students claim to have been involved in some form of
activism prior to starting at university. Significantly, there appears to be correlation between
this and their family background: 53.3 per cent of students active prior to university had
grown up in a household where politics was discussed regularly or fairly often, whereas the
corresponding figure for the inactive is only 32.9 per cent. A similar pattern can be found
with regards to the political participation of students’ parents/guardians: 45.4 per cent of the
pre-university active had parents/guardians who were very/fairly active, whereas for the
inactive the figure is 28.9 per cent. Returning to the general participation index introduced in
the previous chapter (see figure 4.7), figure 5.2 suggests a strong link between pre-university
activity and the participatory costs and risks students typically engage in: 74.5 per cent of
students politically active prior to university are categorised as medium or high-cost/risk
participants (using the general participation index), compared with only 27.2 per cent of
students politically inactive prior to university. This posits a connection between students’
participation as measured in the index and their family socialisation, which is explored in
figure 5.3. Around half of high-cost/risk participants come from politically-engaged and
active families compared to less than a third of low-cost/risk participants. This suggests low-
cost/risk participation does not particularly benefit from political socialisation via the family
– a point perhaps supported by the fact that high-cost/risk repertoires typically demand more
specialist forms of activist knowledge than low-cost/risk activities.
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Figure 5.2 Comparing pre-university political activity with general participation index
Politically active

















Non-participant (N=174) 1.0% 10.6% 7.0%
N=2,485. Note: Percentages by column.
Questions: At the time when you were growing up, how often was politics discussed at home? How
politically active were your parents/guardians when you were growing up?












At the time when
you were growing
up, how often was
politics discussed at
home?
Regularly 33.4% 25.4% 12.7% 8.6%
Fairly often 22.3% 24.9% 19.5% 14.4%
Sometimes 23.3% 25.7% 32.4% 30.5%
Rarely 15.9% 19.2% 27.9% 39.7%
Never/don’t
know






Very active 12.5% 7.8% 2.8% 2.3%
Fairly active 34.5% 34.8% 25.7% 19.5%
Not very active 33.7% 38.4% 49.0% 48.9%
Not at all active 18.3% 16.8% 19.1% 22.4%
Don’t know 1.1% 2.2% 3.3% 6.9%
N=2,485. Note: Percentages by column.
Although these findings show correlation rather than causation, they appear to support the
qualitative studies of Braungart and Braungart (1990) and Coles (1986) which emphasise the
importance of family socialisation on the development of students’ political participation at
university. Looking at figure 5.3, there is a noticeable similarity in the political backgrounds
of high and medium-cost/risk participants – backgrounds which stand in stark contrast to
low-cost/risk participants and non-participants. This goes against Binder and Wood’s (2012)
study of right-wing student activists at US universities, which place far greater emphasis on
how campuses play a primary role in shaping initial political interests into a fully-fledged
political identity. This may partly reflect differences in US and UK campus cultures, though
it is also significant that Binder and Wood do not compare the upbringing of activists with
those of inactive students. To tease out these differences, the following two sections analyse
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the political socialisation of medium/high and low/non-participants using both survey and
interview data.
The political socialisation of medium and high-cost/risk participants
Figure 5.4 maps the pre-university pathways to political participation for medium and high-
cost/risk participants. In this case, ‘political family background’ is measured according to
whether survey respondents recalled politics being discussed ‘regularly/fairly often’ at home.
The largest sub-category of medium and high-cost/risk participants (35.2 per cent) relates to
those who had a political family background and had been active prior to coming to
university. This broadly fits with the political socialisation perspective, though one can argue
that the correlation between family background and pre-university activism is not as strong
as one might expect: 26.9 per cent of medium and high-cost/risk participants became
politically active prior to university without having had a strong political family background.
Of course, ‘political background’ in this instance does not necessarily entail a practical
introduction to participation, since other pre-university factors may also come into play,
including schooling and non-family social networks.
Figure 5.4 Mapping the relationship between political background and high and medium-cost/risk
participants
N=1,116.
Turning to interview data, there is evidence to suggest many medium and high-cost/risk
participants recognised the advantages of their political family background. Students spoke
of growing up in a household where political knowledge and media was freely accessible,
and were encouraged to ‘discuss politics around the dinner table’. Certain formative
experiences were described with some significance: Andrew (Cambridge), for example,
recalled finding a copy of Bertrand Russell’s History of Western Philosophy in the family
bookcase, whereas Lindsey (Edinburgh) spoke of learning about climate change via copies
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of New Scientist left ‘by the loo at home’. For both, these interests led to reading
contemporary writers such as Noam Chomsky and George Monbiot (‘the slightly clichéd
anti-establishment thinkers’ according to Andrew). Although neither claimed that their
parents qualified as activists, others were able to speak knowledgably about parents’ and
relatives’ experiences and involvements:
I’ve been, like, left-wing all my life really – my family is political. My grandfather
was very involved in the miners and stuff like that; my aunt was a full-time
student organiser for a number of years. (Peter, Edinburgh)
I grew up being aware that when [my parents] were students they went on protests.
Protest has always been something that is kind of like, ‘that’s what we did’…I
know that my mum was at Greenham Common for a while. (Angie, Cambridge)
Although many spoke admiringly of their family’s political heritage in much the same way
Braungart and Braungart’s (1990) sixties activists did, most saw only limited overlap
between their ‘political upbringing’ and current activist identity and affiliation. Parallels can
be drawn here to Binder and Wood’s findings, as students were reluctant to present their
politics as somehow unreflexively inherited from their parents, and were conscious that their
personal politics had developed significantly since their formative years. Whilst it might be
true that the political content of their upbringing may pale in comparison to their highly-
reflexive current political identity, it is perhaps useful to see family background as providing
high and medium-cost/risk participants with the platform to embark on their own political
journey. Interviewees such as Brett (UCL) recalled ‘being dragged along to the odd march
by my parents’ but few recalled such events as particularly significant for their own personal
politicisation. What students did gain, however, was the normalisation and legitimation of
protest as an activity, and the feeling that the experience could be quite enjoyable.
Not all formative experiences of activism came through family, however: figure 5.4 shows
that 26.9 per cent of medium and high-cost/risk participants were politically active prior to
university despite the lack of a political family background. For many of these students,
politicisation came via school. In some cases, interviewees’ schools functioned as mini-
universities: not only providing pupils with the opportunity to study politics and join
debating societies, but also enabling them to meet already-politicised pupils. This is
illustrated in the case of Gaz:
There was this guy at school and he must have been a socialist, and I remember
starting to question critically the Iraq War and he was like, ‘look, quite clearly this
is about oil’ and explained it. And at that point lots of things started to make sense.
(Gaz, UCL)
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Protests against the Iraq War coincided with most 2011/12 undergraduates’ early teenage
years, and so represented for many their first major political issue of personal interest. Brett
recalls ‘spend[ing] hours and hours discussing Afghanistan, Iraq, and the War on Terror’ at
sixth-form, whereas Damon (UCL) was taken on the 2003 Iraq demonstration by his parents
and played a part in organising walkouts at his school. For Andrew, commuting to a larger
city for his sixth-form studies meant going to a college where socialist parties would
regularly flyer outside, and befriending pupils from different social backgrounds. This,
together with reading up on Chomsky, Monbiot et al, helped him foster an interest in left-
wing politics, and once exposed to certain specific grievances related to his local
environment, Andrew felt sufficiently angered that ‘no-one else was making a fuss’ that he
started organising protests himself:
The first real form of activism I took was when I mobilised a group of students
from my sixth form to go down to the Unite Against Fascism demo. It was quite a
terrifying experience because it was the first time I’d ever actually done something
with my politics apart from read about it. (Andrew, Cambridge)
At a practical level, these experiences of organising protests can be seen as an invaluable
part of developing a ‘radical habitus’ (Crossley, 2003) which Andrew recalled as especially
useful for campaigns he would later help organise at university. At a more symbolic level, it
is interesting how he and others identify particular biographical moments in which they
began to self-identify as an ‘activist’ or ‘radicalised’. As illustrated in Ronnie’s experience
of an anti-fascist protest against the BNP, and Gaz’s participation in the 2008/9 Gaza
protests in London, these moments involved witnessing or experiencing injustice and then
seeing protest provide an effective and empowering response:
I’d say that I’ve always been aware of [political] problems, but it wasn’t until
about 5 or 6 years ago that I ever thought it would be possible to act in a way
where you could effect change… I think the fact that the first demonstration I went
on was so effective – that was in Derbyshire, you know the BNP conference? And
that was considered by the people engaged in it to be a very successful action – it
pretty much shut down their conference. (Ronnie, Warwick)
With Gaza there was the first big protest, and there were thousands who started to
gather at the embassy. The police… I just couldn’t understand it, they were being
just so violent, so physical […] I just couldn’t understand what they were doing,
and it made me really fucking angry. (Gaz, UCL)
Certainly, not all students who would later qualify as high or medium-cost/risk participants
could draw on such experiences: as figure 5.4 shows, 16.9 per cent grew up in political
household but did not convert this into participation prior to university. Unlike Gaz, Andrew
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and Damon, students such as Jeremy, Bekka and Angie found limited opportunities to
develop their nascent political interests at school:
I’m from a village where nothing much really happens, so there isn’t much
discussion of politics […] I’d read a couple of books by Chomsky and stuff, but
never sort of clicked applying this to day-to-day life so much. (Jeremy, Edinburgh)
I moved from a school which had a big mix of people to a school that was in the
middle of the countryside that was full of like, racists and sexists and…just Tory
bastards really. And I think that made me think a lot about what my own politics
were. (Bekka, Edinburgh)
We do talk about politics a lot at home, and when I was at school that was
something that marked me out a lot, I felt, from a lot of my peers because they just
weren’t interested in politics and they didn’t know anything about it. I didn’t know
anyone who would want to go to protests. (Angie, Cambridge)
Common themes in these accounts point to certain environmental factors – notably access to
culturally-diverse urban centres – that made students feel their school lacked the critical
mass of sympathetic and politically-engaged pupils that Andrew and Damon were seemingly
able to draw on. For some – such as Jeremy – frustrations came from the lack of activism
opportunities in his local environment, whereas Angie and Bekka recall the lack of kindred
spirits willing to battle against the seemingly apolitical (or right-wing) consensus at the
school. As a consequence, these students had to wait until arriving at university before
converting their political engagement into collective action.
The political socialisation of low-cost/risk participants and non-participants
At first glance, merging analysis of low-cost/risk participants and non-participants might
seem counter-intuitive: after all, one group participates and the other does not. To some
extent, this is borne out in comparing their political backgrounds: for low-cost/risk
participants, 32.2 per cent had a political family background, whereas for non-participants
the figure is 23 per cent. However, it was found in interviews that students from both
categories told similar stories about their background, suggesting that the gap between the
two was not as significant as the survey statistics implied: after all, as we saw in chapter
four, the most frequent score in the general participation index was only 2 – equivalent to
signing one petition and making one ethical purchase in the past three years.
Looking at figure 5.5, it is clear that the majority of low-cost/risk participants and non-
participants grew up in households where politics was rarely discussed. It is also notable that
the percentage of students who became politically active prior to university without having
had a political family background is actually higher than those who did. This suggests that
low-cost/risk participation depends very little on growing up in a political household.
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Moreover, only a quarter of those with a political family background converted this into any
form of pre-university activism (7.6 per cent of low-cost/risk participants and non-
participants overall). This raises the possibility that other factors may have played a part in
their nonconversion: as with medium and high-cost/risk participants, these students might
have lacked politically active parents, opportunities to get more politically-active at school,
or access to urban centres or other environments where opportunities for political
participation were strong.
Figure 5.5 Mapping the relationship between political background and low-cost/risk participants and
non-participants
N=1,369.
Interviews with low-cost/risk participants and non-participants tend to support these
findings, as for many students politics was rarely discussed at home, and if it was, was
seldom a topic for debate. By way of an illustration, students were asked if they knew who
their parents voted for: whereas medium and high-cost/risk participants were usually able to
speak knowledgably about their parents’ political views, low-cost/risk participants and non-
participants often had to ‘guess’ who theirs voted for:
We don’t discuss [politics] at all. I have no idea what any of my family’s political
opinions are. I know my dad is not Conservative, but I don’t know what he
actually is. (Heather, Leeds)
My parents never really discuss politics. I think my parents are probably Lib Dem
supporters if I had to [guess]. No, we’ve never really been sort of
politically…maybe that’s why I’m not particularly politically strong. (Louise,
UCL)
This opacity over political self-identification appears to have had a strong legacy in how
non-participants and low-cost/risk participants engage with politics. At one level, it gives the
impression that political action was afforded little social value within their families. This
meant that certain key tools of active engagement – listening to and critiquing arguments,
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reading up on an issue, defending one’s own views – were not passed onto these students as
part of their family socialisation. This was strongly expressed by Cynthia (Cambridge), who
was very self-conscious about her lack of political understanding and debating skills,
admitting that she found it difficult to discuss politics even with close friends. This
disposition she saw as having been inherited from her parents, both of whom avoided politics
as a point of discussion on the grounds that to do so was invasive and impolite. In a sense,
one can argue that aspects of a ‘non-participatory’ habitus can be inherited in much the same
way as a ‘radical’ habitus. For Sharon, this inheritance is ‘political’ in some respects, though
it also rests on the assumption that any conversion is best left avoided:
The main reason people vote the way they do is because that’s what their parents
voted, and I make no pretence that I’m not active because I’m just copying them
[…] We’re political in that we complain a lot, but there’s never been any kind of
‘let’s go and make a difference, let’s go and protest’. There’s been political
involvement in terms of voting, but we wouldn’t write a letter to our MP or
anything like that. (Sharon, Warwick)
In some ways, Sharon’s limited participation implies a view that politics is the problem (see
Hay, 2007). This is not dissimilar to the disposition of Julian and Rick, both of whom have
academic parents and recall growing up in a household where politics was discussed more as
a subject for satire and scorn than debate and action. As Rick put it:
We were big fans of satirical news programmes, so we used to watch Have I Got
News For You and so on. We did talk a lot about politics in the house, and
generally it was quite negative towards whoever was in power at the time! […] I
think maybe because politics is something that we so openly discuss and talk
about, that diffuses the need to feel like I need to go out and do something active.
(Rick, Edinburgh)
Perhaps significantly, Julian and Rick’s political background played a part in their decision
to study politics. This appears to have solidified their ‘sideways’ view of politics. For
example, when discussing the student protests it was noticeable that Rick and Julian often
slipped into analysing activists’ tactics and forms of organisation from a ‘political science’
perspective, rather than recalling their personal thoughts and experiences. In this sense, it is
interesting that Rick characterised political discussion and political participation as somehow
incompatible. Of course, studying politics does not discourage participation – several high-
cost/risk participants also studied the subject at degree level – though it is possible that it
helps reinforce one’s pre-existing political perspective. Furthermore, Rick’s attitude towards
political participation was strongly affected by his parents’ experience of accidentally getting
caught up in an anti-Iraq War demonstration in Edinburgh. This incident gave him a lasting
impression of protest as a volatile activity:
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They told stories about how one time they were going down Princes Street and
ended up being kettled because they were too close to some people protesting –
that sort of idea puts me off wanting to be anywhere near active protests, because
even if you're not taking part you can end up getting caught up in it. (Rick,
Edinburgh)
In sum, non-participants and low-cost/risk participants show signs of having inherited certain
attitudes which prevent or discourage a more active engagement in politics. Of course, low-
cost/risk participants have bucked this trend to some extent, though it would seem that their
participation – mostly involving petition-signing and ethical consumption – reflected little in
the way of family socialisation beyond a basic-level interest in politics. Developing such
nascent interests, of course, depends on network opportunities provided by the university
campus and this will be the focus of the next discussion.
Arriving at university: seeking political groups and networks
Given the prominent role played by politics and activism in the overall image of university
life (Boren, 2001), it is perhaps unsurprising that the survey shows around two-thirds of
students considered the chance to ‘become more socially and politically aware’ an important
reason for studying at university (see figure 4.11). In practice, this owes much to the
resources provided by the campus field, both socially and institutionally. In their study of
student activism at the University of Manchester, Crossley and Ibrahim (2012) identified two
overlapping networks comprised of interlinked political agencies and their corresponding
social network of students. The agencies network consisted of political parties and campaign
groups with the student union residing somewhere in the centre, whereas the social network
mapped the connectedness of individual activists. Crossley and Ibrahim argue that it is the
combination of these networks through which students kept ‘in the loop’ about upcoming
actions, events and campaigns, though it is in the latter particularly where affinities, loyalties
and friendships develop, creating a more informal distribution of knowledge and ideas.
For new students wishing to become politically active on campus, accessing this network is
of paramount importance. Although student unions and politics societies are generally open
in their recruitment processes, Crossley and Ibrahim note that the surrounding social
networks can sometimes be difficult for neophytes to penetrate. This is because networks
might generate strong affinities between members, resulting in dense network cohesion. In
other words, political mobilisation on campus draws on formal institutional recruitment
drives (e.g. via mass-emails, advertisements or fresher’s fairs) and informal network access
(friendships, relationships, shared living spaces), creating a complexity of different paths and
barriers that students encounter in seeking to become politically active.
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This complex picture is exacerbated by the range of different backgrounds, prior
experiences, and expectations of university life new students arrive with. For freshers who
are already politically active, interviews suggest that their pre-university experiences of
activism equipped them not only with knowledge of activist politics and repertoires, but also
a social confidence to make the necessary connections with existing activist groups and
networks. In this sense, students such as Andrew, Gaz and Damon arrived at university
already in possession of a ‘radical habitus’. Indeed, for students such as Andrew and Graham
(the latter also advantaged in his position as a postgraduate), their paths were smoothed even
further by already having connections to activists and groups on campus before they arrived
as freshers:
I’d been talking to various people who’d found that I was going to Cambridge and
contacted me and said ‘oh yeah, there’s this great anti-cuts group, since you're
really political’… (Andrew, Cambridge)
I started at UCL and the very first thing I did on campus was a London Living
Wage protest. I recognised a couple of faces from the old political landscape, and
on the back of that I got some space on a [fresher’s fair] stall to promote a mass-
action to shut down the oil refinery in Kent. By doing that stall, I met a couple of
the old-hat union activists […] So very quickly I got to know the limits of the
amount of people that were doing stuff here. (Graham, UCL)
Graham and Damon’s experiences reflect Tilly’s (2004) concept of the ‘social movement
entrepreneur’ insofar as both came to university already knowledgeable about student
politics, and were committed to bringing specific campaign issues onto the campus via the
setting up of events and campaign groups. For Damon, this issue was higher education
policy:
I came into university knowing that I was going to be political so I was elected a
delegate to the NUS conference in my first year. Most of the activism I started
doing was UCL Students for Free Education because NUS had ditched free
education as a policy and started backing a graduate tax, and we felt that we had to
do something or it would just fall entirely off the agenda. (Damon, UCL)
For many of the students from political backgrounds who had not been active prior to
university (28.7 per cent of students according to figure 5.1), arriving on campus represented
an opportunity to make up for lost time. In practical terms, this meant attempting to locate
and situate themselves firmly in groups and networks where they knew they were likely to
find fellow political advocates:
Something that I found really nice about coming to university is that I could get
involved a bit more. Part of the reason why I chose King’s as my college was
because I knew it had a reputation for left-wing politics. (Angie, Cambridge)
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I researched it and found out exactly what I wanted to do before I even came here.
I found this little group and looked at different groups on campus, so I made
contact with them, probably in the first week of being here or so, and then joined
in at that point. (Raphael, Warwick)
Not all students who came to university with a desire to become more active were able to do
so, at least initially. Unlike Angie and Raphael, Peter and Bekka’s initial motivations were
diluted by a seeming lack of social pathways to open up, or sustain, involvement. This, they
both claimed, was a consequence of the halls of residence they found themselves living in
during their first year as undergraduates. Given the sometimes fragile confidence and social
malleability that might come from entering into a new and unfamiliar social setting, Peter
and Bekka’s experience in different ways suggest a demobilising effect from encountering
network ‘cross pressures’:
My first year was basically a write-off – I came expecting to do lots of politics and
activism and so on, [but] it just never really happened. I was in catered halls and it
was quite an inward-looking community there, and I ended up doing very dull
things like drinking Carlsberg. In my second year I got much more involved.
(Peter, Edinburgh)
I remember in first year getting a bit involved in Socialist Worker, and a lot of my
friends that I made in halls – who aren’t my friends anymore – were kind of
condemning me for that, and didn’t really, like, understand the reasons for wanting
to get involved more in politics […] I think as well when you're first starting to
engage in politics and going on demos and stuff, especially if you don’t know
people, like, your friends aren’t doing it, it can be kind of alien[ating]. (Bekka,
Edinburgh)
Both accounts speak of environmental factors having a de-motivating effect on the seeking
out of participatory opportunities. In some ways, this adds a further dimension to Crossley
and Ibrahim’s (2012) findings, namely that belonging to the wrong networks can delay or
preclude participation. Bekka’s experience recalls Oegema and Klandermans’s (1994)
concept of ‘erosion’: in cases where participating threatens to cause too much social pressure
and antagonism – especially among friends – non-participation becomes the easier option,
with the student embedded in what effectively becomes a political counter-network. For
Bekka, this positioning appeared to erode – or rather, corrode – her confidence as an activist,
and partly as a consequence she did not become regularly involved in activism until she
established friendships with more politically-active students in her final year.
If some students with political aspirations found themselves in the wrong networks to realise
them, other students found themselves in the right networks to become more politically
active, even when they had few initial political ambitions. In Marianne’s case, the collegiate
network at her university provided the pathway to her participation in union politics. In
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contrast to Bekka, this environment helped her develop a social confidence, resulting in her
becoming President of her college union:
I had done a bit of committee stuff previously, but never been the person who
stood at the front of things. I came to university and realised I could do things I
probably didn’t think I could do earlier on. I think it’s a social confidence, but also
realising that other people were perhaps not any better at things than I was!
(Marianne, Cambridge)
As shown in figure 5.4 this sort of mobilisation accounts for a sizeable proportion of medium
and high-cost/risk participants: of these combined categories, 37.9 per cent had not been
mobilised prior to coming to university – 17 per cent of students overall. At one level, this
refers both to the broader availability of medium and high-cost/risk activities typically
available at university. At another level, the propagation of specific grievances among the
student community – at a local and global level – gives students a greater number of causes
to consider. One such cause was the 2010/11 student protests against fees and cuts, and the
influence of this on the mobilisation of hitherto-inactive students is a key consideration for
the next two sections of this chapter.
Summary
One can summarise that growing up in a household where politics is regularly discussed, and
where a students’ parents are politically active, creates the conditions for students to develop
their own political interests and become more active. This also has consequences for the type
of participation students come to engage in: whereas the majority of medium and high-
cost/risk participants come from political backgrounds, the same is true for only a third of
low-cost/risk participants. In this sense, the latter group has more in common with non-
participants, as students from both often spoke of lacking the knowledge and confidence to
be more politically active.
Although family background sets an important platform for students’ political development,
school is also very important to furthering their experience and expertise as political
participants. For high-cost/risk participants especially, formative experiences of mobilising
people for campaigns equipped them with the confidence to make connections immediately
once at university. For those without prior experience, more seemed to depend on how they
negotiate the campus field when they first arrived: whereas some (such as Raphael and
Angie) were strategic in how they identified the sorts of groups and networks they wanted to
join, others were less proactive. Drawing from the case of Bekka, it would appear that some
students might find themselves in the wrong networks – networks which may in some ways
discourage and preclude political participation. In contrast, students such as Marianne found
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opportunities to become more politically active via having the right network links – even if
they had relatively little prior expectation of getting involved in student politics. Of course,
political background and campus networks are not deterministic. Survey data shows a
minority of students overcame their lack of political background to become active at
university, and interviews indicated that some students were more proactive in seeking to
make social connections than others. Conversely, students with multiple opportunities to be
politically active may still choose to be inactive.
There has been little discussion so far of the mobilising appeal of certain new and prominent
grievances. Turning to the next section, the emergence of collective action frames can
enhance pre-existing paths to participation both for mobilising agencies and informal social
networks on campus. In this sense, explaining non-participation – especially in the case of a
‘popular’ grievance – requires the introduction of new variables.
3. Mobilisation and the 2010/11 student protests: paths and barriers
to demonstrations, rallies and occupations
This section retraces the narrative of the 2010/11 student protests in terms of its key
mobilisation opportunities. This involves looking at how certain sociological processes of
participation – especially political background and network access – dovetailed with the
formal and informal mobilisation strategies of political agencies (including the NUS, student
unions and societies, and non-institutional campaign networks) to generate the series of
interrelated protest events and activities that comprised the 2010/11 student protests.
Marrying the two together, of course, is the concept of the ‘collective action frame’
discussed in chapter one. Therefore the key focus of this section is to show how mobilising
agencies were able to emphasise notions of grievance, identity and agency, and how students
responded in their participation.
Mobilising agencies: coordinating networks and resources
Given that the majority of student interviews in this section are from Cambridge, Edinburgh,
UCL and Warwick, it is useful to begin by providing an account of the activism fields at
each campus at the beginning of the 2010/11 academic year. All saw well-attended activism
events take place on campus during the 2010 autumn term, even if the survey indicates that
the majority of students remained inactive. According to Crossley and Ibrahim (2012), the
campus provides multiple resources for building activism campaigns, with students fairly
accessible for mobilisation drives both on campus and online (see also Biddix and Park,
2008). At the same time, however, building large multi-repertoire movements requires the
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effective coordination of activist groups and their resources on campus, and the clear
expression of grievances and agency to the wider student community.
As institutions, one can argue that Cambridge, Edinburgh, UCL and Warwick were all well-
resourced for building mass-campaigns. Each has a student population in excess of 18,000,
and is in the most part geographically concentrated in a single campus or city centre. The
population size and wealth of each institution also contributes to the maintenance of a large
and well-funded student union (Cambridge operating with a supplementary college union
structure). All are members of the Russell Group – the elite group of UK universities which
lobbied Government throughout the late-2000s for the tuition fees cap to be abolished – and
so activists from each university felt that some of their grievances towards higher education
funding reform could be directed to their university management as well as the Government.
At Warwick and UCL especially, student activists commonly bemoaned their university’s
reputation as ‘right-wing’: students from the former referenced its large business school,
whereas students from the latter had run no-confidence campaigns against their university’s
vice-chancellor for his advisory role in recent NHS restructuring reforms.
According to student activists, this ‘right-wing’ political character also extended to the
student population. UCL and Warwick activists regularly decried its apparent critical mass of
conservative, privately-educated students. Cambridge and Warwick students also referred to
the sometimes inward-looking ‘bubble’ of campus life. At the same time, however, each
university boasted a large, interconnected network of left-wing political groups and societies
similar to the one identified by Crossley and Ibrahim (2012) at the University of Manchester.
Although research did not extend to a formal social network analysis of campus political
worlds, interviewees did touch on the often diverse range of groups hosted at each university
– especially at Edinburgh:
There was everything you can imagine – so, in terms of political parties there were
Tories, Labour, SNP, Lib Dems, Greens and Socialists. In terms of campaign
groups People & Planet was probably the biggest, but there was Stop Aids,
Amnesty, Students Act for Refugees, Students For a Free Tibet, others I’ve
probably forgotten. I don’t know of any other university that has all those different
groups. (Lindsey, Edinburgh)
Depictions of the relationships between activism groups tended to vary. Students
acknowledged a strong personnel overlap between many of the groups, which created a
reciprocal relationship when it came to attending each others’ campaign events. This also
reflected the broad underlying political consensus between these groups on left-leaning
issues and causes, especially the ‘post-material’ politics of anti-fascism, nuclear
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disarmament, LGBT activism, and the environment. However, group relationships were
sometimes more fraught when they reflected ideological differences. Recalling patterns of
disputes in UK student activism going back to the 1960s and 1970s (Crouch, 1970;
Hoefferle, 2013), fault-lines emerged between Labour Party affiliates and the more radical
left-wing groups such as the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), Alliance For Workers Liberty
(AWL), as well as more independent socialist and anarchist societies. Activists also recalled
disagreements within the radical left milieu itself, and whilst these differences usually have
ideological roots – autonomy versus collectivity; reform versus revolution; hierarchy versus
network etc – they also take on a social character due to the fusing of political groups with
affinity networks. This point is well described by Ronnie:
In the social circles that I’m in, people’s friends tend to be quite ideologically
close, so one exacerbates the other, which is that you don’t like it when somebody
challenges your political beliefs, but you don’t like it when somebody challenges
your friends, and if that’s both, then I think it makes the factionalism worse […] I
think that group-herd mentality often leads to people drawing boundaries that
often aren’t really there between yourself and other people with whom you share
90-95 per cent of the same beliefs. (Ronnie, Warwick)
A related finding is that interviewees would sometimes identify certain groups as the ‘core
group’ of the wider activist network. This was usually the group with the network’s largest
membership overlap, making it a de facto forum where the majority of activists were most
likely to regularly meet and discuss ideas. Although the core group was usually also the most
‘active’ group, its specific identity would vary by university and over time. When Eric
arrived at Cambridge in 2008, he felt that the group in question was Education Not For Sale:
Before I came to Cambridge I looked up on the website of societies and picked a
load that looked quite interesting. I very quickly found that ENS was quite active,
and lots of people from other societies were using ENS as an umbrella group. So it
was quite a good coordinating hub. (Eric, Cambridge)
Given the importance of coordinating activists on campus into organising effective actions,
interviews indicated that the 2010/11 student protests at Cambridge, Edinburgh and Warwick
benefitted in particular from having hosted occupations in early 2009 in protest against
Israel’s attack on Gaza. Each of these occupations was successful in bringing student
activists from across the network together in an open, discussion-based environment.
Resources and practices were also pooled from a variety of different movements students
had been involved in elsewhere – notably Climate Camp activists’ use of consensus
decision-making. Moreover, at least five or six students from each occupation would later
help set up occupations against student fees in autumn 2010, and thereby transfer knowledge
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and skills such as campaign outreach, democratic organisation, and negotiations with
university management to younger students:
What [the occupation] did do was get a lot of the student left together in a room
for a long enough time that they got to know each other and make friends and
learn from each other which was very useful preparation for what happened two or
three years later when those people who had been in first year stayed friends, and
the Tories get in power – I think that happened nationally. (Lindsey, Edinburgh)
For students hitherto only semi-connected to the activist network on campus, the Gaza
occupations represented an opportunity to meet a wider range of activists than they had done
previously. It also provided a forum to challenge some of their own preconceptions about
political groups and ideas elsewhere on the network, whilst learning new organisational
skills and campaign tactics. The experience was particularly valuable for John, then a
member of the Humanist Society, and Marianne, a college union delegate. Both would later
participate in campus occupations in 2010 and 2011:
That was kind of the first time I met lots of the people who were involved in the
left on campus […] I actually went to the Gaza occupation originally thinking that
I was going to go there and think ‘well, I agree with everything they're saying but I
just don’t like their tactics’, but actually when I got there I just had a conversation
with a couple of people and decided to stay. (John, Edinburgh)
It made me feel really uncomfortable that they were doing it! Because on the one
hand I felt like I should be there, and then on the other hand I felt ‘this is so out of
my comfort zone’ […] But anyway, I came along a couple of times and spent one
or two nights there. It was a sort of gentle entry to methods that I had never been
involved with previously. (Marianne, Cambridge)
Although the Gaza occupation represented a successful forum for transferring activist skills
and resources to a less-experienced audience, students were always conscious of the
problems in maintaining groups and campaigns caused by constant cohort turnover. Whilst
there was evidence to support the benefits of communications technologies for passing on an
online architecture of mailing lists, campaign content and websites, this could not counter the
loss of influential personnel once they graduated. Of particular value were ‘advocates’ whose
network position and mobilising skills made them especially valuable for organising protest
events. Advocates differ from political ‘leaders’ in the Weberian sense insofar as they do not
necessarily hold any formal position of authority. Rather, they are influential participants
who can harness their network position – both inside and outside of activist networks – to
promote events and help ensure strong turnouts. At Cambridge, Edinburgh, UCL and
Warwick at least, this also reflected the general shift in popularity from traditional group
hierarchies (which depended more on elected leaders) to more horizontal and consensus-
based modes of organisation, which though ‘leaderless’ in principle, nevertheless required
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skilled and knowledgeable participants to ensure their effective running. The role of
organisational structures and their impact on participation will be a key theme for the next
chapter.
The student protests against fees and cuts: building for the NUS demonstration
It was noted in the first chapter that the late-2000s represented a relative fallow-period for
higher education funding campaigns at UK universities, especially in comparison to
strengthening Climate Camp and pro-Palestine movements. Consequently, the lack of
grievances to mobilise around resulted in the decline of higher education funding campaign
groups on campus, as key advocates graduated from university without being instantly
replaced. For remaining students such as Damon, Eric, Raphael and Peter, this necessitated a
need to build new groups, coalitions and campaigns – usually with new identities:
In April 2009 – my first year – all of the left at UCL went off on a year abroad so
I’m left running Stop the War society, Friends of Palestine society, the Free
Education campaign, the Living Wage campaign. Over the summer I talked to a
guy [and] we start talking about a national convention against fees, the idea being
at the time that free education is falling off the political map because NUS isn’t
backing it. (Damon, UCL)
So 2009/10, post-ENS, there wasn’t very much going on at all. The activist
infrastructure wasn’t pursued but lots of people went out and did Climate Camp
stuff. There wasn’t any broad forum so the task for activists in the next academic
year – 2010/11 – was setting up something called the Cambridge Left Group.
(Eric, Cambridge)
We used to also run a magazine called Dissident Warwick, which we used to
publish two or three times a term… but those were the Blair and Brown years so it
was quite a different activism to how it is now, it was a much smaller group. Most
of them left after my first year, because they were all in their final year. (Raphael,
Warwick)
Towards the end of my second year, I was like, ‘okay, there’s all these different
groups on campus doing things – why are all these people not co-ordinating?’ […]
There was some appetite for it, and then what actually happened is a separate,
simultaneous initiative from the SWP did start, and that was the Anti-Cuts
Coalition. (Peter, Edinburgh)
As the above accounts suggest, by 2010 many student activists were conscious that higher
education funding was about to return as a key campaigning issue: they were aware of the
Browne Review’s impending recommendations, and had seen the issue become a focal point
for the Liberal Democrats in the general election. Consequently, forming new groups were
necessary for reframing the political context on campus and appealing to new cohorts of
students. By the beginning of the 2010/11 academic year, student activists saw a notable
upsurge in interest in, and attendance at, leftist and anti-cuts meetings:
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I guess education funding became the big issue once Peter Mandelson got hold of
the university sector and started making cuts. And then when the Tories got in, it
was obvious that that was going to be the issue […] [I organised] the UCL
Education Forum, which was every Wednesday at 5pm, with free food and drink.
And I branded it in quite a lefty way, and we got quite a lot of random people
coming to it, so it was 30-40 people sometimes and we would sit in a big circle
and we’d talk. (Damon, UCL)
The Cambridge Left Group had two meetings, I think. By the second meeting
there were suddenly 80 people there. That was the day after the Browne Report,
and we realised that we were entering a different period now. So it became a kind
of anti-Browne Review meeting, and it happened every Wednesday and eventually
we had to book bigger rooms. […] [We] got a whole wave of new people who had
maybe done a bit of activism here and there, now brought into educational
activism for the first time. A friendship group at King’s College provided a lot of
people. (Eric, Cambridge)
At this point, much of the above organisation had been done with little involvement from
each university’s student union. Although Damon, Raphael and Peter sat on their respective
student councils, all felt they were in the minority when it came to pushing for mass-protest
campaigns. The NUS and many student unions had been actively involved in persuading
electoral candidates to sign its pledge to oppose tuition fees increases, but there had been
little in the way of collective action drives. Labour’s 2010 general election defeat removed a
significant shackle from Labour-dominated student unions mobilising against the
Government on higher education (Solomon, 2011). With Damon involved in the running of
nascent free education group NCAFC, and SWP running its parallel Education Activist
Network, NUS called a national demonstration for 10 November 2010 in London – two
weeks after the Browne Review’s publication, and the first of its kind since 2006.
With the implications of the Browne Review being discussed widely in the UK press, and
the Liberal Democrats’ tuition fees pledge now being placed under increased scrutiny,
newly-formed campaign groups at Cambridge, Edinburgh and UCL felt well-equipped to
pressurise their student unions into ploughing more resources into mobilising for the NUS
demonstration. According to Andrew, Cambridge Defend Education (CDE) was able to push
CUSU into organising buses to London – the Guardian (10 November, 2010) reported that
362 Cambridge students attended, along with 150 students coming from Warwick, and 1,000
from UCL (aided by its central London location, but still at least double that of any other
London campus). Tasked with mobilising students for an 800 mile round-trip, activists at
Edinburgh were especially keen to ensure a strong turnout:
I was one of the very few people who was heavily involved in the Anti-Cuts
Coalition whilst still being very involved in EUSA [Edinburgh University
Students’ Association] […] When we first organised it, we were like, ‘We need to
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try and get people on these buses, it’s going to be really difficult’. And we didn’t
even charge for them, which from what I can tell is quite rare in student union
politics. So people would give a five pound deposit, that got them the journey
there and back, and a packed-lunch for the day – like a school trip (laughs). We
spent almost £10,000 on it. (Peter, Edinburgh)
EUSA later reported that five buses containing a total of 250 students travelled to London for
the demonstration (EUSA, 2010). Similar to McAdam’s (1986) findings on Freedom
Summer applicants, interviews suggested that students sympathetic to the anti-fees cause but
with little or no prior activism experience were more likely to sign up if they knew at least
one other person who was thinking of attending. Given that the survey found one in five UK
students had voted Liberal Democrat, and that most had admitted to feeling betrayed by the
party’s fees u-turn, there was no shortage of potential participants on campus. As a result,
Danny, Jeremy, and Rhiannon – all undergraduates with nascent interests in politics but no
prior activism experience – were each able to find friends with whom they could attend the
demonstration:
I was going to go on the demo because a friend – a new friend at uni – said, you
know, ‘Let’s go on this, it looks like fun’. And so I thought, ‘Yeah, this is what
you do at uni: yeah, what a great opportunity – £5 bus to London and back.
(Jeremy, Edinburgh)
I was with a group of friends from first year – about six of us. Of those six, four
are now really involved. (Rhiannon, Edinburgh)
I found out that my flatmate was going. I decided I would go down, but a big
concern with going on this trip was not knowing anyone on it – that was a
terrifying concern, so it helped that I knew she was going. (Danny, Edinburgh)
Unlike at Edinburgh, UCL students were not faced with the same time costs for attending the
London-based demonstration. Nevertheless, students without prior activism experience felt
similar barriers of inexperience and social hesitancy. For Donna, her reservations about
attending were outweighed by the social pressure created by the fact that her whole
friendship group attended:
I was interested in [politics], but I wasn’t an activist […] I had a boyfriend at
Oxford who was, like, incredibly political and they were organising loads of really
interesting things. As soon as the Browne Review came out he got involved
immediately in organising something. So I was hearing about that a lot, and I was
talking about it with my friends, and some of my friends were quite political – not
activists – they were keen Labour supporters. So we decided to go on the first
demo […] But I think it was just because my whole friendship group went –
probably, like, 20 of us went on that march. (Donna, UCL)
The recollections of Jeremy, Rhiannon, Danny and Donna all highlight the fact that for most
people, attending a demonstration is a fundamentally social activity, and for those who had
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not been on demonstrations before this social context helped them share and make sense of
the experience. In Donna’s case especially, the ‘social pressure’ she felt is similar to the
mobilising factors identified by McAdam (1986). In contrast, the absence of a comparable
social context not only removes a key motivation to participation, it might also function as
an active motivation for non-participation. This was arguably true for Bekka, who had
previously had her enthusiasm for activism knocked-back by the corroding effects of her
network position:
I had my opinions about [the fees increase]. I thought – and still think – that it’s
absolutely disgusting and it’s elitist. But I wasn’t really as engaged as I should
have been – I didn’t go to any of the things in London, and I don’t feel guilty
about that but I kind of feel that I should have stopped being so lazy and done it. I
think that me and my flatmate were just like, ‘Oh yeah, we should really go to
that… yeah, we should really go… oh whoops, we haven’t gone…’ (Bekka,
Edinburgh)
As an Edinburgh student, Bekka had been subjected to the same enticements to attend the
demonstration as Jeremy, Danny and Rhiannon, but unlike them, lacked the surrounding
network links to make it seem a viable opportunity. At this point, she was arguably more
politically-engaged than Donna was, but whereas Donna was given the opportunity to
convert and develop her nascent political interests by virtue of her network position, Bekka
waited until her final year before realising that she would have to be more proactive in
seeking out activism network links. One can argue that there are many engaged students who
remain mostly ‘unconverted’ as medium or high-cost/risk participants because of their
network position – regardless of the work of mobilising agencies to publicise events and
lower the costs of participation.
Digesting Millbank: student networks of deliberation
The experience of attending the NUS demonstration – and being part of crowd of 52,000 –
was described by interviewees in overwhelmingly positive terms. The witnessing of the
Millbank occupation, however, had a more divisive effect. For some students, the occupation
was immediately exhilarating and empowering, representing a true and necessary ‘moment
of excess’ (Free Association, 2011) where students showed to a UK-wide media audience
the extent of their feelings towards the Government and its higher education reforms. This
was compounded the moment they realised the full extent of the media coverage, and how
‘Millbank’ was setting the news agenda for that day:
I remember talking to some friends about [the demonstration] before we went on it
– I was just kind of like, ‘oh, I don’t know if demonstrations are my kind of thing’
[…] Even when I was on the march, it was like… it was a fun atmosphere, but
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until Millbank happened it wasn’t that interesting. And then Millbank happened
and everyone was like ‘hey, this is really cool!’ […] I guess it was people actually
expressing anger, and the sense of it suddenly not being like a nice little protest
that no-one cared about. (Donna, UCL)
I stayed in the lobby [in Millbank Tower], taking photos of the people pressed up
against the window and somebody spray[ing] the anarchy symbol on a pillar.
Suddenly these guys started kicking this window […] But then I didn’t realise that
there was a TV in the lobby that happened to be showing Sky News, and suddenly
just seeing the Skycopter filming this massive crowd that were outside – it was
like, ‘oh, I’m stood inside there! That’s a lot of people!’ (Jeremy, Edinburgh)
There was a lot of anger, and I guess with it being the first time for an awful lot of
people there – including myself – that they had been on a very large
demonstration. Millbank, I guess, must have been the largest demonstration since
Stop the War in London. So the fact that it was the first time I had been on
something like this I have to say I felt empowered. (Ronnie, Warwick)
Interestingly, Millbank also served to inspire and re-energise older activists who had
seemingly grown impervious to the protest repertoires routinely employed by students. Some
high-cost/risk participants involved in Climate Camp and forms of direct action expressed
their surprise at the demonstration’s anger and radicalism, which they considered unusual
compared with recent UK student protests. For them, the event recalled moments of agency
in social movement history, and consequently opened up the possibilities in terms of what
sort of mass-movement could be created:
To be honest, I was very defeatist about the entire thing, thinking it would just be
this stupid march where you walk around for a bit, and Tony Benn speaks, and
just… the usual. And I didn’t realise how big of a struggle and how big of an issue
it was. (Raphael, Warwick)
The police were completely outnumbered, and just seeing kids smashing up the
Tory HQ and dancing around to dubstep, I was like, this was fucking brilliant –
they're only kids, but they fucking know instinctively that the Tories are fucking
scum (laughs). And I was with some friends who were quite uneasy about it – they
were like, ‘Ooh, better move away… it’ll just make us look bad: all this violence,
the media will hate it’. And I felt sort of instinctively, like, this is good. (Brett,
UCL)
Arguably a key component of Millbank’s power was the uncertainty caused by the
protesters’ actions. Although ideas for direct action had been (covertly) planned in advance
of the march, the events that followed were largely spontaneous and uncoordinated. The
resultant uncertainty can be considered as a form of ‘counter-power’ (Gee, 2011), recalling
Alinsky’s (1971: 129) maxim that ‘the threat is usually more terrifying than the thing itself’.
For Brett, his ‘instinctive’ appreciation of Millbank reflected his activist background and
knowledge of social movement history. For other participants, Millbank was felt to be self-
defeating – both in the fear and uncertainty they felt on the day, and also in the way it
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depicted students to the rest of society. The latter was especially a concern for Roehampton
students Laura and Hayley. Angered and frightened by the escalation of events, both chose
to leave the march with their respective friendship groups once the Millbank occupation
started:
We ended up in a pub because everywhere was not letting students in. And we
were sitting there and this woman was like, ‘has this got anything to do with you?’
and she was pointing to the TV. And as we were watching it, people [were]
throwing things off the top of Millbank. I felt quite disgusted because… I mean, I
don’t always agree with the police and their approaches to things, but to drop
something off of a building is absolutely disgusting – you cannot justify it. (Laura,
Roehampton)
[Millbank] upset me because a lot of people – friends, people in passing – know
that you're a student directly after that… several comments: ‘Oh, you're a student,
oh don’t start a riot!’ […] Every student is now sort of in a box, and because I live
off campus I was incredibly offended to be associated with it. (Hayley,
Roehampton)
It is interesting how both students recalled anger at being made to feel somehow accountable
for Millbank. This owed much to the interactions Laura and Hayley had with non-students in
the event’s aftermath, which compounded their own initial feelings of anger and frustration.
There may have been a network aspect to this: as mature students, neither was strongly
embedded in undergraduate student life since both worked part-time, lived away from
campus, and had non-student friends. Hayley, too, was mother to a young child and spoke of
the reaction other parents had to the event on her school run. Given their range of
surrounding social networks, it is perhaps unsurprising that both placed greater emphasis on
how events such as Millbank would be perceived by non-students. Consequently, both would
later play little or no role in follow-up protests.
For many of the demonstrators who did play a large role in the protests, their initial response
to Millbank was a mixture of excitement and caution. Though pleased at how it broke the
shackles of ‘polite protest’ (a notion many linked to the 2003 Iraq War demonstration) and
had put students on the front pages – many remained unsure as to how it might impact on the
movement as a whole. Like Laura and Hayley, some were concerned that students had lost
the moral high-ground in their use of direct action tactics, and felt that the confrontational
scenes would put some students off mobilising for future actions. Again, students’ network
position was important to how this was resolved. In the week following the NUS
demonstration, debates took place formally via student unions and informally among
networks and affinity groups. It was through these debates that high-cost/risk activists
developed a shared consensus on how Millbank should be framed:
154
I think I stood by Millbank being very bad up until there was a motion taken to
Student Council – by this point I recognised the people who I thought were the
people who were clever and who got it and who I wanted to be friends with. And
that was the first time I heard someone say that violence is very different if it’s
towards an inanimate object  […] I guess hearing people talk about that changed
my mind a huge amount. (Rhiannon, Edinburgh)
My immediate reaction to Millbank was kind of ‘Ah, this is crazy’, and now I’ve
revised my opinions of it […] I spent a lot of time thinking about it myself, and
then I started talking to other people about it, bouncing ideas off people – political
friends whose opinions I trusted […] and I realised that I’d been thinking about it
in a kind of reactionary way. (Andrew, Cambridge)
Both Rhiannon and Andrew’s reflections capture the importance of social networks as a
resource for developing shared narratives whilst counteracting dominant media discourses.
Indeed, it can be argued that such networks strengthened in response to such events: through
listening to activist friends they trusted, both grew confident in articulating a political
defence of Millbank, and became more clearly aware of which ‘side’ they identified with. In
particular, students had to respond to accusations put forward in some of the UK press that
the protests had been ‘violent’, ‘thuggish’ and ‘infantile’27, with many focusing on the
incident where a student threw a fire extinguisher from the roof, narrowly missing police
lines. With the vast majority of demonstrators having immediately condemned this particular
incident (Mason, 2011b: 43), drawing distinctions between ‘symbolic’ and ‘actual’ violence
(see DeLuca and Peeples, 2002) was considered essential to constructing the ‘Millbank
defence’. Ultimately, activists argued that through its widespread media coverage Millbank
created a political event which had drawn attention to the symbolic violence perpetrated by
the Government against young people. In Damon’s words, the fees and cuts grievance was
now being reflected by an ‘alternate reality’: not only was the coverage helping to promote
upcoming protest events, it also helped propagate a sense of agency that defeating the
parliamentary vote (still four weeks away) was indeed possible. To take this forward,
activists recognised the need to bring this sense of agency back to the campus. For this
purpose, NCAFC’s ‘National Walkout and Day of Action’, scheduled for 24 November, was
perfect:
Millbank gave us two things: it gave us the coverage in terms of all of a sudden
every newspaper in the country would be calling you going ‘when is the next big
mobilisation?’ […] So activists on the student left felt confident, and they had a
date two weeks away, which is a decent amount of time to build for – time to hold
a meeting and then do an action. (Damon, UCL)
27 See, for example, ‘Student demo thugs’ Tory HQ riot’ (The Sun, 11 November 2010).
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This sense of agency became all the more palpable in the week following the NUS
demonstration when interviewees recalled a notable surge in attendance for anti-fees and
cuts campaign meetings. Much of these meetings was taken up by debates on the ethics of
Millbank – with many students voicing criticisms – but given the broad underlying
opposition to the fees and cuts and the sense of urgency many felt in maintaining momentum
in the run-up to the December parliamentary vote, this was not a problem for campaigners.
As Damon recalled, ‘It was “job done” – they were in the room!’
Bringing Millbank to the campus: the NCAFC day of action, and the university
occupations
Key to the appeal of the NCAFC day of action was its merging of local and UK-level
activism. On the one hand, NCAFC’s press release encouraged ‘students of all ages and
backgrounds to take peaceful and creative forms of political protest and direct action’
(NCAFC, 2010). Although they did suggest ‘university occupations, banner droppings and
walkouts’ as examples of effective actions, activists, groups and unions were ultimately free
to define ‘political protest’ in whichever way they saw fit. Consequently, the day of action
provided a focal point for student groups to mobilise en masse, either by organising new
protests or coordinating already-existing plans so that they all took place simultaneously
across the UK. In this sense, the day of action was a highly-effective means of creating a
single spectacle out of multiple local events. Moreover, its openness enabled students to
organise events on their own terms: UEA activists, for example, were keen to stress the
peaceful nature of their march in opposition to the radicalism of Millbank (Norwich Evening
News, 2010). Regardless of the politics or protest repertoires used, organisers recognised the
demand for protest on campus, and therefore recognised the appeal and importance of
connecting this to the national narrative created by NUS demonstration and ongoing media
debates:
So literally a week later [after the NUS demonstration] there was a meeting. It was
quite a small group before then, but at this meeting a lot more people turned up
than we expected, and so there were a lot of people just really angry, calling for an
occupation, which I didn’t expect going to the meeting. The NCAFC called the
day of action, so that was what this meeting was for, so we planned for a small
demonstration. (Raphael, Warwick)
The idea was to say ‘where next?’ and we decided that we would call our own
demo, to do something ourselves in Edinburgh – we need to target the Liberal
Democrats: there are no Tories up here, so let’s focus on them. So we organised a
demo where we marched to the Liberal Democrat HQ in Haymarket. And that was
the 24th November, two weeks exactly after the Millbank day. (Peter, Edinburgh)
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In bringing the protests to the campus, the events scheduled succeeded in sustaining the
interest and participation of high-cost/risk participants who may have otherwise drifted back
towards other campaigns. This was certainly true for Graham, a UCL postgraduate, who had
arrived on campus that term with the intention of promoting environmental actions.
Moreover, it lowered the costs of participation for a number of students who had not been to
the NUS demonstration and up until that point had been less politically-engaged. This was
certainly true for Justine, a UCL student with very little prior background or interest in
politics, but like Donna for the NUS demonstration, had been persuaded to join the protest
on 24 November via friendly peer-pressure:
[My housemates] were just friends I made on my course – I never even knew that
they were political! […] They went to a couple of meetings and then were like,
‘There’s going to be this thing called an occupation…’ and I was like, ‘I don’t care
about the fee rise, what’s it got to do with me?’And so my friend was like, ‘Do
you think I would have even been able to start doing any of this if the fee rise had
come into play before we started our degree?’ And so I got really emotional –
because I’d had a bottle of wine obviously – and was like, ‘Oh, that’s so true…
okay, actually no to fee rises’. So I texted my dad saying okay, I’m doing this
[occupation] tomorrow, and I think that everything you said ever is wrong.
(Justine, UCL)
As Justine’s quote suggests, talk of occupations was already in the air. Although some had
already started prior to the NUS demonstration – notably at Manchester and Sussex – at least
a third of the 51 occupations (Palmieri and Solomon, 2011: 60) in autumn 2010 were
initiated on the 24 November day of action. Due to the need to organise semi-covertly (so as
to avoid alerting university management of their intentions), planning relied strongly on
existing networks of experienced activists, some of whom had had prior involvement in the
2009 Gaza occupations. Crucial to an occupation’s establishment was achieving a critical
mass of participants that could outnumber security staff and ‘hold the room’. As a result,
activists at Edinburgh and Warwick adopted a strategy that in many ways replicated the
Millbank occupation the previous fortnight: with student unions having organised a local
march on NCAFC’s national day of action, activists disseminated plans for occupation
through the crowd, so that a sizeable number would follow them to their intended
destination. Although numbers dropped off once the march adopted this tactical switch, both
occupations were successful in attracting upwards of 200 students to their intended locations.
UCL activists took an even more daring approach. Conscious that no Gaza occupation had
occurred on campus in 2009, activists advertised and then staged a ‘mock’ rally, promising
to lead its students to the main demonstration in central London. Instead, they exited UCL
only to march back onto campus and occupy the Jeremy Bentham Room. This had the
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advantage of effectively tricking many of the students on the march into occupying, and
whilst some quickly left for their originally-intended destination, the occupation was boosted
by a sizeable number of anti-fees students who had not expected to find themselves engaged
in direct action but nevertheless decided to stay on.
Activists at Cambridge had initially planned their occupation in much the same way as
Edinburgh and Warwick, but on 24 November found that their intended location – the Old
Schools Combination Room – had been locked up by the university’s facilities staff.
Consequently, a group of students planned to stage an occupation a few days later. This was
akin to a military operation in which a group of 20 students occupied the Combination Room
at 10am, followed by another 20 students who locked the doors. Again, this drew strongly on
existing activist networks, and the experience of former Gaza occupants:
I rang the Labour Club. I texted lots of people who weren’t there and everybody
rang their mates and soon that 40 became 50, 60, 70, 80 – it was established in the
first afternoon, so it happened quite quickly. But we knew there was a large milieu
of people who had maybe been to one or two meetings that we could rely on to be
involved. (Eric, Cambridge)
I was with someone who was much more experienced, and basically used their
legal knowledge for why we couldn’t be chucked out. I think from the occupation
as a whole I came out as a much more experienced activist. (Andrew, Cambridge)
Despite the relative openness in how they mobilised students, one can generally observe that
occupations drew heavily on pre-existing networks and affinities. Significantly, all occupants
interviewed were able to identify at least two pre-existing friendships with other attendees,
though the more experienced activists were likely to be better-connected than first-year
undergraduates. As a result, some who had been drawn in via affinity networks found
themselves initially unsure of their role as occupants:
I remember getting a text from a friend one day saying ‘we’re in Old Schools –
come down, bring food’. I was like ‘What? Okay!’ […] But it was kind of like
‘What do we do now?’ I wasn’t sure! (Angie, Cambridge)
There were people there – third and fourth years – who knew each other from past
causes and things that they all did together […] I think I was just intellectually a
bit out of my depth, but I stayed because I wanted to learn and hear all the stuff
and decide what I thought about it. (Rhiannon, Edinburgh)
Whilst students such as Angie and Rhiannon quickly became aware of their comparative lack
of knowledge and expertise regarding the purpose and organisation of an occupation, to
paraphrase Damon’s earlier comment, it did not matter too much as they were already in the
room. Recalling McAdam’s (1986) model of recruitment to the Freedom Summer campaign
(see figure 2.3), putting individuals in a position of opportunity was enough of a mobilisation
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victory on the part of its organisers, as from this point on the students were experiencing
high-cost/risk participation. Of course, many chose to leave shortly afterwards, but others –
such as Angie and Rhiannon – opted to stay on. Analysing the political and social factors
involved in participants’ growing commitment to occupations will be a key consideration for
chapter six.
4. Building critical mass on campus: survey data on student
mobilisation networks
In order to apply the paths and barriers identified in the previous section to the UK student
population as a whole, this final section returns to survey data analysis. First, it will seek to
test the extent to which recruitment drives for fees and cuts campaigns successfully accessed
the whole UK student population. This involves identifying specific recruiting agencies –
notably the student union – as well as certain methods of recruitment such as Facebook event
pages. Second, it will attempt to test the extent of students’ network connectedness to
activism participants. This allows for comparisons to be drawn between participants and
non-participants, as well as the cost and risk of activities students were typically involved in.
Networks of recruitment
As noted in section two, students’ pre-university political backgrounds are important for
equipping them with knowledge and experience of protest, as well as an appreciation of its
social benefits. For students without pre-university activism experience, one can argue that
the 2010/11 protests provided an ideal first opportunity to convert their grievances into
action. Figure 5.6 shows that 36.7 per cent of students who had been politically active prior
to university took part in the student protests – among UK students only, this figure rises to
40 per cent28. Both figures are comfortably above the overall participatory rate for the
student protests of 22.3 per cent. This figure drops considerably to 13.6 per cent when it
comes to mobilising students who had been inactive prior to coming to university. This
suggests that despite students’ widely-shared grievance regarding fees, those students with
the ‘head-start’ of pre-university activism experience were generally better-placed to convert
their grievances into action.
28 p=0.00.
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Although the ‘pre-university activism’ variable does not account for students’ participation
between arriving at university and the start of the student protests, one can at least see from
figure 5.6 that 38.2 per cent of students who took part had no pre-university activism
experience. It is here where one can contextualise the experiences of Jeremy, Danny,
Rhiannon and Donna in their mobilisation for the NUS demonstration: all were able to draw
on the critical mass of students predisposed towards participation, as well as the pathways to
attendance provided by their student union. In other words, students benefitted from
receiving a combination of different modes of recruitment – both social and practical – to
encourage their participation.
These different modes of recruitment are also measured in the survey. Respondents were
asked to state whether they had been invited to participate in the student protests by the
following options: student union; course colleagues; friends from your university; friends
from other universities, or Facebook group/event invitation. Again, notions of connectedness
are indicative as it is possible students may have been invited by means not stated in the
available options, and ‘participation’ is again subjectively defined by the respondent to
include any action considered relevant. Nevertheless, figure 5.7 shows that 70.9 per cent of
respondents recalled being invited via at least one of the available options. This indicates that
the student protests achieved a broad reach of mobilisation paths to the overall student
population, including two-thirds of students who arrived at university with no prior activism
experience. Demographically, a marginally higher proportion of non-UK students;
postgraduates; and maths, science and technology students were not invited. This supports
findings from chapter four, which identified a high proportion of these student populations as
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non-participants opposed to higher fees, and consequently something of a missed
opportunity for activism organisers.
Figure 5.7 Comparing students invited and uninvited to participate in the student protests
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Question: Have you been invited to participate in the student protests against fees by any of the
following? Yes/no binary aggregated from the following available options: student union; course
colleagues; friends from your university; friends from other universities; Facebook group/event
invitation.
It is also noticeable that a smaller proportion of first-year students were invited to participate
in the protests than students in their second year or above. This points to the slight
disjuncture between the case study and the data collection period – undergraduates beginning
their degree in 2011/12 were unlikely to have been at university in autumn 2010 when the
NUS demonstration and first wave of occupations took place. Although this indicates that
the supply of mobilisation opportunities declined in 2011/12 compared to the previous year,
the drop was perhaps lower than one might expect given that the passing of the fees bill in
Parliament in December 2010 arguably removed the protests’ most powerful grievance. This
suggests that the organisational legacy of the 2010 protests remained strong in 2011/12,
even if the grievances themselves were harder to mobilise for.
Comparing different recruitment channels, figure 5.8 shows that the student union had the
widest reach when it came to inviting students to participate in the protests. This is perhaps
unsurprising considering that student unions typically have access to the mailing lists for the
entire student population on campus. This reach, together with the mass-email newsletters
unions typically use to communicate with students, perhaps explains why this method of
invitation also has the highest population of ‘don’t remember’ answers. It is also the union’s
mostly mass-communication methods that likely accounts for it having the lowest conversion
rate of invitees into participants: only 30.1 per cent of students who recalled being invited by
the student union took part in the protests, though this remains the largest share of
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participants as a whole. Of course, these statistics cannot separate specific conversions from
other invitations student might have also received, but it is noticeable that ‘network’
invitations via university friends and course colleagues had a much higher conversion rate –
in each case more than 40 per cent. Although these figures account for a lower proportion of
students overall, they do again point to the value of the social context of activism
participation evidenced in Danny, Rhiannon, Jeremy, Justine and Donna’s mobilisation, so
that students’ initial interest does not go unconverted, to use Oegema and Klandermans’s
(1994) term.
Figure 5.8 Invitations from networks and mobilising agencies to participate in the student protests,











Student union 53.7% 33.2% 13.2% 30.1% 16.2%
Course colleagues 26.3% 64.9% 8.9% 42.1% 11.1%
Friends from your
university
36.8% 56.7% 6.5% 40.8% 15.1%
Friends from other
universities
23.4% 68.8% 7.8% 46.8% 10.9%
Facebook group/event
invitation
49.0% 42.6% 8.4% 32.4% 15.9%
N=2,485. Note: Percentages by row (first three columns only).
Question: Have you been invited to participate in the student protests against fees by any of the
following? Have you participated in any way in the student protests against fees?
Given the large amounts of press attention paid to the new social networking technologies at
students’ disposal (Mason, 2011b; Penny, 2011), it is perhaps unsurprising that ‘Facebook
group/event invitations’ achieved the second-highest reach of invitations to students. Users
might receive group and event invitations if they are already members of activism groups, or
are connected to users who share these invitations with their own friends. Unlike mass-
emails, there is a reciprocity to Facebook event invites as users are encouraged to RSVP,
which may encourage participation. Moreover, in cases where invitations come via friends,
one can argue that Facebook is more personalised than mailing lists: this possibly also
accounts for the fact that more students remember being invited via Facebook than they do
by the student union. Despite this added personalisation, the conversion rate is only
marginally higher for Facebook than for student unions and around 10 per cent lower than
offline social network routes. What might not be captured in the data is the supplementary
role online social networking played in tandem with offline social networking captured
elsewhere in figure 5.8. At a basic level, this involves sharing practical information about the
event, which may support or initiate concurrent face-to-face discussions. Moreover,
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Facebook event invitations allow its users to see who else is going, which might encourage
them to attend themselves:
If you're gonna organise a protest you put it on Facebook – that’s how I find out
about protests. So I think definitely that’s how you spread the word – yeah, it’s
primarily through Facebook. (Angie, Cambridge)
Although less likely to achieve the same reach as student union mailing lists, Facebook event
invitations boast a visibility and openness of information which helps users decide whether
to attend the event. Moreover, Facebook also doubles as a deliberative enclave for friends to
openly share resources and discuss and debate issues. Certainly during the student protests,
these networks helped popularise the politics of the student protests via a combination of
event invitations and information sharing. Event invites, however, were still rooted in
‘offline’ social ties, as students would often make distinctions between invitations from
‘real’ friends, and invitations from ‘Facebook friends’. The latter refers to weaker and more
distant social ties, and given the mass-invitational reach of Facebook (where users might
forward an invitation to his or her entire friends list without necessarily screening or
personalising the process), invitees are consequently less likely to consider them as ‘real’
invites. A good example of this distinction can be found in non-participant Rick’s
‘invitation’ to join the 2010 NUS demonstration.
Most people who were going [to the NUS demonstration] invited people just
through massive Facebook events, and I think for most of those I clicked ‘no’ or
‘maybe’ – because ‘maybe’ is just a polite way of saying ‘no’ – but I never really
had to explain myself for not going. I was never accused of being ‘for’ tuition
fees, because the people who I know who went on those demos are people who I
don’t tend to interact with too much directly – it’s mostly online. (Rick,
Edinburgh)
Nevertheless, Facebook remained useful as a means of sharing information and mobilising
users within the medium itself – be it signing a linked petition or ‘liking’ a group page. This
allowed interested users to increase their knowledge and engagement as if by osmosis. A
good example of this was Danny, a student with nascent political interests in autumn 2010:
whilst his ‘offline’ network links to activists were not strong enough to broker integration
into that term’s campus occupation, his ‘online’ links proved useful for helping him further
his own knowledge of and engagement in the issue:
I remember reading about [the tuition fees increase] online, probably through
Facebook – so someone would link a blog and I would read it. I do remember
reading and just thinking in my head, and reading papers and speaking to my
friends who were more politically engaged than I was at the time. (Danny,
Edinburgh)
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In other words, Facebook connections can help enhance and supplement students’ pre-
existing ‘offline’ friendships. One such network this might draw on is likely to be friends
and colleagues from students’ degree courses. According to figure 5.8, ‘course colleagues’
achieved the second-highest participation conversion rate of the available options, but also
accounted for the second-lowest proportion of overall students. Looking at figure 5.9, it is
clear that the arts, humanities and social science subjects appear to operate more effectively
as recruitment networks than the science subjects. With students of the former more
politically-active in general (see figure 4.8), one can argue that their classrooms and lecture
halls were more likely to feature conversation and debate about the fees and cuts issue, and
the protests taking place nationally and on campus. Moreover, with the majority of protest
participants studying these subjects anyway, this network aspect was arguably self-fulfilling:
interviews found that occupation participants would sometimes give ‘shout-outs’ at the start
of their lectures to promote forthcoming protest events on campus. Similarly, students from
the humanities and social sciences especially recalled staff members discussing the protests
in class, or even teaching their classes and supervisions at the occupation venue.
Figure 5.9 Invitations to participate in the student protests via course colleagues: conversion rate per
subject type
Degree subject type % invited to
participate by course
colleagues
Art & design (N=128) 29.7%
Humanities (N=786) 28.8%
Logic and technology (N=279) 15.4%
Natural sciences (N=642) 19.0%
Social sciences (N=650) 34.0%
N=2,485.
A further means of measuring students’ network position is through their personal
connections to other participants. As interviews with Donna and Bekka indicated, individuals
surrounded by friends who were keen to participate arguably helped normalise activism
activities whilst providing a social pathway to participation. Figure 5.10 uses survey data to
compare students’ participation to their stated personal connections to other participants. Of
course, one can argue that the act of participation by its very nature increases the likelihood
of meeting and connecting with other participants. Nevertheless, it is noticeable that around
half of students with five or more personal connections to participants also participated
themselves. In contrast, for students with only one personal connection, one in ten
participated themselves. This suggests the importance of network density as a pathway to
participation, where a student’s social circle reaches a critical mass of interested, prospective
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participants. This was certainly illustrated in Donna’s recollection of attending the NUS
demonstration, where not participating might have seemed the harder option to take.
Figure 5.10 Participation measured by social network connectedness to protest participants
% Participated
Nobody (N=1,032) 8.2%
One person (N=201) 12.4%
2-4 people (N=612) 21.9%
5 people or more (N=640) 48.3%
N=2,485.
Question: How many people (other than yourself) do you know personally who have participated in
the student protests against fees at your university?
This returns us to the costs and risks of participation, and the importance of network
connectedness for mobilisation. Figure 5.11 compares personal connectedness of participants
to the type of participation they engaged in, using the student protests participation index
introduced in chapter four. It finds that 90.8 per cent of high-cost/risk participants personally
knew five or more participants, compared to only 42.3 per cent of low-cost/risk participants.
This partly reflects the fact that activities included under the former are inherently more
social than many of the activities included under the latter. In other words, one may not need
multiple personal connections to be mobilised into signing a petition, but it might be more
helpful for those thinking of travelling to higher cost/risk events such as protest marches.
This was certainly evidenced in Donna, Jeremy and Danny’s accounts of their mobilising for
the NUS demonstration, as the costs and risks involved in the activity (and social enjoyment)
could be collectively shared.











Non-participant (N=1,932) 49.0% 9.1% 24.7% 17.1%
Low-cost/risk participant (N=281) 21.4% 6.0% 30.2% 42.3%
Medium-cost/risk participant
(N=200)
10.0% 3.0% 21.5% 65.5%
High-cost/risk participant (N=65) 1.5% 1.5% 6.2% 90.8%
N=2,485. Note: Percentage by row.
Question: How many people (other than yourself) do you know personally who have participated in
the student protests against fees at your university?
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5. Conclusion
A recurring point made throughout this chapter is just how social paths and barriers to
protest participation are. Although to claim that mobilisation does not take place within a
vacuum borders on sociological cliché, one can argue that students’ political backgrounds
and network position play significant roles in shaping the sort of participation (and non-
participation) students typically perform. In the case of the former, it was found that the
majority of medium and high-cost/risk participants had been politically active prior to
university. In the most part this came via the family, with students’ parents giving them an
early appreciation for politics, and, in some cases, providing them with formative activism
experiences. For others, political engagement and participation were encouraged at school.
Conversely, family background also played a strong part in shaping the political attitudes of
low-cost/risk participants and non-participants, giving them a detachment towards most
forms of political participation, or a cynicism towards politics in general.
Once on campus, it was found that students already equipped with an activist background
possessed the knowledge, skills and confidence to quickly connect with activist networks on
campus. Students without such a background, in contrast, depended more on network
factors: some found pathways to activism via the friendship groups made at their halls of
residence or through their degree courses, whereas others found themselves effectively
belonging to the ‘wrong’ network. These counter-networks add further layers of social
interaction and conflict to the one-directional recruitment networks analysed by McAdam
(1986) and others. As a concept, ‘counter-networks’ remains empirically under-developed at
present, though van Stekelenburg (2013: 229-30) identifies similar ‘disapproving networks’
which may ‘nourish beliefs, values, norms, and identities that may…discourage
participation’ among members. What is also important is the way non-participant networks
assert their distance from participant networks as a means of strengthening their own beliefs
norms and values: chapters six and seven will explore in more detail how counter-networks
dis-identify with student activist groups. What should be clear at least is that research into
activism recruitment networks would benefit from paying closer attention to network ‘cross-
pressures’ caused by actors’ positioning in more than one network.
These conclusions broadly explain paths and barriers to protest participation in general, but
within certain collective action frames one can argue that some of these barriers can be
broken down, enabling individuals to be more easily ‘fast-tracked’ to participation. This
owes not only to the protests achieving a media-augmented ‘objective reality’, but also the
greater number of available protest events and activities individuals can be mobilised for. At
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Cambridge, Edinburgh, UCL and Warwick at least, mobilisation was aided by the effective
coordination of each university’s activism network – where core groups and coalitions
formed and became the network’s principal communicative and organisational hub. It was
though these groups that activists were able to pressurise student unions into building for the
NUS demonstration, as well as meet on campus and debate using protest repertoires that
student unions would never be able to officially sanction – notably university occupations.
Alongside this, of course, were the student unions themselves. Each of the four principal
campus case studies had well-funded and resourced unions that mobilised students in large
numbers for the NUS demonstration, and organised and publicised local marches and actions
for the NCAFC day of action a fortnight later.
Moreover, paths to mobilisation were aided by online social networks, as Facebook
invitations in particular provided information on upcoming protest events and enabled
invitees to see who else might be attending. Given the critical mass of students who shared
the fees (and Liberal Democrats policy u-turn) grievance during autumn 2010, one can argue
that online networks become especially powerful resources for mass-mobilisation during
collective action frames, even if they still draw principally on friendships and affinity links
developed ‘offline’.
These findings provide important lines of study for the next two chapters. First, there has
been relatively little discussion so far of the experience of protest, and how this may affect
participants’ attitudes towards politics and activism in general. Similarly, whilst there has
been some discussion already about activism networks, less has been said of their socio-
cultural aspects, including how collective identities form and new participants are integrated.
These will be key themes for chapter six. Second, chapter seven will explore non-
participation in the student protests as a category in its own right. This will look into certain
sub-populations – notably international students – in more detail, as well as exploring further




radicalisation and the building of collective
identities
1. Introduction
Analysis presented in the previous two chapters afforded relatively little consideration to
collective identity as a means of explaining participation in the student protests. As a
necessary component of a collective action frame as per Gamson’s (1992) definition, the
identity of the ‘students’ as the interest group pitted against the Government was widely
propagated by mobilising agencies and the UK media throughout 2010/11, which helped
make clear a collective sense of the ‘we’ in the building of a protest movement. Yet survey
findings in chapter four make clear that opposition to Government proposals for higher fees
and cuts were not restricted to only protest participants. Furthermore, survey and interview
data in chapter five stresses the importance of affinity networks in making protest
participation appear a politically legitimate, socially enjoyable and efficacious activity –
networks which were seemingly not available to all sympathetic actors. In other words, to
attach too much significance to the formation of a collective sense of ‘we, the students’ in
mobilising large numbers to protest would be to fail to get to the root cause of what
separated participants and sympathetic non-participants.
Of course, certain individuals might identify more with a cause than others irrespective of
their network position. Collective identity can also be seen as the social glue of specific
campus activism networks for keeping members ‘in the frame’. Consequently, this chapter
broadens our understanding of participation to include questions of how it is sustained and
increased beyond one-off activities – especially after the closing of the fees-based collective
action frame – and how certain experiences might come to separate participants from non-
participants even further.
As we saw in chapter two, applications of collective identity tend to fall into one of two
broad categories: identity as a constructed social ‘product’, and identity as an ‘outcome’ of
participants’ sustained social interactions (Fominaya, 2010). Although different, these
conceptions of collective identity do not contradict each other – indeed, one can argue that
they often operate simultaneously. For this chapter it is necessary to consider the impact of
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collective identity on students’ initial mobilisation and sustained participation in the protests.
This involves a sharpened analysis of what sort of collective identities were produced and
where. According to Melucci (1988) and Diani and Bison (2004), this is a key question in
considering whether the student protests should be considered a ‘movement’ or not.
Consideration will also be paid to how the protests continued after the December 2010
parliamentary vote on tuition fees. On the one hand, the passing of the fees bill removed a
key facet of the collective action frame described in chapter one. On the other hand, because
of the shared experience of protest participation, together with the ongoing grievances of
higher education cuts, many students saw the need for campaigns to continue into 2011. It is
here in particular that the effects of collective identity on protest participation becomes
significant, and will consequently be a key theme for discussion. As with chapter five, the
use of qualitative data in is chapter focuses predominantly on interview accounts from
Cambridge, Edinburgh, UCL and Warwick students.
2. Experiencing demonstrations and occupations: the building of a
collective identity
Given the scale and scope of the student protests, and the different groups and agencies
involved, there are multiple locations and interactions from which a sense of collective
identity might emerge. Of course, Melucci’s (1988) definition of collective identity would
suggest that it is more likely to emerge in spaces where affective ties develop. In this
context, campus occupations arguably represent key fields of study, as their constant
supplying of news material for the UK media – including protest actions, public events and
publicity stunts – indicates that they were significant contributors to the propagation of a
group and movement-level collective identity. After all, following the 10 November
demonstration, NUS had distanced itself from taking a lead role in the protests (excepting its
‘candlelit vigils’ on 8 December), after its President Aaron Porter publically condemned the
events of Millbank. Instead, the independent network NCAFC organised follow-up
demonstrations in London in autumn 2010, as well as the ‘national’ demonstration in autumn
2011. Much like the 1968 protests in the UK, the lack of an institutional voice of student
protesters created a vacuum for media-savvy alternative voices to occupy and define the
movement themselves – and as this chapter will show, this had consequences for how
students were perceived by non-participants.
At a campus level, one can claim that at the beginning of 2010/11 activism networks at
Cambridge, Edinburgh, UCL and Warwick did not have strong collective identities already
in place. To some extent, this reflected the lack of a single partisan group dominating
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activism on campus in the same way that, say, the SWP appeared to do at the University of
Leeds (see Really Open University, 2010). As we saw in chapter five, semi-formal activism
networks had evolved out of the Gaza occupations in 2009 (excluding UCL), but it remained
the case that no single group was powerful enough to ‘impose’ a specific identity on new
recruits. Of course, factionalism remained an underlying issue at most occupations, but with
student unions mostly divided between activists and what many interviewees called
‘reactionary Tories’ or ‘Blairites’, occupations became the focal point for where protest
participants discussed politics, built solidarities and disseminated ideas and activities to the
wider student population. As a result, it seems appropriate to focus on occupations for
analysing key themes related to collective identity formation.
Inside the occupations
At a ‘movement’ level, much of the significance of the autumn 2010 campus occupations
was attributable to their scale and length: Palmieri and Solomon (2011: 60) estimate that 51
occupations took place that term, and though some only lasted 24 hours, others – notably at
Kent and UWE – lasted for nearly a month. The longevity of the occupations at Cambridge
(which spanned ten consecutive days), Edinburgh (eight) and UCL (sixteen) owed much to
the choice of location and the organising structures put in place within the first 24 hours.
UCL’s Jeremy Bentham Room, Cambridge’s Old Schools Combination Room, and
Edinburgh’s Appleton Tower were all large, relatively comfortable spaces in central
locations – UCL and Cambridge’s spaces featured kitchen areas, whereas Appleton Tower
was even equipped with shower facilities. Although occupying these spaces was disruptive
to the university timetable, they were arguably not disruptive enough for university
management to quickly force evictions. In contrast, Warwick’s location choice of the
Warwick Arts Centre represented a more direct attack on the university’s finances. Subjected
to greater ostracism from university management, this more ambitious occupation could not
be sustained beyond one night – a cause for personal regret for some participants:
I think [the occupation] achieved very little, outside of a few column inches in a
few papers. The university clamped down very heavily, and because the
movement didn’t have the strength to respond, it lasted 12-14 hours or something
so I think calling it an occupation is quite generous! […] I think the longer
occupations go on, and go on successfully, the more places go into occupation –
that’s how the Gaza thing worked – and people go ‘Well, if they can do it we can
do it’. And I think failing almost undermines that confidence in others, not just
yourself, so what I took away from that was that sometimes you need to
compromise if ultimately it’s gonna benefit your movement. (Ronnie, Warwick)
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Ronnie’s admission that ‘the movement didn’t have the strength to respond’ to external
pressures is instructive: as will become more apparent throughout this chapter, the building
of collective affinity and trust between participants was a key aspect of occupations’
endurance at Cambridge, Edinburgh and UCL. Comparatively undisturbed in their respective
locations, these occupations were able to quickly transform the space to suit their needs.
Students with occupying experience suggested the group divide into smaller ‘working
groups’. Each was tasked with focusing on one aspect of the occupation’s overall running, be
it kitchen, media, security, or outreach. Graham, a UCL postgraduate and experienced
occupier, was especially conscious of the need to make less-experienced students feel they
felt as much a part of the occupation as self-defined activists. Working groups thus embodied
what he saw as ‘the politics of doing’, which together with the writing and issuing of a list of
political demands29, was a key foundation to fostering a shared sense of ‘we’ within the
occupation, and a reason to keep participating. This was certainly the case for Justine, who
as we saw in chapter five had been recruited to the occupation through her politically-active
housemates. By the first evening of the occupation, she and Donna attached themselves to
the media working group, and consequently felt more compelled to stay on:
I know so many people that were like me that came in on the first day of the
occupation and kind of got involved because there was this massive spirit of
‘Yeah, we’re doing something amazing here’. Within a couple of hours they
realised that they didn’t really have a place to fit in […] But luckily I had this tiny
little thing with Twitter which meant that I had a role [otherwise] I would have felt
really, really obsolete. (Justine, UCL)
All three occupations quickly established an organising structure of working groups, daily
assemblies, consensus decision-making, and a ‘safer spaces’ policy30. This model had been a
feature of camps associated with alter-globalization movement since the 1990s (Graeber,
2009), and had been employed both in recent Climate Camps and the 2009 student Gaza
occupations (it would later become the favoured model for Occupy movement camps in
2011). For anarchist groups especially, a key advantage of this structure is found in the
liminal conditions it helps create, with participants able to separate themselves from normal
structural constraints and build their own ‘autonomous geographies’ (Pickerill and
29 UCL’s occupation (2010) demanded that the university publically condemned ‘all cuts to higher
education and the rise in tuition fees’; implemented an open books policy on budget constraints;
made assurances of no redundancies, reversed its outsourcing policy, implemented the London
Living Wage to all staff, and made guarantees for the protection for occupation participants.
30 A ‘safer spaces policy’ typically sets ground rules against forms of discrimination, promotes
inclusivity and a respect for individuals’ physical and emotional boundaries. It often, though not
always, involves the banning of alcohol and drug consumption in the space. An example of this in a
student activism context can be found here: http://anticuts.com/ncafc-policy/safer-spaces-policy/
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Chatterton, 2006; Yang, 2000). For participants already embedded through the working
groups, this produced an ontological shift in which politics became practiced as well as
discussed by participants on a daily basis. These effects were clearly felt by Donna:
I guess because if you do consensus meetings and you start to arrange your daily
life in a different way – and it happens really fast – you start thinking about the
world in a different way. Because those are the only conversations we were
having… you learn a lot, and it’s all you are thinking about for two and a half
weeks. (Donna, UCL)
Although consensus decision-making was important for creating this liminality, its practical
application was sometimes difficult. Activists’ favoured model of consensus decision-
making requires a trained facilitator so that consensus on a given proposal can be reached,
and participants who are willing to employ the system’s own language of different hand-
signals. Its anti-hierarchical structure reflects its roots in anarchism, focusing on respecting
the individual autonomy of all participants and making group decisions openly and
organically without the need for leaders or representatives speaking on others’ behalf
(facilitators ideally alternate between meetings). Although the majority of interviewees
spoke positively about the system overall, many were also conscious of its obvious flaws –
most notably its tendency to produce very long meetings after which consensus was not
always even reached. More problematic still was the longstanding argument that the system
creates a ‘tyranny of the structureless’ (Freeman, 1969), as participants with greater activist
knowledge and expertise (and sometimes commitment) can consequently become accidental,
de facto leaders (Purkis, 2001). This has some overlap with the concept of ‘advocates’
discussed in chapter five, as network connectedness can sometimes operate as an instrument
of power and influence. Eric, for example, recalled seeing this in action during the
Cambridge occupation:
I remember somebody had a proposal to do something and said ‘Oh, shall I run it
past X?’ who they thought was in charge. And they went over to this guy and said
‘Can we do this?’ and the guy’s like, ‘Well I’m not in charge!’ But the impression
that certain activists give off is that they actually are in charge, and unless they
agree with something it doesn’t really happen. But because they're not formally in
a position of authority they're actually not accountable. (Eric, Cambridge)
Perhaps inevitably, individuals accused of behaving as ‘accidental leaders’ were often those
who had the most experience of using the consensus model. At UCL especially, consensus
advocates were conscious of this problem and therefore keen to train up more participants as
facilitators. Nevertheless, many students who had not been involved in occupations before
admitted to finding the process difficult to learn: Rhiannon recalled that she ‘hardly spoke’
in meetings, feeling that some of the political discussions were going ‘so over my head’,
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whereas Justine recalled that she would often copy the hand-signals of ‘someone I liked’. As
active participants throughout the occupation, however, both Rhiannon and Justine would
eventually become capable and experienced users of consensus decision-making by the time
of the 2011 occupations. In 2010, Donna noted more infrequent visitors to the UCL
occupation often struggled to pick up the system well enough to take part, though it is
unclear if the system itself was a direct impediment to their continued participation.
Despite this discrepancy of experience, it is worth pointing out that occupations were mutual
learning spaces where knowledge and skills were freely shared. Andrew, for example, had
organised protests at Sixth Form College, but had not been involved in an occupation before.
For him, the occupation provided opportunities to train as a protest legal observer and action
medic. Brett, too, was an experienced activist but spoke positively about the opportunities
for participants to learn from each other:
There were just some brilliant people in that occupation… and I was learning so
much from all these people, and learning off each other. (Brett, UCL)
As noted in chapter five, the student protests at Cambridge, Edinburgh and UCL were as
much a victory for coordinating existing activist networks on campus under a single issue as
they were a victory for mobilising large numbers of students. This was felt particularly at
UCL, where there had been no Gaza occupation in 2009. Not only did its occupation bring
together union officers, Labour members, anarchists, socialists, Liberal Democrat voters and
even reportedly one or two Conservatives, it also became a hub for attracting activists in
London who were not tied to occupations elsewhere in the city, but were socially connected
to those involved. This produced a broad and diverse network of occupants, many of whom
had different expectations of how the occupation should proceed. This was highlighted in
Justine’s initial encounter with Noel, an experienced activist and occupier:
On the first day of the occupation, I was, like, ‘What do you do?’ ‘I occupy’.
That’s what he said he does. [Noel’s] one of those people who just terrify you
when you’re new to everything […] When I first met him he clearly had an instant
dislike to me because he hated the internet [and] he hated the thought that he
couldn’t trust every single person through knowing them from endless meetings
and protests, who had this deep sense of leftishness instilled in them. And as much
as I learned that people like him aren’t necessarily scary – they're just entrenched
– he had to learn that people like me would come in and might actually be a little
bit useful to the cause, and maybe they wouldn’t have got, like, half as many
people out on the protest as they did if we hadn’t just been like… ‘We’re gonna
tweet about it though babes, okay? I know you don’t want us to’. (Justine, UCL)
Justine’s recollections suggest that the occupation succeeded in breaking down certain
‘identity’ preconceptions among participants.  Part of this was attributable to the working
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group structure, as it enabled participants with little or no prior activism experience to
introduce their own skills and areas of expertise – in her case, social media as a tool for
publicising the occupation and its related events. Moreover, with a basic shared political
consensus regarding higher education fees and funding, not to mention the fact of
participants sleeping over in the occupation space, it is perhaps unsurprising that occupants
quickly developed personal and collective affinities:
It’s so ridiculous how you bond with people so quickly, because you suddenly
realise that there is this one thing you can have in common with someone which
you never would have even considered talking about with them before, but you're
all in this same space – it kind of takes away that awkward small talk at the
beginning of any conversation, and then friendships are built and it’s wonderful.
(Justine, UCL)
I’d never been in something that felt that big, this national thing where all these
people were feeling similar things and it might’ve gone somewhere and achieve[d]
something. So I would say in retrospect that I stayed because I felt like if I left I
would have then been personally missing out and also detracting from this energy
and this thing that was happening. (Rhiannon, Edinburgh)
As Rhiannon points out, collective affinities were partly borne out of the unique shared
experience of being in occupation together, one which compelled participants to put other
activities to one side so as to not ‘miss out’. Clearly a significant part of this was also the
empowerment that came from participating. As with Millbank, this had a lot to do with the
extensive coverage the UK-wide network of campus occupations were receiving from
national and international news and television:
It was incredibly exciting because you felt part of something that felt really big
and important. We – as not just the occupation but the national occupations that
were happening – were on the news every day and that was really exciting, so
when we got a mention it was ‘wahey!’ and so on. (Peter, Edinburgh)
We had journalists coming in all the time. The moment where you have any kind
of political agency where the media is coming to you, that’s really rare – most of
the time if you're involved in any kind of political activism, you're chasing the
most minute bit of coverage. (Brett, UCL)
As well as helping to promote the fees issue, this media traction was also used by occupants
as a form of leverage against university management: although occupations would routinely
be threatened with forced eviction, management were nevertheless mindful of the negative
publicity such an action would cause. Moreover, activists were keen to supply the media
with further news stories to keep the fees and cuts issue on the front pages: according to Gaz,
UCL routinely organised flashmobs on ‘slow news days’ and made sure the press were there
to report it. Part of this, he admitted, was borne out of being in ‘friendly competition’ with
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other occupations over whose stunt could gain the most column inches, but it reflected more
a growing inter-occupation solidarity rather than any genuine rivalry. In fact, occupations
would regularly Skype each other and exchange messages of solidarity and support:
It was really nice actually, when you’re tired and then Manchester or Edinburgh
tweet or Skype and be like ‘Hi! What’s up?’ and you’re like, ‘Oh hey, a room very
similar to ours with lots of posters up and loads of crazy lefties too! This is great’
– it showed that we were actually physically not alone at that stage. (Justine, UCL)
There was a Twitter hash-tag involved, and there were messages of solidarity
coming from across the country – UCL in particular I remember. And there was a
movement across the country where if [an occupation] ended up getting kicked
out, we would basically jam the phones to the whole university, so you’d get
people from across the whole country calling up the university! (John, Edinburgh)
As well as sharing the same protest repertoires, occupations tended to veer towards a politics
more radical than a basic anti-£9,000 fees stance. On the one hand, left-leaning education
activist groups from CFE to NCAFC have always campaigned for free education along with
wider concerns regarding the marketisation of higher education. Both of these issues were
areas of concern among more experienced student activists, and would soon gain traction
within the Cambridge, Edinburgh and UCL occupations, even if members remained
ostensibly committed to defeating the tuition fees bill first and foremost. On the other hand,
the practicing of anti-hierarchical models of organisation and decision-making meant that a
more radical left-wing politics was being practiced as well as discussed. For many
participants – including experienced as well as inexperienced activists – this was felt to be
highly significant to the development of their own personal political views and self-
identification:
There was quite a lot of kind of radical politics there, which is interesting to think
about now [because] that’s the first time that I’d come across people really talking
about that kind of anti-capitalist message […] I think the fees issue was a way of
getting into a much broader range of political issues and quite radical politics.
(Angie, Cambridge)
I was on the revolutionary left when the occupation started, and now I’m a
revolutionary anarchist as opposed to a revolutionary socialist, because for me that
was a visible demonstration that anarchist politics could be made to work. (Gaz,
UCL)
Although the more regular occupation participants tended to lurch leftwards the longer time
they spent at the space, this did not appear to coalesce around any particular party or
philosophy. Of course, occupations provided opportunities for political and philosophical
debates, but their significance in group relations tended to be outweighed by the broad
consensus regarding participants’ opposition to fees and cuts, and their commitment to
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maintaining the occupation space. This had a basis in the urgency brought on by the
impending parliamentary vote, and the knowledge among activists that they only had a
certain amount of time to generate pressure – in this context, factional differences were fairly
irrelevant to the main task at hand:
That was the best thing – it didn’t really matter where you stood. Everyone from
hardcore anarchists to some centre-right people turning up, and it didn’t really
matter. As a Marxist-socialist, that was the only point I think where I’ve been
involved in the left where I’ve never had any political arguments with anyone
else! (laughs) Like, ‘Against fees and cuts? Good! That’s it’. (Andrew,
Cambridge)
In other words, at a time when there was a clear and strong campaign and tactical consensus
– not to mention emerging social and emotional bonds – one can argue that an ‘outcome’
collective identity developed between occupation participants. The application of ‘collective
identity’ here probably warrants further clarification. Given its historical roots in Marxist
class politics, the application of collective identity to direct action tactics has been refuted by
authors such as McDonald (2002) for assuming group uniformity whilst ignoring its
anarchism-inspired emphasis on individual autonomy. In this case study at least, Melucci’s
notion of an ‘outcome’ collective identity aptly describes the affinities and relations of trust
which emerged from the shared practice of occupying. In this sense, ideological differences
within the occupations – at least in 2010 – did not act as barriers to the emergence of a
collective identity.
One can also contend that a broader, looser collective identity also emerged through the
simultaneous network of occupations – at least on the basis of the three studied. By their very
nature, occupations shared the same repertoire of protest tactics, along with the desire to
pressurise universities’ management into publically opposing the £9,000 fees cap. Certainly
among the longer-lasting occupations, a reflexive sense of ‘we, the students’ was produced
through their intercommunications (and, as evidenced in John’s earlier quote, shared
actions), one in which Ronnie admitted frustration that Warwick’s occupation did not last
long enough to become part of. Moreover, all were aware of the symbolic power of an
interconnected UK-wide network of campus occupations, and contributing to this network
generated feelings of pride and agency. This helped reinforce and legitimise activism at a
local level, as participants spoke positively about feeling part of something bigger and more
powerful than the room itself. Within this context at least, occupants certainly had good
reason to feel part of a wider occupation movement.
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Building a cross-repertoire movement
It is perhaps unsurprising that activists in occupation not only saw themselves as part of an
occupation movement – they also felt part of a wider student movement. Of course, this
feeling partly had normative dimensions, though reported attendances of the NUS
demonstration and NCAFC day of action gave occupants reason to believe that their political
views were shared in numbers far greater than those currently sleeping in campus buildings
across the UK. To propagate the idea of a multi-repertoire student movement, occupations
used blog websites, Facebook pages and Twitter feeds to issue press releases, advertise
events and protests, and provide diaries, pictures and videos of life inside the occupation. As
is the nature of these mediums, they also became interactive spaces where users could write
messages of support, post articles and event flyers, and debate with occupants. Here,
‘participation’ takes on a more subjective definition, though it is perhaps significant that
occupants took these forms of online interaction very seriously:
To feel that through the online presence people across the UK and beyond were
being inspired by this to act for themselves and to get involved themselves…
activist groups in Scotland and trade union people all suddenly getting in touch,
and all clearly being inspired. (Jeremy, Edinburgh)
Although Jeremy recalled that the majority of emailed messages of support came from the
already-active, more indirect forms of participation – notably the online hits of blog pages
and YouTube videos, as well as the number of Twitter followers and Facebook ‘likes’ –
were regularly quoted by interviewees as indicators of the occupation’s wider support. The
upcoming parliamentary vote had created a sense of urgency to keep publicising the fees
issue, and so occupations became centres for planning and publicising multiple medium and
low-cost/risk protest actions on campus. Actions were sometimes arranged in partnership
with the student union – not least due to the fact that many of its more left-leaning officers
were often sleeping in the occupation – and had a variety of audiences and purposes. First,
petitions were set up to show support for the occupation among students and staff. This had
the dual benefit of pressurising university management and enabling the more distantly-
connected or biographically unavailable to register their support. Jeremy claimed that
Edinburgh activists produced a 600-strong petition from staff backing the occupation, which
was then sent to the university’s vice-chancellor.
Second, occupations organised their own local marches. These sometimes had a clear
objective – such as pressurising a local Liberal Democrat MP into voting against the fees bill
– though more generally they were geared towards building a united and visible student
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movement. Aided by social media technologies, these marches were relatively easy to plan
and promote at short notice:
We had two of our own demos whilst we were in occupation, a week apart. So
each time we were getting maybe 400 people or so, not doing any real publicity –
just putting it online, tweeting it and saying ‘Let’s meet here’ […] Once you get
the core people and different political groups that are already established, and just
having them send out messages, get[ting] their friends along, it makes a big
difference. (Jeremy, Edinburgh)
We could get demos weekly by demand – just call a demo, make a Facebook page
and a couple of hundred people show up. It was simple… those were the times we
were in. (Eric, Cambridge)
Survey data from the last chapter showed Facebook had an invitational reach to match the
student union, and at a time when the fees issue was being given considerable media
coverage in the UK press, marches could be organised quickly and easily, with the fees
grievance virtually selling itself. As Jeremy observes, the activism network on campus could
be trusted to mobilise in large numbers, but beyond this ‘core’ was a much larger peripheral
layer of more loosely-connected and less-politicised individuals who – under the right
circumstances – could also be mobilised in large numbers.
To some extent, occupation mobilisation can also be explained in terms of cores and
peripheries. Chapter five found that students’ routes to joining occupations on the first day
came mostly from pre-existing social ties, even if this did not aggregate to a single united
network. In general, students who stayed over on the first night were generally more likely to
get involved in consensus meetings, working groups and social events, and as such develop
feelings of solidarity, enjoyment and belonging, and thus stay on for its full duration. Beyond
this core, the outer layers of participation are well-described by Angie:
Obviously there was the kind of hardcore group who’d been there from the start
and stayed there to the end. Then there were people like me who went there every
day and might have stayed there a few nights, but weren’t there permanently. And
then there were quite a lot of people who were just dropping in and out, like,
coming to show their support, or just coming because they’d heard something
good was happening there. (Angie, Cambridge)
According to interviews, the outer layers of occupation participation were mobilised
principally through social connections to those already involved. At UCL and Cambridge
especially, this meant that the occupation took on a specific character through the college
and course networks it drew from. As with local marches, a vital tool for helping turn these
social ties into pathways to participation was the fact that the media coverage of the fees
issue was helping publicise the occupations as much as the occupations were helping to
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publicise the fees issue. Consequently, these networks extended outwards to draw in people
who were connected to participants in non-political ways:
It was almost like a beacon. So for instance, my girlfriend had never done
anything political ever, and her friend got involved in it and a guy that she knew –
a PhD student who was working at the coffee shop she went to – gave her a leaflet,
and she looked at it and saw that her mate was going along and decided to go with
him. And now that’s opened her up to a whole new group of people and a whole
new set of ideas. (Liam, Cambridge)
It was a really sociable… people invited their friends to come, like, my brother
came to visit, people from other universities when their occupations ended, they
came down. (Donna, UCL)
It was mostly King’s people there – partly because it was next door to King’s – so
everyone was up there. And people from other colleges who came in were like,
‘Oh, it’s always all King’s people’. So I guess you're drawing from a slightly
different pool of people, because it was people who weren’t necessarily even that
interested in politics, who were vaguely onside, but they were coming up because
that’s where people were hanging out on an evening. The student bar was empty
all of that week’. (Angie, Cambridge)
Despite the power of these social networks, mobilisation was tempered by the fact that at its
core, occupation participation was a high-cost/risk activity. Not only were occupations
deviant and disruptive in nature – sometimes incurring personalised threats from university
management – they also required the shared and sustained commitment of a sufficient
number of participants to sleep at the space each night (not to mention sharing nightly ‘guard
duty’ during a particularly cold winter). Given the social nature of occupations, interviews
suggest that outsiders would be less-inclined to consider these costs and risks
insurmountable provided there were social pathways to getting involved. This was certainly
true for Rhiannon, Justine and Angie, all of whom had friends they attended their respective
occupations with on the first day. In contrast, students such as Anoushka, Yvonne and Danny
had participated in other marches, but lacked both strong social connections to occupants and
friends also interested in joining. Without a social context to counter the higher costs and
risks involved, none ultimately felt that joining the occupation was an option personally open
to them:
If I knew more people who were going I would have gone. I mean, I knew people,
as in a couple of people involved because of Facebook, but I was never formally
invited. (Anoushka, Cambridge)
I wasn’t involved in the occupation – I remember thinking it was a bit ridiculous. I
didn’t even know it was happening, to be honest. I walked through there a couple
of times, saw people, didn’t know any of them, and didn’t want to approach them!
(Danny, Edinburgh)
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It’s the same people involved again and again. I know – not personally too much –
some of the people, but they are all older than me, so I guess there were no
freshers involved. (Yvonne, Warwick31)
Anoushka’s reference to Facebook is especially telling, as it chimes with arguments made in
the last chapter about the limitations of social media as a mobilising tool on its own (see
Gladwell, 2010). Given that Danny and Yvonne also recalled having weak ties with
occupation participants, there is further evidence to suggest that occupation participation –
defined at least in terms of taking an active part in consensus meetings – was more likely if
students were well-connected offline to participants. Of course, for occupants involved in
‘outreach’ working groups this was something to be challenged, and so they employed
multiple strategies to attract the more distantly-connected. At a basic level, this involved
presenting a positive image of the occupation to outsiders. Certain activities – notably a
‘dance-off’ between UCL and Oxford occupations which became a YouTube viral video –
were clear reflections of the fun and camaraderie being created in addition to activism work.
Certainly, many occupants were keen to avoid the intensity, dogmatism and earnestness that
had arguably been traditionally associated with political activism and make the occupation
(both offline and online) appear socially and aesthetically appealing to visitors:
I mean, we didn’t sit there thinking (advertising exec voice) ‘How can we be new,
how can we be exciting, how can we synergise?’ – but I remember being quite
keen to sort of work on its image, which is why I did a lot of the graphic design
[on the occupation website] because I wanted it to appear quite modern and not
fall into a sort of outdated, irrelevant thing like the SWP. (Gaz, UCL)
So sort of trying to present this image of this as being something savvy, something
exciting, a bit cool. (Jeremy, Edinburgh)
Public events were almost a daily occurrence at Cambridge, Edinburgh and UCL’s
occupations and functioned both as a means of occupation outreach and promoting the fees
and cuts issue more generally. During the day, there would be invited talks and debates – as
well as certain staff members from well-represented faculties relocating their lectures and
seminars to the space – and evenings were usually filled with social events such as film
screenings, open mic nights and ceilidhs. According to Graham, all were forms of outreach
designed to make the occupation more appealing so that visitors would then be compelled to
engage more in its political content. Although occupants generally considered attending such
events an endorsement of the occupation’s politics, Marianne and Eric expressed some
frustrations over the limited extent that the political element was being effectively put across:
31 Yvonne is speaking about Warwick’s 2011 occupation.
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I think we even had a couple of hundred there one night, after a particularly fun
evening. Maybe they weren’t convinced of all the ideas, and I’ve actually had
people who were really involved in CDE tell me subsequently on the January 28th
demo that they didn’t actually believe in free education – it shocked me a little bit.
I think I was glad that lots of people were there, but I was a bit concerned that it
was becoming an extension of the English Faculty poetry scene… which was
pleasant and nice, but it begs the question of what the occupation is for, really.
(Eric, Cambridge)
It does irritate me when people are just like, ‘I’m going to turn up and educate
myself but I’m not going to take any time out of my day to actually help build this
thing’. But that is a form of participation and if they come in and they get a
positive feeling about what’s going on, then that changes the conversation they
have with people around them in their colleges or whatever. (Marianne,
Cambridge)
This again points to different layers of participation, and corresponding layers of collective
identification. For those sleeping over most nights and participating in the majority of daily
assemblies, the occupation was more likely to have transformative social and political
effects. For those on the periphery, who might have attended social events but participated
little in the occupation’s debates or protest events, feelings of collective identification were
likely to have been weaker. It is also unclear where exactly the boundaries of ‘occupation
participation’ might lie: for example, Leeds student Heather revealed in her interview that
she had brought soup for the occupiers, yet did not include this in the survey as part of her
‘participation’. Conversely, another survey respondent specified ‘providing food for
occupiers’ as one of their ‘other’ participatory activities. In other words, it is questionable
whether infrequent visitors to the occupation felt that they were participants, especially when
they compared themselves to individuals more heavily involved in its day-to-day running
(see Bobel, 2007). According to interviews, much of this seemed to hinge on who spent the
most time at the occupation – including sleeping over for the most nights. For Justine and
Rhiannon, this was an area where accidental hierarchies could emerge: not only did long-
term participants develop a stronger sense of ownership over the space, this potentially
compromised the occupation’s apparent ‘openness’ to visitors:
I think that a lot of the time people might not have enjoyed that sense of coming
into a space where clearly people have been sleeping, eating, living, breathing,
existing – not everyone is as comfortable with that […] [For the 2011 occupation]
we were like, ‘Nobody sleeps here two nights in a row; we don’t want any
ownership of this space’. Obviously you need a lot of people there for the running
of it, like the kitchen and things, but a lot of it was to do with the fact that we
really didn’t want anyone to feel uncomfortable when they came in. (Justine,
UCL)
[The occupation] did draw people in, so obviously it was effective. But it is a
small number of people who will go down because it takes two days for 30 people
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to hang out together and all get to know each other and then it’s a clique.
(Rhiannon, Edinburgh)
Furthermore, sleeping in the space regularly appeared to increase participants’ commitment,
as this opened individuals more up to the space’s liminal powers. Angie – who tellingly
began her interview by stating that she ‘wasn’t one of the hardcore people who stayed there
the whole time’ – admitted these different levels of commitment created tensions. She
recalled two of her friends – both of whom had become members of the occupation’s ‘core’
participants – telling her that she had to come down to sleep at the occupation one night and
partake in a ‘secret’ protest which they would only reveal once she came over. Expressing
hesitation, her friends angrily demanded ‘if you care at all about this you will stay tonight
and you will come down tomorrow morning!’ Although they later apologised, for Angie it
reflected the divide between ‘hardcore’ and outer-core participants, recalling that the
experience of being in the former had made her friends very ‘intense’ in their commitment –
a commitment which she did not share.
To summarise, one can argue that the occupations and their related actions produced
multilayered collective identities, with a core group of radical and committed occupants
followed by multiple outer-layers of participants. Although protest participants shared
consensus over opposition to £9,000 tuition fees, the political transformations experienced
by students such as Gaz, Donna, Justine, Jeremy and Rhiannon did not necessarily extend to
the occupation’s more infrequent visitors and fellow demonstrators, let alone its petition
signatories. Of course, ‘transformative political experiences’ might vary from individual to
individual, and Angie, for example, certainly valued her time spent at the occupation even if
she did not consider herself one of the ‘hardcore’. What this does call into question are the
limits to which collective identity can apply to all of its participants, or even who its
‘participants’ truly are.
On the other hand, one should perhaps avoid being overly stringent on how homogenous
participants have to be in their political and tactical views to generate a sense of collective
identity: after all, for the purposes of building a student movement occupants were keen to
emphasise a united anti-fees stance in the run-up to the parliamentary vote, even if many
were simultaneously developing more radical political views. In this sense, protest
participants were part of a collective movement, even if not always for the same reasons: if
some were simply happy to protest for fees to remain at £3,290, others saw this as an
incremental victory as part of a wider struggle. But during autumn 2010 at least, such
distinctions did not really matter.
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Outside the occupations: counter-networks and dis-identification
In some ways, persuading protest participants to unite under a single protest tactic or
political philosophy was only a small part of the struggle: a sizeable and more significant
task was engaging and mobilising students who might have disagreed with a £9,000 fees cap
but only had a passing interest in politics. As argued so far, participation in medium and
high-cost/risk participation owed greatly to the existing social networks surrounding those
regularly involved: with the fees issue gaining widespread support among students, social
networks became ‘activated’ as mobilisation networks. When questioned on the network
properties of occupation recruitment, Damon admitted that the ideal is that ‘the networks
never stop’ though in reality he acknowledged that politically sympathetic students ‘14
layers of connection’ away from the occupation were probably less likely to get involved. As
has been argued in previous chapters, research into non-participation tends to focus on
activists’ failure to mobilise them, rather than any properties unique to non-participants
themselves. This returns us to a concept introduced in chapter five, that of counter-networks
to social movement participation.
One of the more remarkable aspects of the student protests was that its UK-wide network of
campus occupations gave many students their first encounter with direct action politics –
encounters which would extend to a wider public following the worldwide Occupy
Movement 12 months later. As a public space, occupations were themselves a form of
outreach, and activists were keen to choose locations which were visible and accessible to
students on campus. To attract the interest of passers-by, occupations ran information desks
during the day for students to visit and discuss issues. The principal purpose of this was to
inform and discuss with visitors higher education funding grievances, and what students
could do about it. The latter, of course, played into a secondary purpose which was to
explain and defend the occupation itself. As occupants at Edinburgh recalled, this was met
with difficulties:
In the lobby we had tables out where people would be sat all day, talking to
students. We had people out flyering. On campus people were unsure of what to
make of it, because this is very much something new. So people weren’t saying
‘Oh no, we disagree with this’ or anything, there were just lots of people saying,
‘yeah, it’s quite right that you're doing this’. (Jeremy, Edinburgh)
Hardly anyone came in and disagreed with us completely – everyone was like
‘Well, you know, yeah, I get that, but how is this going to change that?’ That kind
of attitude was difficult. (John, Edinburgh)
Visitors’ general sense of disconnect from the occupations’ practical purpose – to pressurise
each university into publically opposing a £9,000 fees cap and in turn, pressurise MPs into
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voting against the bill – suggests certain limitations in the movement’s capacity to engage
and mobilise many of its more latent supporters. This was confirmed in some of the
recollections of occupation visitors:
I didn’t really understand why they were occupying the university when it had
nothing to do with fees, especially in Scotland. (Danny, Edinburgh)
Seeing the occupy thing here saying that they were against student fees was like,
‘No one is seeing this banner that you put up; no one that can actually change this
is aware that you're doing this!’ So I think in a policy sense I think they're
generally pretty useless. (Lawrence32, Warwick)
This recalls survey findings from chapter four which indicated that whilst the majority of
respondents saw protest as a legitimate form of political participation, few were sure of its
overall effectiveness, especially in relation to governmental politics. Not all non-
participating visitors were necessarily sceptical of the occupation tactic, however. Rick, for
example, was quite comfortable in his role as a ‘supportive non-participant’ on the basis that
he and others were important conduits for helping spread its message to a wider audience:
I think Appleton Tower was occupied for a while and I had classes in there, so I
would walk past and they would have a banner and a little table saying ‘Ask us
about occupy’ kind of thing. And I was just like, looking at this and thinking ‘this
is good’… and just continued on! (laughs) It was like, ‘I support this’ but I’m not
going to sleep in Appleton Tower […] I think it’s important for there to be people
who aren’t directly taking part saying ‘I support this, I think it’s a good idea’ that
gives them a bit more legitimacy. (Rick, Edinburgh)
Although supportive, Rick felt under no social obligation to join the occupation, admitting
that most of his friends were like him in being opposed to the £9,000 fees cap but were not
the sorts of people who ‘will necessarily actually go out and join in a protest’. Once again,
social networks were a key part of this: as we saw in chapter five, Rick had received notional
invitations to join the NUS demonstration via Facebook, but did not have strong enough
offline links with participants to feel any expectation or pressure to attend. This suggests that
Rick’s non-participation could be explained as a form of ‘nonconversion’ according to
Oegema and Klandermans’s (1994) definition due to the lack of strong ties to the occupation.
It is worth considering that both Rick and Danny’s political views and level of engagement
in autumn 2010 were not all that different from the initial thoughts of many who did join the
occupations on the first evening. The difference was that students such as Justine, Donna,
Angie and Rhiannon had connections which made the prospect of participation more socially
appealing. Moreover, unlike Rick, the prospect of their non-participation might have been
considered by their peers as tantamount to ‘letting the side down’ à la McAdam’s (1986)
32 Lawrence is speaking about Warwick’s 2011 occupation.
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Freedom Summer applicants. Once involved, however, each had the sort of unanticipated
transformative social experience that arguably proved difficult to translate to visitors on the
other side of the ‘welcome’ tables.
In this sense, Rick and Danny’s friendship groups at that time – though supportive of the
protests – functioned as counter-networks in much the same way as Bekka’s did in the run-
up to the NUS demonstration (see chapter five). With little value afforded to participation,
and minimal social pressure to get involved, counter-networks can hold individuals back
from participation in the same way activism networks can push individuals towards
participation. As a barrier, however, counter-networks on their own are not insurmountable,
for as we will see in the next section both Bekka and Danny would become more politically-
active the following year. Barriers might grow stronger, however, when they are
supplemented by related counter-grievances. Sometimes this may amount to certain
inconveniences brought about by the protests – Anita, for example, admitted to being
predisposed against the Cambridge occupation because it prevented her from accessing her
favourite coffee shop. This was certainly a more common complaint against occupations, as
students would sometimes find their lectures and seminars cancelled or relocated.
Occupations would often try to negotiate ways of ensuring that classes could still go ahead,
though this would sometimes cause disagreements within the occupation over how disruptive
the protest really should be.
One prominent example of this issue was found when the UCL occupation’s choice of venue
forced the cancellation of rehearsal bookings made by the Musical Theatre Society. The
society favoured the space due to its wooden floors, and requested that the occupation leave
the room entirely for its duration. Seeking to maintain their ownership of the space without
wishing to cause conflicts with other students, occupants engaged in a long and heated
discussion about the disruptive ethics of the occupation, and its relationship to the wider
student body:
I remember facilitating – it was one of the more difficult GAs [general assembly]
to facilitate. There was a whole heated debate about the various options – on the
one extreme we get out and let them have it, and on the other extreme we don’t let
them in, or can we find a compromise where we move to one side of the room.
Very long meeting, and whenever we eventually got to a proposal they were
blocked. So we didn’t achieve consensus on anything – there were a large amount
of significant people blocking the idea of letting them in, because we were in
occupation. So yeah, that posed some tensions with the group undoubtedly.
(Graham, UCL)
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With no consensus reached, the occupation had no choice but to stand its ground. The
cancellation caused a great deal of animosity between students, as various affected drama
and dance societies united around this grievance and accused the occupation of lacking
legitimacy as a representation of student views. The occupants, on the other hand, felt that
the society’s lack of flexibility reflected the right-wing disposition of its members. This may
have had some validity, not least as a number of anti-occupation Facebook groups and
Twitter feeds sprung up shortly afterwards (e.g. ‘UCL Trespass’, ‘UCL Mockupation’)
claiming that it had caused ‘financial and reputational damage to our university33’.
Nevertheless, there were students involved in these societies who were sympathetic to the
anti-£9,000 fees cause, but found themselves pitted against the occupation because of their
counter-grievances:
I did go in and try to speak to people because I was very interested in it all… and
it was very one-sided, and anybody who didn’t completely agree with and 100%
support everything that was going on was just heckled and told that you were a
Tory. It wasn’t a very nice atmosphere at all. I’d imagine it would have been great
for the people who were involved in it, but I thought it was quite unnecessary and
immature in a way. (Sonya, UCL)
I think it’s awful that tuition fees have changed, but I’m not sure than an
occupation is the right way to do anything… It became a place for people
partying, it was taking up space that was needed for exams and the like… I just
saw people becoming ‘martyrs to the cause’. Its supporters were in the minority
across the university… Clubs and societies – zero support. (Louise, UCL)
Louise’s position was especially interesting. She was against trebled fees, and as an English
student and sports societies member, she belonged to two contrasting networks – the former
had a critical mass of supportive and participating students, and the latter, she claimed, had
neither. From a networks perspective, Louise’s non-participation might be explained as a
form of ‘corrosion’ (adapting Oegema and Klandermans (1994)) given that her initial anti-
fees stance was compromised by her membership of counter-networks. Another factor, too,
was her disengagement from protest politics more generally, which as we saw in chapter five
went back to her lack of a political background growing up. To some extent, this was also
fuelled by counter-networks’ collective dis-identification from activists involved in the
occupation. As a concept, dis-identification has its roots in Bourdieu-influenced class
analysis; particularly in the way actors might ascribe particular cultural or behavioural
33 Facebook page entitled ‘no ifs, no buts, this occupation sucks’
https://www.facebook.com/pages/No-ifs-no-buts-this-occupation-
sucks/172862326072135?id=172862326072135&sk=info. This also reflected an accompanying
grievance brought about by the occupation, namely the practice of ‘chalking’. Reflecting the views of
some participants that the occupation had not been disruptive enough, this involved writing political
slogans in chalk on university buildings, resulting in arrests being made.
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signifiers to a group or class in order to draw distance from them (e.g. Savage et al, 1992;
Skeggs, 1997; Savage et al, 2010). Although invoking these signifiers is usually designed to
emphasise a group’s perceived otherness or stigma, they also reveal something about the
individual doing the ascribing, and what he or she wishes to dis-identify from. In the case of
political activism, this tends to relate to certain styles, behaviours and practices that students
might feel uncomfortable about – especially those associated with high-cost/risk activism.
This might be garnered from encounters with certain activists on campus, though it can also
relate to more generalised media images and stereotypes. A clear example of activist dis-
identification can be found in comments made by Mick, a Cambridge student:
When I came here I considered myself a left-winger, and then I actually met left-
wingers at my college… they were mental, so I jacked that in quite quickly!
(laughs) It’s full of the annoying side of the left – vegans and self-proclaimed
Trotskyites, people who were living in squats and stuff like it was a political
statement or something. Also people who tended to be from quite wealthy
backgrounds, which is always hilarious. (Mick, Cambridge)
Interestingly, Mick qualified as a medium-cost/risk participant in the student protests
according to the survey: not only had he been present at the NUS demonstration, he was
even supportive of the attack on Millbank. In other words, his dis-identification from the
Cambridge occupation (and resultant non-participation in it) was socially rather than
politically motivated. The point of analysing dis-identification therefore has less to do with
the real practices, styles and attitudes of activists (many of which are analysed elsewhere in
this chapter) than demonstrating how activist significations are used by non-participants as a
means of drawing distance. Dis-identification, counter-grievances and network position can
be mutually reinforcing, because much like the selective attention strategies described by
Norgaard (2006), collective dis-identification helps legitimise individuals’ own non-
participation – even when some might be sympathetic to a campaign’s goals. This was
arguably true for Louise, whose depiction of the occupation as a hedonistic space was
invoked as a means of questioning the sincerity of their actions. Similarly, Mick’s reference
to some activists’ alleged ‘wealthy backgrounds’ draws on discourses of class-based
‘lifestylism’ in activist politics (Haenfler et al, 2012). Non-participants’ dis-identification
from activists will be explored in more detail in chapter seven.
3. Identity, affinity networks and cliques: the tuition fees vote and
after
Given the widening gap of experience between core occupants and other student protest
participants in the run-up to the parliamentary vote, this section focuses on the impact of the
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vote itself on the students who had forged strong affinity links to other participants and
wished to continue campaigning into 2011. As already noted, time spent in occupation had
widened many participants’ grievances beyond tuition fees to include the wider
marketisation of higher education. Nevertheless, the fees remained autumn’s principal target,
and one which via the parliamentary vote on 9 December 2010, carried the possibility of
political agency should students pressurise enough MPs into defeating the bill.
‘Day X-3’ – the day of the vote
By this time, Cambridge and Edinburgh’s occupations had ended, though students from the
latter joined NUS Scotland’s march to Parliament on 8 December, whilst students from the
former – via Cambridge Defend Education – combined with the student union to arrange
coach travel for 300 students and sixth formers to attend the demonstration in London on the
9th. Still in occupation the night before, UCL became a mass-sleeping space for student
activists who had travelled down from across the UK. With a reported 30,000 in attendance,
the demonstration was marked by a large police kettle in Parliament Square, which the
crowd forced its way out of once news got out that the bill had been passed by Parliament.
Although some interviewees recalled attending the demonstration anticipating police clashes
– and had ‘masked up’ accordingly – many found themselves stuck in the middle of violent
confrontations:
I was legal observing that day and I’d never seen that kind of violence up close. I
could see people getting trampled, I could see people getting their heads smashed
in, and as the police charged I saw someone from Cambridge who was lying on
the ground: I think she managed to break out and then got knocked over. So I and
one of my friends picked her up and tried to carry her away, at which point the
police charged again, and I ended up getting bashed on the head as I was trying to
carry this really badly injured girl away. (Andrew, Cambridge)
Having lost the vote but defied the police, many of the students involved recalled the protest
with a mixture of pessimism and empowerment. The latter feeling, however, was
instrumental to giving students cause to resume the protests the following January. Although
unsuccessful in their principal aims, and left exhausted by the occupations and weekly
demonstrations, the experience had given many a sense of collective agency which they felt
could be mobilised again for other grievances. Moreover, many admitted to undergoing such
a political – and arguably, emotional – transformation that they felt that there was now little
turning back:
I think because everyone kind of like felt their whole world-view changed quite
drastically, and so nearly all of us carried on. I mean, the student fees were kind of
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over, but I think people had just been radicalised and wanted to do more political
actions, so it didn’t feel like people were defeated at all. (Donna, UCL)
I think one of the steps people make towards engagement is to realise that you're
in this for the long haul, it’s not like we’re going to go on one demonstration and
the Government are going to say ‘oh, silly us – let’s just revoke all this stuff’.
(Andrew, Cambridge)
With the fees issue now in the past, each occupation network met up in early January to
discuss where to go next. Some students were concerned that mobilisation for non-NUS
demonstrations had been restricted by their student union’s reluctance to promote and
finance ‘unofficial’ protests and were therefore keen to form ‘activist’ slates for forthcoming
elections. That way, student activism would be better funded and resourced at a local level,
and with unions across the UK operating on a pro-activism remit, opportunities to build a
united student movement would be strengthened. Others, however, felt that the most
powerful legacy created by the occupations and demonstrations was their use of direct
action, and that if anything, the protests had not been radical enough. From their perspective,
this had been what had put students on the front pages, and the relationships of trust and
solidarity that had formed between participants could be used to mobilise for further actions,
actions which could be used to build links with other groups in the wider anti-cuts and anti-
capitalist movements. Consequently, parts of the wider occupation networks began to drift
off into different directions. Although interviewees were usually keen to stress that these
differences were tactical rather than personal, some acknowledged that the split reflected the
fragile and temporary nature of the political consensus which had been forged within
activism networks the previous term:
That entire [previous] semester there wasn’t much structured political discussion.
We had a purpose – we were all there because of the fees thing, and the fact that
some people were SJPs [Students’ Justice for Palestine], and some were anarchists
or whatever, it didn’t matter – it was kind of like, ‘We all agree on this’, it didn’t
matter about the rest. That of course caused problems when the vote happened
because it wasn’t clear anymore what we were united on. (Peter, Edinburgh)
In many ways, such disagreements conform to Tarrow’s (1989) theory of ‘protest cycles’,
with one side advocating escalation and the other institutionalisation. Given the broad
political consensus that remained between core occupants, however – free education, anti-
marketisation – this did not cause a complete fragmentation of the network. This reflected
the social affinities involved –‘we’re all still friends’, one was keen to stress – as both sides
would help out the other: union sabbatical officers would speak out in support of (and
sometimes, albeit covertly, participate in) occupations and forms of direct action, whereas
direct action activists would campaign for union candidates. In some ways, however, these
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tactical differences also reflected different approaches towards mobilising the rest of the
active student community. Certainly there was a need for a new approach: having initially
resumed organising meetings and demonstrations in much the same fashion as they had done
the previous term, activists quickly realised that the loss of the tuition fees issue had
removed a key uniting and mobilising issue, causing attendance numbers to diminish:
The first thing we needed to deal with was a lot of people giving up because the
bill had gone through, and our numbers shrank because of that. We decided to
build for localised events, and for quite a long period that year we were just
organising things like trying to get our MP to call to reinstate EMA, that kind of
thing. (Andrew, Cambridge)
We were still very high-profile, we had a lot of support – a lot of latent support –
but when we didn’t have an active issue to grapple around, that became a problem
[…] Because we had attached our political actions to the actions of Parliament,
we’re then subservient to their timescale, and as soon as they stop doing things
relevant to us, we cease to be relevant. (Gaz, UCL)
This pointed to two problematic legacies of the previous term’s protests. First, the protests
had mostly been built around the grievance of the £9,000 tuition fees cap. In truth, fees were
only one aspect of the Browne Review’s recommendations, and whilst higher education
campaigners and occupation participants were well aware of this, they nevertheless
recognised that fees had represented a trump card for mobilising students in large numbers.
Without this trump card, activists lost an issue that had appealed to the wider student body,
and provided campaigns with a clear political objective. Inevitably, the seeming timeframe-
dependence of the fees grievance became a problem for activists wanting to broaden their
campaigns to other higher education grievances. But grievances related to the Higher
Education White Paper did not carry the same sense of urgency as the fees issue, nor did
they appeal to students’ feelings of betrayal from the Liberal Democrats’ 2010 election
manifesto. This not only affected how students interacted with the issue on a personal level –
it also impacted on how the issue was framed in the media:
The tuition fees were the tip of the iceberg, [but] the media would just drag the
narrative back to (reporter’s voice) ‘Students protesting against higher tuition
fees…’ – we’re not protesting against higher tuition fees, we’re protesting because
there’s eighty percent cuts to university teaching! It’s about far more than just
tuition fees! (Gaz, UCL)
This played into a second legacy, that activists had become somewhat dependent on
widespread media coverage to promote their grievances and actions throughout autumn
2010. Not only was the fees issue easy for students to grasp, it also made for an appealing
narrative for the UK press, one which dovetailed with the already-prominent news story of
the newly-formed coalition Government. With the controversy surrounding the Liberal
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Democrats’ policy u-turn, followed by Millbank signalling the ‘return of student activism’,
the media were keen to amplify activist voices which helped give promotion to forthcoming
protest actions on a far greater scale than would have been possible independently. For
sympathetic students only distantly-connected to activism networks on campus, the media
coverage may have provided the necessary tipping-point. For Damon, this was a key tool for
mobilising students in autumn 2010:
Students believe that a student movement is worth fighting in when they see it
reflected by an alternate reality – when the mainstream media is writing the same
kind of articles that appear in their student paper, and they go ‘Ah, wait – this one
matters’. (Damon, UCL)
This tool, however, had a limited lifespan. Once the bill passed, the press’ fees-centric
characterisation of the student protests rendered it effectively completed as a news story.
Damon, too, acknowledged that ‘there is a limit to how much you can use the Guardian front
page as your main communications tool because they can’t actually print it every other
week’. Although protest would continue to receive large amounts of media coverage in 2011,
with the Arab Spring, UK public sector protests, the English riots and the worldwide Occupy
movement, student campaign groups found it harder to mobilise students on issues of higher
education to the same extent that they managed in autumn 2010.
Resuming the struggle
Given this apparent shift in media focus, many activists chose to put their energies into
mobilising for other campaigns within the wider anti-cuts movement, including UK Uncut,
anti-NHS privatisation campaigns, and union protests – notably the TUC march in London
on 26 March – and the public sector strike on 30 November. Such was the strength of the
occupation network at UCL that it saw a further three occupations take place in the spring
term, the last of which was designed as an organising space in the build-up to the TUC rally.
The choice of occupation space – UCL’s Registry – reflected the extent that radical protest
repertoires had gained traction among those involved in the previous term’s occupation. As
Aitchison (2011) noted, whereas the 2010 occupation was principally a demands-based
action seeking to build support on campus through multiple outreach strategies, the Registry
occupation employed more ‘ruptural’ visions of an occupation’s purpose: one which was not
founded on a politics of demands (or, indeed, student outreach) and was more interested in
creating its own forms of counter-power (see Pickerill and Chatterton, 2006; Gee, 2011). A
similar display of radicalism by a group of former occupants occurred in Cambridge in
November 2011, when a talk given by Minister for Universities David Willetts was shut
down by students, resulting in a 30-month suspension of studies for one of its participants
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(Varsity, 2012)34. Whilst such actions reflected the relationships of affinity and trust that had
built up between core-members of the 2010 occupations, it arguably also reflected the extent
to which they had become disconnected from the wider student body:
People definitely became slightly ghettoized, and there were fewer people joining
in as the months progressed, in that cycle between Millbank and March 26th it
became much more of a group of friends. And this is a pattern that’s repeated
across activism movements – the idea that you have to be friends with the people
you organise with, and you have to be ideologically correct and all this kind of
stuff – that is quite pernicious. (Brett, UCL)
This is something that I had an issue with, in the past year or so, which is that it’s
become this little clique of people who just kind of talk about things amongst
themselves. (Angie, Cambridge)
To some extent, these ‘cliques’ were borne out of the increased risks incurred through their
choice of protest repertoires. The experience of occupying spaces had resulted in participants
being threatened with legal action, having their degree registrations terminated, and being
ordered to pay legal or cleaning costs. In addition, some interviewees had been arrested
during protests, and nearly all spoke of their personal connections to individuals who had
received criminal charges (most of which they disputed) or had been seriously injured as a
result of the London demonstrations. All were knowledgeable about high-profile court cases
concerning student activists – notably Alfie Meadows and Charlie Gilmour – and many had
become involved in campaigns such as Defend The Right To Protest as a result. In other
words, many activists felt strongly that they had been victimised, and consequently were
wary of planning and promoting their actions as openly as they had done in autumn 2010.
This, together with the friendships and loyalties that had developed had the knock-on effect
of making it more difficult for outsiders to join these groups or networks as equal
participants. One practical illustration of this was the invitation-only ‘secret Facebook
group’. Although occupation groups also had larger ‘public’ Facebook groups which
unconnected students could freely join, it was in the secret groups where the real debates and
decisions were made:
With Facebook groups, we have one which is a secret group, which has about 40
people on it, and then there is a broader one that has about 300, so I think that
would be the core and periphery balance. We eventually became aware that we
were being monitored from the Facebook group by security because they started
turning up for our meetings, so we set up this secret group. (Raphael, Warwick)
34 After large-scale protests from students, the sentence was later reduced to one term (The
Cambridge Student, 2012).
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We have a [Facebook] page where we broadcast messages, and there’s the secret
group, which in a way isn’t very healthy – it’s a terrible way of organising.
(Damon, UCL)
As Raphael suggests, these groups were initially set up so as to avoid university management
being able to monitor their plans. When in occupation, students involved had been freely
added to this group, but by 2011 it had become a de facto secret planning group. This
symbolised the barriers put up against students who wanted to join the group, but had not
been involved in the original occupation. One such student was Danny, who as we saw in
chapter five had attended the NUS demonstration but felt insufficiently connected socially to
get involved in the Edinburgh occupation. Having read up on issues around austerity politics
and attended local marches and actions, he began to strengthen his social ties to activists who
had been involved in the 2010 occupation, some of whom had since set up a slate for
upcoming student union elections on a ‘free education’ platform. Through these actions, he
recalled a ‘growing acceptance of who I was and what my political beliefs were’, but this
remained subject to the overcoming of certain barriers of affinity and trust:
So there’s a secret Facebook page and that’s where a lot of organising used to
happen. It used to be quite a little hub and I wasn’t let on it for several months just
to make sure I was alright – if I’m a cop I’m not going to tell you, right? (laughs)
[…] It’s very much the case that if you’ve got connections then they assume you're
good, whereas if they’ve seen you around campus, they sort of know who you are
but they don’t really know your politics it takes a while to get their trust, which I
felt a little bit alienating to be honest. (Danny, Edinburgh)
A related hurdle to the recruitment of new participants was also found in the way existing
members had developed their own political views. Although the 2010 occupations had seen
political differences put to one side for the collective pursuit of anti-fees goals, many
activists were still involved in other groups and campaigns. Over time, occupation groups
developed certain consensus views on a wide range of issues, including gender politics,
foreign policy and the environment, among others. Interviewees from one university recalled
an incident where a student requested to join their free education group (which had evolved
out of the occupation). The group responded by calling a private emergency meeting to
discuss whether they should be allowed to do so. The reason for this was that some members
– who were also active in Students Justice For Palestine (SJP) – had accused the student of
being a Zionist. Whilst the evidence for this claim was disputed by some members, the
group’s SJP members considered his views tantamount to apologism for (Israeli) violence,
and thus a violation of the group’s ‘safer spaces’ principle. With no consensus reached, the
student was ultimately refused membership.
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Some members expressed their regret over the way the issue was handled, admitting that the
decision and the way it was handled had made the group look ‘scary’ and ‘alienating’ to
outsiders. The relevance of the issue to higher education was also considered a problem,
especially given that the group apparently had no official position on Israel-Palestine
politics. This example, along with Danny’s belated entry into the Edinburgh occupation’s
‘secret Facebook group’, both arguably illustrate some of the more problematic
consequences of an ‘outcome-based’ collective identity: for individuals who consider
themselves part of the same movement but are outside certain schemes of experience, their
integration into these networks is compromised. Although there was nothing ‘official’ to stop
either individual from joining the free education group, the broad underlying political
consensuses which had developed out of the sustained interaction of its core members
posited certain invisible criteria to apparent ‘outsiders’.
There is, of course, an irony to these ‘clique’ issues given that one of the key successes of
the 2010 occupations was their mobilising of students with little or no prior activism
experience. Within the space of a year, however, students involved in these core occupation
groups matured as activists with considerable speed. Although this points to wildly different
experiences of the student protests between high-cost/risk participants and the rest,
occupations on a practical level were more concerned with building a multi-repertoire
student movement than a population of occupiers. Testing the basis for a cross-repertoire
collective identity will be the focus of the final section.
4. Participating in the student protests: measuring shared
experiences and solidarities
Throughout this research, we have seen certain consistencies and inconsistencies when
comparing the political views of participants. In chapter 4 (figure 4.21), the survey found
that the vast majority of low, medium and high-cost/risk participants were united in their
belief that access to an affordable university education is a right not a privilege, and that
parties should always be held accountable for election pledges once elected to government.
Consensus began to fragment, however, when it came to assessing certain political policy
solutions, as well as attitudes towards the democratic process. Although these statistics do
not demonstrate any causal effects, they do posit certain limitations in the extent to which
protest participants might have shared a collective sense of ‘we’, at least beyond a desire to
use collective action to force Parliament to vote down the fees bill. Moreover, we have seen
in accounts of participating in occupations and large-scale demonstrations that these
experiences had a transformative effect for many of the students involved – generating
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strong feelings of empowerment, emotion, solidarity and commitment – feelings which were
sometimes difficult to translate to low or medium-cost/risk participants. This opens up
questions about the differing experiences of participation students had, and thus warrants
further consideration through comparative survey data analysis.
Comparing high, medium and low-cost/risk participation
Figure 6.1 compares high, medium and low-cost/risk participants’ reasons for participating
in the student protests. Given their broad endorsement of most of the statements put to them
– barely any respondents outright disagreed – it compares the extent to which each category
strongly agreed. This uncovered a consistent trend in which higher-cost/risk participants
were more likely to strongly support statements, though the disparity between high and low-
cost/risk agreement varied. The biggest disparity (of 30 per cent) is found in the statement
regarding the need to pressurise universities into publically opposing fees. This reflects the
fact that occupations often appealed directly to university management to publically oppose
higher fees in their list of demands. Moreover, as we saw earlier in this chapter, this purpose
proved difficult for occupants to explain to sceptical visitors. This suggests that low and
medium-cost/risk participants were less clear-minded in their protest targets than high-
cost/risk participants – it is noticeable, for instance, that both considered the more general
notion of ‘raising awareness’ as considerably more important than directly pressurising
politicians or universities.
Considering the last chapter’s emphasis on social networks in protest mobilisation, it is
perhaps surprising that the participation of ‘friends and people I respected’ should score
comparatively poorly as a reason for participation. Although by no means an unpopular
answer – more than 60 per cent of respondents agreed across all three categories – it clearly
pales in comparison to the other available options. This may be a failing of the survey
question, as it creates a false equivalency in situating a ‘supply-side’ reason in a list of
reasons which are otherwise all directly political.  In other words, regardless of political
background respondents are unlikely to identify the participation of ‘friends and people I
respected’ as more important than the political cause – as we saw in the cases of Danny,
Jeremy and Donna, their friends’ involvement functioned more as the tipping-point to their
own participation than the principal reason itself. This supports Klandermans’s (1992)
argument that strong identification makes participation more likely, but it does not
necessarily capture how participation became more realisable for students, especially those
with little prior activism experience. Consequently, these sorts of paths and barriers are
arguably better captured through the qualitative research found in chapter five – both in
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terms of high-cost/risk participation found through occupation recruitment, and in low-
cost/risk participation typified by the forwarding of Facebook pages and e-petitions.





















I want to express my views 75.4% 72.2% 57.8% 65.7%
We must pressurise politicians into
making things change
80.0% 67.9% 55.2% 63.3%
We must raise public awareness 83.1% 80.0% 57.7% 76.9%
I wanted to express my solidarity with
fellow students
70.3% 54.2% 43.5% 51.1%
Friends and people I respected were
also getting involved
36.9% 34.0% 22.8% 29.1%
Students need to pressurise
universities into publically opposing
fees
83.1% 60.4% 53.0% 59.8%
It is important that students are part
of a wider anti-cuts movement
83.1% 69.4% 56.7% 65.1%
N=553 (excluding when respondents did not answer certain questions).
Question: If you HAVE taken part in the protests, how much do the following statements capture
your reasons for protesting?
Statements related to collective identity – e.g. acting in solidarity with fellow students,
becoming part of a wider anti-cuts movement – elicit much stronger support from high-
cost/risk participants in figure 6.1, reflecting the networks of trust and commitment forged
through involvement in occupations and the like. Whilst the existence of UK-wide student
and anti-cuts campaigns were hardly a secret, it raises the question of whether low-cost/risk
participants had fewer meaningful interactions with other participants than medium or high-
cost/risk participants. Certainly, the repertoires used to define the latter are more social in
nature, and as we saw in the last chapter (figure 5.11) low-cost/risk participants appeared
notably less-connected to other activists than medium and high-cost/risk participants.
This supports the earlier argument that the protests produced layers of collective
identification based on the costs and risks that students’ participation typically incurred.
Further supporting evidence can be found in figure 6.2, which compares the experience of
participation with the costs and risks typically involved. The vast majority of high-cost/risk
participants found their experience of protest to have been enjoyable, and a source of pride,
even if only around half also felt that the experience had made them feel positive about the
power of protest. This suggests that for high-cost/risk participants, the experience of protest
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has positive effects that make further participation worthwhile irrespective of its political
successes or failures – a point perhaps illustrated by Warwick student Ronnie’s admission
that participating in the 9 December demonstration represented ‘the most empowered I’ve
ever felt in my life’. Moreover, the ostensible failure of the protests appears not to have
deterred three-quarters of high-cost/risk participants from stating their preparedness to
protest on similar issues in the future. A similar amount of pride could also be found among
medium-cost/risk participants, which indicates that feelings of collective identity extended
beyond occupation groups. However, such feelings only extended to around half of low-
cost/risk participants: whilst 82.2 per cent claimed to have ‘felt good’ about their personal
contribution, less than half claimed to have actually ‘enjoyed’ participating.
These findings point to a clear divide in the social and personal consequences of protest
participation between high and low-cost/risk participants. Less than half of the latter claimed
to have become more politically knowledgeable, gained a strong sense of solidarity with
fellow protesters, or felt more positive about the power of protest as a consequence of their
participation. Moreover, only 12.1 per cent claimed that their experience led to them making
more friends when the corresponding figure for high-cost/risk participants is 69.2 per cent.
This correlation implies that friendship-forming and feelings of collective identity are
mutually reinforcing. The scale of new friendships made also suggests that the more trust-
heavy protest repertoires were not the sole preserve of already-experienced and socially-
connected activists. This recalls students’ earlier accounts of occupations bringing together
different overlapping networks, and allowing for unlikely friendships and affinities to
develop (e.g. Justine and Noel at the UCL occupation).
Given the fact that experiences of protest might be positive or negative, respondents were
asked if they had any regrets about their participation. Overall, the vast majority reported no
regrets in getting involved. Given this broad consensus, it is interesting that 22.2 per cent of
low-cost/risk participants admitted wishing that they had expressed their views on the fees
issue ‘in a different way’ – more than both other categories and twice that of high-cost/risk
participants. One can hypothesise that these participants might have liked to have undertaken
more costly or risky activities than they ended up doing, which given the findings of the
previous chapter, may reflect a lack of network connectedness.
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Figure 6.2 Comparing high, medium and low-cost/risk participants’ experiences of, and attitudes















It felt good to do something about an
issue important to me
95.3% 97.4% 82.2% 89.8%
My involvement has made me more
politically knowledgeable
87.7% 69.1% 52.6% 63.8%
My involvement has led to me making
new friends
69.2% 35.6% 12.1% 28.9%
Overall, I enjoyed getting involved in
the student protests
96.9% 82.2% 46.3% 67.3%
I am proud to be part of a UK-wide
student movement
86.2% 81.6% 54.8% 69.5%
My involvement has made me feel
positive about the power of protest
50.0% 43.2% 29.8% 37.7%
I wish I had expressed my views on the
student fees issue in a different way
9.2% 16.7% 22.2% 18.2%
I now regret getting involved in the
student protests
6.2% 5.2% 3.9% 4.7%
The student protests will be
remembered more for violence than
politics
35.4% 52.5% 63.3% 55.7%
The student protests have made me
more prepared to protest on issues of
importance to me in the future
75.4% 72.9% 46.3% 59.1%
N=553 (excluding when respondents did not answer certain questions).
Questions: If you HAVE taken part in the protests, to what extent do you agree with the following
statements?; This question is for all respondents. To what extent do you agree with the following
statements?
As found in chapter five, networks played a key part in how different students responded to
the events of Millbank at the 2010 NUS demonstration. Although ‘violence’ is not defined in
the question, it is perhaps telling that whereas 52.5 per cent of medium and 63.3 per cent of
low-cost/risk participants agreed that ‘the student protests will be remembered more for
violence than politics’, only 35.4 per cent of high-cost/risk participants agreed with this
view. Continuing with this theme, figure 6.3 compares participants’ general trust in state
bodies. Trust in the UK Government is unsurprisingly low for all three participation
categories. The slightly higher percentage of trust among low-cost/risk participants supports
findings in chapter four (figure 4.21) which indicated that they were less likely to treat the
fees issue in ideological terms than medium or high-cost/risk participants. Complementing
this apparent ideological separation is the different forms of knowledge flowing between
high and medium-cost/risk participants. In particular, high-cost/risk participants display
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remarkably low levels of police trust – 46.2 per cent claimed to ‘strongly distrust’ the police,
with 70.8 per cent distrusting overall35.









UK Government 6.2% 13.5% 19.6%
The Police 18.5% 42.5% 54.1%
N=553.
Question: Please indicate, in general, how much you trust each of the following.
This disparity arguably reflects the nature of the protest activities undertaken by high-
cost/risk participants and the sorts of insider information pooled and distributed between
participants. As noted earlier, many high-cost/risk participants recalled first-hand
experiences of police violence in interviews, along with friends who had faced criminal
prosecutions following their involvement in the London demonstrations. With information
related to certain cases being shared across activism networks, it is perhaps unsurprising that
high-cost/risk participants developed a strong distrust of the police. One such case is recalled
by Brett:
I had this sort of ‘idea’ that the police lied all the time, and now I’ve seen them
repeatedly lie systematically, to try and send people I know, like, friends, to
prison. Like one friend, they said he assaulted a police officer. Six police officers
went on record in court saying he assaulted a police officer. The defence kept a
piece of evidence on YouTube – they said ‘Take it down and keep it till the day of
the trial, and allow the coppers to perjure themselves and then produce the video’.
And the video showed it was the copper assaulting him! And it was like, ‘In light
of new evidence that has cast significant doubt in the testimony of the officers we
are going to be withdrawing the prosecution’. We were, like, pissing ourselves, but
probably no repercussions for those police officers. (Brett, UCL)
For an impression of how much participants diverged in their experiences of the police, it is
worth comparing this quote to those of Laura and Hayley in chapter five. The divergence of
information and experiences being shared among different social networks is also reflected
in figure 6.4, which shows that a higher proportion of high and medium-cost/risk participants
considered themselves aware of cuts taking place at their own university than low-cost/risk
participants. Although it is not possible to test if cuts actually were taking place at each
university – such information may not have been widely reported in the national or local
press – the perception is nevertheless significant: whereas only 10.8 per cent of high-
35 p=0.00.
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cost/risk participants admit to being unsure of the answer, the figure is 44.5 for low-cost/risk
participants. In other words, high-cost/risk participants were more likely to belong to
networks where more specific grievances and forms of campaign information were shared
and discussed.








Are you aware of any
recent/ongoing cases of cuts
being made at your own
university?
Yes 53.0% 63.5% 89.2%
No 2.5% 2.0% 0.0%
Don’t know 44.5% 34.5% 10.8%
N=553. Note: Percentages by column.
5. Conclusion
The extent to which collective identity was felt by participants in the student protests has
been a key consideration for this study: not only does it help explain why some people chose
to continue participating after the tuition fees vote, it also represents a key question for
determining whether the student protests constitute a social movement. According to Diani
and Bison (2004: 283), a strong, enduring collective identity is essential to elevating
movements beyond a specific event, campaign or coalition. This distinction also recalls
Tilly’s famous definition of social movements as consisting of ‘a sustained series of
interactions between power-holders and persons successfully claiming to speak on behalf of
a constituency lacking formal representation’ (Tilly, 1984: 306; emphasis added). On this
basis, for the student protests against fees and cuts to constitute a movement it would have to
show evidence of having extended its grievances beyond opposition to trebled tuition fees,
and its collective action beyond the parliamentary vote. Moreover, the construction of a
strong and durable collective identity would provide the motor for further campaigns against
the marketisation of higher education.
This chapter has argued that the student protests produced multiple layers of collective
identity, each varying in its social effects and life-span. Adapting Gamson’s (1991)
definition, one can draw basic distinctions between identities formed around the community
(in this case, the students), specific groups and organisations (the NUS, student unions,
individual occupations) and the overarching anti-fees campaign. Authors such as Hunt and
Benford (2004) claim that further layers of identification might also operate in between these
levels, and given that this chapter discussed the cores and peripheries within occupation
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participation, the student protests were no different. Whether this can be aggregated into an
overall movement-level collective identity, however, is questionable: not only did distinct
and sometimes conflicting identities emerge from different forms of participation, these
identities were shaped in different ways by the time-dependence of the £9,000 fees
grievance.
One can perhaps claim that the student protests succeeded in building a basic-level collective
identity among the majority of participating students. Survey findings indicate that feelings
of collective identity – measured by respondents’ feelings of pride in belonging to a wider
student movement – extended to 69.5 per cent of all participants, with 51.1 per cent citing
the desire to act in solidarity with other students as a motivating factor in their participation.
Such feelings of collective identity did not reach at least half of low-cost/risk participants,
however, and explaining this necessitates going deeper into comparing students’ experiences
of protest participation.
Perhaps inevitably, collective identity experiences were generally strongest and most durable
among high-cost/risk participants. This owed to the specific and sometimes unique
experiences students shared – be they sleeping in lecture rooms, negotiating threats from
university management, communicating with national and international media, being
‘kettled’ at national demonstrations, confronting police, or having friends receive serious
injuries. Not only were these experiences instrumental in generating strong affinities and
relations of trust between participants – thus creating an ‘outcome’ collective identity – they
arguably created a participatory legacy quite removed from that of low-cost/risk participants.
This is borne out in survey data, which found that high (and to a lesser extent, medium)
cost/risk participants felt better-equipped to protest again as a result of their experience. For
high-cost/risk participants especially, this was evidenced in the way they took higher
education campaigns into 2011 – either through forming union election slates with an anti-
cuts mandate, or taking increasingly radical forms of direct action – notably UCL’s
occupation of the University Registry and Cambridge’s shutting down of the David Willetts
talk.
In contrast, low-cost/risk participants – who made up the majority of participants overall –
had comparatively little in the way of a ‘transformative’ political experience. This may have
reflected the fact that the forms of participation they typically undertook – e.g. signing
petitions, liking Facebook pages – tended to draw less on strong, sustained, face-to-face
social interactions. This meant they gained comparatively little in the way of affinity ties,
political knowledge or feelings of enjoyment from their involvement. Moreover, there was
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evidence of dis-identification from other students, with some feeling uncomfortable with
high-cost/risk participants’ choice of tactics, as well as the attitudes and ‘lifestyles’ of the
individuals involved.
Differences were also found in how students framed their own participation. Survey data
found that high and medium-cost/risk participants displayed a clear sense of their intended
audience – the Government, local MPs, university management – whereas for low-cost/risk
participants their action was borne out of a more generic need to ‘raise awareness’. In some
ways, this complements findings from chapter four (figure 4.10) which indicated that whilst
the majority of (general index) low-cost/risk participants saw political participation as part of
a citizen’s duty, less than half felt it could change UK Government policy. In this sense, low-
cost/risk participants’ activity choices were arguably indicative of a desire to do something in
a similar vein to the narratives of self-preservation described in Norgaard’s (2006) study.
Despite these differences and tensions, occupation groups were keen to ‘talk’ a student-wide
collective identity into existence through their media work and numerous protest actions.
Given the shared grievance of £9,000 fees, augmented by the betrayal felt by many regarding
the Liberal Democrats’ u-turn and the large numbers of students participating across a range
of different repertoires, autumn 2010 in many ways represented a perfect storm. Under these
shared grievances, the protests saw the participation of anarchists, Trotskyists, Labour
supporters, Liberal Democrat voters, and students with little or no prior activism experience.
During this time, this unlikely coalition operated as a highly effective protest campaign.
Whether the protests constituted a movement, however, is more doubtful. Given Tilly’s
emphasis on sustained engagement, and Diani and Bison’s on a collective identity that is not
reducible to a single campaign, the student protests against fees and cuts arguably fall short.
Whilst the campaign-level collective identity was strong enough to maintain broad coherence
in the run-up to the parliamentary vote, it rested on the shared goal of forcing Parliament to
vote down the fees bill. As soon as the bill passed, the conditions for a movement-wide
collective identity evaporated, leaving a smaller network of high-cost/risk participants
brought together and radicalised through the occupations and demonstrations to take the
protests into 2011, albeit on a reduced scale.
Although the protests lacked the strength of collective identity and broader political goals to
build a mass student movement, for participants such as Damon, John and Eric, the 2010
fees protests had been the latest instalment in the long-term narrative of student higher
education campaigns. In this respect, NCAFC represent the current torchbearers for a small
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but enduring ‘free education’ movement that extends back to the 1990s (see chapter one)36.
Whilst the autumn 2010 protests failed to sustain mass-participation, it nevertheless
succeeded in expanding the support-base for the free education movement (as well as the
broader anti-cuts movement): all were involved in follow-up occupations in 2011, and most
had become involved in union politics or NCAFC with the intention of building a strong
organisational base to promote the principle of free education on their respective campuses,
and across the UK.
Of course, one may argue that this represents a very niche sub-movement given the scale of
participation in the autumn 2010 protests. This reflects the significant strength of students’
opposition to trebled tuition fees during this time. In this context, it also bears thinking how
much support the protests gained from non-participants, especially given the tactical and
social dis-identifications which emerged among those who did take part. This brings us to
questions fundamental to this research project, namely why the vast majority of students
chose not to participate in the student protests at all. This will be a focus for the next chapter.
36 The endurance of a free education group in UK student politics owes, in part, to the wider NUS
system and electoral process. Following on from CFE and ENS, NCAFC positions itself as the campaign
group responsible for maintaining a free education voice within NUS. In practical terms, this involves
putting candidates forward for NUS elections, and holding information stalls at the annual
conference. This effectively operates as an ‘abeyance structure’, giving campaign groups a purpose





dis-identification and the ‘caring but not
committed’
1. Introduction
Non-participation has been a theme throughout this study, but so far has tended to be used as
a means of comparison with participants. The purpose of this chapter is to consider non-
participation as a social and political category in its own right. Whilst non-participation –
especially among young people – has recently become an area of study in the political
sciences, this work has tended to focus on emerging gaps between patterns of engagement
and public policy (e.g. Marsh et al, 2007; Pattie et al, 2004; O’Toole et al, 2003; Loncle et al,
2012). These studies have been important for reframing the debate to include ‘supply-side’
as well as ‘demand-side’ factors (Hay, 2007: 56), but arguably they undervalue the
possibility that non-participation might also be socially produced at an agency level. To
some extent, this has been addressed in rational choice theories of participation (e.g. Olson,
1965; McCarthy and Zald, 1977), which presuppose that non-participation is a product of the
incompatibility of a group’s goals and an actor’s personal interests. Yet, as we saw in chapter
two, this perspective does not fully flesh out the social context of non-participants’ decision-
making, nor whether rational ‘decisions’ have even been made.
The shortcomings in political science approaches to non-participation have inspired more
sociological approaches. Some studies have directly addressed non-participation (e.g.
Norgaard, 2006; Oegema and Klandermans, 1994; Eliasoph, 1998), and an applying and
expanding these may help us to understand not only how non-participants differ from
participants, but also how non-participation is produced and sustained in everyday life. As
we have seen in the past two chapters, the role of counter-networks (and accompanying
counter-grievances) held back some politically-disposed students from getting involved in
certain activities, when other, less-engaged students seemed to convert their political
sympathies into action because of their network position. Moreover, in chapter six we saw
how some students dis-identified with activist groups because of the protest repertoires they
used, and the socio-political ‘lifestyles’ that members seemingly practiced. This suggests
‘supply-side’ factors in students’ non-participation at a campus as well as governmental
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level, where encounters with political actors generate feelings of wariness or hostility. In this
sense, if collective identity helps to produce and sustain participation, collective dis-
identification may help to produce and sustain non-participation.
This raises interesting questions about how non-participants might be studied as a group,
albeit one that operates mostly ‘in itself’ rather than ‘for itself’. Given that this research has
focused on general and case study-specific aspects of non-participation, this chapter consists
of two substantive sections. The first uses survey data to compare different types of students
who did not participate in the student protests. This involves a comparative analysis of
students who identified themselves as ‘supportive’, ‘unsupportive’ and ‘undecided’, with
interview data from each category used to illustrate and expand on emerging themes. The
second section uses these themes as a basis for studying individuals who might be
considered as ‘caring but not committed’. This draws on material specific to the fees and
cuts case study, as well as findings related to political groups and campaigns in general.
2. Non-participation in the student protests: trends and experiences
of the ‘supportive’, ‘unsupportive’ and ‘undecided’
Exploring non-participation trends
Analysing non-participants in the survey gives us plenty to work with, as they represent a
total of 1,932 respondents – 77.7 per cent of the sample. According to figure 7.1, around
two-thirds of non-participants ‘broadly supported’ the student protests, with only 15.3 per
cent – 11.9 per cent of students overall – claiming to be outright opposed. This provides
further evidence not only of majority opposition to higher fees, but also widespread support
for the protests themselves. As shown in chapter six, a key issue of struggle for occupations
was the extent to which they could claim the support of a ‘silent majority’ of students on
campus. Although this can broadly be taken as validation of occupants’ claims, it does not
necessarily reflect widespread support of the occupations per se: after all, protest
participation featured layers of collective identification that varied according to certain
ideological standpoints, not to mention protest tactics favoured. Nevertheless, as a basic level
of collective identification one can combine percentages of participants (22.3 per cent) and
supportive non-participants (51 per cent) to claim that 73.3 per cent of students overall were
positively disposed towards the protests.
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Supportive of the student protests 1,268 65.6% 51.0%
Unsupportive of the student protests 296 15.3% 11.9%
Undecided 343 17.8% 13.8%
N=1,932 (excluding respondents who ‘did not answer’).
Question: If you have NOT participated in the student protests, do you broadly support students’
campaigns and protests on the issue?
Before breaking down analysis into the three categories of support, it is useful to consider
non-participants in the student protests as an overall group. Chapter four discussed the
demographic differences between participants and non-participants found in the survey, with
the former group featuring a higher proportion of students studying the social sciences,
undergraduates in their second year or above, UK-domiciles, and students identifying as
working class (see chapter four, figure 4.15). Comparing demographics of supportive,
unsupportive and undecided students (shown in figure 7.1), we can see that a much higher
proportion of male students opposed the student protests than female students. There appears
to be no single explanation for this, although it is notable that a higher proportion of non-
participating male students studied science subjects (46 per cent) than female students (37.6
per cent37). We will return to analysis of gender patterns among supportive non-participants
in the next section.



























Upper middle class (N=577)
Lower middle class (N=782)
Working class (N=348)













N=1,932 (excluding respondents who ‘did not answer’). Note: Percentages by row. **p<0.05.
Chapter four also discussed findings that non-EU international students were significantly
underrepresented among protest participants, with only 6 per cent taking part. Figure 7.2
shows that just over half of non-EU non-participants were supportive, with 31.2 per cent
‘undecided’. Whilst their majority support might be attributable to the fact that international
37 p=0.00.
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students normally pay fees at least twice as high compared to UK and EU students, their low
conversion rate to participation – together, perhaps, with their high proportion of ‘undecided’
– might reflect their lesser degree of network connectedness on campus, thus reducing
students’ opportunities for engagement and participation. This disconnectedness relates to
two things: first, the propensity for universities to house international students in separate
halls of residence to UK students; and second, the existence of certain cultural boundaries
that make integration into UK university life more difficult for international students,
especially those from non-English-speaking countries. Schweisfurth and Gu (2009: 468)
observe from interviews with UK-based international students that they often felt alienated
by the social practices of the home student body, especially the focus around ‘drinking
alcohol’ and ‘clubbing’. The end result is that ‘students may self-select into peer groups
consisting mainly of people from their own, or similar cultures’ whilst avoiding
‘intercultural’ situations. This tendency was observed by Rhiannon, a non-EU protest
participant and international representative for her student union:
A lot of universities basically segregate international students. So when I was in
halls – but flats – in my first year all my flatmates were international students… It
became this insular thing where they just hung out with each other. I would meet
international students 6-8 months into my course and they had not met a Scottish
person! (Rhiannon, Edinburgh)
Rhiannon’s political background, combined with her network access to politically-active UK
students on campus led to her joining the autumn 2010 occupation, which in turn, helped her
go on to become strongly involved in fees and cuts campaigns at Edinburgh. Yet her
participation was still to some extent constrained by her visa status, which unlike the
majority of her activist friends, placed much higher levels of risk on her involvement in
certain protest activities. Moreover, in her role as union representative, she recognised how
these constraints limited opportunities for international students’ mobilisation for medium or
high-cost/risk activism – even when it related to grievances specific to this group:
Mobilising [non-EU students] is almost impossible, so it’s all petitions and all
anonymous things. I want to go out and picket the UKBA but no-one will do it,
and in fairness I probably wouldn’t either […] I’m on a student visa, which is why
all my interest in things like Millbank is very academic – I’m never going to do
anything like that because the second I’m near a policeman I’m like, ‘fuck, I’m
going to get deported’, and have to stay at the back with a camera and be like, ‘I’m
just a journalist’ or something. (Rhiannon, Edinburgh)
To some extent, non-EU international students’ network position is reflected in survey data
shown in figure 7.3. With disconnectedness measured by not being invited to participate by
friends or groups, and not knowing any participants, it is noticeable that EU students were
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not significantly less-connected to the student protests than UK students, whereas non-EU
students are around ten per cent adrift of the rest. Although international categories draw on
substantially smaller sample sizes, findings indicate that non-EU students may have been
less connected through social media to receive Facebook invites from active students, or
know UK or EU-based course colleagues well enough to be aware of their protest
participation.





UK students (N=2,104) 28.1%** 40.7%**
Other EU students (N=193) 30.6%** 41.5%**
Non-EU students (N=184) 38.6%** 50.0%**
N=2,485. **p<0.05.
Question: Have you been invited to participate in the student protests against fees by any of the
following? Yes/no binary aggregated from the following available options: student union; course
colleagues; friends from your university; friends from other universities; Facebook group/event
invitation. How many people (other than yourself) do you know personally who have participated in
the student protests against fees at your university?
Figure 7.3 also indicates that network disconnectedness affects participatory opportunities
for UK as well as international students. We can see from figure 7.4 that two-thirds of
supportive non-participants had at least been invited to participate, and this suggests the
majority of supportive non-participants did not lack opportunities to get involved. However,
figure 7.4 also shows that 47.8 per cent of all supportive non-participants did not personally
know anybody who participated.
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Have you been invited to
participate in the student
protests against fees by any of
the following?
Invited 68.0% 61.1% 54.5%
Not invited 32.0% 38.9% 45.5%
How many people (other than
yourself) do you know
personally who have
participated in the student
protests against fees at your
university?
Nobody 47.8% 45.9% 56.3%
One person 8.3% 11.5% 9.9%




N=1,932. Note: Percentages by column.
Question: Have you been invited to participate in the student protests against fees by any of the
following? Yes/no binary aggregated from the following available options: student union; course
colleagues; friends from your university; friends from other universities; Facebook group/event
invitation.
As we saw in chapter five, personal connections to prospective participants appeared a much
stronger pathway to participation than the receipt of anonymous mass-invitations through
Facebook or student union mailing lists. This suggests that nearly half of supportive non-
participants (a quarter of the total survey population) felt little social encouragement or
pressure to participate in the protests from their friendship groups on campus, even if they
were aware that protest events were taking place. This is clearly evidenced in the accounts of
Christine, a ‘supportive’ non-participant, and Cynthia, an ‘undecided’ non-participant.
In terms of Edinburgh, I suppose I don’t have many friends, but I didn’t really
hear anybody saying ‘We’re going to the student protests’ or ‘We went to the
student protests’, so I wasn’t just going to go along… I was just doing my thing in
college that day. (Christine, Edinburgh)
I read a bit about it, I don’t think I discussed it with many people. There were a
few marches I think… I don’t remember much of the details. I didn’t go on any of
them. I think my problem at that time was that I didn’t know people around.
(Cynthia, Cambridge)
Whereas Christine was supportive of the protests but lacked a network context through
which to get involved, Cynthia was ‘undecided’, and therefore depicted her disconnectedness
in terms of not being able to discuss the fees issue with others and form an opinion of it. As
we saw in chapter five, Cynthia admitted that she saw politics as something of a taboo
subject, and would avoid discussing it if she felt that the other person was ‘not particularly
willing to bring it up in conversation’. This, she felt, strongly reflected her upbringing where
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politics was never discussed at home. Looking at figure 7.5, it is striking that supportive and
undecided non-participants have very similar political backgrounds, with just over a third
claiming to have grown up in households where politics was discussed at least ‘fairly often’.
Unsupportive non-participants, on the other hand, have political backgrounds that generally
sit between supportive/undecided participants and participants. This would indicate that the
unsupportive had more ‘political’ reasons for not participating in the protests – reasons that
we shall explore in more detail shortly.
Figure 7.5 Comparing participants and non-participants’ political background and discussion of
politics
Non-participants Participants
Supportive Unsupportive Undecided Participated
At the time when
you were growing




























Drawing on survey data from each specific category, as well as interview data from students
who fell into each category, the following discussion is separated into the three categories
non-participants identified with: ‘supportive’ of the student protests, ‘unsupportive’ and
‘undecided’. This allows us to explore some of the political as well as sociological reasons
for students’ non-participation.
‘Supportive’ non-participants
This category is arguably at the heart of the research project, as out of all the subsections
studied in the fees case study – low, medium and high-cost/risk participants; supportive,
unsupportive and undecided non-participants – supportive non-participants are by some
distance the largest (51 per cent of the total survey population). Figure 7.6 looks at
supportive non-participants’ reasons for not taking part. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the claim of
being ‘too busy with academic work’ is strongest at 64.1 per cent. Ostensibly, there is some
evidence for a rational choice interpretation here, with a third admitting that the issue did not
personally affect them, and 37.7 per cent agreeing that their involvement would not have
made any difference. This feeling was reflected in some ways by Julian (Leeds) and Rick
(Edinburgh), both of whom had friends on the NUS demonstration, but felt that they were
too busy with their studies to take part:
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At the time I was just like, I’m going to just go do some work – there’s no point in
me going down, it’s a waste of time, I’ve got better things to do essentially. [My
friends] didn’t think very much of that attitude – especially coming from a politics
student! [Protest] is effective, but only if enough people take part… and obviously
it’s a bit contradictory for me to say ‘It works only if enough people take part so
I’m not gonna go’, but at the same time for some reason I’ve got the attitude that
all those other people are going on the demonstration so I don’t need to be there.
(Julian, Leeds)
I knew lots of people who went down to London but I was kind of thinking that I
wanted to keep on with my studies, and also thinking that I had a bad feeling about
what was going to happen with these protests, when you see the amount of
policeman riding into students and stuff – I was thinking that I didn’t want to go
down and get involved in that at the moment, it’s a bit too dangerous. That’s just
self-preservation, but I definitely felt that the protests were good. (Rick,
Edinburgh)





The student fees issue is not important enough for me to
protest
14.6% 14.5% 71.0%
I feel that I do not know enough about the student fees
issue to make an informed decision
27.3% 13.1% 59.6%
I was undecided about how good or bad the Government’s
proposals were
21.8% 16.8% 61.4%
I support the Government’s changes to Higher Education
funding
3.9% 13.1% 83.0%
I was too busy with academic work to participate 64.1% 15.5% 20.4%
I didn’t participate because the fees and funding issue does
not personally affect me
33.4% 12.6% 54.0%
Personal commitments (job, family etc) prevent me from
participating in the protests
44.6% 20.3% 35.1%
I am concerned about clashing with police and/or getting
arrested during student protest marches
48.0% 15.5% 36.5%
I do not approve of the protest tactics used by students 34.7% 30.0% 35.4%
I do not personally identify with or feel comfortable around
the people involved in the protests
33.8% 25.6% 40.6%
My involvement wouldn’t have made any difference 37.7% 25.7% 36.6%
It is right to protest against public sector cuts, but wrong to
prioritise the student cause
17.4% 31.9% 50.7%
The student protests were not radical enough 8.5% 25.5% 66.0%
N=1,268 (excluding respondents who ‘did not answer’). Note: Percentages by row.
Question: If you have NOT participated in the student protests, to what extent do you agree with the
following statements?
Although focusing on academic work is by no means an illegitimate reason for non-
participation, it is not necessarily one that distinguishes participants from non-participants –
after all, the ‘barrier’ of study time should affect all students (at least in theory). Nor is it
necessarily the case that non-participants were any less ‘affected’ by the fees increase than
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those who participated – especially since the £9,000 fees cap did not directly affect any
students at university when the survey was distributed. Nevertheless, this and ‘being too
busy’ should not necessarily be taken at face-value, as they may reflect a difference in
students’ priorities. As we saw in chapter five, both Julian and Rick admitted to having little
in the way of an ‘active’ political background growing up, and, as political science students,
tended to view politics more from an abstract ‘academic’ perspective. Moreover, Rick’s
earlier mention of concerns about violence at the NUS demonstration also reflects his more
general tendency to consider protest in ‘rational’ rather than ‘emotional’ terms:
I really tend to think through the pros and cons of doing something, and I try to put
my personal feelings on the back-burner a bit more, I think – it’s like, ‘Do I want
to be spending a lot of time in St Andrews Square protesting, or should I really be
working on my dissertation’ or ‘Do I want to stay in the warm more than I want to
do that?’ (Rick, Edinburgh)
Although Rick’s comment here fits with a classic rational choice deliberation, it is worth
pointing out that neither he nor Julian had ever been on a demonstration. This means that
what Whiteley and Seyd (2002) refer to as ‘process’ and ‘outcome’ incentives – which in the
case of demonstrations might include feelings of political empowerment and a personal
satisfaction for acting upon his or her beliefs, as well as making new friends – remain mostly
abstract. Furthermore, these might be outweighed by more easily-perceivable disincentives
(fear of arrest, time spent travelling to London, missing out on study-time). As we saw in
chapter five, Rick’s recollection of his parents’ experience of being accidentally kettled
when passing by a demonstration appeared to heighten his impression of active protest as
high-risk and volatile. This returns us to issues surrounding students’ political backgrounds:
as noted in figure 7.5, only 36.2 per cent grew up in a household where politics was
discussed regularly or fairly often. This would indicate that supportive non-participants in
general lack a political background – one where politics might be freely discussed and
political participation considered a normal, legitimate, and broadly ‘safe’ activity – that
makes protest participation appear as a ‘rational’ option.
Of course, we saw in chapter five that politically-interested students without much in the
way of a political background or activism experience may see the university as providing
opportunities for engagement. Moreover, it was also found that some students without strong
political interests found themselves becoming more active by virtue of their social networks
on campus. For Julian and Rick, their statuses as social science students meant that they were
relatively well-connected to students who attended local and UK marches (though not to
those involved in campus occupations). According to figure 7.7, non-social science students
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were generally less-connected socially to the protests. Science students generally considered
themselves busier with academic work than students in the arts, humanities and social
sciences. On the one hand, this reflects the fact that science subjects tend to be more densely-
timetabled, making it more likely that protest events would clash with lectures (especially
given that the 2010 and 2011 NUS/NCAFC demonstrations both took place on
Wednesdays). On the other hand, it is again possible that feeling ‘too busy’ partly reflects the
absence of social pressure to participate: just over half of science students claimed to know
nobody who participated (around ten per cent higher than arts, humanities and social science
students), and the percentage invited to participate by course colleagues was nearly half that
of humanities and social science students. In this sense, their ‘support’ for the student
protests as registered in the survey may have been purely notional, with little or no
expression in practice.















% were ‘too busy with
academic work to participate’
61.4% 64.7% 65.6% 70.4% 56.2%
% were invited to protest by
course colleagues
18.3% 25.1% 13.4% 14.6% 26.1%
% knew 5 or more
participants
23.9% 22.4% 13.4% 12.4% 52.2%
% knew no participants 40.8% 46.4% 53.7% 52.8% 42.9%
N=1,268.
As noted earlier, supportive non-participants include an above-average proportion of female
students. Considering that the survey is already biased in favour of female students, this
creates a considerable gender imbalance in the supportive non-participant category: 72.5 per
cent are female and 27.1 per cent are male (discounting 0.5 per cent who did not answer).
This means that female supportive non-participants amount to 37 per cent of the survey
population, suggesting that their non-participation might carry gender-specific properties. To
test this, figure 7.8 compares male and female supportive non-participants’ political
engagement. The first three statements, all of which focus on the moral properties of the fees
issue, elicit extremely similar responses from both male and female students. The fourth
statement, however, relates to a basic policy proposal for funding higher education.
Comparing this to results from chapter four (figure 4.21) we can see that this statement
draws stronger support from participants (especially high-cost/risk participants) than
supportive non-participants. However, figure 7.8 shows a notable gap between male and
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female students, with only 29.2 per cent of women agreeing. This might suggest that female
non-participants were either more circumspect towards certain left-wing policy solutions
than men, or that they were less sure of their views.





% agree that ‘access to an affordable higher education is a right is a
right, not a privilege’
86.6%** 90.5%**
% agree that ‘I feel let down by the Liberal Democrats over their
reversal of tuition fees policy’
81.0%* 80.5%*
% agree that ‘I am concerned that higher fees will put off some strong
candidates off applying for university altogether’
87.2% 92.3%
% agree that ‘higher education funding should be maintained through
higher taxes’
43.7% 29.2%
N=1,268. * p>0.05; **p<0.05.
Of course, the case study is principally concerned with why supportive students did not
participate in the protests and chapters five and six identified network connectedness and dis-
identification as key variables for explaining why students participated in different ways.
Figure 7.9 indicates that connectedness and dis-identification does not differ significantly
between supportive male and female non-participants. Where they do differ, however, is how
often each claims to discuss politics, and the extent to which they consider themselves
politically knowledgeable. Despite having similarly strong views about tuition fees and
being no less-connected to protest participants, only 39.6 per cent of female students claim to
discuss politics often – 13.5 per cent less than male students. What is more, 67.6 per cent of
female students often feel that they ‘don’t know enough about politics to fully engage in it’ –
a figure that is 24.5 per cent higher than for male students. In other words, although women
are apparently no less politically engaged or connected to political people than men, they do
not appear to discuss politics as often. This raises key questions about women’s engagement
in politics in general – particularly relating to why they feel less confident in discussing
politics than men (or conversely, why men claim to be more confident in discussing politics
than women). This will be explored in more detail in the third section of this chapter.
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% knew 5 or more participants 44.9%* 43.7%*
% knew no participants 46.4%* 48.1%*
% agreed that ‘I do not approve of the protest tactics used by students’ 32.4%* 34.3%*
% discuss politics regularly/fairly often 53.1% 39.6%




Figure 7.10 indicates that coverage of the tuition fees issue increased engagement for 42.6
per cent of supportive non-participants, which at 21.7 per cent of the total sample, is almost
as many as those who actually participated in the protests. Similarly, 29.1 per cent claimed to
have become more politically engaged as a result of the protests – 14.8 per cent of students
overall. Although the survey did not explore what this engagement might have actually
entailed, it is reasonable to assume that this included accessing the extensive coverage of the
protests in the UK press, together with media generated by occupations and campaign
groups. Notwithstanding students who may have been ‘biographically unavailable’ to
participate in the protests, one can argue that persuading these supportive and engaged
individuals to take part in anything from signing petitions, liking Facebook pages to
attending marches would have almost doubled the overall participation rate for the whole
UK student population. Whether this would have made the protests any more successful is a
moot point – what is clear, however, is that the protests – well attended though they were –
did not mobilise anywhere near as many students as they could have done.
Certainly for medium and high-cost/risk activities, it has been argued by many activists and
academics (e.g. Power, 2012) argue that police tactics – particularly in London – were
deliberately deployed as a deterrent to students’ participation in demonstrations and forms of
direct action. Figure 7.10 indicates that the majority of supportive non-participants were
critical of protesters’ treatment by the police and judiciary – 60.3 per cent agreeing that ‘the
Government and police force have made protest appear an illegitimate and deviant act’. As a
deterrent to their own involvement, cross-tabulating this category with those who admitted
that police clashes and fear of arrest factored in their decision not to participate totals at 31.5
per cent38 of supportive non-participants (16 per cent of all students). In other words, given
supportive non-participants’ general lack of political socialisation and network
connectedness, one can argue that all of these factors were mutually reinforcing, resulting in
38 p=0.00.
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many students – like Rick – feeling sympathetic to protesters’ treatment by police but
lacking much personal motivation to get involved.





The tuition fees issue has made me more politically
engaged
42.6% 28.2% 29.3%
The student protests have made me more
politically engaged
29.1% 34.5% 36.4%
The student fees and anti-cuts protests will make
the Government pay more attention to the views
of its citizens in the future
27.4% 28.2% 44.3%
The student protests will be remembered more for
violence than politics
56.9% 23.0% 20.0%
The student protests have made me more
prepared to protest on issues important to me in
the future
27.4% 35.7% 36.9%
The Government and police force have made
protest appear an illegitimate and deviant act
60.3% 26.7% 13.1%
N=1,268. Note: Percentages by row.
Question: If you have NOT participated in the student protests, to what extent do you agree with the
following statements?
Despite such disincentives, figure 7.10 also shows that 27.4 per cent claim that the protests
have made them more prepared to protest on issues important to them in the future. Of
course, there is no indication what the cause might be, or what ‘participation’ might involve,
but it does at least suggest that the protests were partially successful in promoting the
importance of this form of political expression. Nevertheless, converting individuals’
willingness into action would likely depend on many of the perceived barriers to
participation covered in this section being overcome.
‘Unsupportive’ non-participants
Given the research questions of this study, it would be easy to overlook ‘unsupportive’ non-
participants because their self-identification effectively excludes them as ‘unconverted’ non-
participants. Nevertheless, one should not take this category at face-value, as students might
have many different reasons for not supporting the protests: as we saw in chapter six,
opposition to the protests (evidenced by ‘Mockupation’ websites and the like) can be a
response to specific counter-grievances, grievances that are themselves to some extent the
product of persuasion and mobilisation. Moreover, to effectively understand participation
and mobilisation it is important to understand the criticisms that anti-fees campaigns had to
counter.
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Recalling statistics from figure 7.5, the unsupportive appear to represent the most politically-
engaged group of the three non-participating categories. A higher proportion of this group
grew up in households where politics was discussed regularly/fairly often, and a higher
number still claim to discuss politics regularly/fairly often. This might indicate that the
unsupportive are more likely to have discussed and debated the issue of higher education
funding than other non-participants. Data investigating unsupportive non-participants’
reasons for not taking part in the protests (figure 7.11) can be used to test this further.
Ostensibly, the dominant views were students’ disapproval of the ‘tactics used by students’
(72.6 per cent agreeing), and disagreement with the statement that the protests ‘weren’t
radical enough’ (75.9 per cent), suggesting that respondents felt the protests were too radical.
However, this seeming disapproval of more radical tactics appears to have only played a
limited part in explaining why this group did not participate, especially given that only 32
per cent were ‘concerned about clashing with police and/or getting arrested during student
protest marches’. Figure 7.11 shows that around half of unsupportive non-participants
claimed to support the Government changes to higher education funding (only 6 per cent of
students overall), with 26.6 per cent opposed to them and 22.7 per cent unsure. In other
words, there is evidence to suggest a polarisation of views amongst unsupportive non-
participants between those who did not support the protests for political reasons (i.e. they
were broadly supportive of higher fees) and those who shared the same grievances as the
students who participated, but opposed the protests for different reasons.
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The student fees issue is not important enough for me to
protest
47.5% 17.4% 35.1%
I feel that I do not know enough about the student fees issue
to make an informed decision
19.9% 15.2% 64.9%
I was undecided about how good or bad the Government’s
proposals were
16.3% 25.5% 58.2%
I support the Government’s changes to Higher Education
funding
50.7% 22.7% 26.6%
I was too busy with academic work to participate 37.1% 21.1% 41.8%
I didn’t participate because the fees and funding issue does
not personally affect me
42.5% 16.4% 41.1%
Personal commitments (job, family etc) prevent me from
participating in the protests
13.8% 22.0% 64.2%
I am concerned about clashing with police and/or getting
arrested during student protest marches
32.0% 22.8% 45.2%
I do not approve of the protest tactics used by students 72.6% 15.3% 12.1%
I do not personally identify with or feel comfortable around
the people involved in the protests
61.0% 19.1% 19.9%
My involvement wouldn’t have made any difference 40.4% 30.9% 28.7%
It is right to protest against public sector cuts, but wrong to
prioritise the student cause
27.4% 34.9% 37.7%
The student protests were not radical enough 5.0% 19.1% 75.9%
N=296 (excluding respondents who ‘did not answer’). Note: Percentages by row.
Question: If you have NOT participated in the student protests, to what extent do you agree with the
following statements?
To take this further, figure 7.12 compares attitudes towards the fees, the protests and
activism according to unsupportive non-participants’ views on higher education reforms.
Although data relating to students unsure or unsupportive of the reforms is limited by very
small sample sizes, it is still possible to detect patterns that explain their respective reasons
for not participating. Unsurprisingly, around two-thirds of students who supported
Government reforms displayed right-wing, libertarian and pro-market views: 64.3 per cent
claimed to identify with the Conservative Party, and only a third admitted concerns that
strong candidates might be put off by higher tuition fees. In clear contrast to students unsure
or unsupportive of Government reforms, 44.1 per cent of students supporting reforms agreed
that taxpayers who did not go through higher education should not have to pay towards
funding the system. In other words, two-thirds of students in this category were politically
opposed to the student protests.
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Figure 7.12 Comparing attitudes towards the fees, the protests and activism of unsupportive non-












% agreed that ‘I do not approve of the protest tactics
used by students’
81.8% 62.5% 56.0%
% agreed that ‘I feel that I do not know enough about
the student fees issue to make an informed decision’
11.9% 28.1% 28.0%
% agreed that ‘Protest suffers because the actions of a
minority usually spoil it for the majority’
81.8% 70.3% 68.0%
% agreed that ‘Maintaining higher education funding
is not a priority when public service cuts have to be
made’
56.6% 43.8% 36.0%
% agreed that ‘I am concerned that higher fees will put
some strong candidates off applying for university
altogether’
34.3% 59.4% 77.3%
% agreed that ‘Taxpayers who did not go through
higher education should not be expected to pay for
the higher education of others’
44.1% 9.4% 21.3%
% currently identifies with the Conservative Party 64.3% 37.5% 40.0%
N=296 (14 respondents did not answer).
Question: If you have NOT participated in the student protests, to what extent do you agree with the
following statements? “I support the Government's changes to Higher Education funding”.
Evidence of a pro-fees attitude was also expressed in the majority of interviews with
unsupportive non-participants, many of whom gave their own counter-arguments to activists’
anti-fees position. For all interviewees in this category, openness to £9,000 fees combined
with general dissatisfaction with the current standard of university education in the UK, as
well as hostility to Tony Blair’s famous policy target of getting 50 per cent of young people
going to university by 2010. Given the fact that students frequently invoked personal
experiences when discussing this issue, it is possible to argue that dissatisfaction with the
existing higher education system functioned as a ‘counter-grievance’ to student protest
campaigns:
The reason I backed the tuition fee rise is that fewer people will go to uni, and
what a degree is worth would increase because you will have fewer people doing
fewer of the… I hate to pick on it, but performing arts and theatre studies degrees.
So you would have fewer people going to uni just for the sake of having a degree
– you would have more dedicated students, and possibly a higher quality of
graduates because people will think twice about whether doing a degree is actually
worth it. (Dennis, Warwick)
I think Tony Blair’s whole ‘Everyone should go to university’ campaign was a
really bad idea. There’s a massive amount of difference between the expected
level at different unis, and if you have everyone going to university it does kind of
devalue some degrees. Because a degree’s not for everyone, not everyone benefits
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from spending three years at university studying, like, travel and tourism. I think
there are too many courses, too many universities. (Louise, UCL)
There are people at my school who I don’t think should have gone to university.
Some of my friends went and they dropped out because they were just not that
interested. I think there’s this stigma attached to not going to university – if you
don’t go to university then you must be really stupid or lazy. I think the 50 per
cent target is a big problem actually. (Anita, Cambridge)
Perhaps significantly, concerns related to Labour’s ’50 per cent’ ideal were shared by some
students who participated in the student protests (though never high-cost/risk participants).
In other words, unsupportive non-participants felt that the student protests were effectively
defending a higher education system that many students – participants included – recognised
as deeply flawed. Of course, activists would likely contest the counter-argument that these
reforms will drive up standards as it rests on the assumption that higher fees will only deter
the ‘bad’ or ‘uninterested’ students from going to university, but students such as Pattie also
claimed that student protest campaigns intentionally depicted the tuition fees increase in a
catastrophic way whilst downplaying the terms of its loan repayment scheme:
Most of the people I know who went on the protests were saying ‘It’s completely
unjust that students should have to pay more for their education’. And that spurred
me to go online and find the documents that set out what the proposed changes
were, and I actually decided that in an economy where cuts had to be made in
order to reduce the deficit, tertiary education is a privilege […] The rate in which
you pay it back is quite low – if after graduation your degree is only getting you
into a job where you're at the minimum of paying it back, the cost of paying it
back is one less pint a week – it’s not that much money! (Pattie, Cambridge)
To explain the non-participants who did not support the protests or the fees cap increase (7.2
per cent of all non-participants), we can return to figure 7.12. In some ways, this group is
more closely aligned politically to supportive non-participants: 77.3 per cent of non-
participants are ‘concerned that higher fees will put some strong candidates off applying for
university altogether’, and only 21.3 per cent agreed that ‘taxpayers who did not go through
higher education should not be expected to pay for the higher education of others’. What
remains strong, however, is their dis-identification with the activists themselves, and their
scepticism about the efficacy of protest. The one interviewee who fell into this category was
Louise, who opposed higher fees but also held misgivings about the current system of higher
education. As we saw in chapter five, the combination of her relatively apolitical background
and membership of counter-networks to the UCL occupation meant that she opposed the
protests. These factors also contributed to her fatalistic view of electoral politics, leaving her
feeling both powerless to change anything about higher fees, and cynical about the actions
and motives of those trying to doing so:
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It is a constant problem in education that there isn’t very much money –
particularly in humanities subjects. And I think it’s unfair because it means some
people are pushed out of education because they haven’t got the funds to do
without. But I just feel that I can’t really see a way around it – there’s nothing I
can do. (Louise, UCL)
Students’ feelings of powerlessness and uncertainty regarding political action will be
discussed in more detail in this chapter’s third section. But such feelings also play a
significant part in explaining the non-participation of the final sub-category, namely those
who were ‘undecided’ whether they supported the student protests or not.
‘Undecided’ non-participants
Perhaps predictably, analysis of undecided non-participants tends to locate them somewhere
between supportive and unsupportive non-participants, though more emphasis is arguably
placed on students’ uncertainty and lack of engagement with politics in general. Looking at
figures 7.13 and 7.14 it is noticeable how few strong feelings undecided non-participants
appear to hold: no single statement achieves 60 per cent agreement or disagreement, even the
otherwise widely-contested claim that ‘the student protests weren’t radical enough’. Other
statistics provide useful pointers, however. For example, there is evidence to suggest that
around half of this category were relatively disengaged from the higher education funding
issue as well as the protests: figure 7.13 shows that only 21.3 per cent disagreed that they
were undecided about how good or bad the Government’s proposals were. Around half of
students in this category also felt that the fact that the fees issue did not personally affect
them, as well as a general dis-identification with the activists and the tactics they used.
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The student fees issue is not important enough for me
to protest
29.8% 32.7% 37.5%
I feel that I do not know enough about the student
fees issue to make an informed decision
46.4% 20.7% 32.9%
I was undecided about how good or bad the
Government’s proposals were
48.3% 30.3% 21.3%
I support the Government’s changes to Higher
Education funding
13.5% 44.6% 41.9%
I was too busy with academic work to participate 50.1% 26.9% 23.0%
I didn’t participate because the fees and funding issue
does not personally affect me
49.9% 16.7% 33.4%
Personal commitments (job, family etc) prevent me
from participating in the protests
23.3% 33.4% 43.3%
I am concerned about clashing with police and/or
getting arrested during student protest marches
41.6% 28.4% 30.0%
I do not approve of the protest tactics used by
students
54.0% 33.4% 12.5%
I do not personally identify with or feel comfortable
around the people involved in the protests
51.7% 31.8% 16.5%
My involvement wouldn’t have made any difference 42.0% 39.0% 18.9%
It is right to protest against public sector cuts, but
wrong to prioritise the student cause
26.9% 46.7% 26.3%
The student protests were not radical enough 3.6% 35.8% 41.9%
N=343 (excluding respondents who ‘did not answer’). Note: Percentages by row.
Question: If you have NOT participated in the student protests, to what extent do you agree with the
following statements?
Figure 7.14 presents similar results, showing that the student protests had little impact on
changing the thought and behaviour of undecided non-participants. Only 11.7 per cent
followed them enough to have become more politically engaged as a result, and only 7.6 per
cent claimed that they have made them more prepared to protest on other issues in the future.
Significantly, nearly half of students held no view on whether the student protests had failed
in their aims, suggesting that there might have been little awareness of what its aims and
outcomes might have been. This might point to a broader disengagement from politics in
general: only 58.3 per cent said that they were certain to vote in the next election, a
proportion which is considerably lower than non-participants overall (see figure 4.16). To
some extent this reflects the above-average proportion of lesser-connected international
students (see figures 7.2 and 7.3) in this category, as the percentage jumps to 69.3 per cent
when limited to UK students only (N=257). This may also suggest ambiguities over which
election the question is referring to. Similarly, 66.3 per cent of undecided international
students (N=86) offered no opinion of whether the protests had failed or not.
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There is further evidence, however, that undecided non-participants have little belief in the
efficacy of political participation regardless of individual cases: whilst just over half of this
group believe that it is a citizen’s duty to participate when necessary, only 45.5 per cent
believe that their participation can have an impact on UK Government policy. Faith in
protest to achieve this is lower still, at 33.2 per cent. In other words, not only are undecided
non-participants generally unsure about the fees grievance, two-thirds disagree that protest
can help change government policy anyway.
Figure 7.14 ‘Undecided’ non-participants’ attitudes towards the legacy of the student protests, and





The tuition fees issue has made me more politically
engaged
20.7% 38.2% 41.1%
The student protests have made me more politically
engaged
11.7% 40.8% 47.5%
The student protests have failed in their aims 45.2% 45.5% 9.3%
The student protests will be remembered more for
violence than politics
58.3% 32.4% 9.3%
The student protests have made me more prepared
to protest on issues important to me in the future
7.6% 40.2% 52.2%
I am definitely going to vote in the next election 58.3% 32.1% 9.6%
My participation can have an impact on government
policy in this country
45.5% 26.5% 28.0%
If a person is dissatisfied with the policies of
government, he/she has a duty to do something
about it
53.9% 32.1% 14.0%
Protest can help change UK government policy 33.2% 41.1% 25.7%
N=343. Note: Percentages by row.
Question: To what extent do you agree with the following statements?
To some extent, undecided non-participants’ lack of strong feelings might be explained by
the fact that only 37 per cent claim to discuss politics regularly or fairly often. This reflects
their political background, with only 38.8 per cent claiming to have grown up in a home
where politics was discussed regularly or fairly often (see figure 7.5). This lack of political
engagement might also reflect their social network position on campus: figure 7.4 shows that
a higher proportion of undecided non-participants were not invited to participate in the
protests (45.5 per cent) and knew nobody who participated (56.3 per cent) than supportive
and unsupportive non-participants. This general disconnectedness is illustrated by Cynthia,
whose lack of confidence discussing politics combined with her political network
disconnection meant that she felt left behind when it came to weighing up the pros and cons
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of the fees increase. Interestingly, however, her desire to be rational and methodical in her
decision-making was often put forward as a contrast to students who did participate:
Lots of people that were protesting I thought – rightly or wrongly – probably only
know one side of the story, and are not willing to discuss the issue properly. I
think lots of people had already made up their minds, and as I hadn’t made up my
mind and felt like I didn’t have enough information to take part. But on the other
hand I don’t think you're ever going to know everything about an issue, so you
have to make some kind of preliminary decision and work with that (Cynthia,
Cambridge)
Although slightly more confident in their views, this perception of ‘political students’ was
shared by Sharon and Sonya, both of whom also self-identified as ‘undecided’ non-
participants. This reflects a slightly different type of dis-identification, namely a dis-
identification with a more general ‘student activist’ identity:
I just felt that the same buzzwords were being brought up over and over again, and
I didn’t get much in the way of information or reasonable discussion [about tuition
fees] […] It was that kind of very scandalised take on it all, which again I think is
a part of the reputation students have – you know, they get to university and they
go crazy and they think that they know everything. (Sonya, UCL)
I was sceptical about those protests because a lot of it was people just being self-
centred and not wanting to pay personally for what they enjoy. (Sharon, Warwick)
This characterisation of student activists as self-interested egoists masquerading as self-
appointed moral arbiters recalls discussions of the history of student activism in chapter two.
Whereas Sonya’s comments reflect her first-hand encounters with the UCL occupation
discussed in chapter six, Sharon’s observations draw little on personal connections with
protest participants. In both cases, however, the argument is that activists are overly
dogmatic. This dogmatism was seen to have come at the expense of being well-informed
about the conditions and origins of the fees increase. As we saw earlier, this was also felt by
students who opposed the protests – such as Pattie – but also by some students who actually
participated in the protests:
I was actually down in London, and there were people shouting for Labour, and I
turned round to these guys and said ‘Do you realise that it was Labour who
brought in fees in the first place you bloody idiot – we’re only here because they
started it!’ (Mick, Cambridge)
Irrespective of how informed or uninformed student activists were, one can argue that this
sort of dis-identification points to many students’ more fundamental problem with politics
overall. This relates not only in the perceived failure of democratic systems, but also the
perceived failure of political actors – from ministers to student activists – to practice politics
in the way it should be done. This dissatisfaction arguably transcends both the case study and
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distinctions between participants and non-participants, and it this that we shall focus on in
the third section of this chapter.
3. ‘Caring but not committed’: individualism, uncertainty and
political dis-identification
The previous discussion pointed to ambiguities in non-participation: although a large
proportion frequently showed disappointment and frustration with politics as performed in
government and on campus, non-participants were often conscious of their own limitations
as politically-engaged actors. However, as we saw in chapter six, many protest participants
displayed similar uncertainties and dis-identifications. This final section seeks to bridge this
divide by addressing sociological themes that help explain students who were found to be
‘caring’ about politics but not ‘committed’ to participating in specific groups or activities.
According to the survey, there is evidence to suggest that a large number of respondents
might qualify as ‘caring but not committed’: 51 per cent of survey respondents supported the
student protests but did not participate in them, whereas chapter four showed that 63.7 per
cent of general low-cost/risk participants admitted that they ‘often don’t know enough about
politics to fully engage in it’.
As a theoretical concept, ‘caring but not committed’ recalls Eden and Roker’s (2000)
‘engaged cynic’ and Jordan and Maloney’s (2007) ‘concerned, unmobilised’ categories, both
of which focus on individuals in society who do not convert their political predispositions
into any form of action. Whereas these concepts explain non-participation in terms of a
perceived lack of efficacy, more sociological approaches (e.g. Norgaard, 2006; Eliasoph,
1998) look at how negative emotions and collective narratives of self-preservation can serve
to produce and legitimise non-participation in everyday life. Analysis of why students might
be caring but not committed draws from both of these approaches, focusing on interview
accounts from eleven students who fall into this category: Lawrence and Sharon (Warwick);
Anita, Cynthia and Mick (Cambridge); Christine and Rick (Edinburgh); Louise and Sonya
(UCL), and Heather and Julian (Leeds).
Dis-identification with political parties
A principal expression of the ‘caring but not committed’ phenomenon is students’
widespread dis-identification from political parties. Although survey statistics point to a
swing towards ‘no party identification’ since the 2010 general election (see figure 4.14),
interviews indicate that many who still identify express similar reservations. Party dis-
identification is a well-studied area in political science: recent research has found that in the
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UK young people especially are increasingly disengaged from formal politics, characterised
by declining electoral turnout since the 1980s (Henn and Foard, 2012: 47-8). To some extent
this is connected to wider societal transformations, where the increased mobility demands of
the labour-market has resulted in individuals becoming more and more ‘disembedded’ from
their local environment (Giddens, 1991; Beck, 1992). This in turn has contributed to the
decline of ‘mass politics’ which political parties traditionally depended on for their support
(Putnam, 2000). This is increasingly replaced by forms of political participation more
congruent to the contemporary labour ethic of mobility and flexibility, such as single-issue
social movements and campaign that are identity-based or concerned with a ‘post-material’
politics (Inglehart, 1997).
Reflecting this, recent research has found that young people in the UK prefer to practice
politics on their own terms, evidenced in their increasing engagement in non-traditional
‘one-off’ forms of ‘consumer citizenship’ (Pattie et al, 2004; Marsh et al, 2007; Bang, 2004).
Student interviews suggest that the appeal of this ethic has had a knock-on effect in terms of
attitudes towards electoral politics. A common theme across the eleven interviews was a
rejection of party identification on the basis that it would compromise their desire to be
flexible in their political opinions on a range of issues:
I don’t really buy the whole political spectrum anymore […] I don’t see the point
of wedding myself to one sort of programme come up by some dead guy yonks
ago. (Mick, Cambridge)
I’ve voted in elections and voted for different parties each time, because policies
change, and political parties change – yes, you’ve got a traditional model of what a
Tory is and what a Labour supporter is, but I think you're getting yourself into
trouble if you take that model as gospel. (Sonya, UCL)
I’m open-minded, and if something makes sense, whoever’s saying it, I’ll go along
with it. So it’s never really been a case of me wanting to wage an ideological war
against Conservatives or whoever’s in power – I always criticise things based on
policy. (Julian, Leeds)
If you vote Lib Dem you are supposed to agree with X, X and X – but I might not,
it might be the first two things and the third thing I disagree with completely. So
it’s difficult to give a fully-rounded view of one’s political views if you mainly
politically identify with a party. (Anita, Cambridge)
It is worth pointing out that each of these four students voted Liberal Democrat in the 2010
general election. As noted in chapter four, many voters had considered the Liberal
Democrats as a left-of-centre alternative to Labour prior to the election, and so felt wrong-
footed by the formation of the coalition. The fact that these students seem to prioritise
‘pragmatism’ and ‘open-mindedness’ above party identification arguably reflects their
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original motives for voting Liberal Democrat, and their subsequent desire to reassert their
political autonomy. This is because of their concern with doing politics on their own terms –
a desire which is congruent with the more autonomous forms of participation described by
Bang (2004). Party identification, on the other hand, is seen as sticky, restrictive and
defining – not just because of pressure to defend unpopular policies, but also a perception
that supporters are expected to subscribe to various positions on a range of issues they might
not agree with or feel sufficiently knowledgeable about. Although the students above
disagree on whether party identification weds them to an impregnable historical ideology (as
suggested by Mick) or a party programme that is itself constantly changing (as argued by
Sonya) the effect is much the same. Instead, these students favour a political engagement
process in which they personally acquire and consider knowledge impartially before making
a decision:
I don’t like pinning myself to any kind of allegiance without doing proper research
on the party, and I haven’t had the time or impetus to do that yet. (Rick,
Edinburgh)
Someone [who] declares themselves a left-winger and then goes and finds out
what that entails for them to believe, rather than making up their mind what they
should be the case and sort of sticking to that – it seems like the wrong way round.
(Mick, Cambridge)
If you're a Lib Dem or whatever, you'll vote for this because you're with
them…which I don’t think is a particularly good thing if they're changing things
about their party. [But] I’m not personally convinced that I have everything clear
in my head in order to be able to judge what the most important issues are.
(Cynthia, Cambridge)
Despite this desire for a methodical process, it is questionable how far this can be
successfully practiced in reality. As Rick admits, he requires ‘the time and impetus’ to
engage fully, neither of which he claims to have had during his four years at university.
Moreover, practicing this ideal might be harder still when political issues are numerous and
complex. Cynthia’s comment alludes to how political parties are supposed to help voters
judge what the most important issues are. Of course, widespread cynicism towards the
actions and motivations of political parties and politicians can be seen to have broken this
relationship of trust (see Stoker, 2006; Hay, 2007) and evidence suggests that the ‘caring but
not committed’ find problems in undergoing this individualised engagement process alone.
We will return to this theme later in this section.
Of course, part of the reason why so many students were prepared to mobilise for the fees
protests was that the issue could be interpreted on a basic moral level i.e. the right to an
affordable education. In this way, it had a similar appeal to many forms of single-issue
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politics. Furthermore, an anti-£9,000 fees position can also be taken from a strictly non-
partisan perspective: after all, Labour had introduced fees in 1998 and commissioned the
Browne Review in 2009; the Liberal Democrats had campaigned to abolish fees only to then
u-turn on the policy, and the Conservatives were ultimately responsible for pushing the fees
bill through Parliament. As we saw earlier in this chapter, however, majority support did not
translate into anything approaching majority participation. To a significant extent, this
reflects many students’ uncertainty over protest as a means of participation.
Protest and efficacy
For many higher education campaigners, protest was the only available repertoire of
participation that could influence the parliamentary vote in December 2010. Although the
survey indicates the protests successfully mobilised 22.3 per cent of students, the caring but
not committed often spoke of feeling uncertain and uncomfortable about this choice of tactic.
First, the directness of many of the protest repertoires – especially the London
demonstrations – was a source of unease, as it went against their preconceptions that protest
was most efficacious when its primary goal was to ‘raise awareness’ – evidenced by the
diffusive effects of long-term social change discussed in chapter two – than attempting to
force sudden and emphatic changes of government policy:
It’s always a bit tricky with protest and activism to tell whether they’ve made a
really palpable difference, but I think that more often than not they do the job of
raising awareness among the public rather than the government. (Rick, Edinburgh)
I can’t think of many instances in the recent past where protest has made a notable
difference, at least not a protest where you take to the streets. (Sonya, UCL)
What have protests done for us lately? All the major ones we’ve had in the past
few years – the budget cuts, the student one, Iraq… you know, the Iraq one was
huge, and it was completely ignored. I support the right to protest, you know –
that’s fundamental – but because they don’t get listened to, it’s not really worth it.
(Sharon, Warwick)
This combination of a strong respect for the importance of protest and a general lack of faith
in the power of protest to provoke change (at least at a governmental level) recalls survey
findings from chapter four. A key aspect of protest’s perceived impotence relates to
confusion over how it should be performed. Whereas students involved in direct action
repertoires frequently cited the 2003 Iraq War demonstrations as evidence of the limitations
of what ‘polite protest’ could achieve, low cost/risk participants and non-participants often
cited it as showing the limitations of what protest of any kind could achieve. These debates
became especially prominent in the aftermath to ‘Millbank’ in autumn 2010: although
defenders of the event were usually high-cost/risk participants, some of the caring but not
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committed were prepared to consider the possibility of direct action and property violence as
more effective than mass ‘peaceful’ actions:
I think it’s going to get people’s attention more than a march would, because it’s
prolonged, and it can cause more disruption than a march might, so I do think it’s
a valuable political tool. (Julian, Leeds)
Realistically, if a government knows that all you're going to get out of a movement
is peaceful protest, you know, you can just write them off – like, ‘Oh, the peaceful
protesters are outside again’ – like, what does that mean? Absolutely nothing to
anyone! The public will forget about it within a week. They need to be disruptive.
(Mick, Cambridge)
If I were in a situation where I felt extremely strongly about something, I think I
would probably be happy to commit a criminal offence. (Lawrence, Warwick)
Of course, these comments are hypothetical responses to hypothetical situations: of these
three students, only Mick had recently attended a demonstration, and he admitted to being
too worried about his own career prospects to personally participate in the sorts of disruptive
actions he deemed necessary. Moreover, these sorts of arguments, even in the abstract, were
distinctly in the minority among caring but not committed students. To explore this further,
interviewees who condemned Millbank were invited to consider activists’ defence of the
event – that it represented a deliberately controversial but necessary ‘moment of excess’ to
give the fees grievance wider coverage. Students’ usually responded by claiming that
arguments for the use of ‘violence’ were incompatible with any legitimate claims to the
moral high-ground in a political debate:
It’s not productive to get aggressive and angry in that way – it just looks like
you're a mob. If you reason with someone it’s more productive than if you
threaten them. I just think it’s counterproductive, and now they’re gonna pay a
fuck-load of money to fix the building – it doesn’t really benefit anyone. (Heather,
Leeds)
To an extent I can see that you have to inconvenience people to make them listen,
but I don’t think you have to make people feel afraid – and I don’t just mean
David Cameron. If I were to go on a big demonstration, to be perfectly frank I
would be slightly afraid that I’d end up dead, or injured in some way. It’s a big
crowd, it can be volatile. (Anita, Cambridge)
A large chunk of them are just along for the ride, I think, and the violence comes
from people who are just looking for an excuse to go out and be violent – I’m
sorry, but not wanting to pay higher fees isn’t a valid reason for smashing a
window. It definitely does undermine the goal, because it portrays these protests as
being just people wanting to yell for the sake of yelling. (Sharon 39, Warwick)
39 Though these anti-violence quotations are drawn exclusively from female interviewees, and
quotations from ‘open-minded’ are all male, this might reflect selection bias rather than a ‘gendered’
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As with students’ preferred method of choosing which party to support, emphasis is again
placed on rationality rather than emotion. It is revealing that, when asked to clarify what the
ideal model for protest might look like in practice, many students cited the ‘peaceful’ and
‘dignified’ historical examples of Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson Mandela and the U.S. civil
rights movement. This suggests that protest is perhaps easier to consider as ‘effective’ or
‘legitimate’ once history has proven it as such. Moreover, aspects of violent or radical tactics
(as were a feature of both the anti-apartheid and civil rights movements) were not
commented on.
Another aspect of students’ aversion to protest participation was a desire to avoid being
‘tarred with the same brush’ as activists who might seek to use contentious tactics or
promote unrelated causes. This recalls chapter five’s discussion of the anger felt by NUS
demonstration attendees Hayley and Laura for being made to feel ‘responsible’ for Millbank,
though more generally it reflects students’ desire to maintain autonomy and control over
what they choose to protest for, and how they do it. For example, Anita was hesitant about
attending demonstrations because, she claimed, ‘it only takes one person [to act violently]
for everyone to get tarred with the same brush’. Mick, on the other hand, attended the NUS
demonstration and was supportive of Millbank, but recalled being angry that marchers were
displaying pro-Palestine and Labour Party banners, neither of which he wanted to be seen to
be endorsing by association. In this sense, the desire to maintain control over one’s self-
expression in a protest march is always potentially compromised by the actions of the other
protesters. Not only does this recall actors’ need to maintain a favourable (and flexible)
impression of the self (Goffman, 1971), it also suggests problems with the notion of
collective action, reflected in students’ tendency to dis-identify with political actors.
Dis-identification with political actors
These interviews show multiple ways in which students dis-identified with political actors.
To explore this relationship, non-participants and low-cost/risk participants were invited to
describe and compare his or herself to the most political person they knew personally. This
had the dual purpose of clarifying the extent of their ties to activism networks on campus (as
studied in chapter six), and revealing how they saw themselves as political actors. Broadly
speaking, the caring but not committed regularly sought to characterise themselves as
trend per se: the survey, for example, shows that a slightly higher proportion of female students
considered ‘direct action protest (e.g. occupations, sit-ins, blockades)’ very /somewhat effective
(48.1 per cent) than male students (46.0 per cent).
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rational, reasoned and open-minded in their political decision-making, whereas their more-
active peers were often depicted as lacking in these qualities:
I like to think I think about the other side. And I think he is generally more
extreme in his views, so every little thing that springs up about politics he’s very
quick to get on his soapbox. (Sonya, UCL)
I don’t chat with her [about politics] because it goes into a big mess and it isn’t
what I would consider a proper debate because it just gets emotional and not
logical. It’s self preservation! (Sharon, Warwick)
I don’t want to debate with somebody when I’m being forced into the position of
defending a party that I don’t agree with, just because I can’t bear to be in a debate
where only one party is represented. Because I will misrepresent the argument,
and it will sound like I am agreeing with them, when in fact I am just trying to
understand them. (Cynthia, Cambridge)
Again evident in these accounts is a sense that the more politically-active fail to live up to
students’ ideal standard for political decision-making. According to Sonya’s description, her
chosen activist is dogmatic rather than rational. Sonya and Sharon also claim to feel
uncomfortable with their activists’ tendency to politicise everyday conversations and get on
their ‘soapbox’. As recipients of this behaviour, it is also noticeable how Sharon and Cynthia
draw attention to their lack of control in how discussions proceed. For Sharon, her inability
to impose ‘rational’ rules of debate in the face of ‘emotional’ arguments leads her to
withdraw from the debate completely (‘it’s self preservation!’).
Sometimes implicit within these criticisms is the argument that political actors are not
necessarily as well-informed and knowledgeable as they think they are. This recalls students’
concern that choosing to identify with a political party eventually results in the party
identifying you. In other words, the caring but not committed often suspect people who
publically espouse their political views of having blindly accepted a group’s stance on an
issue without having independently considered both sides of the argument. Some students
were able to identify specific cases where activists used information which they considered
inaccurate or misrepresentative. Such instances not only confirmed their suspicions about
activists’ dogmatic thinking, but also heightened their general distrust of how they might
take positions on other campaign issues. This is seen as reflecting the way activists in a
group sometimes develop a collective consensus on a range of different issues. As we saw in
chapter six’s discussion of the free education campaign group’s stance on Gaza, the
relationship between these issues might have appeared abstruse to outsiders, and more the
result of a ‘clique culture’ than individuals having independently come to the same
conclusions on a range of issues. This also involves a blurring of what might be considered
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‘political’ and what might be considered ‘lifestyle’ factors. Anita and Cynthia recalled
similar experiences of wanting to join political groups – the feminist society for the former,
and the college student council for the latter – finding that their political similarities were
ultimately outweighed by their cultural dis-identification from existing participants:
I felt like we weren’t alternative enough – we didn’t only go and shop at the fair
trade market and every time someone made a joke about women we didn’t pounce
on them and go ‘Actually that’s derogatory’. I don’t see how [radical feminism]
translates to other lifestyle choices … it made me feel that if I came back wearing
dungarees and Doc Martens and been a bit more ‘yeah, screw the patriarchy’ I
would have fitted in a bit more. (Anita, Cambridge)
I went to some of the open meetings in college but I was a bit disillusioned with
that because they were incredibly cliquey […] They were all from pretty similar
backgrounds – or if they weren’t, they pretended that they were – and cultivated
similar interests, and bought the same clothes, and you got the sense that politics
came with that. (Cynthia, Cambridge)
Both identified what they felt to be the group’s key ‘tie-signs’ – be it clothes, food
consumption or other leisure interests – as a stronger basis for dis-identification than the
group’s politics or organisation. This feeling was also found in Mick’s experiences of the
Cambridge student occupation (“it was run by a lot of the hipstery, vegany bits of the left”).
Although cultural conformity and underlying hierarchies can create negative impressions for
any group or organisation, activist dis-identification can be as revealing about the identifier
as it is about the identified. The desire of the caring but not committed to avoid being
defined by their politics is key to this; for Anita especially, being a feminist did not have to
mean dressing and behaving in specific ways. It may also be the case that dis-identification
is sometimes self-fulfilling, with the ‘caring but not committed’ using certain encounters to
confirm preconceived impressions of activists and their motivations. Some questioned the
authenticity of activists’ political identity, believing them to mask more nefarious personal
motivations, such as narcissism (Louise bemoaning Facebook being filled of ‘arty’
Instagram photos of students ‘suffering for the cause’), self-interest (Sharon claiming that
students attending protest marches ‘are just trying to get a day off’) or hypocrisy:
It’s the dishonesty and hypocrisy… seeing one of these guys after graduation
being driven by his dad in his enormous Jaguar – like, one of these really
prominent left-wingers, I think you are a ridiculous person, telling everyone that
you're bloody poor… (Mick, Cambridge)
Accusations of ‘radical chic’, ‘lifestylism’ and cultural tourism have been a regular issue for
leftist activists for many years and do not necessarily warrant deep analysis here. What
perhaps can be claimed, however, is that in comparison to the complexity of many political
issues, perceived inconsistencies between an individual’s politics and actions are often
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invoked to confirm an underlying cynicism towards the motivations of political actors. Yet
as Runciman (2008) has argued, an individual’s demand for an ‘authentic’ hypocrisy-free
politics rests on unrealistic expectations, expectations which might reflect more the
individual’s own lack of experience with the practical realities of political action. For the
caring but not committed in particular, accusations of narcissism, self-interest and hypocrisy
seem to reflect their suspicion towards individuals who have taken the ‘leap of faith’ into the
complex world of political activism and self-identification, a leap which the caring but not
committed feel unable or unwilling to take themselves. This forms the basis of the final
discussion.
Civic ambivalence or civic anxiety? Knowing enough to care, but not enough to
participate
At one level, taking the step from political engagement to political action is something that
the vast majority of students in this study have done at one time or another: only 7 per cent
of survey respondents claimed to have participated in none of the listed activities in the past
three years. Inviting students to reflect on their own decision-making process, however,
reveals a greater ambivalence over the meaning of their actions. For certain members of the
caring but not committed this ambivalence is underpinned by a tendency to feel engaged and
knowledgeable enough to broadly follow politics and appreciate its importance, but not
enough to convert this into any forms of committed action they see as efficacious.
The issue of lacking sufficient political knowledge to participate in politics has been a theme
throughout this research, as well as political surveys more generally. Henn and Foard (2012)
found that 47 per cent of 18 year-olds felt they did not know enough about what is going on
in politics in general and only 24 per cent felt they did. Moreover, there is also further
evidence to suggest a gender imbalance in political confidence: Hansard’s (2011: 91) survey
finds that 62 per cent of men feel knowledgeable about politics, compared with only 42 per
cent of women. Not only does this chime with earlier analysis of supportive non-participants
(see figure 7.9), figure 7.15 suggests that this gender imbalance extends beyond non-
participants as well – among those who participated in the student protests, the proportion of
women claiming that they ‘often feel that they don’t know enough about politics to fully
engage in it’ is almost double that of men.
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Figure 7.15 Comparing male and female students’ political confidence and discussion
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N=2,485. Note: Percentages by column.
The literature on gender and political participation has variously cited the lack of female
role-models in formal politics (Taft, 2006), women’s hesitancy and uncertainty over feminist
identifications (Aronson, 2003; Crossley, 2010), and depictions of female activism as being
somehow incompatible with women’s gender identity (Freeman, 2005; Hercus, 2005) as
possible reasons for female non-participation. Nevertheless, the extent to which this impacts
disproportionately on how women discuss and debate politics in everyday life is less clear,
and warrants investigation in future research. In this study, however, there is evidence to
show that both male and female interviewees’ claim insufficient knowledge about politics as
a key reason for their non-participation in many activities and campaigns they were
interested in:
I don’t think I understand politics very well. I appreciate that lots of people who
vote probably don’t understand politics very well, but it’s often difficult for me to
try to weigh up which particular points are the most important. It seems to be very
easy to form initial impressions of political parties or political figures which are
very superficial and based on things that don’t really matter. (Cynthia, Cambridge)
I’m always aware that stuff’s more complicated than what I know generally, so I
was a bit dubious to get involved unless I’m aware of what I’m doing. (Mick,
Cambridge)
I would [like to be more politically active] but I’d like to know more about it. I
tend to like to know a lot about something before I’ll argue about it normally. I
don’t know how much I’d have to know before I’d want to argue about it!
(Heather, Leeds)
Given students’ earlier criticisms of political actors for possessing an inflated confidence in
their own political views, the caring but not committed are understandably keen not to fall
into such traps themselves. Like many students, Heather found it fairly easy to take a basic
moral position on tuition fees, but was less sure if this alone was a strong enough reason for
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participating. For those without activist backgrounds and social connections to activist
networks, nagging doubts and uncertainties over the detail of the fees policy ultimately
meant that ‘supportive non-participation’ – or in Heather’s case, low-cost/risk participation –
represented the easier option. Seemingly underpinning this withdrawal is a desire for self-
preservation and the avoidance of double-standards, as publically stating one’s opinion on an
issue runs the risk of being exposed as insufficiently informed and subject to the sort of
ridicule they might normally direct at other political actors:
I’d say one of the things that has happened to me at university is in general I’ve
become less sure of my views. Like, a lot of the time I’m thinking okay, I know I
think this, but not with enough confidence to try and persuade other people of it.
So I might support a cause, but I’ll be aware that there are people who are far more
intelligent than me who don’t and say that it isn’t a good way of doing this. And I
don’t feel confident enough to go preaching my views to other people. I mean, I’m
happy to have them myself – I’m not insecure in having them – but at the same
time I don’t want to go shouting it from the roof if I’m not sure of it. (Lawrence,
Warwick)
I don’t want to be the person shouting about politics when I only know enough to
be spouting the opinion I’ve heard from someone else, and I don’t know enough to
base it on an actual thought-process. (Heather, Leeds)
In an ideal world you would find a party or a movement where you think that their
views are roughly the right opinion, and follow them and what they say. I don’t
think that will ever really happen, but even if you did, you would still need to read
the opinions of your opponents otherwise how are you going to understand the
logic of anyone who believes differently? The problem is basically there’s always
other things I could be doing than sitting and reading about politics, and you
know, most of the time I’m going to pick them, because I have things that I need
to do. (Cynthia, Cambridge)
This perhaps gets to the core of what makes these students ‘caring but not committed’: the
view that political participation should in theory be the product of a rational and informed
decision-making process which, in practice, all-too-often becomes a puzzle that is too
demanding and ultimately not worth solving. For Cynthia especially, her need for useful and
impartial information about both sides of an argument leaves her with an arduous task of
making sense of an issue but little outside pressure to actually do so. This is because of the
relative absence of external expectations of her acting politically, expectations which would
otherwise have come from her political family background or network access to politically-
active peers. Since she claimed to have neither, her rational instincts ultimately steer away
from undertaking an otherwise arduous and thankless task.
Cynthia’s withdrawal from decision-making is partly dependent on the amount of time she is
prepared to allocate to learning, thinking and talking about politics. This also relates to
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political background and network position. For political actors – especially high-cost/risk
participants – the time they allocate reflects the external pressures and expectations that
come from their membership of activist networks, the greater access to information and
debate they have at their disposal, and the importance of politics to their overall self-identity.
The caring but not committed, on the other hand, face none of these expectations and
consequently devote little time to their idealised process of impartial decision-making. This
becomes a vicious cycle, as the absence of external expectation to participate places little
pressure on them to increase this allocation.
Whilst interviews go some way to showing how the caring but not committed withdraw from
political commitment, it is more difficult to ascertain its emotional significance. For
example, in her study of non-participation in climate change activism Norgaard (2006) noted
that individuals’ uncertainty over how best to convert their engagement into participation
caused feelings of helplessness and guilt. Students, however, generally gave little impression
that being ‘caring but not committed’ over the fees grievance or other issues of interest was a
source of personal anxiety. A possible explanation for this comes from Warde (1994), who
argues that individuals are only likely to feel a ‘choice anxiety’ if subjected to expectations
that their deliberations will produce an outcome40. For most ‘caring but not committed’
students, however, their lack of network access to collective participation opportunities
meant that their non-participation was seldom subjected to any emotional pressure.
Interview accounts indicate that students are most likely to critically reflect on their non-
participation when confronted – either via the media or in person – with individuals who,
unlike them, have taken a position and acted upon it. Some – such as Rick – were admiring
of participants standing up for their beliefs, though for many others there is a suspicion that
the action of some participants reflected a rashly-taken and ill-informed ‘leap of faith’.
Recalling Norgaard (2006), one can argue that this sort of dis-identification from political
actors functions as a form of ‘perspectival selectivity’: by identifying inconsistencies in the
actions and behaviours of activists, non-participants might also be protecting themselves
from confronting their own political indecisions and uncertainties. This has an overall effect
of legitimising their non-participation, especially in social networks dominated by other
40 This was sometimes an unintended outcome of the interviews themselves. Among caring but not
committed interviewees especially, I often got the sense that they enjoyed the opportunity to
discuss politics with someone who appeared impartial and was willing to listen to their views. Some
lines of questioning, however, often resulted in students’ feeling under more pressure to self-
scrutinise their political thoughts and (in)actions. This was reflected upon by Julian: “In hindsight
when you do objectify it in this way it does appear to have more value, and it’s like, well, yeah, I
should have done something”.
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‘caring but not committed’ students. Unless an individual makes social connections to
someone who might broker access to participation networks – networks which are open and
welcoming enough to challenge his or her grounds for dis-identification – this cycle of non-
participation is likely to remain unbroken.
4. Conclusion
This chapter has posited a number of approaches for studying non-participation, both in
relation to a specific collective action frame – the fees and cuts grievance – and on political
issues more generally. Although non-participation is to some extent a response to the
specificities of collective action frames – a fundamental disagreement with the grievance or
tactics, for instance – there is also evidence to suggest non-participation as a more general
phenomenon might also be socially produced and maintained independently. Interview
accounts show how students use narratives of dis-identification to contrast an idea of
emotional, dogmatic and ill-informed participants with reasoned, rational and realistic non-
participants. Whilst for ‘unsupportive non-participants’ this is generally unlikely to be the
only reason for their non-participation, it is perhaps significant that dis-identification is also
found in the accounts of the ‘caring but not committed’.
Focusing on the fees and cuts case study, it was found that 65.6 per cent of non-participants
(51 per cent of all survey respondents) supported the protests. Whilst this confirmed many
activists’ claims that their anti-fees stance reflected the vast majority of student views, only a
third of supportive students felt they had become more politically engaged as a result of the
protest. A similar percentage also indicated that police violence and fear of arrest had played
a part in their decision to not participate, though for many it would seem their ‘support’
amounted to little more than answering the survey question than any deep engagement in the
fees grievance. To some extent, this reflected their disconnectedness to activism networks on
campus – especially among international students and students studying science and
technology subjects – which created comparatively few opportunities to discuss the issue, or
social pressures to act. This led to the slightly misleading finding that most considered
themselves ‘too busy with academic work’ to take part in the protests, even though as fellow
students they were generally no more ‘biographically unavailable’ than those who did
participate.
What becomes clear is that a large proportion of ‘supportive’ and ‘undecided’ non-
participants felt generally uncertain of their own political views and how to act upon them.
This suggests deeper problems of engagement: few discussed politics very often, or came
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from family backgrounds where politics was considered particularly important. This meant
that their feelings towards certain issues – be it trebled tuition fees or other grievances –
were ultimately not strong enough to withstand corrosion by counter-arguments and counter-
grievances and be converted into participation. In the case of the student protests, corrosion
came in the form of uncertainties over ‘violent’ protest tactics and a sense that the protests
were defending a higher education system they considered to be flawed. For students such as
Sonya and Louise, these uncertainties were given greater precedence due to their
membership of counter-networks, resulting in them taking an ‘anti-£9,000 fees’ but not a
‘pro-protest’ stance.
Arguably at the heart of many students’ non-participation was a lack of confidence when it
came to taking political positions and acting upon them. It was notable that most had high
standards of how political decisions should be made, yet putting these standards into practice
was often felt to be too demanding. This position of stasis was seemingly reinforced by a
perception that political actors frequently failed to live up to these standards too, rendering
the whole process of political participation fundamentally flawed. At the same time,
however, few students showed signs of anxiety over their non-participation – in fact, non-
participation seemed to represent for them a state of autonomy and self-control. One
expression of this was students’ desire to avoid being ‘forced’ into participating in politics
on someone else’s terms (such as a party or movement), be they ideological or identity-
based. Another was the fear of being made to look foolish for expressing an opinion on
something that others might be better-informed about. Compounding matters, both of these
fears ran the risk of affecting students’ friendships and relationships, as people who held a
different view might think differently of them as a result. In this context, it often feels easier
to avoid politics as a topic of conversation altogether.
This desire for autonomy and self-preservation arguably reflects ‘supply-side’ problems with
the quality of politics typically available to individuals (Hay, 2007), but it also might have
roots in more sociological processes. In general, the ‘caring but not committed’ take a very
individualised view of politics. In some ways, this resembles Bauman’s (2000) consumer-
centric ‘task’ of identity in a society that increasingly prioritises mobility and flexibility.
Whilst their non-participation firmly eschews some of the more nefarious aspects of
participation – dogmatism, hypocrisy, cliques – this desire for self-preservation often leaves
individuals stuck as ‘caring but not committed’ instead of getting their hands dirty in the





This research project broadly sought to understand and explain why some students mobilise
for forms of political participation and activism, and why others do not. As a case study of
participation and non-participation, the UK Government’s proposal to treble tuition fees in
autumn 2010 represented an issue of widespread grievance for the student population, yet
very few converted their grievances into collective action. As the findings chapters have
shown, this study has used the fees and cuts collective action frame to explain differences in
patterns of participation and non-participation (chapter four); identify what sort of paths and
barriers might enable or preclude mobilisation (chapter five); understand how collective
identities build movements and help sustain participation between collective action cycles
(chapter six), and illustrate how non-participation can be collectively produced and sustained
(chapter seven).
To bring the research project to a conclusion, this chapter is divided into three sections. The
first section summarises the thesis’s key findings using data and analysis from chapters 4-7.
The second section provides an evaluation of the research study, identifying its key
contributions to the study of political participation, social movements and student activism,
and considering its methodological limitations. The third and final section returns to the case
study and considers the legacy of the 2010/11 student protests for higher education and anti-
austerity campaigns in the UK and abroad, as well as for the participants themselves.
2. Participation, non-participation and the student protests
At a basic level, the vast majority of students were political participants in some form:
recalling survey findings from chapter four, only 7 per cent had taken part in none of the
listed activities in the past three years. Around half of students, however, classified as ‘low-
cost/risk’ participants – with most having only ever taken part in occasional one-off
activities. In general, medium and high-cost/risk participants expressed a stronger all-round
confidence in the efficacy of protest. Despite the fact that 83.2 per cent of students
considered affordable higher education a right not a privilege, only 22.3 per cent took any
part in the student protests. More pertinently still, two-thirds of non-participants claimed to
have supported the student protests. This posits a number of possible explanations for why,
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despite numerous different participatory opportunities, the student protests failed to mobilise
two-thirds of its overall support base.
This discussion will be divided into three sections, focusing first on students’ protest habitus
and network connectedness; second, the layers of collective identification that developed
between participants, and third, the social conditions of non-participation.
Habitus, networks and mobilisation
It’s so to do with the people that surround you the whole time. If I had got in with
the sports crowd or something at UCL, god knows, I could have been running the
Mockupation Twitter account! (laughs) (Justine, UCL)
A fundamental area of interest for this research was how individuals accessed political
knowledge, debate and participatory opportunities. Overall, the study found that students’
political socialisation tended to come from family, school, or in Justine’s case, friendships
and social connections made at university. One can argue that family background was the
strongest of these, given that the majority of medium and high-cost/risk participants grew up
in a household where politics was discussed often. Moreover, the majority of high and
medium-cost/risk participants also claimed to have also been politically active prior to
arriving at university. These formative experiences gave them the confidence to easily
assimilate into their campus’s activist network once they arrived at university. In contrast,
the political socialisation of low-cost/risk participants arguably had more in common with
non-participants: merging the two categories from the survey, chapter five found that two-
thirds had come from family backgrounds where politics was seldom discussed, and 59 per
cent had been politically inactive prior to university. Interviews revealed that politics often
felt like a ‘taboo’ subject, with many students admitting to not knowing who their parents
voted for.
To some extent, the campus provided resources and opportunities for students to subvert
their non-political background, though much depended on the sorts of friendships and social
networks they formed in their first year. As implied in Justine’s above quotation, having
friendship groups that considered protest ‘normal’ behaviour provided unanticipated
opportunities for the less-experienced members to become more politically engaged and
active. Conversely, however, some already-engaged students found themselves belonging to
the ‘wrong’ networks where politics and activism were either afforded no social value or
actively discouraged. For students lacking the confidence to ignore these pressures and find
new networks, their participation was likely to be held back by these ‘counter-networks’.
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These networks were not deterministic, however, as specific political ‘events’ and collective
action frames – especially those that gain media traction beyond the university – play a
significant part in opening up new participatory opportunities. Although higher education
funding had long been a campaigning issue for students, the Government’s proposal to
increase the fees cap to £9,000 per year, combined with the grievance felt by many student
Liberal Democrat voters over the party’s decision to u-turn on its fees policy, gave the issue
an ‘objective reality’ through regular, widespread media coverage. This enabled activists to
pressure student unions into funding travel to the NUS demonstration, which in turn, lowered
the costs of participation for students. This generated a critical mass of potential participants,
as students could sign up in the confidence that they were likely to personally know others
attending.
The result was a demonstration attended by over 50,000 people from universities across the
UK, though the occupation of Millbank perhaps represented the significant ‘event within the
event’. Controversial and certainly divisive among students, networks were key to students’
subsequent framing of the event. Many high-cost/risk participants admitted to being initially
critical of Millbank, but through discussions with fellow activists were eventually won over
to its value as a necessary ‘moment of excess’ (Free Association, 2011). In contrast, students
who were critical of Millbank but resided outside of more radical activism networks were
less likely to be confronted with counter-arguments, thus giving them little cause to alter
their views.
Networks also played a key role in protest mobilisation after Millbank. With the NUS
reluctant to preside over a campaign that featured direct action tactics, individual student
groups, unions and networks took it upon themselves to organise their own local and national
protest events. The most prominent and coordinated of these was NCAFC’s ‘National
Walkout and Day of Action’, which served as the springboard for the majority of campus
occupations across November and December. Occupations brought together different
networks of people which over time coalesced into a single, multilayered network of
students involved in the daily running of the space. Occupations functioned as a political
‘hub’ on campus, as students with social connections to participants could be persuaded to
visit the space, participate in meetings and debates and even sleep overnight. Aided by the
considerable coverage the protests were getting in the UK press and television, these
connections extended out further and wider than the similarly-organised Gaza occupations
had managed in 2009. In turn, the more people attended the occupations, the more media
coverage the occupations received, and the more people became aware of the fees grievance.
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For students sharing the fees grievance but who did not take part in occupations, networks to
some extent played a part in their non-participation. In general, students were less inclined to
visit the occupation if they did not have personal connections to people involved, even
though the space was ostensibly open to all. Lacking these social pathways, students were
more likely to see the costs and risks of participation (sleeping in public buildings during
winter, fear of sanctions from university management) rather than the benefits
(empowerment, education, and developing strong social affinities). Moreover, participation
was sometimes held back by certain ‘counter-grievances’ caused by the occupations, be they
the cancellation of events and services originally timetabled for the space, or some of the
tactics used by students. These counter-grievances passed around aforementioned ‘counter-
networks’ in much the same way that the ‘Millbank defence’ did around activist networks,
meaning that students from these networks who shared the fees grievance were more likely
to have their protest support corroded by narratives of dis-identification.
Whilst networks go some way to explaining protest mobilisation this does not mean
participants were homogenous in their opposition to the £9,000 fees cap. Nevertheless,
activists were keen to propagate the notion that protest participants were broadly united
under a common cause. Analysing the foundations of this notion is the subject for the next
section.
Building collective identity: a campaign or a movement?
Looking back it was kind of the golden days of the anti-cuts group. We actually
did something; students were a bit radical – it was good. Lots of friendships.
Almost all of my friends are from that group. And my girlfriend as well. (John,
Edinburgh)
Given the range and diversity of tactics used, it should come as no surprise that participants
had differing experiences of the student protests. For John, participation in the Edinburgh
occupation helped him strengthen his political views and develop lasting personal
relationships with many of those involved. Yet whilst similar experiences were relayed by
many high-cost/risk participants at Edinburgh, UCL, Cambridge and Warwick in autumn
2010 (and to a lesser extent, autumn 2011), they were by no means typical of participants as
a whole. Survey findings in chapter four found that around ten per cent of all students
participated in demonstrations, and four per cent in occupations, whereas more ‘low-
cost/risk’ activities such as petition-signing and joining/‘liking’ Facebook groups were more
popular. This raised questions over the extent to which ‘collective identity’ could emerge out
of a multi-repertoire movement.
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As discussed in chapter two, there is much disagreement in social movement studies over
whether collective identity represents a necessary component of any movement (Mellucci,
1988), or whether they are too heterogeneous ideologically, tactically and organisationally to
generate any sort of mutuality beyond a basic overarching ‘shared concern’ (Saunders,
2008). Certainly in the student protests, feelings of shared trust, solidarity and affinity were
more easily locatable at a group and tactic level. Campus occupations in particular were
spaces for intensive debate and knowledge-sharing, as well as the practicing of politics
through consensus meetings, working groups and protest planning. Much like Gitlin’s (2013)
depiction of Occupy Wall Street participants, however, students at Edinburgh, Cambridge
and UCL spoke in terms of cores and peripheries. For core members, their participation had
radicalising effects: most extended their critique to an opposition to public sector
marketisation, with many also becoming more open to radical protest tactics (Aitchison,
2011). Moreover, the costs and risks involved in maintaining the space helped develop
strong mutual relations of trust. In contrast, members of occupation peripheries were more
loosely connected to the occupation’s daily assemblies, debates and decision-making
processes, and so were less likely to feel these radicalising effects. Moreover, infrequent
visitors to the occupation struggled to understand the tactic itself, whereas others considered
the attitudes and lifestyles practiced by many occupants a cause for derision and dis-
identification.
If these tactical differences reflected some of the problems in building a cross-repertoire
movement, it should still be remembered that all participants were united by the common
goal of forcing the defeat of the fees bill in Parliament. According to survey statistics, this
common goal generated a sense of collective identity for the majority of participants, with
69.4 per cent claiming to have felt ‘proud to be part of a UK-wide student movement’.
Whilst this indicates that feelings of collective identity remained strong across the majority
of high, medium and low-cost/risk participants some 18 months later, in practice campaigns
had struggled to sustain mass-participation after the fees vote passed. This was because
collective identity was firmly rooted in the fees grievance, and from 2011 onwards broader
grievances related to higher education marketisation and the Government’s White Paper
found only limited engagement among the wider student population. This restricted activists’
capacity to build a durable mass-movement out of the fees protests’ mass campaign. What
the autumn protests did achieve was an upsurge in mobilisation for the much smaller ‘free
education’ movement, which had been a fixture in student politics since tuition fees were
originally proposed in the 1990s. Via certain student unions and the UK-wide student
network NCAFC, these activists were responsible for the ‘unofficial’ national demonstration
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on 9 November 2011, along with further campus occupations. Although popular, these
actions generally operated on a much smaller scale than in the previous autumn.
Of course, the right to an ‘affordable’ university education had represented enough of a
shared concern to unite the majority of participants irrespective of ideological or tactical
differences in autumn 2010, but the 22.3 per cent who took part in the protests reflected only
a fraction of the scale of student opposition to trebled fees – as noted earlier, 83.2 per cent of
students agreed that ‘access to an affordable university education is a right, not a privilege’.
In other words, whilst the fees grievance might be taken as a basic commonality between
protest participants, it does not account for the difference between participants and non-
participants. Explaining the non-conversion of the latter is a key issue for the next section.
The social production of non-participation
I don’t see that my participation would have changed the way that things were
going. I didn’t think it was going to do anything, so why take part, why bother!
(Julian, Leeds)
Survey findings from chapter seven showed that 65.6 per cent of non-participants in the
student protests were supportive of them, with 15.2 per cent unsupportive and 17.8 per cent
undecided. Although this suggests something of a victory for activists who claimed latent
support from the wider student population, less than a third of ‘supportive non-participants’
claimed to have become more politically engaged by the protests. This indicated that
students engaged with the grievance on a moral basis, but lacked the political knowledge and
participatory ethos to convert this into participation. Moreover, only 43 per cent claimed to
discuss politics often – lower than participants and unsupportive non-participants. In other
words, the precise nature of non-participants’ support for the protests suggested more
fundamental barriers to participation than ‘biographical unavailability’: as indicated in
Julian’s quotation above, this pointed to a wider problem with valuing political participation
in general.
It is perhaps significant that many supportive non-participants were open to some of the
counter-arguments put forward by unsupportive non-participants. They felt the preceding
Labour Government’s target of putting 50 per cent of young people through higher education
had dulled the prestige of a UK university education, and that the increase in fees could help
improve this situation. Whilst unsupportive non-participants usually framed this argument
from a right-wing perspective (underlined by the fact that two-thirds identified with the
Conservative Party), supportive and undecided non-participants were more cautious in their
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claims, sometimes admitting that they did not know enough about the policy to make more
forceful arguments either way.
Network factors played a part in supportive students’ non-participation. Survey evidence
found that although two-thirds had been invited to participate, nearly half personally knew
nobody who participated. Network effects also accounted for why certain types of student
were more disconnected than others. Among supportive non-participants, it was found that
science and technology students knew far fewer participants than humanities and social
science students. Similarly, fewer non-EU international students were invited to participate
than UK and EU students, suggesting that cultural as well as political barriers played a part
in their non-participation, as well as the heightened risks involved in protest activity for
students on study visas.
Among the many non-participants who lacked strong political network links, interview data
in particular pointed to certain trends and themes around their tendency to be ‘caring but not
committed’ on a range of political issues. Recalling the work of Beck (1992), Giddens
(1991) and Bennett (1998), these students had ‘dis-embedded’ from traditional collective
political practices – notably memberships and party identification – preferring instead to
appear flexible and noncommittal about political groups and causes. This stemmed from a
general dissatisfaction and cynicism towards the supply of politics – both at a campus and
UK level – with political actors all-too-often failing to live up to students’ expectations by
taking ill-informed ‘leaps of faith’ or acting unreflexively out of group/party loyalty. That
said, students often struggled to live up to their own expectations, as they were either unable
or unwilling to devote the time they considered necessary to becoming knowledgeable
enough to participate. Networks also played a part here, as the caring but not committed
were seldom expected by their peers to be politically engaged or active, which meant they
were unlikely to feel any pressure to devote more time to political engagement. Non-
participation therefore represented a position of sanctity and self-preservation, and was
perhaps only challenged when specific collective action frames become national or
international talking-points.
Survey evidence also implied that the ‘caring but not committed’ phenomenon might affect
women more than men. A lower proportion of women – including participants as well as
non-participants – discussed politics regularly/fairly often; whilst a higher proportion of
women agreed that they ‘often feel that they don’t know enough about politics to fully
engage in it’. These findings indicate barriers to female political engagement via the way
politics is discussed and debated in everyday life, though it might also indicate that women
245
tend to be more self-critical in how they perceive themselves as political actors. Either way,
these findings arguably warrant further consideration in future research – considerations
which will be expanded on in the following section.
2. Evaluating the research study
Building on the findings outlined above, this section firstly situates the research project’s
contribution to the literatures on student activism, social movements and political
participation discussed in chapter two. Second, it evaluates the study’s methodology and
research design, taking into consideration the validity and reliability of its key findings.
Third and finally, it considers these findings as a basis for future research.
The significance of the findings
This section seeks to make five basic points about the research findings and discuss their
relevance to the literatures on social movements and political participation. The first is that
for most politically-active students, politicisation begins before university. This chimes with
Bourdieu’s (1984) emphasis on the importance of primary socialisation for shaping cultural
norms and values, which applied to social movements provides important steps towards
acquiring a ‘radical habitus’ (Crossley, 2003). Recalling Braungart and Braungart’s (1990)
study, this habitus did not involve the verbatim inheritance of a political ideology or party
identification: rather, it provided students with the tools of politicisation – notably access to
knowledge, the normalisation of political debate, and the legitimation of protest as an
activity. For some students, this politicisation began in school rather than at home, with
interview findings pointing to the politicising effects of certain educational environments –
especially private schools. This arguably warrants investigation in future research.
Second, it was found that networks create paths and barriers to participation. This
complements research by McAdam (1986) and Crossley and Ibrahim (2012) as it was found
that individual mobilisation for occupations and demonstrations required a social context to
make the activity seem viable and socially valid. For high-cost/risk participants especially,
this context tends to take the form of a campus’s wider activist network, taking in numerous
political groups and societies. Although sometimes tightly-bonded and cliquey, these
networks are subjected to flurries of recruitment during the emergence of new collective
action frames. Networks can also create barriers to participation, as some predisposed
students belonged to friendship groups where activism was afforded little or no social value,
or was actively discouraged. Adapting Oegema and Klandermans’s (1994) terms, belonging
to these counter-networks can corrode the potential participation of individuals through their
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peers’ counter-arguments to protest campaigns, or it can go unconverted as students have no
outlet in which to discuss the issue any further.
Third, dis-identification from political groups and actors causes non-participation. It was
argued in Crossley and Ibrahim’s (2012: 608) recent study that activist networks on campus
develop mutual ‘tie-signs’ which ‘communicate strong links between actors’. Research by
Crossley (2008) and Saunders (2008) have both illustrated some of the problems of dense
activist networks bound by strong cultural markers. Despite these studies, little research has
actually been conducted on the thoughts and experiences of ‘outsiders’ themselves.
Interviews especially showed that dis-identification – that is, rejecting a group or
individual’s perceived political identity or ‘lifestyle’ – was a significant barrier to joining
occupations or becoming a member of a political group/society. Connections can also be
made to Norgaard’s (2006) work, as impressions formed by non-participants about the
motivations and lifestyles of participants helped keep them in their counter-network ‘frame’.
In other words, just as collective identity helps produce and sustain participation, collective
dis-identification helps produce and sustain non-participation.
Fourth, online networks can help strengthen offline ties but they can also strengthen cliques.
Information networks and social media are undoubtedly valuable tools for mobilising online
and offline activism, but for the latter especially mobilisation seldom operates independently
of actors’ ‘real’ social ties. Certainly in autumn 2010, local marches could be organised at
short notice via Facebook ‘events’ – arguably pointing to a certain dependence on the power
of collective action frames – but attendance still depended mostly on whether individuals had
friends also thinking of going. In other words, Facebook alone does not mobilise people –
rather, it simplifies and helps visualise already-existing offline social networks. In some
cases an individual’s online identity can strengthen an individual’s offline social networks –
Danny, for example, recalled using social media to access the sorts of debates activists were
having, which helped him assimilate into activist groups on campus. However, not all
activist debate and information sharing is freely accessible: occupation groups at UCL,
Edinburgh and Warwick regularly made use of invitation-only Facebook groups throughout
2011, which arguably helped reinforce a clique culture around ‘core’ participants. In other
words, as Morozov (2011) has argued, the internet is an extremely malleable tool that can be
used to facilitate network openness, but also network secrecy.
Fifth, and finally, it was found that sympathetic non-participants favour self-preservation
over collective action. In this context, self-preservation means avoiding political engagement
and action that might involve being challenged about one’s political opinions, or feeling
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forced to defend the views of a group or party they might not fully understand or believe in.
To some extent this can be understood from a rational choice perspective, where individuals
choose to avoid getting their hands dirty by ‘free-riding’ on the work of others (Olson,
1965), though ironically their non-participation is often managed collectively through
counter-networks and ‘perspectival selectivity’ (Norgaard, 2006). For the ‘caring but not
committed’ especially, their non-participation was ‘rational’ insofar as few felt any social
pressure or expectation to be more active, but they recognised that their lack of confidence in
their political knowledge and decision-making had meant that they were failing to live up to
their own expectations of how citizens should act. These findings perhaps owe to temporary
‘life-cycle’ effects (Henn et al, 2002), which might recede after graduation, though
arguments have been made for the growth of political individualism (e.g. Putnam, 2000),
evidenced in many individuals’ preference for one-off, low-cost/risk participation via
professionalised ‘protest businesses’ (Jordan and Maloney, 1997). As an emerging theme
from this study, the ‘caring but not committed’ phenomenon arguably warrants further
research in a range of other fields.
Methodological issues
Of course, ascertaining the significance of these findings also depends on the robustness and
reliability of the study’s overall research design. Unlike most studies of student activism, this
research had the advantage of sampling multiple campuses – thus laying claim to UK-wide
representativeness. Moreover, the survey enabled testing the impact of certain key variables
– family background, pre-university activism, network connectedness, invitations to
participate – on participants and non-participants, allowing for comparative analysis. The
meaningfulness of these variables was then explored in more detail through student
interviews with participants and non-participants. Inversely, narratives emerging from
interviews could be tested for their reliability by situating the experiences of certain types of
individual onto the representative map of the survey. Clearly, this duality of analysis was the
fundamental advantage to employing triangulation in the research design, though the process
of data collection nevertheless produced certain methodological issues which might place
some limitations on the reliability and applicability of its findings.
First, despite the desire to achieve representativeness the survey incorporated elements of
bias into its sample. This owed to certain problems experienced in the sampling process:
response rates were generally low (though this did not affect response numbers) and the high
yield of students studying at particular departments at the University of Edinburgh resulted
in a slight sample bias in favour of arts, humanities and social science students, as well as an
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above-average proportion of Scottish domiciles. Furthermore, the survey generated certain
response biases, most notably female students. Whilst it was felt that these biases were not
problematic enough to warrant weighting the sample for representativeness, subject and
gender variables would have to be analysed separately whenever necessary. That said,
gender bias might be a factor in the data underpinning analysis of the ‘caring but not
committed’ and thereby warrants follow-up research to test these findings further. It should
also be pointed out that the survey’s representative purpose came at the cost of generating a
large sample of student protest participants. The small yield of high-cost/risk participants
(N=65) limited the extent to which types of participants could be subjected to detailed
comparative analysis. This category, however, was overrepresented in interview sampling,
allowing for this data to take the lead on analysis of demonstrations, occupations and groups
involved in direct action repertoires.
Second, survey data analysis frequently made substantive use of ‘indexes’ of aggregated
variables. The most prominent examples of this were the ‘general participation index’ and
the student participation index’, both of which sought to measure participation in terms of
the frequency of students’ participation in activities by cost and risk. Their arbitrary nature
necessitated careful use: with the possible exception of high-cost/risk participants, the
categories did not have any objective ‘group consciousness’ – rather, they existed as tools
designed to measure general participatory trends. The data used for these indexes might also
be considered problematic: the failure to incorporate data from the ‘other’ category meant
that certain forms of participation absent from the list – notably writing letters to MPs,
writing blogs, making YouTube videos – did not factor into the analysis. Although the
fixedness of selection might have reproduced standard survey measurements in much the
same way as other datasets, this might also reflect the limitations of surveys as a research
method, as the ‘other’ option yielded very few responses anyway. Instead, these missing
forms of participation might be worth adding to the list of options for similar indexes in
future research so that their aptitude can be tested.
Elsewhere, the survey used aggregated variables to measure the ‘campus effect’ i.e. the
extent to which coming to university increased students’ political participation. Causality can
be difficult to measure in surveys without multiple points of data collection, or depending on
respondent memory. The latter formed the basis of the aggregated variable to test the campus
effect, but like the general participation index it drew from a fixed list of group/movement
activities. Of course, there is no way of knowing whether the inclusion of different activities
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would have significantly altered findings, but results produce similar ‘campus effects’ as
Crossley’s (2008) comparative study.
Whilst the objectification of complex concepts via variable measurements is an inevitable
issue with survey research, interviews allowed for definitions to emerge more naturally
through semi-structured conversation. This, however, brings us to a third issue: despite the
richness of its data, interviews are restricted by breadth of sampling, and even though the
research project produced 56 interviews, certain voices and narratives were under-
represented. Perhaps the most significant issue was the failure to secure a broader sample of
university types. The limited returns at Roehampton meant that narrative accounts are
overwhelmingly dominated by students from large Russell Group universities with well-
funded unions. Consequently, chapters five and six – which make strongest use of these
narratives – are perhaps limited in their applicability to all UK campuses.
It was also found that within the campuses studied certain types of student were
underrepresented in the final interview sample. Given the gender-specific trends uncovered
in the survey, a notable issue is the lack of female high-cost/risk participants who had been
active prior to university. Similarly, the overall lack of non-EU international students also
limited opportunities to test possible network effects – notably their social disconnection
from home students – which might have provided barriers to their participation in the student
protests. This also points to the fourth and final methodological issue: that despite the
emphasis placed on network effects in providing paths and barriers to participation, the study
does not make use of social network analysis (SNA). For analysis of high-cost/risk
participants, this was not considered a significant limitation: on the one hand, interview data
hinted at similar activist networks at Cambridge, Edinburgh, UCL and Warwick to the one
uncovered using SNA by Crossley and Ibrahim (2012) at the University of Manchester, and
so its existence could be taken as a given. On the other hand, not collecting network data
arguably gave interviewees more freedom to speak freely and candidly about issues of
hierarchy, conflict and cliques. Seeking these reflections and detailed network information
about the participants involved might have created a conflict of interest for interviewees. Of
course, SNA might be better employed for testing some of the emerging themes and
concepts from this study in follow-up research, which is the focus of the next section.
Directions for future research
As noted above, this study has been shown to have its limitations, with some lines of
analysis arguably better-served through follow-up research. However, it is also hoped that
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the study has been responsible for introducing new issues and concepts – notably counter-
networks, dis-identification, and the ‘caring but not committed’ – which can be adapted and
applied to other participatory fields. There is also scope for follow-up studies which expound
on areas within the field of student activism that require further investigation. First, a study
of political participation at ‘post-1992’ universities would provide a valuable counterpoint to
the campuses focused on in this study’s qualitative work. Whilst research of this kind would
not necessarily coalesce around a specific case study, it would be useful to test the extent to
which activist networks comparable to those identified by Crossley and Ibrahim (2012) exist
on different types of campus.
Second, there is plenty of scope to study the new repertoires of political activism, including
in particular Web 2.0 ‘media making’ and online discussion. These repertoires were only
partly captured in this research project, and future research would perhaps benefit from
taking a web ethnographic approach in tandem with the sorts of interviews used for this
study. Third, perhaps the most significant ‘emerging theme’ from this study was that women
appeared to be less confident in expressing their political views than men. Given that plenty
of research has already been conducted on the subject of gender and social movements (e.g.
Taylor and Whittier, 1998; Kolářová, 2009) further research would perhaps benefit from
studying the level below: that is, students’ everyday conversations about politics. An area of
particular interest would be the study of female students who – like Anita – joined feminist
groups and societies only to stop attending meetings and events after a term. Moreover,
ethnographic research into general political groups and societies on campus would likely
benefit from being studied principally through a gender lens.
Fourth, research findings have often stressed the importance of ‘events’ for providing
grievances with an objective (media-amplified) reality, and students with multiple
participatory opportunities. To tease out the significance of this variable, it is perhaps worth
following Ibrahim’s (2010) lead and researching student campaigns outside of specific
collective action frames. This would be particularly useful for ascertaining the extent to
which mass-mobilisation is dependent on the media narratives to give campaigns traction
and validity. Of course, studying social movements requires researchers to be responsive to
emerging grievances and collective action frames: at the time of writing, student protests in
the UK under the moniker ‘Cops Off Campus’ have arguably displayed a radicalism to
suggest that the political and organisational legacy on the 2010/11 protests warrants follow-
up analysis in its own right. This brings us to the issue of the protests’ overall legacy, which
is the subject of the final discussion.
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3. The legacy of the student protests
I don’t think any of us expected to win [the fees vote] – I think we’d always seen
that this was something greater, and that all we could really do was be detonators
to wider society. I mean, the student movement blew apart any consensus that the
cuts were inevitable or necessary, and they played a very strong part of the
resistance. The Lib Dems’ electoral haemorrhaging I think stems directly and
irrevocably from the student movement. We were eleven [sic] votes away from
winning. So we had an absolutely massive impact, even if we didn’t win what we
wanted. (Gaz, UCL)
Ostensibly, the protests failed in their principal aim of preventing the Government from
raising the cap on tuition fees for students in England, and since 2012/13 undergraduates
have faced a future of up to £27,000 in debt repayments from fees alone. Given that higher
fees represented a ‘headline issue’ in autumn 2010, and was the core uniting grievance
among protest participants during this time, it is perhaps surprising that only around half of
survey respondents agreed that the protests had ‘failed in their aims’ (see figure 4.16). This
arguably chimes with Gaz’s claim that the legacy of the student protests should not be
judged purely on the outcome of the fees vote. Certainly, there is a literature in social
movement studies that seeks to broaden the analysis of movement outcomes beyond basic
policy goals to include forms of cultural, ethical and institutional change (Giugni, 1998). As
we saw in chapter two, the significance of student-led movements has often been found more
in long-term societal changes, such as the shifting of dominant norms and values. Whilst
wider societal effects might be difficult to gauge so soon after the protests took place, one
can at least consider their impact on higher education campaigns, student politics and social
movements in general.
To begin with the issue of higher education, one can reiterate Gaz’s argument that
pressurising Parliament into voting down the fees bill was always going to be a steep task for
students. Whilst the fees grievance drew widespread sympathy from students and the general
public, protest campaigns were faced with the Government’s all-encompassing austerity
mantra of ‘there is no alternative’, and even opponents to austerity politics were liable to
claim that student grievances were ‘low in the pain pecking order’ (e.g. Toynbee, 2010).
Protest, too, was only an indirect means of effecting change. In this context, the narrowness
of the bill’s passing is something of a testament to the pressure students exerted on MPs,
especially Liberal Democrats. Moreover, it has been argued by McGettigan (2013: 24)
among others that a desire to avoid repeating the scale and radicalism of the 2010/11 protests
was a likely factor in the Government’s decision in 2012 to shelve its Higher Education
White Paper.
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One can also claim that the protests drew significant attention to the Liberal Democrats’ u-
turn on tuition fees, causing substantial damage to the party’s image, especially among
young people. As Gaz alludes to, many commentators had cited this as a factor when the
party lost 695 seats in 2011’s local council elections (Daily Mail, 7 May 2011). However,
the protests’ legacy was arguably made most apparent in September 2012, when Nick Clegg
took the unusual step of personally apologising for the breaking his party’s pledge to oppose
increasing tuition fees (even if he did not apologise for backing the policy itself).
Of course, these indirect outcomes did not stop many activists and commentators from
making critical arguments about the 2010/11 protests from a campaigning perspective.
McGettigan (2013) pointed out that the protests’ primary focus on tuition fees and the
parliamentary vote was problematic, as this meant that comparatively little attention was
paid to the conditions of the repayment mechanism, as well as the Browne Review’s broader
recommendations for the marketisation of higher education. Gilbert (Gilbert and Aitchison,
2012) argued that the emphasis on fees reflected the fact that the movement was
‘overwhelmingly… by and for the children of the professional classes’ rather than those
students already faced with a reality of long-term debt repayment. Both Gilbert and
McGettigan were also critical of the way campaigns sometimes misleadingly gave the
impression that students would be expected to pay £27,000 fees up-front. As we saw in
chapter seven, lack of information was felt to be a problem for the ‘caring but not
committed’ who wished to make a policy-informed decision about fees, and also students
who questioned the motivations of campaigners’ presenting of government proposals in such
catastrophic terms.
At the same time, however, activists’ depiction of the fees issue primarily as a moral
grievance (Ibrahim, 2011) was arguably vital to the protests gaining as much support and
participation as they did. Not only did its simplicity make the issue easy for most students to
understand, it also functioned as an important hook for mobilising cohorts who were not
themselves affected by the increase. Moreover, the Government’s decision to hold a ‘snap’
vote necessitated a ‘snap’ response, with students given only seven weeks to digest the
recommendations of the Browne Review and build a UK-wide campaign. In this sense, the
fees grievance gave the autumn protests a clear sense of narrative: a common goal, a pre-set
timeframe, a sense of who ‘us’ and ‘them’ were, and the possibility of agency through
pressurising of MPs to vote down the bill – in other words, all the fundamental properties of
a ‘collective action frame’ (Klandermans, 1997). This frame was then amplified through the
media, which served to promote and legitimise the campaign’s goals to a wider audience. At
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the same time, however, the focus on fees arguably placed limitations on its capacity to
sustain the level of momentum it had created: once the bill passed, the media (and many
students) considered the campaign to have served its purpose, and subsequent protests
struggled to mobilise on the same scale as before.
With much emphasis placed on creating media spectacles, one can also argue that the student
protests generated a significant tactical and organisational legacy. A key aspect of this was
students’ use of direct action, evidenced by Millbank and the UK-wide network of campus
occupations in autumn 2010. For many activists, memories of the ‘million march’ against the
Iraq War in 2003 had served as a stark reminder to the limits of ‘peaceful’ mass-
participation, rendering more confrontational tactics necessary for breaking away from
seemingly-ineffectual standardised protest repertoires. Although direct action tactics and
anti-hierarchical forms of organisation were by no means new, the fact that they were
directed at Government, and were being practiced on a UK-wide scale, meant that they
succeeded in attracting new participants and reaching new audiences. Moreover, the power
of a coordinated UK-wide network of simultaneous protest events proved a key inspiration
for UK Uncut, the global Occupy Movement in 2011/12, and also Quebec’s student
movement in their 2012 campaigns against austerity politics (Palacios, 2013).
At the same time, students’ direct action tactics arguably spawned a more nefarious legacy,
namely the tactical and organisational responses from the police and university management.
Since autumn 2010, student protest has been subjected increasingly to extreme forms of
public order policing – from kettling to the pre-emptive arresting of activists – with many
activists claiming that such approaches have been more successful in provoking public order
situations than preventing them (Bastani, 2013; Power, 2012). Moreover, at certain
universities there have been instances where management has obtained injunctions to ban
demonstrations or occupations on campus (Independent, 15 December; Chakrabortty, 2013).
Given this context, it is perhaps unsurprising that the survey found 16 per cent of students
were supportive of the protests but had considered police tactics a deterrent to their own
participation. Interviews suggested mixed feelings over the extent of student culpability in
this deterrence: whilst students such as Rick lay blame firmly on police tactics, others (such
as Hayley and Laura) felt that radical student tactics were often responsible for provoking
these responses.
Of course, for high-cost/risk participants there was no question as to who they felt was
culpable in putting students off protest. Many had first-hand experience of some of the
violent confrontations between students and police during the London demonstrations, and
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had seen friends arrested or seriously injured as a result. For many of these students, these
experiences caused a realisation – in Andrew’s words – that they were now ‘in this for the
long haul’. Consequently, many of those core occupants and committed activists were
instrumental in trying to ensure that the protests’ legacy was one of sustained resistance
rather than slow decline. Like any long-term movement, though, students have had to
contend with the cyclical nature of protest (Tarrow, 1998; Ibrahim, 2010), as there is
invariably a limited supply of collective action frames to provide powerful mobilisation
opportunities, and in turn, create possibilities for flurries of tactical and organisational
innovation.
Given the scarcity of such collective action frames, one can argue that the upsurge in
participation was the protests’ main achievement, and arguably their most important legacy.
Not only did 22.3 per cent of students participate in the protests, 38.2 per cent of whom had
not been active prior to university (see figure 5.6). For hitherto-inactive students such as
Justine, Donna, Jeremy, and Danny, their participation had transformative effects, both
personally and for the people around them41. Of course, at present it remains to be seen
whether this transformation will create a ‘radical generation’ of political activists, or will
steer students towards certain career and lifestyle choices (cf. Sherkat and Blocker, 1997).
What can be claimed, however, is that the fees protests provided many of its participants
with a strong belief in the importance and meaningfulness of political participation. Much of
this owed to the multiple participatory opportunities provided by the fees collective action
frame, but also the openness of the activism networks they became part of. Through these
networks, students not only became more politically engaged and knowledgeable, they also
built affinities, loyalties and relations of trust which encouraged their further participation.
One can argue that maintaining the strength of these networks, whilst ensuring that they
remain open and available to new students and budding activists, is crucial for the future of
student activism in the UK. This is because, to quote Damon, ‘ideally, the networks never
stop’. The further the networks extend, the greater opportunities for mass mobilisation,
politicisation and participation.
41 Some students spoke of the residual politicising effects of their participation on friends and family
members, particularly younger siblings. This was recalled by Jeremy, for example: ‘I have friends
outside politics, but they end up being political, just through osmosis. Like, with my little sister,
suddenly it was like, ‘what do you want for Christmas?’ ‘I want some books on feminism’. ‘What?’’
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Final words
We’re going to be better people for this having happened. We’re not going to do
shit things with our lives, and maybe we’ll become teachers and social workers
and human rights lawyers… We’re not the Baader-Meinhoff gang. (Donna, UCL)
It is hoped that this study has made a valuable contribution to knowledge and understanding
of the 2010/11 student protests, the sociology of social movements, and contemporary paths
and barriers to political engagement and participation. In particular, one hopes that the
development of a more unified study of non-participation – hitherto undervalued in the social
sciences – will benefit from some of the narratives, analyses and concepts discussed in this
study. The protests, though short-lived, marked a significant moment in the fight-back
against austerity politics and the building of an anti-cuts movement. Moreover, for many of
students interviewed for this project, the protests created significant and unique personal
experiences: feelings of pride and solidarity, moments of anger and empowerment, and of
friendships made. And as indicated in Donna’s reflections, these experiences have generated
for many participants a desire to change the way they live their lives for the better. I hope
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Appendix A – Student survey questionnaire
1. How important were the following in your decision to study at your current
university?
(1) Very important; (2) Slightly important; (3) Neither important or unimportant; (4) Not
very important; (5) Not at all important
1.a. Improving career chances
1.b. An opportunity to meet new people
1.c. A chance to learn more about the world
1.d. I have a passion for the subject I am studying
1.e. An opportunity to become more socially and politically aware
1.f. A chance to discover a new town/region
1.g. An opportunity to have fun
2. What, in your opinion, is the purpose of university?
(1) Strongly agree; (2) Slightly agree; (3) Neither agree or disagree; (4) Slightly disagree;
(5) Strongly disagree
2.a. To prepare students for a career
2.b. To help students gain a clearer sense of what he or she is good at
2.c. To help students learn more about their personal interests and perspectives
2.d. To make students better citizens
2.e. To make students more free-thinking and independent
3. What sort of extra-curricular activities did you expect to participate in when you
started at your current university?
(1) Yes; (2) No; (3) Don’t know
3.a. Join societies
3.b. Take a part-time job
3.c. Become involved in student politics/councils
3.d. Make friends with people different to you
3.e. Become more politically aware/active
3.f. Take up an internship/voluntary work
4. Tick if you HAVE done any of the following since starting at your current university
(1) Yes; (2) No
4.a. Joined societies
4.b. Taken a part-time job
4.c. Become involved in student politics/councils
4.d. Made friends with people different to you
4.e. Become more politically aware/active
4.f. Taken up an internship/voluntary work
5. How active are you in the student societies you belong to? (If you belong to more
than one society, select the one you are most involved with)
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(1) I am involved with the society's organization and decision-making; (2) Regularly attend
meetings and events; (3) Occasionally attend meetings and events; (4) Passive, little
involvement;  (5) I do not belong to any student societies
6. Have you done any of the following activities relating to your student
union/guild/association?
(1) Yes; (2) No but might do in future; (3) No and not interested
6.a. Taken part in a student union-led campaign
6.b. Participated in a student union-led volunteer scheme
6.c. Voted in a student union meeting/assembly
6.d. Voted in student union elections
6.e. Stood as a candidate in student union elections
6.f. Campaigned on behalf of someone else standing in student union elections
7. How much of a say do you think students should have in influencing the following
issues related to their university? (tick all that apply)
(1) A right to vote on the outcome; (2) A right to be consulted; (3) A right to campaign on
the issue; (4) Students don’t need to get involved with this; (5) Don’t know
7.a. The selection of university chancellor
7.b. Financial investments undertaken by the university
7.c. University stance on Government Higher Education policy
7.d. Provision of student facilities i.e. Halls of Residence, Common rooms etc.
8. To what extent do you feel that your university student union represents your
interests?
(1) A lot; (2) A little; (3) Not very much; (4) Not at all; (5) Don’t know
9. To what extent do you feel that the National Union of Students (NUS) represents
student interests in wider society?
(1) A lot; (2) A little; (3) Not very much; (4) Not at all; (5) Don’t know
10. To what extent do you agree with this statement? 'Everyone would benefit from a
university education'
(1) Strongly agree; (2) Slightly agree; (3) Neither agree or disagree; (4) Slightly disagree;
(5) Strongly disagree
11. How much did the cost of fees/subsistence come into your thinking when deciding
whether to go to university or not?
(1) A lot; (2) A little; (3) Not very much; (4) Not at all
12. To what extent do you agree with the following statements about recent changes to
the funding of Higher Education in the UK?
(1) Strongly agree; (2) Slightly agree; (3) Neither agree or disagree; (4) Slightly disagree;
(5) Strongly disagree
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12.a. Access to an affordable university education is a right, not a privilege
12.b. I feel let down by the Liberal Democrats over their reversal of tuition fees policy
12.c. Politicians don't care about the interests of young people
12.d. Parties should always be held accountable for their election pledges once they become
part of government
12.e. I am concerned that higher fees will put some strong candidates off applying for
university altogether
12.f. Maintaining higher education funding is not a priority when public service cuts have to
be made
12.g. Higher Education funding should be maintained through higher taxes
12.h. Taxpayers who did not go through higher education should not be expected to pay for
the higher education of others
13. Are you aware of any recent/ongoing cases of cuts being made at your own
university? (e.g. course or departmental closures, staff redundancies etc)
(1) Yes; (2) No; (3) Don’t know
14. At the time when you were growing up, how often was politics discussed at home?
(1) Regularly; (2) Fairly often; (3) Sometimes; (4) Rarely; (5) Never; (6) Don’t know
15. How politically active were your parents/guardians when you were growing up?
(1) Very active; (2) Fairly active; (3) Not very active; (4) Not at all active; (5) Don’t know
16. How often do you discuss politics?
(1) Regularly; (2) Fairly often; (3) Sometimes; (4) Rarely; (5) Never
17. Do you use any of the following to access news and information about political
issues?
(1) Regularly; (2) Fairly often; (3) Sometimes; (4) Rarely; (5) Never
17.a. Television
17.b. Newspapers (print and online)
17.c. Alternative news websites
17.d. Independent blogs
17.e. Social networking sites (Facebook, Twitter etc.)
17.f. Emails/newsletters etc from a group that you belong to
18. With which political party, if any, do you most closely identify right now?
Open dialogue box
19. Did you vote in the 2010 UK general election?
(1) Yes; (2) No; (3) Prefer not to say; (4) Was ineligible to vote
19.a. If you answered 'yes', who did you vote for? (Optional)
Open dialogue box
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20. Please indicate, in general, how much you trust each of the following:
(1) Strongly trust; (2) Quite trust; (3) Neither trust or distrust; (4) Slightly distrust; (5)
Strongly distrust; (6) Not applicable
20.a. UK Government
20.b. Scottish Government (if applicable)
20.c. Welsh Assembly (if applicable)





21. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
(1) Strongly agree; (2) Slightly agree; (3) Neither agree or disagree; (4) Slightly disagree;
(5) Strongly disagree
21.a. Most politicians make a lot of promises but do not actually do anything
21.b. I don't see the use of voting, parties do whatever they want anyway
21.c. My participation can have an impact on government policy in this country
21.d. Organized groups of citizens can have a lot of impact on public policies in this country
21.e. If a person is dissatisfied with the policies of the Government, he/she has a duty to do
something about it
21.f. I often feel that I don't know enough about politics to fully engage in it
21.g. I'm usually too busy with other commitments to engage in politics
22. It has sometimes been argued that democracy in the UK needs to be reformed to
allow for greater voice from its citizens. What is your view of the following?
(1) Strongly agree; (2) Slightly agree; (3) Neither agree or disagree; (4) Slightly disagree;
(5) Strongly disagree
22.a. Democracy in the UK would be improved by having more referenda on major issues of
public interest
22.b. Democracy in the UK would be improved if a system of Proportional Representation
was introduced for general elections
22.c. True democracy in the UK is only possible through the abolition of parliament and the
creation of a new system of direct democracy
22.d. I see no problem with the current democratic system in the UK
22.e. Democracy in the UK already gives people too much of a say on political issues
23. Please tick if you have done any of the following political activities in the last three
years (select all that apply)
(1) Yes, I have done this more than once; (2) Yes, I did this once; (3) I have not done this
23.a. Signed a petition
23.b. Boycotted certain products and services for political, ethical or environmental reasons
23.c. Bought certain products and services for political, ethical or environmental reasons
23.d. Worn or displayed a campaign badge or sticker
23.e. Presented my views to a local councillor or MP
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23.f. Been a member of a social movement organization (e.g. Amnesty International,
Greenpeace)
23.g. Worked or campaigned on behalf of a political party
23.h. Stood as a candidate for school/student/local elections
23.i. Distributed flyers for a political campaign
23.j. Taken part in a protest march
23.k. Taken part in strike action
23.l. Taken part in an occupation/sit-in
23.m. Taken part in the blockade of a building or meeting
24. How effective a form of political participation do you think are each of these
activities?
(1) Very effective; (2) Somewhat effective; (3) Not very effective; (4) Not at all effective; (5)
Not sure
24.a. Voting in elections
24.b. Petitions
24.c. Consumer boycotts of products and services
24.d. Contacting an MP
24.e. Joining/financially supporting a social movement organization (e.g. Amnesty
International, Greenpeace)
24.f. Joining or forming a civic association (e.g. Fathers 4 Justice)
24.g. Protest marches
24.h. Strike action
24.i. 'Direct action' protest (e.g. occupations, sit-ins, blockades)
25. People might choose to protest for a variety of different reasons. What sort of
impact do you think protest can have?
(1) Strongly agree; (2) Slightly agree; (3) Neither agree or disagree; (4) Slightly disagree;
(5) Strongly disagree
25.a. Protest can positively influence the views and interests of the wider population
25.b. Protest can increase the wider population's knowledge and awareness of an issue
25.c. Protest can help change UK Government policy
25.d. Protest can help change the policy of corporations
25.e. Protest can gain the support of the mainstream media
25.f. Protest can strengthen the ideals and values of the people involved
25.g. Protest does not make a difference
26. To what extent do you agree with the following statements about protest?
(1) Strongly agree; (2) Slightly agree; (3) Neither agree or disagree; (4) Slightly disagree;
(5) Strongly disagree
26.a. Protest is an essential form of political engagement
26.b. Protest is the last meaningful form of political engagement available in the UK
26.c. Protest can only be effective if it involves taking power by force
26.d. Protest is a legitimate form of political expression, but only when campaigning on
more important issues like civil rights
26.e. There are always better ways of making your views heard than by protesting
26.f. Protest is not a legitimate form of political participation
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26.g. Protest suffers because the actions of a minority usually spoil it for the majority
26.h. Protest has never had the power to change things
27. Please tick if you have been involved in any campaigns and protests relating to the
following issues (select all that apply)
(1) Yes, before I became a student; (2) Yes, since I have become a student; (3) No, Never
27.a. Human rights/global justice
27.b. The environment
27.c. Anti-racism/ethnic discrimination
27.d. Gender rights and sexual politics
27.e. Anti-war campaigns
27.f. Anti-capitalism/neoliberalism
27.g. Campaigns against cuts to the public sector in the UK
27.h. Other
28. Please tick if you have been involved in any of the following campaign
groups/networks
(1) Yes; (2) No
28.a. Climate Camp
28.b. People & Planet
28.c. UK Uncut
28.d. Free Gaza campaign
29. Have you been invited to participate in the student protests against fees by any of
the following?
(1) Yes; (2) No; (3) Don’t remember
29.a. Student union
29.b. Course colleagues
29.c. Friends from your university
29.d. Friends from other universities
29.e. Facebook group/event invitation
30. How many people (other than yourself) do you know personally who have
participated in the student protests against fees at YOUR university?
(1) 5 or more people; (2) 2-4 people, (3) One person; (4) Nobody
30.a. What about at OTHER universities excluding your own?
(1) 5 or more people; (2) 2-4 people, (3) One person; (4) Nobody
31. Have you participated in any way in the student protests against fees?
(1) Yes; (2) No
32. If you clicked 'YES' to the last question, please tick if your participation in the
student protests involved any of the following activities. (If you clicked 'NO', skip this
and go straight to Q36).
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(1) I have done this more than once; (2) I did this once; (3) I did not do this; (4) Did not
participate
32.a. Signing a petition
32.b. Wearing or displaying a campaign badge or sticker
32.c. Distributing flyers
32.d. Attending a national/regional level student march
32.e. Attending a student march in your own/nearest town or city
32.f. Taking part in the blockade of a building or meeting
32.g. Taking part in an occupation/sit-in
32.h. Taking part in the organizing of a protest event
32.i. Attending a student-led teach-in or activism workshop
32.j. Attending a university or union-arranged debate or meeting about student fees
32.k. Like/join a protest page/group on Facebook
32.l. Follow a protest group on Twitter
32.m. Other
33. If you ticked 'other' in the last question, please explain what sort of activity you are
referring to
Open dialogue box
34. If you HAVE taken part in the protests, how much do the following statements
capture your reasons for protesting?
(1) Strongly agree; (2) Slightly agree; (3) Neither agree or disagree; (4) Slightly disagree;
(5) Strongly disagree; (6) Did not answer; (7) Did not participate
34.a. I want to express my views
34.b. We must pressure politicians into making things change
34.c. We must raise public awareness
34.d. I protest to express my solidarity with fellow students
34.e. Friends and people I respected were also getting involved
34.f. Students need to pressurize universities into publically opposing higher fees
34.g. It is important that students are an active part of the wider anti-cuts movement
35. If you HAVE taken part in the protests, to what extent do you agree with the
following statements?
(1) Strongly agree; (2) Slightly agree; (3) Neither agree or disagree; (4) Slightly disagree;
(5) Strongly disagree; (6) Did not answer; (7) Did not participate
35.a. It felt good to do something about an issue important to me
35.b. My involvement has made me more politically knowledgeable
35.c. My involvement has led to me making new friends
35.d. Overall, I enjoyed getting involved in the student protests
35.e. I am proud to be part of a UK-wide student movement
35.f. My involvement has made me feel very positive about the power of protest
35.g. I wish I had expressed my views on the student fees issue in a different way
35.h. I now regret getting involved in the student protests
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36. If you have NOT participated in the student protests, do you broadly support
students' campaigns and protests on this issue? (If you HAVE participated, skip this
and go straight to Q38)
(1) Yes; (2) No; (3) Undecided
37. If you have NOT participated in the student protests, to what extent do you agree
with the following statements?
(1) Strongly agree; (2) Slightly agree; (3) Neither agree or disagree; (4) Slightly disagree;
(5) Strongly disagree
37.a. The student fees issue is not important enough to me to protest
37.b. I feel that I do not know enough about the student fees issue to make an informed
decision
37.c. I was undecided about how good or bad the Government's proposals were
37.d. I support the Government's changes to Higher Education funding
37.e. I was too busy with academic work to participate
37.f. I didn't participate because the fees and funding issue does not personally affect me
37.g. Personal commitments (job, family etc) prevent me from participating in the protests
37.h. I am concerned about clashing with police and/or getting arrested during student
protest marches
37.i. I do not approve of the protest tactics used by students
37.j. I do not personally identify with or feel comfortable around the people involved in the
protests
37.k. My involvement wouldn't have made any difference
37.l. It is right to protest against public sector cuts, but wrong to prioritise the student cause
37.m. The student protests were not radical enough
38. This question is for all respondents. To what extent do you agree with the following
statements?
(1) Strongly agree; (2) Slightly agree; (3) Neither agree or disagree; (4) Slightly disagree;
(5) Strongly disagree (6) Don’t know
38.a. The tuition fees issue has made me more politically engaged
38.b. The student protests have made me more politically engaged
38.c. The student fees and anti-cuts protests will make the Government pay more attention to
the views of its citizens in the future
38.d. The student protests have failed in their aims
38.e. The student protests will be remembered more for violence than politics
38.f. The student protests have made me more prepared to protest on issues important to me
in the future
38.g. I am definitely going to vote in the next general election
38.h. The Government and police force have made protest appear an illegitimate and deviant
act




(1) Male; (2) Female; (3) Prefer not to say
41. When you are not studying at university, in which country do you normally reside?
Open dialogue box
42. Which university do you currently attend?
(1) Aberystwyth University; (2) Birmingham City University; (3) Brunel University; (4)
Cardiff University; (5) Newcastle University; (6) Nottingham Trent University; (7) Plymouth
University (8) Queen Margaret University; (9) Swansea University; (10) University College
London; (11) University of Abertay; (12) University of Cambridge; (13) University of
Derby; (14) University of Edinburgh (15) University of Leeds; (16) University of Liverpool;
(17) University of Nottingham; (18) University of Roehampton; (19) University of Sussex;
(20) University of the West of England (21) University of Warwick; (22) University of York
43. Are you currently studying as an...
(1) Undergraduate; (2) Postgraduate
44. What is your current year of study?
(1) First year; (2) Second year; (3) Third year; (4) Fourth year; (5) Fifth year or more
45. What degree and subject are you currently studying for?
Open dialogue box
46. If you had to choose which social class group you belonged to, which would it be?
(1) Upper class; (2) Upper middle class; (3) Lower middle class; (4) Working class; (5)
None
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Appendix B – Email templates to staff and students
Subject: PhD research – survey
Dear [staff name],
I wonder if you could help me. I am a PhD student at the University of Edinburgh, and I'm
interested in student attitudes towards political engagement opportunities, and their
participation/non-participation in the recent student protests. A significant part of the
research will be quantitative and I am hoping to distribute my survey to current
undergraduates and postgraduates studying in the UK.
[Institution name] is part of my survey sample, and I was wondering if you might be able to
help me by forwarding the survey to current students in the [school/department/college]. The
survey is online, so would only require you to forward to students an email, which I will
send you shortly.
Any help you may be able to offer with this would be fantastic, and much appreciated.
Please also feel free to get in touch with me if you have any further questions - further details
can be found in my research page:
http://www.sociology.ed.ac.uk/research_students/alexander_hensby. If
necessary, I am happy to forward you copies of my ethical approval certificates. You can
also contact my supervisor, Dr Michael Rosie (mrosie@staffmail.ed.ac.uk), senior lecturer in
Sociology at the
University of Edinburgh, if you have any other queries about my research.
Many thanks for your time.
Alex
Alexander Hensby







Subject: Student online survey - win book tokens worth £50
Dear student,
I am writing to invite you to participate in a survey about your experiences as a student at the
University of Sussex, with   particular regard to fees and funding. All students are
encouraged to take part – I am interested in all of your views and experiences, so your co-
operation would be extremely appreciated. All respondents who include their email address
at the end of the survey will be automatically entered into a prize draw for the chance to win
£50 worth of book tokens.
The survey is an online questionnaire and you should take no more than 20 minutes to
complete. All responses will be kept strictly confidential. To take part in this survey, please
click on the survey link below:
https://www.survey.ed.ac.uk/student
Please note that when completing the survey, it is not possible to return to a page once you
click 'continue', so think carefully before recording your answers.
This survey is part of a PhD research study on student political participation, of which
further details can be found at my webpage at
http://www.sociology.ed.ac.uk/research_students/alexander_hensby.
If you would also be willing to be interviewed as part of this research, please contact me at
the above email address.
Many thanks for your time
Alex
Alexander Hensby







Appendix C – list of student interview names
University Name* Sex Degree/status Participated in
protests
Cambridge Andrew Male English UG; union officer Yes
(12) Angie Female English UG Yes
Bruce Male Geography UG Yes
Eric** Male History PG Yes
Marianne Female Sociology PG Yes
Mick Male Biology UG Yes
Anita Female Theology UG No
Anoushka** Female History PG No
Cynthia Female Theology PG No
Charlie Male Sociology PG No
Keith Male Politics PG No
Pattie Female Geography UG No
Edinburgh Bekka Female Anthropology UG Yes
(11) Danny** Male Economics UG; union officer Yes
Jeremy** Male Physics UG Yes
John** Male Spanish & Politics UG; union officer Yes
Lindsey** Male Philosophy G, former union officer Yes
Peter** Male Politics UG; union officer Yes
Rhiannon** Female Politics UG; union officer Yes
Sara Female Arabic & Politics UG Yes
Stevie Female Sociology UG Yes
Christine Female Art UG No
Rick Male History & Sociology UG No
Warwick Billy** Male Politics UG Yes
(11) Gloria Female Sociology PG Yes
Lauryn Female Sociology UG Yes
Raphael** Male Economics UG; union officer Yes
Ronnie** Male Physics PG Yes
Spike** Male Politics PG Yes
Tina Female Sociology PG Yes
Yvonne Female Sociology UG Yes
Dennis Male Economics UG No
Lawrence Male Maths & Economics UG No
Sharon Female Economics UG No
UCL Annie Female English UG Yes
(9) Brett** Male Politics PG Yes
Damon** Male History UG; union officer Yes
Donna** Female English UG Yes
Gaz** Male Architecture UG Yes
Graham** Male Geography PG Yes
Justine** Female English UG Yes
Louise Female English PG No
Sonya Female English UG No
Leeds Heather Female Biology UG Yes
(7) Sean** Male Criminology PG Yes
Stella Female Neuroscience UG Yes
Zak** Male Cultural Studies PG Yes
Jason Male Biology UG No
Julian Male Politics UG No
Mary Female Politics PG No
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Roehampton Hayley Female Anthropology UG Yes
(6) Kieron Male Journalism UG Yes
Laura Female Human Rights UG Yes
Natasha Female Sociology & Criminology UG Yes
Paul** Male Computing UG Yes
Amy Female Journalism UG No
*All interviewee names have been changed. **Denotes student recruited via purposive sampling, snowball
sampling or gatekeeper.
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Appendix D – Student interview information sheets and consent
forms
INTERVIEW INFORMATION SHEET
Alexander Hensby, School of Social and Political Science, University of Edinburgh
March 2012
What is the purpose of the study?
This research project uses the 2010/11 student protests in the UK as a case study for
understanding contemporary expressions of political participation. According to survey
data, young people are frequently found to be the least politically active among age
ranges: this research seeks to reassess this view by suggesting that we might instead
require new indicators that capture the changing way that young people engage with and
participate in politics, indicators that pay greater attention to repertoires of protest and
activism. The recent and ongoing student protests against increased tuition fees and the
funding of Higher Education functions as a useful case study from which young people’s
attitudes towards political engagement can be explored, and a greater understanding of
contemporary forms of political participation can be learned. It also allows us to analyse
the significance of political protest as a form of participation in the UK today.
The study involves an online survey of students from 20 universities across the UK, and
follow-up interviews with students from five different campuses.
Reasons for interviewing students
Interview candidates have been recruited either via participation in the online survey, or
through communication with local student occupations and campaigning groups. All
participants are encouraged to discuss their attitudes towards and experiences of
different forms of participation and protest, including (if applicable) the student protests.
Interview candidates recruited from the survey will have the opportunity to clarify or
elaborate on responses given in the survey. Interviewees who participated in the student
protests, and contributed to specific student campaigns will also have the opportunity to
detail their involvement and reflect on their experiences.
Ethics and confidentiality
Research will be conducted in compliance with ethical guidelines of the British Sociological
Association. All interview transcript data will be carefully anonymised. Participants’ identity
is treated as confidential and no real names will be used in any publication. Publication of
organization-specific findings may require permission. Data will be kept securely:
transcripts held by the researcher and responses to the online survey will be accessible only
to the researcher. In the event that acts of violence to others are divulged by interviewees
during the course of the research, information will be passed on to the police.
This study is funded by the ESRC (Economic and Social Research Council) which encourages
award holders to share their data for archiving and re-use by other researchers – interview
data will be supplied only with the permission of the interview participant. In all cases,
interview data will be anonymised so that no participant can be identified.
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Political Participation and Contemporary Protest –
Analysing the 2010/11 Student ‘Winter of Discontent’
and beyond
Interview Consent Form
Please read this form together with the Interview Information Sheet, initial each box and
sign and date at the bottom where indicated.
I agree to take part in this study as described in the Interview Information Sheet, dated
March 2012.  I confirm that I have read and understood this information, and have had the
opportunity to ask any questions and to have these answered satisfactorily.  The nature and
purpose of this study has been explained to me, and I understand what will be required if I
take part.
I understand that if I decide at any time during the research that I no longer wish to
participate, I can notify the researcher and withdraw from it immediately without giving a
reason. Furthermore, I understand that I will be able to withdraw my interview data up to
the point of publication (July 2013).
I consent to this interview being recorded. I consent to the processing of my personal
information for the purposes explained to me.  I understand that such information will be
treated in accordance with the terms of the Data Protection Act 1998.
I understand that the audio recording will only be accessed by the research
interviewer/transcriber.  I understand that the audio file will be deleted upon conclusion of
this study, and that any quotations used in publications will be anonymised.
I understand that in the unlikely event that any of the information I give is considered to
put others at risk, I would be informed of this, the interview would be terminated and that
particular item of information would be reported to an appropriate person.
Name of participant (BLOCK CAPITALS)
______________________________________________
Signed _____________________________________________ Date _______
Name of researcher taking consent (BLOCK CAPITALS)
______________________________________________
Signed _____________________________________________ Date _______
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USE, RETENTION AND REUSE OF PARTICIPANT CONTRIBUTIONS FORM
STUDY TITLE
Political Participation and Contemporary Protest – Analysing the
2010/11 Student ‘Winter of Discontent’ and beyond




1. ARCHIVING AND SUBSEQUENT USE
This study is funded by the ESRC (Economic and Social Research Council) which
encourages award holders to share their data for archiving and re-use by other
researchers. Any data supplied by the project researcher for this purpose will first
be carefully anonymised so that no participant can be identified (i.e. names and
other identifying references are removed from transcripts). However, you are under
no obligation to share your data in this way. It will only happen with your explicit
consent. [Please tick which statement applies]:
I agree to my anonymised transcript being archived in a public repository for use
by other researchers.
I do not agree to my anonymised transcript being archived in a public repository































































































1 University Campus Suffolk East 2007 Dual city campus 3960 106 2.68 No No
2 University of Bedfordshire East 2006 Dual city campus 23800 444 1.87 No No
3 University of Cambridge East 1209 Multi-site city 18000 362 2.01 Yes Yes Yes
4 University of East Anglia East 1963 Single campus 19600 320 1.63 Yes Yes
5 Anglia Ruskin University East 1992 Dual city campus 20000 150 0.75 Yes No
6 De Montfort University, Leicester East Mids 1992 Dual campus 21200 197 0.93 Yes No Yes
7 Loughborough University East Mids 1966 Single campus 18200 100 0.55 Yes No
8 Nottingham Trent University East Mids 1992 Multi-campus 24200 250 1.03 Yes No
9 University of Derby East Mids 1992 Multi-site city 25000 180 0.72 No No
10 University of Leicester East Mids 1957 Multi-site city 15000 290 1.93 Yes No Yes
11 University of Lincoln East Mids 1992 Dual city campus 16700 325 1.95 Yes Yes Yes
12 University of Northampton East Mids 2005 Dual campus 10600 500 4.72 No No No
13 University of Nottingham East Mids 1948 Multi-site city 40000 250 0.63 Yes Yes Yes
14 Birkbeck College Gtr London 1920 Multi-site city 19000 50 0.26 Yes Yes Yes
15 Brunel University Gtr London 1966 Multi-campus 15500 100 0.65 Yes No
16 City University London Gtr London 1966 Multi-site city 21400 100 0.47 Yes No
17 Goldsmiths College Gtr London 1904 Multi-site city 7600 50 0.66 Yes Yes Yes
18 King's College, London Gtr London 1829 Multi-site city 18600 100 0.54 Yes Yes No
19 Kingston University Gtr London 1992 Dual campus 23100 40 0.17 Yes Yes
20 London Metropolitan University Gtr London 2002 Dual campus 28500 130 0.46 Yes Yes Yes
21 London School of Economics Gtr London 1895 Multi-site city 9000 500 5.56 Yes Yes Yes
22 London Southbank University Gtr London 1992 Multi-site city 24700 80 0.32 Yes Yes No
23 Middlesex University Gtr London 1992 Multi-site city 23200 200 0.86 Yes Yes Yes
24 Queen Mary, University of London Gtr London 1915 Multi-campus 16000 100 0.63 Yes No No
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25 Royal Holloway, University of London Gtr London 1985 Single campus 8000 50 0.63 Yes Yes Yes
26 SOAS Gtr London 1916 Dual campus 4500 100 2.22 Yes Yes Yes
27 St George's, University of London Gtr London 1836 Single site 3000 50 1.67 No No
28 St Mary's University College Gtr London 2007 Multi-site city 3600 50 1.39 No No
29 University College London Gtr London 1826 Multi-site city 21500 1000 4.65 Yes Yes Yes
30 University of East London Gtr London 1992 Dual campus 26300 Yes Yes Yes
31 University of Greenwich Gtr London 1992 Multi location 24900 50 0.20 Yes Yes Yes
32 University of Roehampton Gtr London 1992 Dual campus 8500 200 2.35 Yes Yes Yes
33 University of West London Gtr London 1992 Multi location 47400 60 0.13 No No
34 University of Westminster Gtr London 1838 Multi-campus 24700 50 0.20 Yes No Yes
35 Queen's University, Belfast N Ireland 1849 Multi-site city 24600 yes Yes Yes Yes
36 University of Ulster N Ireland 1968 Multi location 27600 yes (SU) Yes No Yes
37 Durham University North east 1832 Dual campus 15500 40 0.26 Yes No Yes
38 Leeds Metropolitan University North east 1992 Multi-campus 41200 150 0.36 Yes Yes No
39 Leeds Trinity University College North east 2009 Single campus 2500 25 1.00 Yes Yes Yes
40 Newcastle University North east 1963 Single campus 19700 220 1.12 Yes Yes Yes
41 Sheffield Hallam University North east 1992 Dual campus 33800 284 0.84 Yes No
42 Teesside University North east 1992 Single campus 29300 126 0.43 Yes No
43 University of Bradford North east 1966 Multi-campus 13600 591 4.35 Yes Yes No
44 University of Huddersfield North east 1992 Multi location 19700 150 0.76 Yes No
45 University of Hull North east 1927 Multi location 22300 200 0.90 Yes Yes Yes
46 University of Leeds North east 1904 Multi-site city 33500 402 1.20 Yes Yes Yes
47 University of Northumbria North east 1992 Dual campus 30000 227 0.76 Yes No
48 University of Sheffield North east 1905 Multi-site city 25700 500 1.95 Yes Yes Yes
49 University of Sunderland North east 1992 Dual campus 20300 98 0.48 Yes No No
50 University of York North east 1963 Single campus 13500 336 2.49 Yes Yes Yes
51 York St Johns University North east 2006 Single campus 5600 63 1.13 Yes No
52 Edge Hill University North west 2006 Multi location 18700 62 0.33 No No
53 Lancaster University North west 1964 Single campus 12000 250 2.08 Yes No Yes
54 Liverpool Hope University North west 2005 Dual campus 7900 50 0.63 Yes No
55 Liverpool John Moores University North west 1992 Multi-campus 24400 80 0.33 Yes No
56 Manchester Metropolitan University North west 1992 Multi location 33500 60 0.18 Yes Yes Yes
57 University of Bolton North west 2004 Single campus 9000 60 0.67 No No
58 University of Central Lancashire North west 1992 Multi location 35000 200 0.57 Yes No No
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59 University of Chester North west 2005 Dual campus 15700 100 0.64 Yes No
60 University of Cumbria North west 2007 Multi location 13000 130 1.00 No No
61 University of Liverpool North west 1903 Single campus 20600 100 0.49 Yes Yes
62 University of Manchester North west 1824 Multi-site city 39000 200 0.51 Yes Yes No
63 University of Salford North west 1967 Single campus 20000 300 1.50 Yes No
64 Edinburgh Napier University Scotland 1992 Multi-campus 17600 0 Yes No Yes
65 Glasgow Caledonian University Scotland 1993 Single campus 17000 Yes Yes No Yes
66 Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh Scotland 1966 Multi-campus 10200 0 Yes No
67 Queen Margaret University Scotland 2007 Single campus 5400 0 Yes No
68 Robert Gordon University Scotland 1992 Dual campus 9900 0 No No
69 University of Aberdeen Scotland 1495 Multi-site city 13400 0 Yes Yes Yes
70 University of Abertay Dundee Scotland 1994 Single campus 4100 50 1.22 Yes No
71 University of Dundee Scotland 1967 Multi-site city 18600 0 Yes No
72 University of Edinburgh Scotland 1583 Multi-site city 28400 250 0.88 Yes Yes Yes
73 University of Glasgow Scotland 1451 Multi-site city 23600 buses Yes Yes Yes
74 University of St Andrews Scotland 1410 Multi-site city 8640 buses Yes Yes No
75 University of Stirling Scotland 1967 Single campus 11500 0 Yes No
76 University of Strathclyde Scotland 1964 Dual campus 26000 100 0.38 Yes Yes Yes
77 University of the Highlands & Islands Scotland 2011 Multi location 5200 49 0.94 Yes No Yes
78 University of the West of Scotland Scotland 2007 Multi location 13000 0 Yes No
79 University of Kent South East 1965 Single campus 18000 310 1.72 Yes Yes Yes
80 University of Oxford South East 1096 Multi-site city 20300 300 1.48 Yes Yes Yes
81 University of Surrey South East 1966 Dual campus 15700 200 1.27 Yes No
82 Buckinghamshire New University South East 2007 Dual city campus 9000 500 5.56 Yes No
83 Canterbury Christ Church University South East 2005 Multi location 18000 350 1.94 Yes No
84 Oxford Brookes University South East 1992 Multi-campus 19000 170 0.89 Yes No
85 Southampton Solent University South East 2004 Multi-site city 17500 87 0.50 Yes No
86 University of Brighton South East 1992 Multi location 21000 30 0.14 Yes Yes Yes
87 University of Chichester South East 2005 Multi location 4900 80 1.63 No No
88 University of Essex South East 1965 Multi location 11000 300 2.73 Yes Yes No
89 University of Hertfordshire South East 1992 Multi-campus 23700 50 0.21 Yes No
90 University of Portsmouth South East 1992 Dual campus 21800 500 2.29 Yes ? Yes
91 University of Reading South East 1892 Multi-campus 22800 600 2.63 Yes No
92 University of Southampton South East 1952 Multi-campus 24700 Yes No
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93 University of Sussex South East 1961 Single campus 12500 300 2.40 Yes Yes Yes
94 University of Winchester South East 2005 Dual campus 5900 200 3.389831 Yes No
95 Bath Spa University South West 2005 Multi-campus 7100 78 1.10 Yes Yes No
96 Bournemouth University South West 1992 Dual campus 17500 120 0.69 Yes No
97 University College Falmouth South West 2005 Dual campus 3500 123 3.51 Yes Yes No
98 University College Marjon, Plymouth South West 2007 Single campus 5000 70 1.40 Yes No
99 University of Bath South West 1966 Single campus 14000 150 1.07 Yes Yes Yes
100 University of Bristol South West 1909 Multi-site city 18000 73 0.41 Yes Yes No
101 University of Exeter South West 1955 Multi-campus 15700 227 1.45 Yes Yes Yes
102 University of Gloucestershire South West 2001 Multi location 8700 125 1.44 Yes No
103 University of Plymouth South West 1992 Multi location 30500 45 0.15 Yes Yes Yes
104 University of The West Of England South West 1992 Multi-campus 29000 150 0.52 Yes Yes Yes
105 Aberystwyth University Wales 1872 Dual campus 12200 200 1.64 Yes Yes Yes
106 Bangor University Wales 1884 Multi-site city 16600 200 1.20 Yes No
107 Cardiff University Wales 1883 Multi-site city 30900 150 0.49 Yes Yes No
108 Glyndŵr University Wales 2008 Dual campus 7400 50 0.68 No No
109 Swansea Metropolitan University Wales 1992 Dual campus 5800 150 2.59 Yes No
110 Swansea University Wales 1920 Single campus 18500 250 1.35 Yes No
111 University of Glamorgan Wales 1992 Multi location 21500 100 0.47 Yes No
112 University of Wales Institute, Cardiff Wales 1992 Multi-campus 12000 50 0.42 Yes No
113 University of Wales, Newport Wales 1841 Dual campus 9100 50 0.55 Yes No
114 University of Wales, Trinity St David Wales 2010 Dual campus 11140 95 0.85 Yes No
115 Aston University West Mids 1966 Single campus 9500 ? Yes No Yes
116 Birmingham City University West Mids 1992 Multi-campus 24800 294 1.19 Yes No
117 Coventry University West Mids 1992 Single campus 19500 245 1.26 Yes No
118 Keele University West Mids 1949 Single campus 8900 338 3.80 Yes No Yes
119 Newman University College West Mids 2007 Single campus 2600 280 10.77 Yes No
120 Staffordshire University West Mids 1992 Multi location 15200 267 1.76 Yes No
121 University of Birmingham West Mids 1900 Dual campus 26000 400 1.54 Yes Yes Yes
122 University of Warwick West Mids 1965 Multi-campus 18500 150 0.81 Yes Yes No
123 University of Wolverhampton West Mids 1992 Multi location 23500 204 0.87 Yes No
124 University of Worcester West Mids 2005 Multi-site city 9500 100 1.05 Yes No
